Opinion
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
D.C. No. CV-97-00267-LKK
Editorial Note:This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Lawrence K. Karlton, Chief Judge, Presiding.
Before WALLACE, FERNANDEZ, and MCKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
California state prisoner William W. Legg, III, appeals pro se the district court's summary judgment for prison officials in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims alleging that prison officials violated his first amendment rights by interfering with his practice of the Wicca religion and refusing to deliver sexually-explicit magazines that he had ordered by mail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, see Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 852 (9th Cir.1998), and we affirm.
Because there is no material dispute showing that the prison's regulations banning obscene materials were not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, the district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants as to Legg's magazine claim. See Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1058-59 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc). Furthermore, because Legg did not submit evidence showing that defendants's refusal to deliver to him the braid of hair constituted a substantial burden on his free exercise of his religion, the district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on this claim. See Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir.1998).
We conclude that the district court did not err by denying Legg's motion for declaratory judgment and converting it into a motion for summary judgment because both parties submitted, and the district court relied upon, evidence outside the pleadings. Cf. Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that a district court must convert motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment if district court relies upon materials outside the pleadings).
Because this case did not involve exceptional circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Legg's request for appointment of counsel. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir.1980) (per curiam). We further conclude that the district court did not err by denying Legg's motions for assistance of another prisoner at trial or to supplement the pleadings.
AFFIRMED.