Opinion
A-13487
03-02-2022
FRANK D. LEE, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
James Ferguson, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Heather Stenson, Assistant AttorneyGeneral, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Second Judicial District Trial Court No. 2NO-17-00492 CR, Nome, Romano D. DiBenedetto, Judge.
James Ferguson, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Heather Stenson, Assistant AttorneyGeneral, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Frank D. Lee pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree murder after he stabbed a man to death. The sentencing court found that Lee was a worst offender and sentenced him to 80 years to serve. Lee now appeals, arguing that his sentence is excessive and that the sentencing court failed to give adequate weight to his prospects for rehabilitation.
AS 11.41.110(a)(2).
When we review an excessive sentence claim, we independently examine the record to determine whether the sentence is clearly mistaken. The "clearly mistaken" standard contemplates that different reasonable judges, confronted with identical facts, will differ on what constitutes an appropriate sentence, and that a reviewing court will not modify a sentence that falls within a permissible range of reasonable sentences.
McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974).
Erickson v. State, 950 P.2d 580, 586 (Alaska App. 1997).
In this case, Lee and the victim were drinking and began arguing over a bottle of alcohol. Lee then retrieved two knives and stabbed the victim - who was unarmed - in the chest, killing him.
At sentencing, the court noted the senselessness of killing someone over a bottle of alcohol. The court focused on Lee's criminal history, stating that Lee's prior convictions displayed a breadth of criminality that the court had never seen before. In particular, the court noted that Lee had a substantial history of violent and assaultive behavior, including a second-degree sexual abuse of a minor conviction, multiple fourth-degree assault convictions, and a criminally negligent homicide conviction for shaking his infant son to death. The court also emphasized Lee's poor performance on supervised release, which had resulted in multiple parole and probation revocations. Based on these findings, the court determined that Lee was a worst offender and emphasized the sentencing goal of specific deterrence.
We have independently reviewed the record. Given the nature of Lee's crime in this case and Lee's extensive criminal history, we conclude that neither the court's emphasis of specific deterrence over rehabilitation, nor the ultimate sentence it imposed, was clearly mistaken.
See Pickard v. State, 965 P.2d 755, 760 (Alaska App. 1998) (holding that the sentencing judge "bears primary responsibility for determining the priority and relationship of the various sentencing goals in each case" and that the judge's decision to emphasize other sentencing goals over rehabilitation was not clearly mistaken).
The judgment of the superior court is therefore AFFIRMED.