Opinion
Civil Action 2:23-cv-138-wks-kjd
02-28-2024
Michael J. Lewis, Plaintiff, v. Michael Lyon, Michaela Merrill, and Chantel Wood, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (DOC. 32)
Kevin J. Doyle, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Michael Lewis, proceeding pro se, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Michael Lyon, Michaela Merrill, and Chantel Wood in their individual capacities. (Doc. 8.) Lewis requests compensatory damages and injunctive relief based on Defendants' alleged violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights. (Doc. 24.) In a January 4, 2024 Report and Recommendation (R&R), the undersigned recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19) be granted with leave to amend the Complaint, and that Lewis's “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order Issued Ex Parte” (Doc. 24) be denied. (Doc. 33.)
Defendants are either current or former Vermont Department of Corrections (Vermont DOC) officials at Southern State Correctional Facility (SSCF). Defendant Lyon, now retired, is the former Superintendent of SSCF. See Vermont DOC Announces New Superintendent at Southern State Correctional Facility, VT. DEP'T OF CORR. (Dec. 14, 2023), https://doc.vermont.gov/press-release/vermont-doc-announces-new-superintendent-southern-state-correctional-facility. Defendant Merrill is the current Superintendent at SSCF. See id. According to the Complaint, Defendant Wood is a correctional officer at SSCF. (See generally Doc. 8.)
After filing the Complaint and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, and prior to the issuance of the R&R on the Motion to Dismiss, Lewis filed a second Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 32). This second request for injunctive relief is directed at Vermont DOC officials at Northern State Correctional Facility (NSCF), who Lewis alleges are unlawfully confiscating legal paperwork related to his efforts to obtain redress in various legal forums.
For the reasons stated below, I recommend that Lewis's second Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction be DENIED.
Background
On December 26, 2023, Lewis filed a “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Enjoining Confiscation of Legal Pleading[]s, Documentation Marked as Evidence, and Affidavits of Witnesses.” (Doc. 32.) It appears that Lewis seeks to enjoin Vermont DOC officials at NSCF from conducting cell searches, confiscating legal papers, destroying, losing, or misplacing any legal documentation belonging or reasonably appearing to belong to Lewis, and retaliating against him for his “expression of the [r]ight to [a]ccess the [c]ourt.” Lewis also appears to seek a mandatory injunction requiring the Vermont DOC to adopt a policy giving him “pre-deprivation notice” regarding the confiscation of his property. (Id. at 2-3.)
Lewis seeks to restrain “Defendant[]s, and it[]s officials, employees, agents, assigns, and all those working in concert with the Vermont [DOC].” (Id. at 1.) His request for injunctive relief appears to be based on alleged retaliatory conduct by two correctional officers at NSCF that are not parties to the pending action. Lewis alleges that, on December 11, 2023, Correctional Officers Terry Provencher and Colin Houle “conducted a ‘random' cell search (or shakedown) of [Lewis's] cell,” in which Correctional Officer Provencher allegedly confiscated “a ream” of Lewis's legal paperwork “to be used as evidence” in [Lewis's] civil rights action against Defendants Lyon, Merrill, and Wood. (Doc. 32-2 at 2-4.) Lewis alleges that Correctional Officer Provencher “was sent into [his] cell to confiscate documentation or was sent to gather intel on [p]apers or evidence [Lewis] intends to use against [D]efendant[]s or in support of [Lewis's] allegations. (Id. at 5-6, ¶ 13.) While Lewis does not identify the individual allegedly responsible for sending Correctional Officer Provencher to Lewis's cell, he appears to assert more generally that Defendants and “other VTDOC employees working for or in concert with [D]efendant[]s” are responsible for the above-described retaliatory conduct at NSCF. (Doc. 32-1 at 15.) Defendants have not responded to Lewis's Motion.
It is not clear why the State did not file a response to Lewis's second Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. Given that the R&R recommending dismissal of the Complaint was issued approximately nine days after Lewis filed the second request for injunctive relief, the State may have elected not to file a response until receipt of a ruling on the R&R. Nevertheless, the Court expects a response to a filed Motion. If a party does not intend to file a response within the required deadline, it should either advise the Court that no response will be filed or file a Motion requesting an extended response deadline. Notwithstanding the lack of response from the State, the Court has elected to address the second Motion for injunctive relief. Any party may object to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen days after service thereof, by filing with the Clerk of the Court and serving on the Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections that shall specifically identify those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); L.R. 72(c). Failure to timely file such objections “operates as a waiver of any further judicial review of the magistrate's decision.” Caidor v. Onondaga Cnty., 517 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Small v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989)).
Legal Standard
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “The factors considered in determining whether to issue a TRO are similar to those used in considering a motion for a preliminary injunction.” Oeschger v. GeneThera, Inc., 395 F.Supp.3d 345, 355 (D. Vt. 2019) (quoting Tarlinsky v. Pompeo, No. 3:19-CV-659 (VLB), 2019 WL 2231908, at *2 (D. Conn. May 23, 2019)).
However, when the moving party seeks a “mandatory preliminary injunction that alters the status quo by commanding some positive act,” the burden is even higher. Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 n.4 (2d Cir. 2010)). A mandatory preliminary injunction “should issue only upon a clear showing that the moving party is entitled to the relief requested, or where extreme or very serious damage will result from a denial of preliminary relief.” Id. (quoting Citigroup Global Mkts., 598 F.3d at 35 n.4); see also Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1995) (a plaintiff seeking a mandatory injunction must make a “clear” or “substantial” showing of a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim).
The district court has wide discretion in determining whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief. Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 511 (2d Cir. 2005). “In the prison context, a request for injunctive relief must always be viewed with great caution so as not to immerse the federal judiciary in the management of state prisons.” Fisher v. Goord, 981 F.Supp. 140, 167 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 84647 (1994)).
Analysis
Lewis's Motion should be denied because: (1) Lewis's request for injunctive relief as to the defendants named in the Complaint is moot based on his transfer from SSCF to NSCF; (2) the NSCF entities and individuals Lewis seeks to restrain are not Defendants in this action; and (3) the conduct he alleges justifies injunctive relief is not the conduct alleged in the Complaint.
I. Lewis's Motion should be dismissed because any injunctive relief Lewis seeks against Defendants is moot based on his transfer from SSCF to NSCF.
Lewis asks the Court to enjoin “Defendant[]s, and it[]s officials, employees, agents, assigns, and all those working in concert with the Vermont [DOC].” (Doc. 32 at 1.) To the extent that Lewis seeks to enjoin Lyon, Merrill, and Wood, who either work or have worked at SSCF, the request is moot because Lewis now resides at NSCF. See Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272 (2d. Cir. 2006) (explaining that “an inmate's transfer from a prison facility generally moots claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against officials of that facility”); see also Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 304 (2011) (noting that “[a] number of . . . suits seeking injunctive relief have been dismissed as moot because the plaintiff was transferred from the institution where the alleged violation took place prior to adjudication on the merits”). Therefore, Lewis's Motion should be denied to the extent it seeks injunctive relief against Defendants Lyon, Merrill, and Wood.
II. Lewis's Motion should be dismissed because the NSCF entities and individuals Lewis seeks to restrain are not Defendants in this action.
Lewis's requested relief would enjoin Vermont DOC officials at NSCF. Given that Vermont DOC officials at NCSF are not Defendants in this case, the Court lacks jurisdiction to enjoin their actions. In re Rationis Enters., Inc. of Panama, 261 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 2001) (“A court may not grant a final, or even an interlocutory, injunction over a party over whom it does not have personal jurisdiction.”); Lapierre v. Lavalley, 9:15-CV-1499(MAD/DJS), 2016 WL 4442799, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2016) (quoting In re Rationis Enters., Inc. of Panama, 261 F.3d at 270) (finding that a plaintiff could not seek injunctive relief over correctional staff at prison to which he had been transferred, as they were not defendants in the case, nor over staff at his former facility, because transfer mooted request for injunctive relief); Oliphant v. Villano, Civil No. 3:09cv862 (JBA), 2010 WL 5069879, at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. 3, 2010) (“[T]he Court lacks jurisdiction to enjoin the conduct of prison . . . correctional staff who are not defendants in this action.”). The Court lacks jurisdiction over non-party prison officials at NSCF. Although Plaintiff asserts that his request for a temporary restraining order would “enjoin Defendant[]s, and it[]s officials, employees, agents, assigns, and all those working in concert with the Vermont [DOC]” (Doc. 32 at 1), the Court has no jurisdiction over non-party officials at NSCF.
Further, injunctive relief is available against non-parties only under very limited circumstances, none of which are present here. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)(2) (providing that an order granting an injunction or restraining order binds only a nonparty who receives actual notice of the order and who is an “officer[], agent[], servant[], employee[], [or] attorney[]” of a party or “who [is] in active concert or participation with” a party or the officer, agent, servant, employee, or attorney of a party, to whom the injunction or restraining order applies); Sumpter v. Skiff, 260 Fed.Appx. 350, 351 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The district court did not exceed its allowable discretion in denying Sumpter's application for injunctive relief . . . [because] [t]he New York State Division of Parole . . ., to which Sumpter's motion was directed, was not named as a defendant in the underlying action and does not fall within any of the exceptions listed in Rule 65(d).”); Abrams v. Waters, Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-1659 (CSH), 2018 WL 1469057, at *6-7 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2018) (court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter permanent injunction against warden of correctional facility who was not defendant, had no involvement in underlying claims, and did not fit within limited group of individuals described in Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)(2) against whom injunctive relief may be ordered). A court generally cannot order relief as to non-parties other than in exceptional situations where non-parties are in active concert or participation with parties. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Cuomo, Civ. No. 9:17-CV-0892 (TJM/DJS), 2019 WL 2479611, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019) (“[C]ourts generally cannot order injunctive relief as to non-parties ....”).
Lewis's unsupported allegation that correctional officers at NSCF are “working for or in concert with [D]efendant[]s” is an insufficient basis for the Court to order injunctive relief as to the non-party correctional officers at NSCF. (Doc. 32-1 at 15.) There is no basis for the Court to find that Correctional Officers Provencher and Houle are in active concert with Defendants Lyon, Merrill, or Wood-all of whom are either currently or previously employed at SSCF.
Lewis also does not allege that Correctional Officers Provencher and Houle were involved in any of the alleged Eighth Amendment violations at SSCF. Accordingly, I recommend that Lewis's Motion be denied on the grounds that the Court cannot order injunctive relief against non-party correctional officers at NSCF.
III. Lewis's Motion should be dismissed because he does not adequately allege a relationship between the conduct giving rise to the Complaint and the injunctive relief he seeks.
A court generally cannot order relief as to issues that do not give rise to the complaint. See Palmer v. Seidman, No. 9:16-CV-0027 (GLS/TWD), 2016 WL 270864, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan 22, 2016). “To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party must establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion and the conduct giving rise to the complaint.” Vega v. Lantz, No. 3:04CV1215(DFM), 2006 WL 2642416, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 14, 2006); see also Taylor v. Rowland, No. 3:02CV229(DJS)(TPS), 2004 WL 231453, at *3 (D. Conn. Feb. 2, 2004) (concluding that a motion for preliminary injunctive relief was not proper because it was “unrelated to the issues in the amended complaint”); Lewis v. Johnston, No. 9:08-CV-482 (TJM)(ATB), 2010 WL 1268024, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2010) (denying motion for injunctive relief based upon actions taken by staff at Great Meadow Correctional Facility in 2010, where the complaint alleged wrongdoing that occurred at Franklin and Upstate Correctional Facilities in 2006 and 2007).
Lewis's Complaint alleges deliberate indifference and retaliation by prison officials at SSCF. (See generally Doc. 19.) Lewis's request for injunctive relief, however, alleges retaliation through unlawful cell searches and property confiscation by prison officials at NSCF. (See Doc. 32 at 1; Doc. 32-2 at 3-5.) The only apparent connection between Lewis's Complaint and his request for injunctive relief is his allegation that NSCF corrections officers retaliated against him because they are acting as coconspirators with Defendants against him. However, Lewis does not provide any factual basis to support his allegation that SSCF officials are conspiring with NSCF officials to retaliate against him. It appears that Lewis's request for injunctive relief concerns his confinement at NSCF and therefore “deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit.” De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945); see also Lebron v. Armstrong, 289 F.Supp.2d 56, 61 (D. Conn. 2003) (denying inmate's request for injunctive relief because, inter alia, it was based on allegations that were different and unrelated to the facts pled in the underlying complaint). Accordingly, I recommend that Lewis's Motion be denied.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that Lewis's “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Enjoining Confiscation of Legal Pleadings, Documentation Marked as Evidence, and Affidavits of Witnesses” (Doc. 32) be DENIED.