Opinion
NO. 03-12-00046-CV
11-21-2012
Lori L. Legere, Appellant v. David Legere, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 261ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. D-1-FM-03-007363, HONORABLE RHONDA HURLEY, JUDGE PRESIDING
ORDER
PER CURIAM
On original submission, we issued an opinion affirming the district court's order denying the claims of appellant Lori L. Legere to child support and discovery sanctions against her ex-husband, David Legere, and instead awarding attorney's fees against her. See Legere v. Legere, No. 03-12-00046-CV, 2012 WL 3793164 (Tex. App.—Austin, Aug. 29, 2012) (no pet. h.). Central to our analysis was Lori's failure to obtain a reporter's record reflecting the evidence heard below. Id. at *2-3. Although the district court's order suggested otherwise, Lori indicated in her brief that no record had been prepared because "there was no hearing conducted in which a court reporter was present."
Lori has now filed a "motion for rehearing" indicating that she had been mistaken about a court reporter being present at the hearing, asserting that a "short record was found" after all, and requesting that she be allowed to provide us that record and that we re-evaluate her appellate issues in light of it. She further complains that this Court erred in failing to give her the notice and opportunity to cure required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 37.3(c). TRAP 37.3(c) applies in a circumstance where the clerk's record has been filed but the reporter's record has not because the appellant failed to request or pay for it. It allows an appellate court to decide those issues or points in a case that do not require a reporter's record, if it first gives the appellant notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure the omission of the reporters record. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c).
We question whether TRAP 37.3(c)'s notice and opportunity-to-cure requirements apply under the circumstances here, where, among other things, the appellant has affirmatively asserted to the appellate court that no reporter's record exists. Nevertheless, consistent with the Texas Supreme Court's expressed preference that lower courts resolve appeals based on the merits rather than procedural technicalities, we order Lori to secure the filing of the reporter's record with this Court by December 5, 2012, whereupon we will proceed to consider the merits of her rehearing motion in accordance with Tex. R. App. P. 49.
It is ordered November 21, 2012. Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton and Henson
See, e.g., Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752, 756 (Tex. 2012) (noting supreme court prefers "merits determination to a procedural forfeit") (citing Holt Atherton Indus. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 86 (Tex. 1992) ("[A]n adjudication on the merits is preferred in Texas.")); Marino v. King, 355 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2011) ("Constitutional imperatives favor the determination of cases on their merits rather than on harmless procedural defaults."); In re K.C.B., 251 S.W.3d 514, 517 (Tex. 2008) (noting that "justice is not served when a case like this, ripe for determination on the merits, is decided on 'a procedural technicality' that can easily be corrected." (quoting Silk v. Terrill, 898 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.1995) (per curiam)); Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 53 S.W.3d 347, 351 (Tex. 2001) (noting supreme court's "consistent[] and vigorous[]" rejection of denying appellate review on the merits); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 211 (Tex. 2001) (noting that dismissal for procedural reasons "elevates form over substance and hinders parties' rights to have the merits of their claims considered").