Opinion
No. CV-05-4006158S
June 22, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On February 27, 2003, a cranberry-colored PT Cruiser, driven by the defendant Graham Hoagland (Hoagland), collided with an orange Ford F-150 pick-up truck (the pick-up), driven by the plaintiff Mark LeSage (LeSage), at an intersection of two roadways on the premises of the Department of Transportation (DOT) in Newington, Connecticut. The question for the court, in this bench trial on liability, is where the fault lies for the collision.
I.
The court finds the following facts: LeSage and Hoagland both worked at the DOT in Newington (the facility) and were familiar with the layout of the premises including the internal roadways, intersections, walkways and the parking area. LeSage, who was employed as an electrician, also engaged in maintenance work including snow removal and typically was assigned an orange-colored DOT pick-up truck to drive around the facility. Hoagland was employed in the DOT's contract section in a desk job. On February 27, 2003, a sunny but cold day, LeSage had finished his thirty-minute lunch break, which he had taken in the shipping and receiving area of the facility, and had received his afternoon assignment. He got into an orange Ford F-150 pick-up that had been assigned to him that day and headed in a generally southerly direction on the roadway that ran alongside the main building towards the motor pool area of the facility. At approximately the same time, Hoagland left his office in the northern portion of the facility's building and got into his car, intending to leave the facility, as was his custom at that time at lunchtime, in order to administer medication to his mother who lived approximately eight to ten minutes away from the facility.
The roadway that provides access from the parking lot to the Berlin Turnpike (exit road) intersects with the interior roadway upon which LeSage was operating the pick-up. That interior roadway is controlled by a stop sign at which LeSage testified he stopped for one to two seconds, looking left and then right. Because a stand of trees obstructs the view of the exit road to the left from the stop sign, LeSage started forward over the stop line and into the intersection and then looked left again. At that point, LeSage observed the cranberry-colored PT Cruiser to his left coming down the exit road at a distance of what he thought was approximately 100 feet. He did not stop because he thought he had enough time to make it through the intersection.
When Hoagland turned onto the exit road from the parking lot, a distance of approximately 130 to 140 feet from the intersection, he testified that he did not see the pick-up. He did observe that the traffic light that controlled access to the Berlin Turnpike was turning yellow in his direction and he proceeded towards that light at a speed of approximately twenty miles per hour, above the posted speed limit of fifteen miles per hour. He testified that he did not see the pick-up until he was approximately fifteen feet away from it, although he agreed that there is a clear sight line both to the intersection and the stop sign from at least sixty to seventy feet up the exit road. When he saw the pick-up, it was slightly to the right of him but in the intersection. He claimed it was moving at a rapid pace and estimated the speed at between thirty-five and forty miles per hour. At that time, Hoagland thinks he may have braked but he definitely turned to the left striking the pick-up on the driver's side door and front end with the passenger side of his vehicle. As a result of the impact, the pick-up was pushed ten to fifteen feet onto and over a median that separates the exit and entrance lanes to the facility, winding up at rest in the left-turn entrance lane to the facility. The pick-up and the PT Cruiser sustained significant damage.
II.
Each party has alleged that the other was negligent under the common law. Proof of one specification of negligence, and that it was substantial factor in causing the accident, suffices to establish fault. Under General Statutes § 52-572h, the fact-finder may apportion negligence.
In special defenses, Hoagland also alleged statutory negligence on the part of LeSage, specifically violations of General Statutes §§ 14-242 and 14-247. The court finds those statutes do not apply to the facts of this case.
LeSage has alleged and proven, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that Hoagland was negligent under the common law by being inattentive and failing to keep a proper lookout and by driving faster than was reasonable under the prevailing conditions. By way of special defenses, Hoagland has alleged and proven, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that LeSage was negligent under the common law by failing to keep a proper lookout.
Common-law negligence is the failure to use the degree of care that a reasonably prudent driver would use in the same circumstances. The reasonableness of a driver's actions are determined based on the driver's conduct at the time of the alleged negligence. O'Briskie v. Berry, 95 Conn.App. 300, 314, 897 A.2d 605 (2006). LeSage and Hoagland each had a duty to keep a reasonable lookout for any traffic he was likely to encounter and to use reasonable care to discover any dangerous condition that might arise. "The circumstances of each case must determine the degree of alertness required of an operator of an automobile in keeping a lookout for road hazards, and the mere fact that he is traveling in his proper lane of traffic does not relieve him of the duty to maintain a reasonable and proper lookout." Palombizio v. Murphy, 146 Conn. 352, 357, 150 A.2d 825 (1959).
Both drivers were familiar with the particular intersection where the collision occurred and were aware of its poor design and the difficult sight lines from and to the stop sign on the interior roadway. The credible evidence in this case establishes that when LeSage stopped at the controlling stop sign, he did not see any vehicles to his left or right and felt he could proceed across the intersection. Since Hoagland's vehicle did not pose an immediate hazard to LeSage at the time that he came to a full stop, LeSage was not obligated to yield the right of way at that time. See Finkle v. Marino, 151 Conn. 221, 224, 196 A.2d 437 (1963). However, upon pulling out to the point where he did see Hoagland's vehicle approaching from his left, a reasonably prudent driver would have yielded to Hoagland. LeSage negligently concluded he could safely proceed through the intersection because he judged Hoagland to be approximately 100 feet away. He apparently misjudged the distance or the speed or both at which Hoagland was travelling and he failed to consider both the dangerousness of the particular intersection and that Hoagland would have believed that he had the right of way.
LeSage erroneously relies upon Medley v. Mogelnicki, 170 Conn. 583, 368 A.2d 60 (1976), for the proposition that, having fully stopped and having observed no traffic that would pose an immediate hazard, he acquired the right of way and Hoagland was obliged to yield to him. While General Statutes § 14-301(c) contained such language in 1969 when the accident on trial in Medley occurred, that particular language was removed when the statute was "significantly amended" in 1971 as noted in footnote 1 of the Medley decision. Id. at 585.
Nonetheless, Hoagland is also at fault for this accident. Although Hoagland had the right of way, he was not relieved of his duty to exercise reasonable care to be aware of the precise danger that presented itself to him on February 27, 2003 of a driver who crossed in front of him on an intersecting road having misjudged his ability to do so in safety. The credible evidence establishes that Hoagland was not only inattentive but was also travelling too fast. Since LeSage was able to see Hoagland's vehicle when it was approximately 100 feet away from the intersection, Hoagland should have been able to see the orange pick-up as well, but he admits failing to see it until he was only fifteen away from it, an insufficient amount of time to take adequate evasive maneuvers to avoid colliding with the truck. Further, the nature and location of the damage to the truck and the fact that it was pushed some ten to fifteen feet over a median and into the entrance lane, notwithstanding Hoagland's apparent application of his brakes and his effort to turn his vehicle to the left, is strong circumstantial evidence that Hoagland's speed was excessive. See Waldron v. Raccio, 166 Conn. 608, 612, 353 A.2d 770 (1974). Given the point of impact, the damage to the pick-up and its final resting place, the court concludes that Hoagland's testimony regarding LeSage's speed is not credible.
III.
The better evidence in this case leads to the court's conclusion that LeSage failed to keep a proper lookout and misjudged the amount of time it would take Hoagland to reach the intersection and thus negligently proceeded into the intersection, but that Hoagland could have nonetheless avoided colliding with the pick-up truck if he had not been inattentive and travelling too fast. The negligence of each driver was a substantial factor in the resulting accident. As a result, the court concludes that each party was equally responsible for the collision and fault is allocated at fifty percent to the plaintiff and fifty percent to the defendant.