Opinion
Civ. No. 99-0895 SECTION "N".
March 22, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Defendant Fleetwood Motor Homes of Indiana's Motion for Summary Judgment and Third-Party Defendant Cummins Engine Company, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, Defendant Fleetwood Motor Homes of Indiana's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; Third-Party Defendant Cummins Engine Company, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as moot; and Fleetwood Motor Homes of Indiana's third-party claims against Cummins Engine Company, Inc. and Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation are DISMISSED.
A. BACKGROUND
On June 30, 1997, plaintiff Robert Ledet purchased a Fleetwood motor home from Dixie Motors. The motor home's complete chassis and drive train were supplied by third-party defendant Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation ("FCCC"), and its diesel engine was manufactured by third-party defendant Cummins Engine Company, Inc. ("Cummins"). Each of the aforementioned companies warranted certain parts of the motor home. Fleetwood warranted the "structure, plumbing, heating and electrical systems, and all appliances and equipment installed by the manufacturer", but did not warrant the "automotive system (including the chassis and drive chain), . . . which are covered by the separate warranties of the respective manufacturers of these components." FCCC warranted the chassis, with the exception of the engine and other parts, "which are not manufactured by FCCC and which are warranted directly by their respective manufacturers . . ." Cummins warranted the engine, stating that it would "pay reasonable costs for towing a vehicle disabled by a Warrantable Failure to the nearest authorized repair location when necessary to make the repair for the first year from the date of delivery of the Engine to the first user." As part of the warranty, Cummins required the owner of the motor home to "notify a Cummins distributor, authorized dealer or other repair location approved by Cummins of any Warrantable Failure and [to] make the Engine available for repair by such facility."
Fleetwood Warranty, attached to Fleetwood Motor Homes' Motion for Summary Judgment as Exhibit "H". Ledet has not challenged the validity of this or any of the other warranties discussed herein.
FCCC Warranty, attached as Exhibit "I". The FCCC Warranty also states, "Engines and engine accessories are warranted only by the engine manufacturer." (Bold in original.)
Cummins Warranty, attached as Exhibit "J".
Id.
On April 25, 1998, Ledet and his fiancee, Deborah Harris, drove Ledet's motor home from New Orleans to a campsite in Navaree Beach, Florida, with a Jeep Wrangler in tow. When they arrived at the campsite, Harris noticed diesel fuel on the Wrangler, which Ledet determined was dripping from the engine. Ledet called Dixie, which provided Ledet with the toll free number of Fleetwood. Ledet then called Fleetwood, which, according to Ledet, either gave him Cummins' phone number or called Cummins for him. Ledet then spoke with a representative of Cummins International, who told him that Cummins would "track down a rep in the area that would come take care of the problem. . . ." Cummins Alabama, Inc. ("CAI") subsequently called Ledet and told him that they would send a mechanic to look at his motor home the next day.
Ledet's Deposition p. 32.
Id.
The next day, CAI's mechanic inspected Ledet's motor home at the campsite. The mechanic confirmed that the engine was leaking fuel and attributed the problem to a crack in the fuel hose in the motor home's engine. CAI would not fix the problem at the campsite and insisted on bringing the motor home to its facility in Mobile.
On April 27, 1998, CAI's mechanic called All Pro Towing and Recovery, Inc. ("All Pro") to tow Ledet's motor home to Mobile for repairs. An All Pro tow truck arrived at the campsite that morning, hooked Ledet's motor home up, and began towing it to Mobile, During the course of the trip, a truck driver radioed the All Pro driver that the rear wheels of the motor home were bulging outwards and that it looked like the motor home might lose them. The All Pro driver pulled to the side of the road to inspect the situation, and Ledet arrived shortly thereafter in his Wrangler. Ledet observed that the rear wheels of the motor home were at an angle and that smoke filled the interior of the motor home. Subsequent inspection revealed damage to the motor home's rear axle, rear axle housing, and related components.
On March 19, 1999, Ledet filed a complaint in this Court against Dixie and Fleetwood. Ledet alleges that "while in tow, the axle of the motor failed, either as a result of the defect in the trailer and/or the negligence of Cummins of Alabama, Inc. and All Pro Towing Recovery, Inc." Ledet alleges that the defects in the axle and the diesel line were present at the time of manufacture, but that he was unaware of them Therefore, Ledet alleges, he is entitled to a recission of the sale or damages based on Louisiana Civil Code 2531 and theories of respondeat superior, breach of warranty and detrimental reliance. In the alternative, Ledet alleges that, if the defect was not redhibitory and the motor home was damaged due to a faulty to tow job, then Fleetwood should be held liable for the actions of All Pro based on theories of agency and detrimental reliance. At Ledet's request, the Court dismissed Ledet's claims against Dixie on July 7, 1999.
Complaint ¶ X.
Id. ¶¶ XII-XIII.
Id. ¶¶ XV-XIX.
Id. ¶¶ XX-XXI.
On September 29, 1999, Fleetwood answered Ledet's complaint and filed a third-party demand against FCCC and Cummins. In the third-party demand, Fleetwood alleges that "the problems asserted in the original Complaint involve the engine and/or drive train components and/or chassis and/or related components supplied by Cummins and/or Freightliner and for which those two corporations separately warranted to the purchaser, original complainant." Accordingly, Fleetwood asserts that Cummins and Freightliner should be held liable for any potential judgment based on indemnification and/or contribution among joint tortfeasor. Ledet has not asserted any claims against the third-party defendants.
Fleetwood incorrectly named FCCC "Freightliner, Inc."
Fleetwood brought the demand against Cummins, not against CAI.
Third Party Demand ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 4.
Now before the Court are two motions. First, Fleetwood moves for summary judgment against Ledet. Second, Cummins moves for summary judgment against Fleetwood. Because Fleetwood's motion is potentially dispositive of the entire matter, the Court addresses its motion first.
B. LAW AND ANALYSIS 1. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the non-movant's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the opposing party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need not submit evidentiary documents to properly support its motion, but need only point out the absence of evidence supporting the essential elements of the opposing party's case. See Saunders v. Michelin Tire Corp., 942 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1991). To oppose a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must set forth specific facts to establish a genuine issue of material fact, and cannot merely rest on allegations and denials. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. A genuine issue of fact exists where the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en bauc) (per curiam). See also Superior Merchandise Co., Inc. v. M.G.I. Wholesale, Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1935 (E.D.La. 1999).
2. Fleetwood's Motion for Summary Judgment
Fleetwood moves for summary judgment on three grounds. First, Fleetwood argues that All Pro was not its agent and that it therefore cannot be held liable for All-Pro's negligence. Second, Fleetwood argues that the evidence clearly rules out a finding of a redhibitory defect in the motor home. Third, Fleetwood argues that, even if there was a redhibitory defect in the motor home, it did not warrant the parts in question.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that, in the face of the seemingly overwhelming evidence, Ledet no longer wishes to pursue his allegations of redhibitory defect. Admits Ledet, "[i]t is pretty well established that the failure of the axle was due to the way in which the motor coach was towed." Thus, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Fleetwood as to the redhibitory defect claims and turns to Ledet's argument that All-Pro and Cummins were acting on the apparent authority of Fleetwood.
See Cummins' Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment p. 3 (noting that all of the experts agree that the primary damage to the motor home was caused by All-Pro's negligent towing).
Ledet's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment ("Ledet Opposition") p. 5.
Ledet admits that All-Pro and Cummins did not have actual authority to act on Fleetwood's behalf. See Ledet Opposition p. 3 (stating that "[t]he relevant inquiry is the apparent authority vested in Cummins Engine Company, Cummins of Alabama and All Pro Towing", not their actual authority) and p. 4 ("The issue before the trier of fact will be whether Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. established an implied agency as to Mr. Ledet. . . .").
In Louisiana, "[i]mplied or apparent agency exists if the principal has the right to control the conduct of the agent and the agent has the authority to bind the principal." Urbeso v. Bryan, 583 So.2d 114, 117 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1991). For the doctrine of apparent authority to apply, the principal first must act to manifest the alleged agent's authority to an innocent third party. The third party then must rely reasonably on the manifested authority of the agent. See Boulos v. Morrison, 503 So.2d 1, 3 (La. 1987). Thus, apparent agency is established "by the words and conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case." Ehlinger Associates v. Louisiana Architects Ass'n, 989 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. La. 1998) (Vance, J.) (quoting Self v. Walker Oldsmobile Co., Inc., 614 So.2d 1371, 1375 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1993)). Although an agency relationship may be created absent an intention to do so, a "third party seeking to benefit from the doctrine of apparent authority may not blindly rely upon the assertions of an agent", but instead must "inquire into the nature and extent of the agent's power." Id. (quoting Boulos, 503 So.2d at 3). The party seeking to bind the principal has the burden of establishing the existence of the agency relationship.Boulos, 503 So.2d at 3. Thus, the question of apparent authority here turns on whether Fleetwood acted in a manner that manifested to Ledet that Cummins, CAI or All Pro had the authority to act on its behalf and whether Ledet reasonably relied on the agent's authority.
Ledet argues that, by referring him to Cummins, Fleetwood gave apparent authority to Cummins "and the chain of people that followed" to fix the problem. Ledet's argument is utterly meritless. It is clear from the warranties that Cummins, not Fleetwood, took responsibility for the motor home's engine and that Ledet's call to Fleetwood was a mistake. In light of the warranties, Fleetwood's actions cannot be interpreted as a manifestation of authority and can only be interpreted as an express denial of responsibility for the engine. Indeed, the most Ledet alleges is that the Fleetwood representative told him that Cummins was responsible for the engine. Moreover, in light of the clear words of the warranties, it would be totally unreasonable for Ledet to believe that Fleetwood had assumed responsibility over the care of his engine when all it did was correct his mistake. Ledet's vague assertions that Fleetwood assumed responsibility over the engine by selecting Cummins as the engine provider are clearly outflanked by the express language of the warranties. In short, not only is there no evidence that Fleetwood cloaked Cuminins, CAI, or All Pro with the apparent authority to act on its behalf, all of the evidence indicates that any reliance by Ledet on such purported authority would be ridiculously unreasonable.
See Ledet's Opposition pp. 3-4.
Cf. CNA Ins. Co. v. Nutone Corp., 461 So.2d 518, 521-22 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1984) (affirming jury verdict that security alarm service employee had no apparent authority to install security alarms because, inter alia, there was no manifestation of authority; alleged principal "went out of its way to keep its service centers separate and distinct from its sales departments"; its efforts included directing calls for sales information to local sales distributors and directing calls for repairs to local service centers).
Given that no genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court finds summary judgment in favor of Fleetwood appropriate.
3. Fleetwood's Claims against Cummins and FCCC, and Cummins' Motion for Summary Judgment
The Court's granting of summary judgment in favor of Fleetwood and against Ledet moots Fleetwood's claims against Cummins and FCCC. Thus, Cummins' motion for summary judgment is also mooted. The Court therefore dismisses Fleetwood's claims against Cummins and FCCC but denies Cummins' motion for summary judgment as moot.
C. CONCLUSION
The Court finds no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cummins, CAI or All Pro had apparent authority to act on Fleetwood's behalf; it is painfully apparent that they did not. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Fleetwood Motor Homes of Indiana's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Third-Party Defendant Cummins Engine Company, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as moot. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Fleetwood's third-party claims against Cummins Engine Company, Inc. and Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation are DISMISSED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 21st day March 200O.