Opinion
No. CV 01 0185531 S
March 3, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION TO DISMISS #139
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Albert Leserra, commenced this action by service of process on the defendants, Interstate Brands Corporation, Carlos C. Garcia, and Edward Vincent Shipp on August 17, 2001. On September 2, 2002, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which is the operative complaint and which alleges the following facts.
On August 26, 1999, the plaintiff was involved in a multi-vehicle accident. Carlos C. Garcia (Garcia) was driving his own vehicle directly behind the plaintiff. Edward Shipp (Shipp) was driving a tractor-trailer owned by Interstate Brands Corporation (Interstate) directly behind Garcia. The plaintiff's vehicle began to spin and the Garcia vehicle hit the plaintiff's vehicle. The plaintiff suffered injuries that may be permanent in nature and incurred expenses for medical treatments and medication. In counts one and two, the plaintiff alleges that his injuries and expenses resulted from Garcia's negligence and recklessness respectively. In counts three and four, the plaintiff alleges that his injuries and expenses resulted from Shipp's negligence and recklessness respectively. In counts five and six, the plaintiff alleges that his injuries and expenses resulted from Interstate's negligence and recklessness.
In January 24, 2005, Interstate filed a notice of automatic stay from bankruptcy with the court. The notice indicated that on September 22, 2004, Interstate filed a petition for relief in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The notice also stated that under § 362(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, any further action against the Defendant was stayed. On September 22, 2006 and April 2, 2008, Interstate provided notices to the court that Interstate's bankruptcy proceedings were pending.
The Bankruptcy Judge, Venters, J., ordered that the deadline for submitting proof of prepetition claims against Interstate was March 21, 20005, and failure to submit claims by that date would result in discharge of the claim. Memorandum of Law in Support of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (#19), Exhibit A. According to the Bankruptcy record, no party in the present case filed proof of a claim. Memorandum of Law in Support of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (#139), Exhibit B. The United States Bankruptcy Court, Western District of Missouri, Kansas City Division entered an order on December 5, 2008, which executed the reorganization plan and discharged pre-petition liabilities incurred by Interstate as of the effective date. Memorandum of Law in Support of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (#139), (Exhibit C). The order stated: "This confirmation Order shall be a judicial determination of the discharge of all claims against and interest in the debtors, subject to the effective date occurring." Id. The effective date occurred on February 3, 2009, and the Bankruptcy Court discharged and released Interstate from liabilities occurring prior to the petition date of September 24, 2004. Memorandum of law in Support of the Defendant Motion to Dismiss (#139), Exhibit D.
On December 29, 2009, Interstate moved to dismiss all counts against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff did not file an objection to the motion. The matter was assigned for argument on February 1, 2010. The plaintiff did not appear. The court has reviewed the pleadings and memorandum in support of the motion.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 210-11, 897 A.2d 71 (2006); see also Kozlowski v. Commissioner of Transportation, 274 Conn. 497, 501, 876 A.2d 1148 (2005); Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 866 A.2d 599 (2005). Pursuant to Practice Book § 10-31 in relevant part, "[t]he motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter . . ."
"It is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time . . . Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferguson Mechanical Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 282 Conn. 764, 770-71, 924 A.2d 846 (2007). "The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court, sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings . . ." Peters v. Dept. of Social Services, 273 Conn. 434, 441, 870 A.2d 448 (2005). "[I]n determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connor v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 260 Conn. 435, 443, 797 A.2d 1081 (2002).
"Federal preemption implicates the court's jurisdiction." (Citations omitted.) Lewis v. Chelsea G.C.A. Realty Partnership, L.P., 86 Conn.App. 596, 601, 862 A.2d 368 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 909, 870 A.2d 1079 (2005). "The question of preemption is one of federal law, arising under the supremacy clause of the United States constitution . . . Determining whether Congress has exercised its power to preempt state law is a question of legislative intent . . . [A]bsent an explicit statement that Congress intends to preempt state law, courts should infer such intent where Congress has legislated comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the States to supplement federal law . . . or where the state law at issue conflicts with federal law, either because it is impossible to comply with both . . . or because the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of congressional objectives . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barbieri v. United Technologies Corp., 255 Conn. 708, 717 A.2d 915 (2001), Lewis v. Chelsea G.C.A. Realty Patmership, L.P., supra, 601.
In Lewis v. Chelsea G.C.A. Really Partnership, L.P. supra, 86 Conn.App. 596, the Appellate Court stated: "Congress has given the United States district courts original and exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters arising under title 11 of the United State Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). Through the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., Congress has provided a comprehensive federal system of penalties and protection to govern the orderly conduct of debtors' affairs and creditors' right." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 602.
"[A] claim will be deemed pre-petition when it arises out of a relationship recognized in, for example, the law of contracts or torts. A claim exists only if before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the relationship between the debtor and the creditor contained all of the elements necessary to give rise to a legal obligation — a right to payment — under the relevant non-bankruptcy law . . . A `claim' is defined under the Bankruptcy Code as `a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1994). Congress intended by this language to adopt the broadest available definition of claim . . . By this broadest possible definition . . . [of the term claim, the Bankruptcy Code] contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lighthtowler v. Continental Ins. Co., 255 Conn. 639, 647-49, 769 A.2d 49 (2001).
In Santiago v. Kmart Corp., Superior court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV 03 083402 (May 28, 2004, Ronan, J.T.R.), the defendant moved to dismiss a plaintiff's negligence claim for lack of subject jurisdiction. Id. In that case, the defendant filed for bankruptcy protection, and the plaintiff failed to file proof of a claim by the date set by the Bankruptcy court. Id. The court, Ronan, J.T.R., cited 11 U.S.C. § 1142(d)(1), which states in relevant part: "[T]he confirmation of a plan . . . discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation . . . whether or not . . . (i) a proof of the claim based on such debt is filed or deemed filed under section 501 of this title, (ii) such claim is allowed under section 502 of this title; or (iii) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan . . ." In its decision to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court, Ronan, J.T.R., looked to 11 U.S.C. § 1141, the bankruptcy plan, the Bankruptcy Court's order that expunged the plaintiff's claim, and the lack of evidence submitted by the plaintiff to show that a claim was properly filed. Santiago v. Kmart Corp., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 03 083402.
In the present case, the plaintiff's claim was brought prior to Interstate's bankruptcy petition date. Although the plaintiff had a pre-petition claim, there is no evidence that he submitted proof of that claim to the Bankruptcy Court. The Bankruptcy Court discharged the plaintiff's claim in accordance with § 1141(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(a). Once a debtor files for bankruptcy, all prepetition legal obligations of the debtor are dealt with in the bankruptcy case, and the United States district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the bankruptcy matters. Accordingly, this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's prepetition claim.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the above, Interstate's motion to dismiss is granted.