Opinion
Case No. 1:19-cv-0055-SPB-RAL
06-10-2021
PATRICK LEE, Plaintiff v. MURRAY WAKEMAN and, EURO LINK LOGISTIC, Defendants & Third Party Plaintiffs, v. TRIPLE D SUPPLY, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY and FRANKLIN M. DAVILLA, Third Party Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS DAVILLA AND TRIPLE D SUPPLY, LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ECF No. 89
I. Introduction
This personal injury action arises out of an accident involving three commercial tractor trailers traveling one behind the other on Interstate 90 in Erie County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff Patrick Lee, the driver of the second vehicle in the line, asserts negligence claims against Defendant Murray Wakeman, the operator of the truck that collided with the rear of his truck, as well as against Defendant/Third-Party Defendant Frank DaVilla, the driver of the lead truck, who suddenly decelerated or stopped in the highway. Lee also asserts claims against the employer of each driver based on theories of respondeat superior and negligent entrustment.
DaVilla and his employer, Triple D Supply, LLC, have filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, arguing that the record does not support liability against either of them and that the Court should find Wakeman negligent as a matter of law. Because genuine issues of material fact remain regarding each of these assertions, the Court the Court must deny the motion.
II. Procedural History
Lee commenced this action against Wakeman and his employer, Euro Link Logistic, in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Pennsylvania (Civil Action No. 2019-10429). Wakeman and Euro Link Logistic filed a timely notice of removal of the action to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. ECF No. 1-1, p. 4. Wakeman and Euro Link Logistic later filed a third-party complaint for contribution and indemnity against DaVilla and Triple D based on allegations that DaVilla's "sudden, unexpected and abrupt application of his brakes" was unreasonable and contributed to the accident. ECF No. 45, ¶¶ 12, 13. Thereafter, Lee filed his First Amended Complaint, which asserted direct liability against DaVilla and Triple D. ECF Nos. 50, 52, 53. Arch Insurance Company later intervened as a plaintiff based upon its worker's compensation lien and subrogation interest. ECF Nos. 71, 77.
DaVilla and Triple D filed the pending motion for summary judgment with supporting documents on November 30, 2020. ECF Nos. 89-91. Euro Link Logistic and Wakeman have responded to the motion, ECF Nos. 93-95, as has Lee, ECF Nos. 97-100, 102, joined by Arch Insurance. ECF No. 101. DaVilla and Triple D filed a reply brief. ECF No. 103. Lee submitted a sur-reply. ECF No. 108. The Court conducted oral argument on the motion on May 25, 2021. ECF No. 110. The motion is ripe for disposition.
III. Material Facts
The following factual assertions are taken from the parties' respective concise statements of material fact and the exhibits thereto. Disputed facts and conflicting deposition testimony are noted.
The accident giving rise to this case occurred on February 12, 2018, at approximately 1:42 p.m. Immediately prior to the accident, DaVilla, Lee, and Wakeman were driving their respective commercial tractor trailers in the right lane of the eastbound lanes of Interstate 90 in Erie County, Pennsylvania. DaVilla's vehicle was in the lead position, followed by Lee's truck. Wakeman's vehicle was following behind Lee. This area of Interstate 90 is a four-lane highway with east and westbound lanes separated by a grassy median. After the accident, Pennsylvania State Trooper Jarrett Hryniszak arrived on the scene and took witness statements from each driver, a non-party witness Kimberly Snyder, and another witness which he included in his police report.
A. DaVilla's Description of the Accident
DaVilla testified at his deposition that his truck was traveling on cruise control at an approximate speed of fifty-seven miles per hour when he observed a dog in the median of the highway, about 100 feet ahead of him. He further testified that he reacted to the presence of the dog by tapping his brakes to turn off the cruise control, engaging his four-way flashers, and beginning to slow down. He asserted that he continued to watch the dog until he saw it jump over the guardrail. According to DaVilla, a person later identified as Kimberly Snyder was following "right behind" the dog. In response to this development, DaVilla locked up his rear brakes and caused his truck to enter a "straight skid, controlled skid for a short time." DaVilla then let off his brakes to release the skid. As he did so, a car operated by a nonparty was traveling next to him in the left/passing lane. According to DaVilla, he had slowed his vehicle to approximately thirty to thirty-five miles per hour when Lee's truck struck his truck from behind. Following this "first impact," he brought his vehicle to a compete stop. As DaVilla prepared to get out of his truck, he felt a second impact to the rear of his truck caused by Wakeman's truck colliding with Lee's truck and pushing or propelling it into the rear of his vehicle a second time. DaVilla's statement to Trooper Hryniszak on the day of the accident was materially consistent with his deposition testimony.
B. Lee's Description of the Accident
Lee testified that his truck was approximately one-quarter mile behind DaVilla's vehicle and traveling at approximately sixty-two to sixty-five miles per hour when he observed DaVilla's "brake lights come on." Lee did not see what caused DaVilla to hit his brakes, but he did observe "the back of his trailer started jumping," which indicated to Lee that DaVilla was either "hard braking, or he has an empty trailer and he's applying his brakes." This prompted Lee to downshift to slow his truck and ultimately bring it to a complete stop approximately six feet behind DaVilla's vehicle. Thus, contrary to DaVilla's testimony, Lee asserts that he did not collide with the rear of DaVilla's truck. In other words, he disputes the "first impact" described by DaVilla. According to Lee, approximately thirty seconds after he had stopped his truck behind DaVilla's vehicle, he observed Wakeman's truck in his mirror approaching at a high rate of speed. Wakeman's truck collided with the back of Lee's trailer, pushing the cab of Lee's truck into the rear of DaVilla's trailer. The statement Lee provided to Hryniszak on the day of the accident was consistent with his deposition testimony, except that Lee told Hryniszak that he observed a woman in the median prior to the impact.
C. Wakeman's Description of the Accident
Wakeman testified that he had been following Lee's truck for approximately half an hour before the accident. During that time, he had attempted to pass Lee once or twice. As he again approached the rear of Lee's vehicle, he moved into the left lane to pass Lee. As the nose of Wakeman's tractor approached the front of Lee's trailer, he saw another truck in front of Lee and decided to slow down and return to the right lane. Wakeman checked his mirror to see whether it was clear and started moving into the right lane, at which point he believes he saw something in his peripheral vision. When he again looked ahead, he observed Lee's truck stopped in the highway. Wakeman estimates that his truck was within forty feet (or a half-truck length) of Lee's truck when he looked ahead and saw it. Three seconds or less later, his truck collided with the rear of Lee's trailer at a speed of approximately sixty-three miles per hour. Wakeman said it looked and felt like Lee was stopped when he hit him. Trooper Hryniszak issued Wakeman a citation for violating Section 3310(b) of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code. ECF No. 90-1, p. 4; ECF No. 90-1, p. 37:2-24.
"(a) General rule.--The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway. (b) Combinations of vehicles and trucks.--The driver of any motor vehicle drawing another vehicle or of any truck when traveling upon a roadway outside of an urban district and following a motor vehicle drawing another vehicle or following a truck shall, whenever conditions permit, leave sufficient space so that an overtaking vehicle may enter and occupy the space without danger, except that this subsection does not prevent a motor vehicle drawing another vehicle or prevent a truck from overtaking and passing any vehicle or combination of vehicles." 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3310.
D. Kimberly Snyder's Description of the Accident
Kimberly Snyder witnessed the accident. She was driving west on I-90 when she saw a dog and pulled her car over to the right westbound shoulder. She existed her vehicle and then saw the dog run across the median and get hit by a semi-truck. She witnessed the accident at issue shortly thereafter while she was standing behind her car on the shoulder. She could not tell which vehicles collided or in what order. Afterwards, she walked down the shoulder of the westbound lanes along the median to see what had happened. She testified, however, that she never entered the grassy area of the median. Her deposition is mostly consistent with the information she reported to Hyrniszak as related in his report of her telephone interview the day after the accident, but Hyrniszak's report does record that she told him that she went into the median area to observe the scene after the crash.
E. Disputed Facts
As the foregoing summaries reflect, conflicts exist among the versions of the accidents related by the three drivers and Ms. Snyder. The conflicts include whether the dog alone approached or entered the eastbound lanes of I-90 or whether Snyder followed closely behind the dog, indicting a risk that she too might enter the eastbound lanes. Snyder testified that she never even entered the grassy median, let alone crossed the median and approached the eastbound lanes. In contrast, DaVilla testified that when the dog jumped the guardrail and entered the eastbound lanes, Snyder was "right behind" it.
Conflicting testimony also exists regarding the crash itself. For example, Lee and DaVilla disagree regarding the first impact. Lee testified that he had completely stopped his truck approximately six feet behind DaVilla's fully stopped truck when Wakeman rear-ended his truck and pushed it into DaVilla's truck. In contrast, DaVilla testified that Lee initially collided with him while he was slowing down but still moving at a speed of 30 to 35 miles per hour. DaVilla said that shortly after this first impact, he felt another collision with his truck.
DaVilla and Wakeman's testimony also conflicts regarding matters of timing and distances. Lee testified that approximately 30 seconds elapsed between when he stopped his truck and when Wakeman struck him from behind. In contrast, Wakeman said he only saw Lee's truck stopped in front of him for less than three seconds before the impact. As to distance, Lee testified that he first saw DaVilla begin slowing down a quarter of a mile ahead of him. In contrast, Wakeman said the nose of his tractor was just at the front of Lee's trailer when he backed off his passing maneuver and began merging into the right lane behind Lee, leaving only forty feet between his truck Lee's truck when he observed it stopped in the highway.
IV. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to enter summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under this standard "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A disputed fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S. Ct. 2505; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988), To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Further, under Rule 56, a defendant may seek summary judgment by pointing to the absence of a genuine fact issue on one or more essential claim elements. The Rule mandates summary judgment if the plaintiff then fails to make a sufficient showing on each of those elements. When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548. See also Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992).
The parties apparently agree that Pennsylvania law applies to this diversity action, as they cite exclusively Pennsylvania law or federal cases applying such law in their respective briefs. See Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 399 F.Supp.2d 607, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2005) ("If the parties have agreed to the applicable law, that agreed-upon law shall generally be given effect.") (citations omitted).
A. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Preclude Summary Judgment in Favor of DaVilla and Triple D Supply.
DaVilla and Triple D argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the record cannot support a jury's finding that DaVilla was negligent in the operation of his vehicle or that any negligence on his part caused or contributed to the accident and Lee's injuries. To hold a defendant liable for negligence, the plaintiff must prove the following four elements: (1) a legally recognized duty that the defendant conform to a standard of care; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) causation between the conduct and the result injury; and (4) actual damage to the plaintiff. See Truax v. Roulhac, 2015 Pa. Super. 217, 126 A.3d 991, 997 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). The existence of a legal duty is a question of law for the court to decide. See R.W. v. Manzek, 585 Pa. 335, 345, 888 A.2d 740, 746 (Pa. 2005). Whether the defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances is normally a question for the jury. See Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 595, 397 A.2d 111, 114 (Pa. 1977). Similarly, "causation is normally a question of fact for the jury...." Hamil v. Basbline, 481 Pa. 256, 266, 392 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Pa. 1978).
The existence of DaVilla's duty to use reasonable case in the operation of his vehicle is not at issue. Wakeman argues that DaVilla breached this duty when he stopped suddenly on the highway in response to the presence of a dog. ECF No. 93, p. 5. In support of his position, Wakeman cites Chadwick v. Popadick (Chadwick I), 390 Pa. 511, 515 (Pa. 1957), wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that, "[t]he driver of the leading car in a procession of 3 or 4 cars is charged with the responsibility of driving in a manner which will avoid a telescopic crash in the event he should suddenly stop." In Chadwick I, four cars were driving along a highway when Popadick—driving the car in the second position—passed the lead car and then merged into the lane directly in front of Chadwick's car. Id. at 513. After traveling about 150 feet, Popadick stopped suddenly to admire deer grazing in a field beside the road. Id. Chadwick—now in the second position—applied his brakes, but before he could stop, Chadwick was struck from behind by Simones—the car in the third position. Id. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that Popadick was not negligent, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, finding that under the circumstances this was a question for the jury. Id. at 513-14. The Court reasoned that "Popadick knew that he was a link in a four-link traffic chain. So long as he remained an integral part of that travelling unit, he knew or should know that any unusual action on his part would affect the rest of the chain." Id., 514. Popadick's brake lights were the only signal that he was stopping, and this was insufficient to warn Chadwick in the second position and especially Simones in the third (who could not see Popadick's brake lights). Id. Pennsylvania courts have since reiterated that "[u]nder certain circumstances, an abrupt stop by a forward vehicle, which allows neither sufficient time nor sufficient distance for a vehicle in the rear to stop, may render the driver of the forward vehicle negligent or contributorily negligent." Toff v. Rohde, 208 Pa. Super. 411, 413-14, 222 A.2d 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966). In Toff, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ordered a new trial when it determined that the trial court had erred in not instructing the jury "as to plaintiff's contributory negligence" when "[t]he lines of cars in advance of plaintiff came to a halt, and [plaintiff] hastily applied his brakes" and the "driver of the third automobile in the chain, immediately struck the rear of plaintiff's car." Id. at 413. Based on the foregoing Pennsylvania case law, DaVilla had a duty to the drivers of vehicles following him to exercise reasonable care in braking and stopping on the highway.
DaVilla points out that Wakeman's collision with the rear of Lee's truck provides compelling support for a finding that Wakeman failed to operate his truck in a manner that would have allowed him to stop within the assured clear distance ahead of him. DaVilla is correct that the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code makes it unlawful to operate a motor vehicle "at a speed greater than will permit the driver to bring his vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead." 75 Pa.C.S. § 3361.
A finding that Wakeman violated this obligation, however, does not preclude a finding that DaVilla also acted negligently and that his negligence contributed to the accident. See Bongard v. Korn, 1993 WL 120330 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1993). Indeed, Michael O'Dell— DaVilla's highway safety expert—did not testify that Wakeman was the sole cause of the accident, but that he was the "primary cause" and that his failures to follow the appropriate standard of care "were contributing causes of the subject crash." Like this case, the dispute in Bongard arose out of an accident that occurred when the plaintiff stopped her vehicle suddenly in response to traffic conditions and was rear-ended by the defendant. The defendant argued that the plaintiff hit the cars in front of her first, which "shortened" the assured clear distance in which the defendant had to stop his car. Id. at *5. The jury found the plaintiff 40% negligent and the defendant 60% negligent. The district court denied the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court held that the testimony and physical evidence adduced at trial were sufficient for a jury to find that the lead driver's "actions in stopping her vehicle were negligent" and "may have contributed causally to the collision...". Id. at *6.
The Court acknowledges that the logic of this assertion is questionable and arguably inconsistent with the "assured clear distance" rule, discussed infra.
In the present case, the record could support a jury's finding that DaVilla knew or should have known that he was one of multiple vehicles traveling in succession on the highway. The testimony is conflicting regarding whether DaVilla reduced his speed reasonably in response to conditions, or unnecessarily initiated an emergency stop with knowledge that other vehicles were following close behind. Material issues of fact also exist regarding the relative position of Snyder prior to DaVilla's deceleration. This is likely to be an important factor for the jury to consider in evaluating the reasonableness of DaVilla actions. As in Bongard, the jury may reasonably conclude that DaVilla's actions were negligent and contributed to the accident. As the Bongard court stated:
"[T]he manner in which an individual stops when faced with the necessity of bringing an automobile to a stop must be reasonable. Individuals breaking to [sic] early, too late, or too hard may act unreasonably and may therefore be negligent or contributorily negligent."Id. at *6.
DaVilla also argues that the "sudden emergency doctrine" applies to absolve him of any potential liability in this action. The sudden emergency doctrine "recognizes that a driver who, although driving in a prudent manner, is confronted with a sudden or unexpected event which leaves little or no time to apprehend a situation and act accordingly should not be subject to liability simply because another perhaps more prudent course of action was available." Levey v. DeNardo, 555 Pa. 514, 518-19, 725 A.2d 733, 735-36 (Pa. 1999). The sudden emergency doctrine is available where four requirements are met: the individual "suddenly and unexpectedly finds himself confronted with a perilous situation[, (2) ] that permits no opportunity to assess the danger[, (3) if he] respond[s] appropriately[, and (4) ]...proves that he did not create the emergency." Drew v. Work, 95 A.3d 324, 334, 2014 Pa. Super. 137 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting McKee by McKee v. Evans, 380 Pa. Super. 120, 551 A.2d 260, 272-73 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (en banc)). This doctrine does not apply "if that person was himself driving carelessly or recklessly." Levey, 555 Pa. at 518-19. The sudden emergency doctrine does not eliminate a party's duty to act with reasonable care, but instead it relaxes a party's standard of care from the "usual degree of care" to "an honest exercise of judgment" for a driver "confronted with a perilous situation requiring a quick response in order to avoid a collision." Levey, 555 Pa. at 518-19 (quoting Lockhart v. List, 542 Pa. 141, 665 A.2d 1176, 1179 (Pa. 1995)). This is why even where the Court concludes that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine, it does not necessarily follow that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment. The existence, nature, and severity of the emergency situation confronting the driver are relevant factors in determining whether he or she acted appropriately under the circumstances.
Wakeman also invokes the sudden emergency doctrine as a defense.
Here, disputed issues of fact affect the application of these factors, including the nature of the emergency confronted by DaVilla. A jury may reasonably evaluate a driver's response to a person's presence in the immediate area of a highway differently than that of an animal. As noted, the location of Snyder relative to the eastbound lanes of the highway is genuinely in dispute. DaVilla's testimony places Snyder "right behind" the dog as it jumped the guardrail between the median and the eastbound lanes. In contrast, Snyder testified that she never entered the median and remained on the westbound shoulder at the time of the accident. O'Dell acknowledged in his deposition that a driver faced with only a dog in the road should hit the dog if the alternative is an emergency stop that risks a loss of control, collision, or other accident. Indeed, in rendering his opinion that DaVilla acted reasonably under the circumstances, O'Dell assumed the accuracy of DaVilla's testimony concerning the location of Snyder as a factor relevant to evaluating his actions. However, DaVilla's testimony on that issue is in dispute such that a jury may find that Snyder's distance from the eastbound lanes of I-90 did not present a risk of her entering those lanes. Under Pennsylvania law, a jury may also find that DaVilla's response to the risk of hitting an animal was not reasonable and was a contributing factor to the accident. "Where the evidence leaves some doubt as to whether an emergency situation existed...it is incumbent upon the trial court to submit the issue to the jury for its determination.'' Drew, 95 A.3d at 330 (quoting Buchecker v. Reading Co., 271 Pa. Super. 35, 412 A.2d 147, 155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)).
Because Pennsylvania law and the present record require that considerations of the sudden emergency doctrine and its effect upon the standard of care be left to the jury, DaVilla and Triple D's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability must be denied.
B. The Record Does Not Permit the Entry of Summary Judgment Against Wakeman On the Issue of Negligence Per Se.
DaVilla and Triple D's motion also requests that the Court find Wakeman negligent as a matter of law. While the Court agrees that the record provides strong, if not compelling support, for such a finding, the record is not conclusive of the issue such that the Court may remove it from the jury's consideration.
DaVilla and Triple D argue that the record establishes that Wakeman was negligent per se in the operation of his tractor trailer. Pennsylvania courts have defined negligence per se as "conduct, whether of act or omission, which may be declared and treated as negligence without any argument or proof as to the particular surrounding circumstances." Ramalingam v. Keller Williams Realty Grp., Inc., 121 A.3d 1034, 1042 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (quoting Schemberg v. Smicherko, 85 A.3d 1071, 1073 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014)). Negligence per se is not a distinct cause of action but rather an evidentiary presumption that a defendant's violation of a legislative or regulatory enactment constitutes proof of a breach of duty. Deitrick v. Costa, 2015 WL 1606641, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2015) (citing Daniel Boone Area Sch. Dist. v. Lehman Bros., 187 F. Supp. 2d 400, 407 (W.D. Pa. 2002) ("The effect of such a rule is to stamp the defendants conduct as negligence, with all the effects of common law negligence, but with no greater effect.")). "To establish the evidentiary presumption, ... the statute or regulation must clearly apply to the conduct of the defendant..." Deitrick, 2015 WL 1606641, at *12 (citing Cecile Indus., Inc. v. United States, 793 F.2d 97, 99 (3d Cir. 1986)). Although the concept of negligence per se establishes both duty and the breach of duty elements of the claim, it does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of establishing causation. Id. (citing Cabiroy v. Scipione, 767 A.2d 1078, 1079 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)).
DaVilla and Triple D argue that Wakeman was negligent per se because he "follow[ed] another vehicle more closely than ... reasonable and prudent" given the circumstances as prescribed in 75 Pa.C.S. § 3310(a), and operated his truck "a speed greater than will permit [him] to bring his vehicle to a stop with the assured clear distance ahead" in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3361. ECF No. 89, pp. 8-10. In fact, Trooper Hryniszak issued a citation to DaVilla for violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3310(b). Subsection (b) of § 3310 is similar in language to subsection (a) except that it applies specifically to trucks and vehicles hauling other vehicles. DaVilla pled guilty to the citation and paid the associated fine. Unlike in Pennsylvania state court, these facts are likely to be admissible at trial as evidence of DaVilla's culpability. See Malantonio v. Boyle, 2017 WL 633997, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2017) (holding that the Pennsylvania state procedural rule that pleas of guilty to traffic citations are inadmissible does not apply in a federal diversity action, and under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the plea of guilty is admissible) (citing Rain v. Pavkov, 357 F.2d 506, 509 (3d Cir. 1962)).
Although DaVilla and Triple D rely on § 3361 as the statutory basis for their negligence per se argument and Trooper Hryniszak cited Wakeman for violating § 3310(b), the substantive obligations imposed by each are analogous such that the negligence per se analysis is the same for each.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that for violation of a statute to establish negligence per se, that statute "would have to be so specific as to leave little question that a person or entity found in violation of it deviated from a reasonable standard of care." Shamnoski v. PG Energy Div. of S. Union Co., 858 A.2d 589 (Pa. 2004). A statute does not support a finding of negligence per se where it "essentially sets forth a traditional reasonable man standard" without providing additional guidance on the specified conduct. Id. For example, Pennsylvania courts have held that a violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 3714(a)—"Any person who drives a vehicle in careless disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of careless driving."—cannot support a charge of negligence per se because "[t]his statute merely recites general negligence principles and a charge related thereto would serve no purpose other than to confuse the jury." Drew, 95 A.3d at 338.
Here, DaVilla and Triple D cannot rely on a violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 3310(a) to establish Wakeman's negligence per se because this provision, which prohibits "follow[ing] another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent," merely "restate[s] the traditional reasonable man standard." Wendt v. Bussard, 2020 WL 2850599, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 2, 2020) (citing Phillips v. Lock, 86 A.3d 906, 917, 918 n. 10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014)). The second statute upon which DaVilla and Triple D rely, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3361, includes multiple clauses. The first clause, which prohibits driving "a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing," merely restates the general standard of care and therefore lacks standards sufficient to support a negligence per se claim. Wendt, 2020 WL 2850599, at *3. In contrast, the second clause of the statute, which states the assured clear distance rule, is sufficiently specific that it may in an appropriate case support a claim for negligence per se. Id. at *4 (denying motion to dismiss) (citation omitted).
Having concluded that the assured clear distance rule codified in 75 Pa. C.S. § 3361 can support a negligence per se claim, the question remains whether the record establishes that claim against Wakeman as a matter of law. In appropriate cases, courts have not hesitated to so hold. In Smith v. Wells, for example, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court decision refusing to enter judgment against the defendant as a matter of law in a rear-end collision case. 212 A.3d 554, 555-56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019). In that case, the defendant admitted that while driving on the highway, he "didn't stop quick enough ... and rear-ended the car in front of" him. Id. Based on this admission, the Superior Court held that the defendant was negligent per se for violating § 3361's assured clear distance rule and ordered a new trial on causation and damages. Id. The court reasoned that, "[i]f everyone else driving on the highway left themselves enough distance and time to bring their vehicles safely to a halt, the only logical conclusion is that [the defendant] did not, and he therefore acted unreasonably." Id. at 559.
Smith is distinguishable from this case, however, because in that case the defendant "claimed no sudden emergency or any other affirmative defense." Id. at 560. The court noted that a driver may defend a claim of negligence per se "by pleading and proving an involuntary violation of the statute." Id. at 560 n. 2 (citing Bumbarger v. Kaminsky, 311 Pa. Super. 177, 457 A.2d 552, 555 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); W. Prosser, LAW OF TORTS § 36 at 200 (4th ed. 1971)). Here, Wakeman has demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact over whether he faced a sudden emergency in response to DaVilla's possible sudden braking. Because of this, the Court cannot find DaVilla negligent per se at this juncture.
Wakeman's invocation of the sudden emergency doctrine based on the sudden deceleration or stopping of the vehicles in front of him appears somewhat at odds with the assured clear distance rule. The rule contemplates that Wakeman allow sufficient following distance between his vehicle and Lee's vehicle to stop within his assured clear distance ahead. Thus, whether Lee decelerated or stopped suddenly, Wakeman arguably should have been able to stop his truck before colliding with the rear of Lee's truck. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania caselaw makes clear that the sudden emergency doctrine and the assured clear distance rule are not incompatible in all circumstances. A sudden emergency may contribute to or cause a driver's inability to avoid a rear end collision with another vehicle.
"[A]lthough generally it may be error to instruct a jury as to both the assured clear distance rule and the sudden emergency doctrine, under certain circumstances, an instruction as to both is appropriate, and, indeed, required." Bongard, 1993 WL 120330, at *8 (citing Cervone v. Reading, 538 A.2d 16 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 551 A.2d 213 (1988). See also Lockhart v. List, 542 Pa. 141, 665 A.2d 1176, 1182-83 (1995) (holding that jury instructions on both the assured clear distance rule and the sudden emergency doctrine were required under the circumstances). In Bongard, the court reasoned that "if the first automobile in a line of traffic faces a sudden emergency," there is no per se rule that the other vehicles following in the same lane of traffic are not also entitled to an instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine, even if the following vehicle was in fact unable "to stop safely within the original assured clear distance." Id. (emphasis supplied). Instead, the Bongard court held that a sudden emergency instruction for the drivers following the leader was proper if the "drivers in the following cars could not be expected to safely stop before impact with the preceding car forced to stop short due to the emergency." Id. Applying this logic to the instant case, Wakeman may plausibly contend that he was unable to stop safely within his original assured clear distance because of the sudden emergency presented by the unexpected deceleration of DaVilla and Lee's trucks at the precise moment he was merging back into their lane of travel. See also Chiodo v. Gargloff & Downham Trucking Co., 308 Pa. Super. 498, 454 A.2d 645, 646-47 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (when "a sudden emergency arises" within the assured clear distance ahead, the "rule is inapplicable") (citing Hollern v. Verhovsek, 220 Pa. Super. 343, 287 A.2d 145 (1971)).
Moreover, the the Pennsylvania Superior Court has specifically rejected a rule that the sudden emergency doctrine does not apply to "vehicles moving in the same direction." Drew v. Work, 95 A.3d 324, 330-31, 2014 Pa. Super. 137 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014). Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected the proposition that "where an accident involves motorists traveling in the same direction, only the first driver can invoke the sudden emergency doctrine." Levey v. DeNardo, 555 Pa. 514, 725 A.2d 733, 736 (Pa. 1999). See also Hetherington v. Meador, 1992 WL 398365, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1992), aff'd 6 F.3d 779 (3d Cir. 1993). These cases caution against removing the sudden emergency doctrine or the assured clear distance rule from the jury's consideration, except in the clearest of cases. See Drew, 95 A.2d at 333 n. 8 ("where the evidence is such that reasonable minds could differ as to whether a sudden emergency actually existed, both [assured clear distance and sudden emergency] charges should be given"). Thus, Wakeman's negligence remains an issue for the jury's determination based on the evidence and following proper instructions informing the standard of care.
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by DaVilla and Triple D Supply, LLC is DENIED. An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
Defendant Franklin DaVilla and Triple D Supply, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment at ECF No. 89 is DENIED. Dated: June 10, 2021
/s/_________
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
United States Magistrate Judge