Opinion
CASE NO. 5:06-CV-00502.
August 15, 2008
OPINION ORDER [Resolving Doc. No. 23]
The Defendants Perry Videx L.L.C. and Perry Equipment Corporation (collectively "Perry Videx") move for summary judgment. [Doc. 23.] The Plaintiff LeBeau opposes the motion. [Doc. 24.] For the following reasons, this Court DENIES the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
I. Background
The Plaintiff LeBeau was injured in an accident involving an industrial laminating machine and sued several companies in the machine's chain of ownership. [Doc. 1.] Perry Videx is one company in the chain of ownership. [Doc. 1.] LeBeau complained with four causes of action: statutory products liability, common law products liability, negligence, and common law breach of warranty. [Doc. 1 at 4-7.] The Defendants moved for summary judgment and advanced just two arguments: 1) Ohio's ten year statute of repose, O.R.C. § 2305.10, bars all of LeBeau's claims, and 2) Ohio's Products Liability Act, O.R.C. §§ 2307.71 to 2307.80, preempts LeBeau's common law breach of warranty claim. [Doc. 23 at 2-3.]
I.A. The Statute of Repose and Products Liability Act: the parties dispute whether the timing of the statutes' enactments affects their applicability.
The statute of repose stops a cause of action after the act's effective date when the product was delivered to its first purchaser more than ten years before the injury. O.R.C. § 2305.10. The Ohio legislature intended the Products Liability Act to abrogate all common law products liability causes of action. 125th General Assembly Amended Substitute Senate Bill 80 § 3(D) (uncodified law) ("The General Assembly declares its intent that the amendment made by this act . . . is intended to . . . abrogate all common law product liability causes of action."), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText125/125_SB_80_EN_N.pdf; Doty v. Fellhauer Electric , 888 N.E.2d 1138, 1142 (Ohio App. 2008).
These two statutes are straightforward, but the statutes' effective dates complicate their application here. LeBeau was injured on March 6, 2004. [Doc. 1.] On April 7, 2005, the statute of repose and the amendment to the Products Liability Act became effective. On March 6, 2006, LeBeau filed this personal injury Complaint. Id. Both statutes became effective between LeBeau's injury and the filing of his Complaint. The central issue in this motion for summary judgment is not the interpretation or potential applicability of the two statutes. Rather, the parties disagree on the effect of the timing.
I.B. Constitutional Challenge: this Court certifies questions to the Ohio Supreme Court on the Ohio constitutional implications of the two statutes' application to LeBeau's claims.
On December 11, 2006, Perry Videx moved to dismiss relying on the intervening Ohio legislation. [Doc. 23.] LeBeau responded that Ohio's statute of repose violated the Ohio Constitution as applied to his claim against Perry Videx, and that Ohio's Products Liability Act did not preempt common law remedies. [Doc.24.] Because the motion presented novel issues under Ohio's constitution, this Court certified several questions to the Ohio Supreme Court on the Ohio constitutional implications of statutes. [Doc. 38.] This Court stayed consideration of the summary judgment motion pending the resolution of the certified questions.
On February 21, 2008, the Ohio Supreme Court responded to only one of this Court's several certified questions, answering that Ohio's statute of repose violated the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution, OHIO CONST. art II, § 28, as applied to LeBeau's claim. LeBeau v. Perry Videx, L.L.C., 885 N.E.2d 242 (2008); see also Groch v. General Motors Corp , 883 N.E.2d 377 (Ohio 2008).
The Ohio Supreme Court's answer requires this Court to reject Perry Videx's statue of repose argument. Therefore, Perry Videx needs rely upon its argument that Ohio's Product Liability Act preempts LeBeau's common law breach of warranty claim. [Doc. 23 at 8.]
II. Breach of Warranty Claim
II.A. Summary Judgment: the legal standard.
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of the non-moving party's case. Waters v. City of Morristown , 242 F.3d 353, 358 (6th Cir. 2001). A fact is material if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Daughenbaugh v. City of Tiffin , 150 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 1998).
The moving party meets its burden by "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). However, the moving party is under no "express or implied" duty to "support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim." Id.
Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986). It is not sufficient for the nonmoving party merely to show that there is some existence of doubt as to the material facts. Id. at 586. Nor can the nonmoving party "rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court views the factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Nat. Enters., Inc. v. Smith , 114 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir. 1997). "The disputed issue does not have to be resolved conclusively in favor of the non-moving party, but that party is required to present some significant probative evidence which makes it necessary to resolve the parties' differing versions of the dispute at trial." 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander , 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)); see also Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322 . Ultimately the Court must decide "whether the evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Terry Barr Sales Agency, Inc. v. All-Lock Co. , 96 F.3d 174, 178 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted).
II.B. Preemption: the legislature's intent to abrogate common law products liability actions is inapplicable to LeBeau's claim because the cause of action accrued before the legislation.
Perry Videx's remaining argument for summary judgment relates only to LeBeau's implied warranty claim. [Doc. 23 at 8.] The parties dispute whether Ohio's Products Liability Act preempts the common law remedy of breach of implied warranty. Section 2307.72, as it existed when LeBeau was injured, stated that "[a]ny recovery of compensatory damages based on a product liability claim is subject to [Ohio's Products Liability Statute]." ORC 2307.72 (emphasis added). The statute specifically stated that certain common law actions would not be subject to the Products Liability Act. This exclusion suggested the intent to preempt those common law actions not excluded. See 2307.72(C) ("Any recovery . . . for economic loss . . . is not subject to [the Act], but may occur under the common law of this state."); 2307.72(D)(1) ("[The Act] do[es] not supersede . . . the common law of this state . . . that relates to liability . . . from contamination or pollution of the environment.").
In 1997, the Ohio Supreme Court, however, held that the Products Liability Act did not abrogate a common law claim of negligent design. Carrel v. Allied Products Corp. , 677 N.E.2d 795, 798 (Ohio 1997). Negligent design was not one of the specifically designated surviving common law causes of action in the statute. Id. The Court, however, held that the legislature "w[ould] not be presumed to have intended to abrogate a common-law rule unless the language used in the statute clearly show[ed] that intent." Id. The "subject to" language of the statute and the statute's explicit exclusion of only certain common law causes of action was not clear enough language for the Ohio Supreme Court. The Court placed importance on the lack of an "explicit statement" by the legislature of its intent to abolish common law actions. Id. at 799.
After Carrel, two Ohio appellate courts had decided whether a common law cause of action for implied warranty survived the enactment of the Ohio Products Liability Statute. In Nadel v. Burger King , 695 N.E.2d 1185, 1189 (Ohio App. 1997), the plaintiff brought a claim for implied warranties based on Ohio's codification of the U.C.C. The court held that the "Ohio Products Liability Law ha[d] preempted the . . . warranty claims." Id. at 1190. In White v. DePuy, Inc. , 718 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ohio App. 1998), however, the court relied on Carrel and held that the cause of action of "implied warranty in tort continues to exist even after the enactment of the Ohio Products Liability Act." The only difference between the two cases is the characterization of the implied warranty issue as one based on Ohio's codification of the U.C.C. and one based in tort.
On April 7, 2005, the Ohio legislature amended the Products Liability Act and cleared up the state of the law after Carrel. The legislature made clear its intention to supersede Carrel and abrogate all common law products liability actions. Doty , 888 N.E.2d at 1142 . After this amendment, the Ohio Products Liability Act would preclude a plaintiff injured after April 7, 2005 from brining any common law products liability cause of action. O.R.C. § 2307.71. Again, however, LeBeau was injured before the amendment to the Products Liability Act. While the statute now clearly shows the intent to abrogate all common law causes of action, the statute does not address abrogation of common law causes of action that had accrued before the effective date.
In Doty , 888 N.E.2d at 1142 , an Ohio appellate court addressed the issue of common law abrogation of those claims that accrued before the amendment's effective date. The timing of the injury and complaint in Doty is similar to the case before this Court. In Doty, the plaintiff was injured on June 1, 2003 and filed a complaint on June 5, 2005. Id. The court held the amendment would not abrogate claims that accrued before the effective date:
"[T]he statutory construction rules dictate that a statute is presumed to be prospective. Although [section] 2307.71 clearly states the intent to abrogate all common law product-liability claims, it does not provide that causes of action accruing prior to the effective date would be subject tot he amendment. Accordingly, . . . we find that the [section] 2307.71 amendment does not apply to abrogate appellants' claims."Id.
The April 7, 2005 amendment to the Ohio Products Liability Act will not abrogate LeBeau's common law claim that accrued before the amendment's effective date because the legislature did not make clear its intent that courts apply the statute retrospectively. See Groch , 883 N.E.2d at 407-408 (holding that the statute of repose was "clear[ly]" to be applied retrospectively before addressing constitutional issues). The applicable law governing preemption of LeBeau's claim, therefore, is the state of the law after Carrel but before the Ohio legislature's April 7, 2005 amendment. This Court holds, consistent with Carrel, that the text of the Ohio Products Liability Act at the time of LeBeau's injury was not sufficiently explicit to show intent to abrogate his common law cause of action. See White , 718 N.E.2d at 455-456 .
This Court notes that a contrary interpretation of the statute may cause the statute to suffer from the same constitutional infirmities the Ohio Supreme Court identified in Groch. LeBeau's injury occurred on March 6, 2004. On that date, the Ohio Products Liability Act, as construed by the Ohio Supreme Court in Carrel, did not abrogate common law causes of action. LeBeau's common law claim therefore accrued on March 6, 2004. To hold that the April 7, 2005 amendment is effective against LeBeau's 2004 accrued claim would effectively extinguish a cause of action after the cause of action had accrued. But this effect is what the Ohio Supreme Court recently held unconstitutional in the Groch decision. See Groch , 883 N.E.2d at 407-410. This Court, however, bases its decision on the statutory construction principles identified in Doty, rather than on any constitutional defect.
Accordingly, this Court holds that the Ohio Products Liability Act, as it existed when LeBeau's claim accrued, did not preempt LeBeau's common law claim for implied warranty.
III. Conclusion
As pronounced in the Ohio Supreme Court's answer to this Court's certified question, Ohio's statute of repose is unconstitutional as applied to LeBeau. The Ohio Products Liability Act, as it existed at the time of LeBeau's injury, did not abrogate common law causes of action. This Court, therefore, DENIES, Defendant Perry Videx's motion for summary judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.