Opinion
October 13, 1932.
January 25, 1933.
Negligence — Taxicabs — Rear end collision — Passenger — Injury of — Evidence.
In an action of trespass by a passenger against two operators of taxicabs to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in a collision between their cabs on a city street, the plaintiff's evidence established that the cabs were proceeding in the same direction on a one-way street and that the cab in which he was a passenger was following the other cab. The taxicab occupied by the plaintiff was moving at a rate of twenty-five miles per hour while the other cab was proceeding at a speed of twelve to fifteen miles per hour.
The driver of the cab in advance, to avoid running over an obstacle in the street, put out his hand, signalled for a stop, and brought his car to a stop at the left curb. The vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger was unable to stop and it collided with the rear of the other cab and the plaintiff was injured. The accident happened on a clear day, the pavement was dry, and there was not any other traffic in the vicinity or anything to interfere with the vision of the driver of the cab in the rear.
In such case, the question of the negligence of each of the defendants was for the judge sitting without a jury and the judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff against the operator of the cab in which he was a passenger will be sustained.
Where two individuals are driving automobiles in the same direction on a city street, it is the duty of the operator of the car in the rear to so regulate the speed of his car as to prevent a rear end collision.
Appeals — Motion for judgment non obstante veredicto — Refusal of.
In reviewing the refusal of a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, the evidence and inferences therefrom favorable to the plaintiff must be taken as true and all unfavorable to him as depending solely on testimony must be rejected.
Appeal No. 307, October T., 1932, by David Chernikow, from judgment of M.C., Philadelphia County, September T., 1931, No. 696, in the case of William D. Lelar v. Quaker City Cabs, Inc., a corporation, and David Chernikow.
Before TREXLER, P.J., KELLER, GAWTHROP, CUNNINGHAM, BALDRIGE, STADTFELD and PARKER, JJ. Affirmed.
Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before CRANE, J., without a jury.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.
Finding for the plaintiff against David Chernikow in the sum of $458 and judgment entered thereon. David Chernikow appealed.
Error assigned, among others, was the refusal of defendant's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto.
Harry E. Kalodner, for appellant.
Robert H. Arronson, and with him Joseph Margolis, for appellee.
Submitted October 13, 1932.
This action was brought to recover damages for injuries suffered by the plaintiff by reason of a collision between two taxicabs operated by the respective defendants. The case having been tried in the municipal court of Philadelphia before a judge without a jury, a judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant David Chernikow and in favor of the defendant Quaker City Cabs, Inc. Motions were made by the defendant Chernikow for a new trial and for judgment n.o.v. These motions having been refused, an appeal was taken to this court, and the errors assigned were the refusals of the two motions.
We must give the same weight to the findings of facts by the trial court as to the verdict of the jury: McDonald Const. Co. v. Gill, 285 Pa. 305. "Unless requests for findings of fact are presented to the trial judge, the disposition of questions of fact arising from the testimony would have the same effect and should be treated in the same manner as though the evidence had been submitted to a jury at common law. This court will not disturb the conclusions of the judge when based on proper evidence or inferences fairly deducible from such evidence": Herring v. Weinroth, 61 Pa. Super. 529, 531. An examination of the evidence shows that the conclusions reached by the lower court are amply sustained by competent evidence.
The prime reasons given by counsel in support of this appeal are that the judgment was contrary to the evidence and the law. In reviewing the refusal of the motion for judgment n.o.v., the evidence and inferences therefrom favorable to the plaintiff must be taken as true and all unfavorable to him as depending solely on testimony must be rejected: Dunbar v. Preston, 285 Pa. 502, 504.
So viewing the evidence, we will refer to the facts which support the verdict. On a clear day, the Quaker City cab was proceeding in a westerly direction on the south side of Walnut Street, a one-way street, at a rate of 12 or 15 miles per hour. A passenger, who was riding in a car in advance of this taxicab, lost his hat and it fell into the street. The driver of the Quaker City cab, to avoid running over the hat, put out his hand, signalled for a stop, and brought his car to a stop at the left curb, when a taxicab of the defendant Chernikow, in which the plaintiff was riding and which was proceeding in the same direction, collided with the rear of the Quaker City cab. The plaintiff was thrown from his seat and through a glass window, causing severe cuts, a sear, and other injuries. Just prior to the collision, the cab of Chernikow was moving at the rate of 25 miles per hour and was traveling within ten feet of the Quaker City cab. It was a clear day, the pavement was dry, and there was not any other traffic in the vicinity or anything to interfere with the vision of the driver of the cab in the rear. The driver of the Chernikow cab was unable to bring his car to a stop and did not turn to the right in time to avoid the collision. This situation, under our cases, furnished ample basis for the judgment entered.
"No person shall drive any vehicle upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead": Act May 1, 1929, P.L. 905, Art. X, Par. 1002, 73 Purdon Ann. 178. Where two individuals are driving automobiles in the same direction on a city street, it is the duty of the operator of the car in the rear to so regulate the speed of his car as to prevent a rear end collision: Zandras v. Moffett, 286 Pa. 477; Lang v. Hanlon, 302 Pa. 173, 177; McIlhenny v. Baker, 63 Pa. Super. 385; Cormican v. Menke, 306 Pa. 156, 159; Milliken v. United Laundries, 105 Pa. Super. 286.
A considerable portion of the argument of the appellant is devoted to the contention that judgment should have been entered against the Quaker City Cabs, Inc. The answer to this contention is that the court below, on the evidence, found that it was not negligent. Even though both defendants had been negligent, such fact would not relieve the appellant.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.