Summary
In LeMay, the clear wording of the general release provided that plaintiff discharged Mobil of all claims then in existence.
Summary of this case from Wild v. Finger Lakes Racing AssociationOpinion
November 10, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Ontario County, Wagner, J.
Present — Doerr, J.P., Green, Balio, Lawton and Schnepp, JJ.
Order, insofar as appealed from unanimously reversed, on the law without costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed, in accordance with the following memorandum: Defendant Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil), appeals from portions of an order denying its motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint as barred by a release (CPLR 3211 [a] [1], [5]), and denying its motion for partial summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claim for loss of pay as merged into the release (CPLR 3212 [e]). Plaintiff Clinton LeMay was injured on September 23, 1981 when a storage drum he was moving slipped on oil and water which Mobil allegedly allowed to accumulate on the floor of a trucking facility leased by Mobil in Canandaigua, New York. Mr. LeMay was a truck driver who was dispatched from a Mobil terminal in Old Bridge, New Jersey, to deliver products to the Mobil terminal in Canandaigua. When Mobil closed the Old Bridge terminal, Mr. LeMay and other employees filed an unfair labor practice charge against Mobil with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). On May 24, 1983, Mr. LeMay signed a general release in settlement of the NLRB action which released Mobil "from any and all claims * * * damages and liabilities, in law or in equity, the Releasors ever had, now have or hereafter can, shall or may have * * * except as may be expressly and specifically excluded herein". Mr. LeMay made no express exclusion. Plaintiffs commenced the instant action seeking damages for the injuries Mr. LeMay received as a result of the accident.
Special Term should have granted Mobil's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint as barred by the release. Where, as here, the language of a release is clear, effect will be given to the intention of the parties as indicated by the language employed and the fact that one of the parties may have intended something else is irrelevant (Matter of Schaefer, 18 N.Y.2d 314, 317; Single v Whitmore, 307 N.Y. 575; 19 N.Y. Jur 2d, Compromise, Accord and Release, § 77, at 425-426). Since at the time he executed the release plaintiff was aware of the injuries for which he now seeks compensation and failed to exclude his personal injury claim from the embrace of the release, the release bars the instant lawsuit and the complaint must be dismissed, whether New York or New Jersey law is applied (see, Mangini v McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d 556; Viskovich v Walsh-Fuller-Slattery, 16 A.D.2d 67, affd 13 N.Y.2d 1100; Bilotti v Accurate Forming Corp., 39 N.J. 184, 204, 184 A.2d 24, 35).