Opinion
No. 7:20-CV-13-D
02-14-2020
ANTONIA D. LEMON, SR., Plaintiff, v. CASSANDRA Y. LEMON, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the court for memorandum and recommendation on Plaintiff's pro se application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence suit in federal court without paying administration costs associated with such proceedings, and for frivolity review of the complaint. [DE-1, -1-1]. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence of his inability to pay the required court costs, and it is recommended that his application be denied. Additionally, Plaintiff's complaint is frivolous, and it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed. A. In Forma Pauperis Application
A magistrate judge, proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), lacks authority to deny an application to proceed in forma pauperis and may only issue a recommendation to the district court. See Hunter v. Roventini, 617 F. App'x 225, 226 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citing Woods v. Dahlberg, 894 F.2d 187, 187 (6th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) ("[A] denial of such a motion is the functional equivalent of an involuntary dismissal and is outside the scope of a magistrate's authority.")).
A litigant may commence an action in federal court in forma pauperis ("IFP") by filing an affidavit in good faith containing a statement of assets and demonstrating he cannot afford to pay the required fees of the lawsuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The IFP statute is intended to ensure that indigent persons have equal access to the judicial system by allowing them "to proceed without having to advance the fees and costs associated with litigation." Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir. 1981). However, "proceeding [IFP] in a civil case is a privilege or favor granted by the government." White v. Barnhart, Nos. 1:02-CV-556, 1:02-CV-557, 2002 WL 1760980, at *1 (M.D.N.C. July 30, 2002) (citations omitted). In ruling on an IFP application, the court must exercise discretion in determining whether to grant or deny the application. Id. In Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948), the Supreme Court first set forth the standard for the determination of IFP status: "[w]e think an affidavit is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for the costs . . . and still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life." Id. at 339 (internal quotation marks omitted). In exercising its discretion, the court is to be mindful that the ability to pay does not require that a plaintiff prove that he is "absolutely destitute." Id.
Based on the information provided by Plaintiff regarding his current financial status, he has failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence indicating that payment of the required court costs would deprive him or his family of the "necessities of life." Adkins, 355 U.S. at 339. Plaintiff receives monthly income of $4,600 in retirement and disability benefits and reported $1,295 in expenses, leaving sufficient monthly disposable income to pay the required court costs. [DE-1] at 2, 5-6. In light of the financial information Plaintiff has reported, the undersigned cannot find that he has met his burden of demonstrating he cannot afford to pay the required fees of the lawsuit. Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff's IFP application be denied.
Plaintiff lists $1,295 in the "Alimony, maintenance, and support paid to others" column, but the preceding expenses total $1,295, so it appears $1,295 is the total of Plaintiff's expenses rather than his support payment.
B. Complaint
1. Standard of Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court shall dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); see Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining Congress enacted predecessor statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) "to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none of the ordinary financial disincentives to filing meritless claims"). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) ("Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are 'so nutty,' 'delusional,' or 'wholly fanciful' as to be simply 'unbelievable.'"). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes "fantastic or delusional scenarios." Id. at 327-28.
In determining whether a complaint is frivolous, "a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the Plaintiff's allegations." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Rather, the court may find a complaint factually frivolous "when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them." Id. "The word 'frivolous' is inherently elastic and not susceptible to categorical definition. . . . The term's capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis, in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all factors bearing upon the frivolity of a claim." Nagy v. Fed. Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2004) (some internal quotation marks omitted). In making its frivolity determination, the court may "apply common sense." Nasim v. Warden., Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1995).
In order to state a claim on which relief may be granted, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Id. In the present case, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id.; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits; the district courts are not required "to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
2. Analysis
Plaintiff's complaint is based on "violation of fundamental rights," "constitutionality of statue," and "misrepresentation," and he cites Rule 5.2 - Privacy Protection for Filings, 4 C.F.R. § 22.25 - Protective Orders and in Camera Review, 28 USC 1331 - Federal Question, Rule 5.1 - Constitutional Challenge to a Statute, Rule 56 - Summary Judgment, and 22 U.S.C. 6401 - Violation of Religious Freedom. Compl. [DE-1-1] at 2-3. Plaintiff seeks annulment of his marriage from Defendant "based on misrepresentation, mental defect existing before the bonds of marriage, and incorrect form, etc. . . ." Id. at 3. Plaintiff asserts the court has removal jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, and federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. at 2. Plaintiff also filed a 132-page document entitled Amicus Curiae for the Petitioner, which appears to challenge the constitutionality of the marriage laws of North and South Carolina. [DE-5].
First, given that Plaintiff is seeking an annulment and domestic relations is traditionally an area of state concern, the court must assure itself of its jurisdiction over the matter. The Supreme Court has long recognized that certain "domestic relations" cases are excluded from the lower federal court's diversity jurisdiction. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 694 (1992) (affirming the domestic relations exception to the jurisdiction of lower federal courts that had been recognized for nearly a century and a half). "Falling within the scope of such exception are 'those cases where a federal court is asked to grant a decree of divorce or annulment . . . ." Falls v. Goldman Sachs Tr. Co., N.A., No. 5:16-CV-740-FL, 2017 WL 6453662, at *13 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 18, 2017) (quoting Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703 n.6). However, the Fourth Circuit has stated that the domestic-relations exception is a limit on diversity jurisdiction and "has no generally recognized application as a limitation on federal question jurisdiction." United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 700-01); see also Parsons v. McDaniel, 784 F. App'x 164, 165 (4th Cir. 2019) ("[W]e conclude that the district court incorrectly determined that the domestic relations exception articulated in Ankenbrandt prohibited it from exercising jurisdiction over the complaint, as that exception applies only to cases brought in diversity."); Reale v. Wake Cty. Human Servs., 480 F. App'x 195, 197 (4th Cir. 2012) (concluding that because the complaint was based on federal question rather than diversity jurisdiction, the domestic relations exception did not limit the court's jurisdiction). But see Johnson v. Byrd, No. 1:16CV1052, 2016 WL 6839410, at *12 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 21, 2016), aff'd, 693 F. App'x 219 (4th Cir. 2017) (concluding that "whether the domestic relations exception limits federal question jurisdiction remains an unsettled issue in this Circuit" because the Fourth Circuit's discussion of the domestic relations exception in Johnson was dicta, and Reale was unpublished and non-precedential). Here, because Plaintiff invokes the court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as opposed to diversity jurisdiction, the domestic relations exception does not clearly apply.
Plaintiff also attempts to invoke the court's removal jurisdiction, but § 1441 contemplates that a civil action brought in state court may be removed by a defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Thus, removal jurisdiction would not apply in this case where a defendant did not remove the case from state court.
The court has also considered whether abstention pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) is appropriate. See Parsons, 784 F. App'x at 165 (affirming court's abstention under Younger from exercising jurisdiction over § 1983 claim seeking the return of a child to her parents) (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (explaining that "[f]amily relations are a traditional area of state concern" and that the court is "unwilling to conclude that state processes are unequal to the task of accommodating the various interests and deciding the constitutional questions that may arise in child-welfare litigation")). However, Younger abstention contemplates the district court's deference to "an ongoing state judicial proceeding." Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Wilson, 519 F.3d 156, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). It is not apparent here that Plaintiff is attempting to terminate an ongoing state proceeding in favor of federal jurisdiction. Therefore, Younger abstention is not appropriate, and there appears to be no bar to the court's jurisdiction over Plaintiff's purported constitutional claims. See Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013) ("[A] federal court's obligation to hear and decide a case [within its jurisdiction] is virtually unflagging.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Next, the court considers whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a claim. A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This is necessary "in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). At the pleading stage, "while a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]" Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff's complaint contains only labels and conclusions, listing statutes and rules without any factual basis for his claims. Compl. [DE-1-1]. Plaintiff's Amicus Curiae filing, [DE-5], does not save his complaint. The court is not required to sift through more than one-hundred pages of documents to ferret out the factual basis of Plaintiff's complaint. See Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 79-80 (1st Cir. 2014) (affirming 12(b)(6) dismissal of claim "not well-pleaded"; "it is not [the court's] job, in an effort to ferret out the adequacy of a plaintiff's pleaded allegations, to haphazardly mine documents appended to a complaint."). Because Plaintiff's complaint fails to meet basic pleading standards, the complaint is subject to dismissal pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) for failure to state a claim.
Alternatively, Plaintiff's legal arguments have no basis in law. Plaintiff seeks an annulment from Defendant and appears to challenge the validity of their marriage and the constitutionality of the marriage laws of North and South Carolina. [DE-1-1]. The rules and statutes Plaintiff cites in his complaint provide no legal basis for his claim. [DE-1-1] at 2-3. Plaintiff's Amicus Curiae filing is a morass of definitions, case law, and religious teachings, asserted in a scattershot fashion, that fails to present a coherent legal argument to support Plaintiff's claim. Accordingly, because Plaintiff presents "an indisputably meritless legal theory," Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, his complaint is subject to dismissal pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
C. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, it is recommended that Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis be DENIED and the complaint be DISMISSED.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation to the respective parties IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on Plaintiff. You shall have until February 28, 2020 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D.N.C.
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).
Submitted, this the 14th day of February, 2020.
/s/_________
Robert B. Jones, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge