Opinion
Civil No. 04-565-MO.
March 15, 2005
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Shcotta Lewis ("Lewis") brought this action alleging he was unlawfully stopped and arrested for a traffic violation. Lewis seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights and for the use of excessive force. Defendants City of Portland ("City"), David Hendrie ("Hendrie") and Chad Gradwahl ("Gradwahl"), filed a motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 seeking the dismissal of plaintiff's entire complaint.
In response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff concedes that the City of Portland is entitled to summary judgment on his claim that it maintained a policy or practice causing plaintiff to be deprived of his Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff also concedes that Hendrie and Gradwahl are entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force claim directed against them. Plaintiff does oppose, however, summary judgment on his claim that he was arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As a result, the sole question presented is whether an issue of material fact exists on whether defendants Hendrie and Gradwahl arrested Lewis for the offense of reckless driving knowing that plaintiff was not the driver of the vehicle.
BACKGROUND
On April 10, 2003, around 9:45 p.m., plaintiff and his friend Brandon Williams asked Brandon's uncle, Michael Williams, for a ride to Wendy's. Michael Williams agreed and borrowed his girlfriend's 2-door 1988 Buick Skylark coupe ("Buick").
Departing from 3559 North Albina in Portland, Michael Williams drove, Brandon Williams sat in the front passenger seat and plaintiff Lewis sat in the rear seat behind the driver. Michael Williams did not have a valid driver's license.
Defendants Hendrie and Gradwahl were on duty in a marked police car near the intersection of Albina and Alberta. The parties dispute whether defendants Hendrie and Gradwahl spotted the Buick on Albina or Alberta. For the reasons stated below, that dispute is of no moment to the resolution of this case. Regardless, the Buick and the patrol car passed traveling in opposite directions and the patrol car immediately executed a u-turn and began following the Buick. Michael Williams took evasive action in an attempt to avoid being stopped and cited for driving without a license. After making a few quick turns, Michael Williams parked the car and slid over the front armrest and into the back seat.
Plaintiff Lewis then pushed the driver's seat forward and began exiting the vehicle as Hendrie and Gradwahl pulled up behind the Buick. Defendant Hendrie called to plaintiff by name to get back into the Buick. Once Hendrie and Gradwahl removed the occupants from the Buick, plaintiff was arrested and charged with reckless driving.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A summary judgment motion may be made in reliance on "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any." Id. The movant is entitled to summary judgment if the non-moving party, who bears the burden of persuasion, fails to designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Thus, in order to preclude a grant of summary judgment, the non-moving party must set forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, defendants dispute the reliability of the declaration of Michael Williams of February 3, 2005, as it is directly contradicted by his affidavit of February 1, 2005. The contradiction concerns whether the Buick was traveling on Albina or Alberta Streets and whether Hendrie and Gradwahl could have seen the Buick swerve into oncoming traffic on Alberta Street and thus have probable cause to stop the Buick for reckless driving. Even if the court disregards entirely Michael Williams' new, contradicted statement that the Buick was traveling on Albina, a larger and undisputed issue of fact exists.
Specifically, both Brandon Williams and Michael Williams state that they heard defendant Gradwahl say that he thought "the old man" was driving. (Declaration of Brandon Williams, ¶ 5; Declaration of Michael Williams, ¶ 6). Both Brandon Williams and Shcotta Lewis are young men, only Michael Williams could be characterized as "old". Significantly, this is reflected not only in their declarations, to which defendants object, but in Brandon Williams' affidavit offered by defendants in support of summary judgment (¶ 6).
Under Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964), probable cause to arrest exists when "at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing the offense." Here, a material issue of disputed fact exists regarding whether Hendrie and Gradwahl had reasonably trustworthy information to believe that Lewis had committed the crime of reckless driving when one of them expressed his belief that "the old man" had been driving.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment is, therefore, DENIED on the issue of whether Hendrie and Gradwahl had probable cause to arrest Lewis. As to the remainder of defendants' motion for summary judgment, it is conceded by plaintiff and is, therefore, GRANTED as to plaintiff's excessive force claim and claim against the City that it maintained a policy or practice causing plaintiff to be deprived of his Fourth Amendment rights.
IT IS SO ORDERED.