Opinion
No. 3-621 / 02-1850
Filed November 17, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Richard G. Blane, II, Judge.
Brian Lee, individually and as executor of the Estate of Bonnie Lee, appeals from the order dismissing a personal injury action against the State of Iowa. AFFIRMED.
Michael Adams of Michael H. Adams Law Office, Des Moines, and Catherine Levine, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Ensign, Assistant Attorney General, and Erica Wehner, Student Legal Intern, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Brian Lee, individually and as executor of the Estate of Bonnie Lee, appeals from the order dismissing a personal injury action against the State of Iowa. Because we agree he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, we affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
On November 26, 2001, a claim was filed with the State Appeal Board by "Bonnie S. Lee (Deceased) by Brian D. Lee, surviving spouse." The claim sought compensation for injuries Bonnie suffered when she fell on the steps of C.Y. Stephens Auditorium located on the campus of Iowa State University. Bonnie died of unrelated causes subsequent to the injury but before the claim was filed with the State Appeal Board. On April 2, 2001, the Board denied the claim.
On April 29, 2002, Brian Lee was appointed executor of Bonnie's estate and filed an action in the district court captioned "Brian D. Lee, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Bonnie S. Lee, Deceased, v. The State of Iowa." The State subsequently moved to dismiss the case on the ground the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The district court initially denied the motion to dismiss, but later reconsidered the motion, and granted it. The district court reasoned that because the plaintiffs in the district court action were not the same as the claimants identified in the claim filed with the State Appeal Board, the action must be dismissed. This appeal challenges only that portion of the ruling dismissing the estate's claim.
Scope of Review.
We review the district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for correction of errors of law. Estate of Dyer v. Krug, 533 N.W.2d 221, 222 (Iowa 1995). A decision to sustain or overrule a motion to dismiss must rest on legal grounds. Id.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
The State may be sued in tort, but only in the manner and to the extent to which consent has been given by the legislature. Hansen v. State, 298 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Iowa 1980). A tort claim against the State must first be presented to the State Appeal Board pursuant to the procedures detailed in Iowa Code chapter 669 (2001), Iowa's Tort Claims Act. Swanger v. State, 445 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Iowa 1989). The administrative remedy provided by chapter 669 is jurisdictional. Swanger, 445 N.W.2d at 347; Brumage v. Woodsmall, 444 N.W.2d 68, 70 (Iowa 1989). Improper presentment of a claim, or not presenting one at all, has been considered a failure to exhaust one's administrative remedies, depriving the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. In re Estate of Voss, 553 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Iowa 1998).
The district court determined, and the State now asserts on appeal, the resolution of this case is controlled by our supreme court's holding in In re Estate of Voss. In that case, Aliccia Voss filed a claim with the State Appeal Board seeking compensation for the death of her adult son, Bryan Voss. Id.at 879. The Board denied her claim. Then, after her appointment as the administrator of her son's estate, Aliccia Voss brought a wrongful death action against the State of Iowa. Id. The district court subsequently granted the State's motion to dismiss, concluding Voss had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Id.
On appeal, our supreme court determined a claimant filing with the State Appeal Board must have the "capacity to sue," meaning that he or she must be a person "to whom the State would be liable for the damages sought." Id.at 880. The court next addressed whether Aliccia Voss had the capacity to sue as a representative of her deceased son's estate when she filed the administrative claim. Id. at 881. Because at the time she made the administrative claim in her own name she was not yet the personal representative of her son's estate, the court concluded she did not then have the required capacity to sue. Id. The supreme court further concluded that Voss failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because she did not submit a claim to the State Appeal Board in her capacity as administrator of the estate. Iowa Code § 669.5; Voss, 553 N.W.2d at 882.
Analyzing this case in a similar fashion, we must determine whether Brian D. Lee had the capacity to sue on behalf of his deceased wife's estate at the time the State Appeal Board was filed. See Voss, 553 N.W.2d at 880 (citing Dumbaugh v. Cascade Mfg. Co., 264 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Iowa 1978) (noting it is an "elementary rule" that a plaintiff must have the capacity to sue in order to maintain an action)). Brian Lee was not yet appointed personal representative of his deceased wife's estate when he filed the State Appeal Board claim or when the Board rejected his claim. Iowa law is clear that only the personal representative of an estate, or the representative's assignee, may sue on behalf of an estate. Iowa Code § 611.22; In re Estate of Dyer v. Krug, 533 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Iowa 1995). The administrative claim brought after Bonnie's death, but before Brian's appointment as personal representative, was not made by the person to whom the State was potentially liable.
Brian Lee never submitted a claim to the Board after his appointment as administrator of the estate. We conclude our supreme court's holding in Voss requires us to conclude the estate failed to exhaust its administrative remedy and that the district court correctly sustained the State's motion to dismiss. We therefore affirm.
Although we affirm, we do so with some reluctance. We believe Vosscompels us to affirm the district court's order even though the claim form filed with the State Appeal Board expressly noted Brian's representative capacity, clearly alleged damages properly recoverable only by the estate, and arguably achieved the purpose of the administrative claim by giving notice of the substance of the claim and providing the State's representatives an opportunity to investigate and resolve the claim upon Lee's appointment as his deceased spouse's personal representative. See Simpson v. U.S., 484 F. Supp. 387, 394 (D.C. Pa. 1980) (noting the purpose of the administrative claim requirement under the Federal Tort Claims Act is to ease congestion in the courts and avoid unnecessary litigation, to afford the government an opportunity to investigate and expedite the fair administrative settlement of tort claims).