Opinion
CAUSE NO.: 2:96-CV-488-TS
September 28, 2001
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for a ruling on damages. On April 25, 2001, a hearing was held before this Court on damages. On May 11, 2001, the Plaintiff, Anthony S. Lenzo, filed a Trial Brief on Damages [DE 58], and the Defendant, School City of East Chicago, filed a Post-Trial Memorandum [DE 60]. Also, on May 11, 2001, the Plaintiff filed his Supplemental Verified Request for Attorney Fees. [DE 59] For the following reasons, the Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to money damages and pre-judgment interest. The Court denies without prejudice the Plaintiff's Request for Attorney Fees, but grants leave to the Plaintiff to renew his request incorporating additional fees or costs incurred, to the Defendant to respond, and to the Plaintiff to reply.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 20, 2001, the Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability as to Defendant School City of East Chicago. The Court's February 20, 2001, Memorandum of Decision and Order with its findings of facts and conclusions of law are incorporated herein.
On March 12, 2001, a hearing was held before the Court on damages. The parties waived jury demand and agreed to present evidence to the bench. The Plaintiff requested a continuance. On April 25, 2001, another hearing was held before the Court on damages. Evidence was presented, and argument was heard.
The Plaintiff presented several arguments: that the Court's Memorandum and Order indicated that the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) are not in dispute; that once discrimination is found and liability is determined, the Plaintiff is entitled to damages, and damages are mathematical under Solon v. Gary Community School Corp., 180 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 1999); that the terms of the CBA provide the Plaintiff with early retirement incentive benefits for a maximum of sixty months; and that the Plaintiff indicated in a letter dated March 30, 1994, to Nadine Kouott that he would consider retiring at the end of the 1993-94 school year. The Plaintiff stipulated that the actual retirement was under the 1995 CBA. The Plaintiff calculated his early retirement incentive benefits under the CBA to entitle him to payments of $1,270.05 per month for sixty months with 8% interest from July 1, 1994 to April 25, 2001. The Plaintiff offered a Verified Request for Attorney Fees.
The Defendant presented several arguments: that the Motion for Summary Judgment challenged the 1994 CBA, not the 1995 CBA, and that the Plaintiff retired and received benefits under the 1995 CBA. The Defendant called George Manous as a witness who testified that he received a letter from the Plaintiff indicating that the Plaintiff planned to retire at the end of the 1994-95 school year. The Defendant offered this letter dated April 27, 1994, as Defendant's Exhibit A. Mr. Manous also testified that the Plaintiff received his last paycheck from the Defendant at the end of the 1994-95 school year. The Defendant offered as Defendant's Exhibit C a letter dated May 3, 1994, indicating that the Board of School Trustees approved his retirement request, effective June 9, 1995, and that the Plaintiff would "receive all benefits entitled to you under the Collective Bargaining Agreement." Mr. Manous testified that the Plaintiff requested severance pay benefits and that the Board granted that request. The Defendant offered as Defendant's Exhibit B a Memorandum dated May 3, 1995, from the Plaintiff to Mr. Manous requesting severance pay benefits. On cross-examination, Mr. Manous testified that the severance pay was the Plaintiff's accumulated sick days and years of service.
The Plaintiff objected to the admission of Defendant's Exhibit A on relevance grounds and referred to the Solon decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Plaintiff objected to the admission of Exhibit C on relevancy grounds, arguing that the Court has already determined liability and that the time to object was during the summary judgment phase. The Defendant responded that Exhibit C was being submitted on the element of damages, not liability.
Defendant's Exhibit C does not indicate the CBA under which the Plaintiff would receive all benefits to which he was entitled. It also does not indicate when the CBA, which was effective from January 1, 1995, through December 31, 1996, was adopted.
The Plaintiff objected to the admission of Defendant's Exhibit B on the same grounds.
On May 11, 2001, the Plaintiff filed his Trial Brief on Damages, arguing that he is entitled to judgment for damages as a matter of law, that the Defendant is precluded from raising factual issues regarding damages, that the Defendant is barred (apparently under the equitable doctrines of laches and unclean hands) from arguing that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any damages because he lacks standing, that logic dictates that damages should be assessed under the CBA effective during 1992 and 1993, and that to allow the Defendant to escape the payment of damages for its discriminatory conduct would result in unjust enrichment. On May 11, 2001, the Defendant filed its Post-Trial Memorandum, arguing that the Plaintiff failed to prove damages, that the Plaintiff's failure to prove his intended time of retirement is likewise fatal to the award of damages, and that the amount claimed for damages is grossly excessive.
On May 11, 2001, the Plaintiff filed his Supplemental Verified Request for Attorney Fees. In its Post-Trial Memorandum, the Defendant requested that the Court delay any assessment of attorney fees and costs until after final judgment has been entered so that the parties may assess the extent of the Plaintiff's success and so that the Defendant may have the opportunity to respond in light of the judgment.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct any and all further proceedings, including trial, and to order the entry of a final judgment. Accordingly, this Court has the authority to decide the merits of this case.
DISCUSSION A. Damages
The Court has already found the following facts regarding the Defendant's early retirement incentive programs (ERIPs) in its CBAs: that the CBAs effective from January 1, 1983, through December 31, 1991, contained ERIPs that distinguished based upon age; that the CBA that was effective from January 1, 1992, through December 31, 1993, and subsequently extended with effective dates of January 1, 1994, through December 31, 1994, contained an ERIP that granted early retirement benefits to teachers based upon their age; that the ERIP in the 1994 CBA provided for a maximum of sixty months of early retirement incentive pay; that an eligible teacher who was paid on a doctoral salary lane would receive annual compensation equal to sixty percent of the bachelor's degree, no experience; that such benefits would be paid on a monthly basis beginning in July; and that early retirement payments would be made in addition to other retirement benefits provided for in the CBA.
The Court has already found the following facts regarding the Plaintiff: that the Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant for more than twenty years; that the Plaintiff held a doctoral degree; that shortly after his 69th birthday, the Plaintiff requested that the Defendant recognize him as an eligible teacher under the ERIP and grant him early retirement benefits; that the Plaintiff was born on January 22, 1925, and thus that his request would have been made in early 1994 under the 1994 CBA; that the Defendant determined that the Plaintiff was not eligible because of his age; that the Defendant denied his request to allow him to participate in the ERIP; that on September 6, 1994, the Plaintiff filed his Complaint with the EEOC, claiming that the Defendant discriminated against him based upon the terms and provisions of the CBA effective January 1, 1992, through December 31, 1993; that the Plaintiff retired in July of 1995; and that during his last school year as an employee of the Defendant, the Plaintiff was paid under the doctorate degree salary lane in the sum of Fifty-One Thousand Forty and 38/100 dollars ($51,040.38).
From the Court's findings in its February 20, 2001, Memorandum of Decision and Order, it is clear that the CBA in effect when the Defendant denied the Plaintiff's request for early retirement incentive benefits was the CBA that was effective from January 1, 1992, through December 31, 1993, and subsequently extended with the effective dates of January 1, 1994, through December 31, 1994. The Court ultimately held as follows regarding the Defendant's ERIPs, particularly the ERIP in the CBAs that were effective from 1992 through 1994:
The Court finds in this case that, under the ERIP, age is used as a factor for determining the entitlement to early retirement benefits and that the terms and conditions explicitly establish an employee's eligibility for the early retirement incentives in terms of his age. In other words, the ERIP doles out benefits based upon age, with younger workers receiving better benefits. The Court finds, therefore, that the ERIP is facially discriminatory on the basis of age.
The Court notes that in responding to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability, the Defendant did not dispute the facts presented by the Plaintiff; rather, the Defendant alleged Eleventh Amendment immunity and conceded the facts underlying this lawsuit as presented by the Plaintiff. At the oral argument heard on June 27, 2000, counsel for the Defendant expressly stated that the Defendant raised no dispute about the operative facts and that the content of the agreements, the offers, and the plans were not subject to dispute.
The Defendant's decision not to dispute the facts but to concede the facts as presented by the Plaintiff was a decision of critical importance to the resolution of the damages issue now before the Court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that the "judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any materials fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Local Rule 56.1(b) of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana provides as follows:
In determining the motion for summary judgment, the court will assume the facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy, except to the extent that such facts are controverted in the "Statement of Genuine Issues" filed in opposition to the motion, as supported by the depositions, discovery responses, affidavits and other admissible evidence on file.
The Defendant, at that time, declined to controvert any of the Plaintiff's facts or evidence, present a statement of genuine issues, or present admissible evidence.
In support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff supported his claims — that he requested early retirement benefits in early 1994, that he was denied such benefits by the Defendant, and that the ERIPs in the CBAs from January 1, 1983, through December 31, 1994, discriminated based upon age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act — with admissible evidence. The Defendant's present attempt to create an issue of fact regarding whether the Plaintiff requested and was denied such benefits early in 1994 is foreclosed by the Defendant's earlier decision not to controvert the evidence presented by the Plaintiff and the Court's findings and conclusions in its February 20, 2001, Memorandum and Order.
Feb. 20, 2001, Memo. and Order at 25.
Among the designated evidence submitted by the Plaintiff in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability were the Defendant's Salary Schedules for several years, including 1993, and an Affidavit of Victoria S. Candelaria, the President of the East Chicago Federation of Teachers. The Salary Schedules were provided to the Plaintiff in response to his request for production, and the Response to the request is signed and accompanied by appropriate attestation by co-counsel for the former Defendant, East Chicago Federation of Teachers. Although no Salary Schedule for 1994 appears in the record, the Affidavit of Candelaria indicates that the salary of a bachelor salary track employee with no experience was $25,401 in 1993 and 1994, and the Defendant's Schedule of Salaries for 1993 indicates the same figure. The Defendant represented to the Court in its Response to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in the oral argument heard on June 27, 2000, that there were no disputes as to any material facts, even as to the provisions of the CBAs. The Defendant declined to controvert the Plaintiff's designated evidence in responding to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Defendant did not controvert or object to the designated evidence at the March 12, 2001, hearing or at the April 25, 2001, hearing. The evidence offered by the Defendant at the April 25, 2001, hearing on damages did not controvert the Plaintiff's designated evidence. Furthermore, nothing in the Defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum controverts this evidence.
The Defendant argues:
There can be no question that plaintiff Lenzo bore the burden of demonstrating his economic loss under the preponderance of the evidence and that the Court's duty in interpreting that evidence was to make him whole. On the record of this case, however, that is impossible because Lenzo admitted no evidence which would permit the Court to award anything. There was nothing presented at the hearing concerning the amounts Lenzo would have collected had the ERIP, which was in effect in 1994, been applicable to him in the year in which he stated his intention to retire. To do so would require admission into evidence of the applicable salary rates for beginning teachers at the bachelor degree level with no experience and the time exactly when Lenzo intended to retire. . . . [H]is failure on this latter point actually destroys his ability to claim any damages because he has not even made the most rudimentary showing that he would have retired had he been given the opportunity prior to the date he requested.
Somehow, the plaintiff believes that this information is already in evidence. But, it is not. Def.'s Post-Trial Memo. at 6-7. At the April 25, 2001, hearing on damages, the Plaintiff referred to portions of the designated evidence submitted by the Plaintiff in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability. The Defendant did not object to the Plaintiff's reliance on such evidence other than to argue that such evidence was not "in evidence."
The Court notes that various salary schedules were submitted by the Plaintiff in the designated evidence supporting his Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability, as well as with the Affidavit of Candelaria. Thus, this designated evidence is contained within the Record and stands uncontroverted by the Defendant. The Defendant declined to controvert this evidence or object to it in the Defendant's Response to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability; in fact, in the Response, the Defendant indicated that the provisions of the CBAs are not subject to dispute. The Defendant did not object to the Plaintiff's designated evidence at the June 27, 2000, oral argument; in fact, at this oral argument, counsel for the Defendant represented to the Court that it did not dispute the operative facts, even as to the content of the agreements. The Defendant has declined to move to strike any of the designated evidence. The Defendant did not object to the designated evidence at the March 12, 2001, and April 25, 2001, hearings on damages. Furthermore, the Defendant has not pointed to any authority that would preclude the Court from further considering the uncontroverted evidence as designated by the Plaintiff. The Defendant's argument would essentially require the redundant submission of the designated evidence, which the Court has already considered in ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability and which the Defendant has never controverted.
Given that the Court has an interest in judicial economy and the efficient resolution of cases, that the Defendant did not controvert the Plaintiff's designated evidence presented in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, that the Defendant conceded the facts as presented by the Plaintiff, and that the Defendant has not controverted this evidence at any proceedings since, the Court will again consider some of the Plaintiff's designated evidence, which has already provided a basis for its earlier ruling, in ruling on the issue of damages.
The evidence offered by the Defendant at the April 25, 2001, hearing established that, in late April of 1994, the Plaintiff requested retirement at the end of the 1994-95 school year, and his retirement request was approved. His retirement was to be effective June 9, 1995, and he would receive all benefits to which he was entitled under the CBA. However, this retirement request occurred some time after his earlier request for ERIP benefits under the 1994 CBA, a request that was denied because of his age. See Feb. 20, 2001, Memo. and Order.
The Court reiterates that it was the Defendant's usage of age as a factor for determining entitlement to early retirement benefits and its adoption of terms and conditions that explicitly established an employee's eligibility in terms of his age that violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623. These violations occurred when the Defendant adopted CBAs with ERIPs that discriminated based upon age and when the Defendant specifically denied the Plaintiff early retirement benefits under the CBA. Thus, the Defendant's facially discriminatory plan took on concrete meaning for the Plaintiff when the Defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his age in denying ERIP benefits under the 1994 CBA. Whenever the Plaintiff was eligible to accept the terms of an ERIP under the effective CBA, the Plaintiff was required to make an unlawful choice whether to retire early or to continue his employment with the Defendant. The fact that the Defendant later adopted CBAs with substantially different terms and conditions did not void or negate the fact that it had already violated the rights of its employees and the Plaintiff's rights. Furthermore, this is so even though the Plaintiff ultimately notified the Defendant that he would retire at the end of the 1994-95 school year and even though the Plaintiff eventually retired when the 1995 CBA was in effect.
Based upon case law within the Seventh Circuit, the Defendant's violation began with its adoption of a CBA with an ERIP and continued as long as it maintained such a policy, and thus the Defendant's violation of the Plaintiff's rights under the ADEA was a continuing violation that began when the Plaintiff first became eligible for early retirement incentive benefits all the way back in 1983 when the Plaintiff turned 58 years of age. See Solon, 180 F.3d at 847, 853 (affirming this Court's entry of an injunction requiring a school district to make the same incentive payments to plaintiffs who were still working at the time of trial and had not retired when they retire that it would pay to similarly-situated 58-year-old teachers or administrators); Karlen, 837 F.2d at 320 (discussing a benefit program that withheld benefits from older persons in order to induce them to retire and finding that such discrimination "is precisely the form of discrimination at which the [ADEA] is aimed).
In its Post-Trial Memorandum, the Defendant argues that the 1995 CBA was "perfectly lawful" and that the 1995 CBA was applicable to the Plaintiff including its Social Security and Medicare Bridge Program. The Court notes that its February 20, 2001, Memorandum of Decision and Order did not find the 1995 CBA lawful — that issue was not before the Court. Rather, the Court found that two separate agreements were effective during the periods of January 1, 1995, through December 31, 1996, and January 1, 1997, through December 31, 1999, and that the terms and conditions relating to retirement in these two agreements were substantially different from the agreements previously effective and involved a Social Security and Medicare Bridge Program. The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability and the Court's consideration focused on two other sets of CBAs: (1) the CBAs effective from January 1, 1992, through December 31, 1994, which included an ERIP that the Court determined was discriminatory based on age, and (2) the CBAs effective from January 1, 1983, through December 31, 1991, that included ERIPs with essentially the same terms and conditions in that they provided benefits for some but not others based upon the age of the applicant.
Also in its Memorandum and Order of February 20, 2001, the Court stated: "The terms and conditions of the ERIP in the CBA implemented by the Defendant are substantially similar to the terms and conditions of the ERIP determined to be discriminatory in the Solon v. Gary Community School and EEOC v. Crown Point Community School cases. See Solon, 180 F.3d at 846-49, 852-53, 855; Crown Point Cmty. Sch. Corp., 1997 WL 54747, at *1-2, *5-7," Memo. Order at 25. The Seventh Circuit summarized this Court's damage award in Solon as follows:
The court . . . awarded the retired plaintiffs damages equal to the amount of benefits they would have received under the ERIPs had they elected to retire at age 58. R. 146. As for those individuals who were still working, the court entered an injunction specifying that each had the right to voluntarily retire and receive the full amount of early retirement incentive benefits that would have been paid to an eligible teacher or administrator who elected to retire at age 58. Id.Solon, 180 F.3d at 848-49. In affirming this Court's ruling on damages inSolon, the Seventh Circuit held as follows:
Finally, Gary Schools suggests that the plaintiffs have been given a windfall by having been awarded the benefits (or the right to receive the benefits) offered by the ERIPs without having to retire at the age specified by the plans. In effect, the plaintiffs' victory has transformed the early retirement incentives into severance payments made to all employees upon retirement. Gary Schools Br. 29. That argument has some intuitive appeal. None of the plaintiffs who testified, for example, indicated that she retired sooner than she otherwise planned or was prepared to do. There is no way to know on this record, then, whether any of the plaintiffs "earned" the incentives by retiring "early." That may simply be the price Gary Schools has to pay, however, for establishing an early retirement plan which turns on the employee's age. Once that discriminatory criterion is removed, there is nothing left in the terms of the plan (but for the criteria as to the employee's minimum years of service) to objectively assess any given employee's eligibility for the incentives. In any case, Gary Schools has not appealed the terms of the judgment entered in the plaintiffs' favor. We therefore need not consider whether there were any alternative remedies available to rectify the discrimination.Solon, 180 F.3d at 855-56. In EEOC v. Crown Point Community School Corp. (Cause No. 2:93-CV-237), this Court, after granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on liability and subject to the joint stipulation of the parties, awarded the employees past benefit loss, pre-judgment interest, and future benefit loss, based upon calculations provided in the applicable ERIP.
The Court's judgment on damages relies upon several pieces from this litigation: the representations of counsel for the Defendant that there are no disputes as to material facts (including as to provisions of the CBAs); the findings and conclusions contained in its February 20, 2001, Memorandum and Order; the evidentiary materials offered by the Defendant at the damages hearing; the Defendant's Schedule of Salaries for 1993 and the Affidavit of Candelaria, which were included in the Plaintiffs designated evidence in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on Liaiblity; the rulings of this Court in Solon v. Gary Community Schools and EEOC v. Crown Point Community School Corp.; and the decision by the Seventh Circuit in Solon. Because the Court has found that the Defendant, through its illegal ERIPs in its CBAs, violated the Plaintiffs rights under the ADEA, the Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to damages equal to those provided under the ERIP in 1994 — sixty percent of the salary for teachers with a bachelor's degree and no experience under the 1993 Schedule of Salaries, paid on a monthly basis for sixty months beginning in July of 1994. Thus, the Plaintiff is entitled to monthly payments of $1270.05 for sixty months.
As already noted, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate his economic loss by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was nothing presented at the April 25, 2001, hearing concerning the amounts the Plaintiff would have collected under the ERIP, and that to do so would have required the Plaintiff to present evidence of the applicable salary rates for beginning teachers at the bachelor degree level with no experience and the time when the Plaintiff intended to retire. As indicted above, such evidence is available in the designated evidence submitted to the Court by the Plaintiff in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability, and that designated evidence remains uncontroverted by the Defendant.
An award of pre-judgment interest lies within the trial court's discretion in an ADEA case. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 162 (7th Cir. 1981). On the issue of prejudgment interest, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northem District of Indiana has stated:
Under federal law pre-judgment interest "is not recovered according to a rigid theory of compensation for money withheld, but is given in response to considerations of fairness. It is denied when its exaction would be inequitable." Board of County Comm'rs of Jackson v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352 (1939). Unless there is a statutory provision to the contrary, the court has broad discretion in deciding whether to award pre-judgment interest. Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 982 (3d Cir. 1984).In re Vic Bernacchi Sons, Inc., 170 B.R. 647, 656 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1994).
The Court finds that pre-judgment interest is appropriate in this case in order to compensate the Plaintiff for the benefits of which the Defendant unlawfully deprived him and to compensate the Plaintiff for his lost use of the money. The Court is also mindful of the number of years during which the Defendant violated the ADEA.
The Court finds that pre-judgment interest should be calculated using the rates found in the federal statute for post-judgment interest. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) ("Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment."); see also Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 553, 56 1-62 (N.D. Ind. 1990). The Court, therefore, awards the Plaintiff pre-judgment interest during the sixty months of payments beginning in July of 1994, compounded monthly according to the federal statutory interest rate corresponding to each calendar month. The Court also awards the Plaintiff pre-judgment interest for the period extending from July of 1999 through the date this Order is entered at the rate established under Section 1961(a) for post-judgment interest, to be compounded monthly. That rate is 2.60%.
The Court directs the Plaintiff to file within fourteen days of the entry of this Order his calculations of damages, including pre-judgment interest, consistent with the directions of the Court outlined above. The Defendant shall have fourteen days from the Plaintiff's filing of his calculations to object to the Plaintiff's calculations. The Plaintiff shall have seven days from the Defendant's filing of its objection to reply.
B. Attorney Fees
In his Supplemental Verified Request for Attorney Fees, the Plaintiff requests attorney fees and costs in the amount of thirty-three thousand nine hundred five and 90/100 dollars ($33,905.90). The Defendant requests that the Court delay any assessment of fees and costs until after the entry of final judgment and after the Defendant has the opportunity to respond pursuant to the procedural rules.
The Court finds it appropriate to deny the Plaintiffs Request for Attorney Fees without prejudice. The Court grants the Plaintiff leave to renew his request for attorney fees and costs, as provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and Local Rule 54.1. The Plaintiffs request should include all fees and costs to date and provide separate subtotals for time spent by the partner, the associate, and the law clerk. The Court also grants the Defendant leave to file a response to the Plaintiffs request for fees and costs and the Plaintiff leave to file a reply to the Defendant's response.
CONCLUSION
Liability having been determined, evidence received, and arguments heard, the Court finds that the Plaintiff, Anthony S. Lenzo, is entitled to money damages and pre-judgment interest.
The Plaintiff is directed to file his calculations of damages and pre-judgment interest pursuant to the Court's directions within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this Order. The Defendant is directed to file any objections to the Plaintiffs calculations within fourteen (14) days of the Plaintiffs filing of his calculations. The Plaintiff is directed to file any reply within seven (7) days of the Defendant's filing of its objections.
The Plaintiffs Supplemental Verified Request for Attorney Fees is DENIED without prejudice.
The Court GRANTS the Plaintiff leave to file a request for attorney fees and costs within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this Order. The Court GRANTS the Defendant leave to file a response within fourteen (14) days of the Plaintiff's filing of his request for fees and costs. The Court GRANTS the Plaintiff leave to file a reply within seven (7) days of the Defendant's filing of its response. Final judgment will be entered thereafter.