Opinion
No. 19-AP-145
01-23-2020
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF SEARCY. LeMasters v. Fleetwood.
{¶ 1} Defendant LaJuan Fleetwood has filed an affidavit pursuant to R.C. 2701.03 seeking to disqualify Judge Amy L. Searcy from presiding over any further proceedings in the above-referenced domestic-relations case.
{¶ 2} Mr. Fleetwood alleges that Judge Searcy is biased against him and has violated his constitutional rights by preventing him from having any contact with his children since 2017. Mr. Fleetwood also claims that the judge's various decisions show her partiality toward the plaintiff and that the judge has unreasonably delayed the case, engaged in ex parte communications, and misinterpreted the law and the parties' family-reunification agreement.
{¶ 3} Judge Searcy filed a response to the affidavit and denies any bias against Mr. Fleetwood. According to the judge, she has based her decisions on the law and the facts. She further states that family reunification is in the best interest of the children but that Mr. Fleetwood has failed to fulfill his duties under the reunification agreement. Judge Searcy acknowledges that the case has exceeded the case-management guidelines established by this court, but she has attempted to explain the reasons for some of those delays, including her efforts to facilitate a settlement.
{¶ 4} For the reasons explained below, no basis has been established to order the disqualification of Judge Searcy.
{¶ 5} First, the gravamen of Mr. Fleetwood's affidavit is his disagreement with Judge Searcy's various rulings, especially the judge's enforcement of a no-contact order between Mr. Fleetwood and his children and the judge's alleged misinterpretation of the reunification agreement. As previously explained in a similar domestic-relations matter:
Ours is a profession in which we turn to judges to resolve difficult questions in contentious matters. Adverse rulings, without more, are not evidence that a judge is biased or prejudiced.
I recognize that the affiant believes that her own health and the well-being of her child are at stake in the case before [the judge]. And she believes strongly that the judge has made multiple legal missteps over the course of many months. Her views—right or wrong—are no doubt sincerely held. Yet my statutory and constitutional authority to decide whether judges can serve fairly and impartially does not empower me to remove a trial or appellate judge from a case every time a party is particularly unhappy about a court ruling or series of rulings. Procedures exist by which appellate courts may review—and, if necessary, correct—rulings made by trial courts. Reviewing alleged legal errors is not my role under
the statutory provision that the affiant has repeatedly invoked.
In re Disqualification of Russo , 110 Ohio St.3d 1208, 2005-Ohio-7146, 850 N.E.2d 713, ¶ 5-6. This is not the appropriate forum in which to determine the propriety of Judge Searcy's legal rulings, and therefore Mr. Fleetwood's dissatisfaction with those rulings cannot be evidence of judicial bias or prejudice.
{¶ 6} Second, "[a]n alleged ex parte communication constitutes grounds for disqualification when there is ‘proof that the communication * * * addressed substantive matters in the pending case.’ " (Ellipsis sic.) In re Disqualification of Forsthoefel , 135 Ohio St.3d 1316, 2013-Ohio-2292, 989 N.E.2d 62, ¶ 7, quoting In re Disqualification of Calabrese , 100 Ohio St.3d 1224, 2002-Ohio-7475, 798 N.E.2d 10, ¶ 2. But "[t]he allegations must be substantiated and consist of something more than hearsay or speculation." Id. Here, Mr. Fleetwood alleges that Judge Searcy engaged in an ex parte communication when she granted two of the plaintiff's 2018 requests for a continuance. Without more, Mr. Fleetwood has failed to establish that Judge Searcy engaged in any improper ex parte communication about a substantive matter in the case. Therefore, this allegation does not support the judge's removal.
{¶ 7} Third, although a judge's neglect or unreasonable delay in a case could be a reason to disqualify the judge, Mr. Fleetwood has not established that Judge Searcy's actions or inaction mandate her removal—especially considering some of the reasons for the delay set forth in Judge Searcy's response to the affidavit. The record does not support a determination that the judge's actions have been so egregious that she has neglected her judicial duties such that she should be removed for unreasonably delaying the case. See In re Disqualification of Collier-Williams , 150 Ohio St.3d 1286, 2017-Ohio-5718, 83 N.E.3d 928, ¶ 7-8. To the extent that any issues remain unresolved, Judge Searcy should expeditiously resolve those issues and assist with the family's reunification, which Judge Searcy acknowledges is in the best interest of the children.
{¶ 8} "A judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these presumptions." In re Disqualification of George , 100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5. Those presumptions have not been overcome in this case.
{¶ 9} The affidavit of disqualification is denied. The case may proceed before Judge Searcy.