Opinion
No. 5-564 / 04-1125
Filed August 17, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Charles L. Smith III, Judge.
Christopher Ray LeGear appeals the dismissal of his second postconviction relief application. AFFIRMED.
Clemens A. Erdahl, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard J. Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, Matt Wilber, County Attorney, and Margaret Popp Reyes, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Miller, JJ.
The postconviction relief applicant, Christopher Ray LeGear, appeals the district court's summary dismissal of his application. Specifically, he contends the district court erred in finding his claims were time barred under Iowa Code section 822.3 (2003). We affirm.
I. Background Facts Proceedings.
Chris LeGear was convicted of first-degree murder on June 28, 1982. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed his conviction in March 1984. State v. LeGear, 346 N.W.2d 21 (Iowa 1984). Procedendo in the direct appeal was issued on April 12, 1984. Thereafter, LeGear filed his first application for postconviction relief. His application was denied, and the denial of postconviction relief was subsequently affirmed on appeal on May 24, 1990. Following the denial of his state postconviction action, he unsuccessfully pursued federal habeas corpus relief. After exhausting his federal remedies, he filed a second application for state postconviction relief on September 12, 1996. The district court summarily dismissed his application as being time barred pursuant to Iowa Code section 822.3. On appeal, this court reversed the district court's dismissal of the application because LeGear was not provided adequate notice and an opportunity to respond and the trial court failed to make a record of the proceedings. On February 28, 2003, following remand to the district court, LeGear filed a second amended and substituted application for postconviction relief. He again amended his application on May 9, 2003. The State filed for summary judgment on April 7, 2004, asserting LeGear's claims were time barred. On June 25, 2004, the district court granted the State's motion and dismissed LeGear's application for postconviction relief. The district court determined LeGear's claims were barred by the statute of limitations contained in section 822.3 and that many of the issues raised were precluded by section 822.8 because they had been previously raised. LeGear appeals.
II. Standard of Review.
Dismissal of an application for postconviction relief is reviewed to correct errors of law. Brown v. State, 589 N.W.2d 273, 274 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). Thus, we will affirm if the district court's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and the law was correctly applied. Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 520 (Iowa 2003).
III. The Merits.
Iowa Code section 822.3 provides, in pertinent part:
All other [postconviction relief] applications must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued. However, this limitation does not apply to a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period.
It is clear our legislature promulgated section 822.3 with the intent to "conserve judicial resources, promote substantive goals of criminal law, foster rehabilitation, and restore a sense of repose in our criminal judicial system." Cornell v. State, 529 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Iowa 1994). Consequently, our appellate courts have previously held an applicant cannot circumvent the three-year limitations period simply by claiming ineffective assistance of appellate or postconviction counsel. See id.; see also Dible v. State, 557 N.W.2d 881, 883-84 (Iowa 1996) (abrogated on other grounds by Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 521); Wilkens v. State, 522 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa 1994); Smith v. State, 542 N.W.2d 853, 854 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). Rather, the exception to the limitations period only applies to situations in which the applicant had "no opportunity" to assert the claim before the expiration of the limitations period. Wilkens, 522 N.W.2d at 823-24. In his brief, LeGear recognizes the long line of cases precluding a defendant from relying on the ineffectiveness of counsel to circumvent the three-year bar. However, he contends his case is distinguishable because, unlike the defendants in other cases, he did raise these issues within the limitations period, but the issues were never fully litigated due to the ineffectiveness of his counsel. We disagree that this case is distinguishable. Consequently, LeGear has failed to establish a "ground of fact" that could not have been raised within the three-year period. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err in finding LeGear's second postconviction relief action was untimely and affirm the dismissal of his application.