Opinion
E050952
08-10-2011
MICHAEL LEAVITT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN JACINTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.
Michael Leavitt, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Declues, Burkett & Thompson, Jeffrey P. Thompson, and Gregory A. Wille for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super.Ct.No. RIC492873)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sharon J. Waters, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael Leavitt, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Declues, Burkett & Thompson, Jeffrey P. Thompson, and Gregory A. Wille for Defendant and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant, Michael Leavitt, was a permanent employee of defendant and respondent, San Jacinto Unified School District (the District), for 27 years, until the District's governing board terminated his employment on November 13, 2007. The trial court denied Leavitt's petition for a writ of mandate directing the District to reinstate his employment. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed Leavitt's remaining cause of action for damages based on wrongful termination, and entered judgment in favor of the District. Leavitt appeals from the judgment in favor of the District.
Leavitt claims the District violated his due process rights in failing to give him at least five days' notice of his right to request an evidentiary hearing before its governing board on the disciplinary charges against him. He also claims he was excused from exhausting his administrative remedy of requesting a hearing within the five-day notice period, because the notice he was given was ambiguous and confusing, and District personnel told him he actually had 10 days to request a hearing.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Leavitt was, in fact, given five days' notice of his right to request a hearing but nevertheless failed to timely request a hearing. We also conclude that the notice was not ambiguous or confusing. Thus Leavitt was not excused from exhausting his administrative remedies of timely requesting a hearing, and his writ petition and cause of action for damages based on wrongful termination were properly denied and dismissed, respectively. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Initial Background
As indicated, Leavitt was employed by the District for approximately 27 years. He first worked as a custodian and was eventually promoted to supervisor of maintenance, operations, and transportation, the position he held at the time of his termination on November 13, 2007. As a supervisor, Leavitt led and managed a team of six employees.
On June 4, 2007, the District placed Leavitt on paid administrative leave pending its investigation of a written complaint by Jeremy Schaefermeyer, a District employee who worked under Leavitt's supervision. Schaefermeyer claimed that Leavitt made several inappropriate sexual remarks to him, including asking him whether he had "fucked" a school bus driver, Jennifer Doan, and that while making these remarks Leavitt touched himself in a sexual manner, and tried to touch Schaefermeyer in a sexual manner.
Also on June 4, the District received a similar written complaint from Doan. Like Schaefermeyer, Doan claimed that Leavitt made several sexually suggestive comments to her and made a sexually suggestive gesture to her in violation of District policy. During the investigation, the District interviewed several witnesses, including Schaefermeyer, Doan, and Leavitt. Leavitt admitted making the sexually suggestive comments and gesture to Doan.
The District also discovered that Leavitt made other sexually suggestive remarks to Doan in December 2006. And on May 29 2007, while another District employee, Jamie Whysong, was in a break room lying on a couch, Leavitt approached her and attempted to lie on top of her, face-to-face. Whysong asked another employee to stay in the break room because she did not feel safe being alone with Leavitt.
The investigation also revealed that Leavitt engaged in other types of misconduct during 2006 and 2007. In March 2006, he called two District employees "fucking idiots" after "aggressively question[ing]" them regarding a replaced windshield in a District vehicle. On April 5, 2006, he directed Schaefermeyer to drive a forklift through a makeshift obstacle course which he set up in the vicinity of a diesel fuel tank, knowing Schaefermeyer had never driven a forklift before and without adequate concern for Schaefermeyer's safety or the safety of others. And on April 6, 2006, Leavitt berated and "physically pushed, bumped, and/or shoved" Schaefermeyer, and threatened to fire him.
On September 30, 2007, following the completion of its investigation, the District gave Leavitt written notice of its intent to recommend that its governing board terminate his employment, together with a statement of charges and notice of his right to a Skelly hearing on the charges. On October 28, Leavitt submitted a written response to the District's notice and statement of charges, and the parties agreed that the Skelly hearing could be conducted based on written evidence. The Skelly hearing was conducted on October 29, and the hearing officer determined that the District administration had sufficient cause to recommend that its governing board terminate Leavitt's employment.
Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 (Skelly).
Then, in a letter dated November 8, 2007, and titled "Notice of Immediate Suspension Without Pay, Recommendation for Dismissal, and Statement of Charges," the District notified Leavitt that he was suspended without pay effective immediately, pursuant to Education Code sections 45113 and 45116, and District Administrative Regulation (AR) 4218. The November 8 notice also advised Leavitt that the Skelly officer had determined there were sufficient grounds to recommend his termination, and the District administration would be recommending that its governing board terminate his employment "effective immediately upon completion of the hearing process," at the next scheduled meeting of the board, "at 6:00 [p.m.] on Tuesday, November 13, 2007 at DeAnza Elementary School . . . ."
All further statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise indicated.
The November 8 notice also advised Leavitt that he had a right to have the matter heard by the governing board in open, public session, and, "[p]ursuant to Education Code sections 45113 and 45116 . . . and AR 4218, you may request a formal hearing on your dismissal. If you wish to request a hearing, you must notify the undersigned in writing by 4:00 p.m. on Monday, November 12, 2007. Failure to request a hearing by that time shall constitute a waiver of your right to a hearing. The Board shall then proceed on the recommendation without a hearing. A form entitled 'Request for Hearing' is enclosed for this purpose." The November 8 notice then stated that if the request for hearing was timely returned, the District governing board would conduct a hearing as soon as practicable, and Leavitt would be notified of the date and time of the hearing.
Copies of sections 45113 and 45116 and AR 4218 were included in documents accompanying the November 8 notice. As pertinent, AR 4218 stated: "The employee may, within five (5) calendar days after receiving the recommendation of personnel action described above, appeal by signing and filing the card or paper included with the recommendation. Any other written document signed and appropriately filed within the specified time limit by the employee shall constitute a sufficient notice of appeal. . . ."
A copy of Board Policy (BP) 4213.1 was also included in the notice, together with other documents related to a notice of a one-day suspension without pay that the District imposed on Leavitt in 2002. The facts underlying the 2002 suspension were detailed in the November 8 notice, under a section titled "Relevant Prior History." BP 4213.1(d)(B) stated: "The employee shall have ten calendar days following the delivery or mailing of the notice in which to return the notice of defense asking for a hearing." Apparently, the District proceeded under BP 4213.1 in imposing the 2002 one-day suspension.
Leavitt did not request a hearing before the governing board by November 12 or 13, 2007, and at its November 13 meeting the governing board terminated Leavitt's employment effective the following day, November 14. B. The Disputed Evidence on the Writ Petition
In his writ petition and supporting declaration, Leavitt averred he did not receive the November 8 notice until the morning of November 9, when he "picked up a packet" of documents, including the notice, at the District's offices. A "person at the front desk" instructed him to sign for the notice and packet, which he did, and the same person advised him to "return a response" as soon as possible. Later on November 9, after Leavitt arrived home after picking up the packet, there was a message on his answering machine telling him to contact "Jamica" at the District's offices as soon as possible. Leavitt called Jamica, who told him he "needed to respond" to the packet "within 10 days."
Leavitt claimed he was confused because (1) the person at the front desk told him he needed to respond to the packet "as soon as possible"; (2) Jamica told him he had 10 days to respond; and (3) a form in the packet told him he had until Monday, November 12 to respond, though November 12 was a holiday. Because of this conflicting information, Levitt read BP 4213.1(d)(B), which was included in the packet and which stated he had 10 days to request a hearing.
Also on November 9, Leavitt left a copy of the November 8 notice and packet at the office of his attorney, Christian U. Anyiam. Anyiam called Leavitt on Sunday, November 11, and asked him whether he wanted a closed or open session hearing. Leavitt said he preferred a closed session hearing. Anyiam then told Leavitt that his request for a hearing had to be faxed by Monday, November 12. Leavitt told Anyiam he had spoken with Jamica and "thought she said" he had 10 days to respond. Anyiam told Leavitt, "'she must have said Tuesday,' not 10 days," and he, Anyiam, would "take care of it and to have a good holiday," as Monday, November 12, was a holiday. Neither Leavitt nor Anyiam delivered a request for hearing to the District by Tuesday, November 13.
On November 14, the District faxed Leavitt a letter advising him that the governing board had terminated his employment at its November 13 meeting, and his termination was effective November 14. On November 18, Leavitt faxed to the District a form titled "Notice of Appeal and Demand for Hearing," requesting a closed session hearing. On November 19, the District denied the request for a hearing as untimely.
On November 20, Anyiam faxed a letter to the District's legal counsel, Mark W. Thompson, asserting that Leavitt's November 18 notice of appeal and request for hearing was timely; that Leavitt picked up the November 8 letter and packet on November 9; that later on November 9 Jamica told Leavitt he had 10 days to respond to the November 8 notice; and that BP 4213.1, a copy of which was included in the November 8 notice, confirmed that Leavitt had 10 days to respond.
For its part, the District adduced a document titled "proof of service," signed by Leavitt and acknowledging his receipt of the November 8 notice and packet at 7:50 a.m. on November 8, 2007. Leavitt claimed he signed the proof of service and wrote in the time of day he received the notice without noticing the date written on the proof of service. The District also adduced evidence that, later on November 8, Jamica told Leavitt he had until 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday, November 13, to submit his request for a hearing, given that November 12 was a holiday. Jamica did not tell Leavitt he had 10 days to respond to the notice.
Thompson averred that, on November 8, after Jamica told Leavitt he had until November 13 to request a hearing, Thompson faxed a copy of the November 8 notice to Anyiam, and confirmed to Anyiam that the November 12 deadline was being extended to November 13 at 4:00 p.m., and Leavitt had been so advised.
Finally, in his petition, Leavitt averred that, in December 2007 or January 2008, several weeks after he was terminated, the District's governing board approved an agenda item denoted, "Approve the Deletion of Board Policy 4213.1 . . . in support of Administrative Regulation 4218." In answering the petition, the District admitted "that its Board approved [the] deletion of Board Policy 4213.1 after the termination of plaintiff's employment, and after plaintiff was told the ten-day time limit to appeal the decision and to demand a hearing did not apply." C. The Trial Court's Ruling on the Writ Petition
Following a September 18, 2009, hearing, the trial court denied Leavitt's writ petition on the ground Leavitt "failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to file a timely notice of appeal as required by AR 4218." The court explained: "Even if, in the beginning, there arguably was some confusion regarding whether [Leavitt]'s rights were governed by BP 4213.1 or AR 4218, the notice from which [Leavitt] was required to appeal clearly advised [Leavitt] of the applicable time period for filing an appeal. That BP 4213.1 was attached to the notice as part of the record from an earlier disciplinary proceeding is of no significance. [Leavitt] . . . was advised in the notice of termination of the applicable appeal period.
"[Leavitt] contends that he received a telephone call from [the District] advising him that he had 10 days within which to appeal as opposed to 5 days as stated in the notice of termination. [The District] offers evidence denying that [Leavitt] was orally advised that he had 10 days within which to appeal. Additionally, [the District] presented undisputed evidence that at the same time this alleged conversation took place, [the District]'s counsel had sent a copy of the notice of termination to [Leavitt]'s counsel, also advising him of the 5-day period within which to appeal. The court concludes that [Leavitt]'s testimony regarding the telephone call allegedly extending his time to appeal simply is not credible." D. Dismissal of Wrongful Termination Claim and Entry of Judgment
After denying the writ petition, the court set an order to show cause why Leavitt's remaining cause of action against the District for monetary damages based on his wrongful termination should not be dismissed. The court later sustained, without leave to amend, the District's demurrer to Leavitt's wrongful termination claim, and entered judgment in favor of the District on Leavitt's fourth amended complaint.
In the first cause of action of his verified fourth amended complaint, Leavitt sought a writ of mandate directing the District to set aside his termination. In his second cause of action, he sought damages for his wrongful termination, including back pay, front pay, and other monetary damages.
The parties later stipulated to bifurcate the writ petition and wrongful termination claim, and stay proceedings on the wrongful termination or damages claim pending the court's ruling on the writ petition. The parties also agreed that the merits of the petition would be determined based solely on documentary evidence, rather than live testimony. The trial court entered an order on the stipulation.
III. DISCUSSION
Leavitt claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying his petition for a writ of mandate directing the District to set aside its action terminating his permanent employment. He principally argues: (1) the District violated his due process rights in failing to give him at least five days' notice of his right to a hearing on the disciplinary charges; and (2) in any event, he was excused from exhausting his administrative remedy of requesting a hearing within the five-day notice period, because the District "whether by design or through inadvertence, thwarted" his ability to "invoke and thus exhaust" his administrative remedy of requesting a hearing. More specifically, Leavitt argues that the November 8 notice was conflicting and confusing, in part because it was accompanied by copies of both AR 4218 and BP 4213.1, and he was informed and reasonably believed he had 10 days to request a hearing under BP 4213.1, rather than five days under AR 4218.
We find no due process violation. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination that both Leavitt and Anyiam received at least five calendar days' notice of Leavitt's right to request a hearing, and this five days' notice satisfied Leavitt's due process rights. Further, Leavitt was not excused from exhausting his administrative remedy of requesting a hearing within five days of his receipt of the November 8 notice, or no later than 4:00 p.m. on November 13. The November 8 notice was not conflicting or confusing. Also, Leavitt and Anyiam were aware that Leavitt had five days to request a hearing and that AR 4218, not BP 4213.1, governed the District's notice and disciplinary proceedings. A. Standards of Review
The applicable standards of review are well settled. We are bound by the trial court's factual determinations, provided substantial evidence supports them. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 824.) We independently review the court's legal determinations, however. (City of Rancho Cucamonga v. Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1384 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) B. Applicable Legal Principles
Section 45113 requires the governing board of a school district not operating under a merit system to "prescribe written rules and regulations, governing the personnel management of the classified service" whereby employees of the district "are designated as permanent employees of the district after serving a prescribed period of probation which shall not exceed one year." (Id., subds. (a), (f).) Permanent employees are "subject to disciplinary action only for cause as prescribed by rule or regulation of the governing board . . . ." (Id., subd. (b).) The governing board is also required to "adopt rules of procedure" that inform the employee by written notice of (1) the specific charges against him or her, (2) a statement of the employee's right to a hearing on the charges, and (3) "the time within which the hearing may be requested which shall not be less than five days after service of the notice to the employee . . . ." (Id., subd. (c), italics added; California School Employees Assn. v. Livingston Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 391, 397.)
As a permanent District employee, Leavitt had a property interest in his continued public employment which, though created by statute, was protected by the minimum procedural safeguards guaranteed by the due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7; Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102, 1112-1119; Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 206-208.) The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that when, as here, a person is entitled to notice in a governmental proceeding and the notice permits or requires action by the person notified, the notice must be given in sufficient time to reasonably permit action by the person notified. (Coburn v. State Personnel Bd. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 801, 806; California School Employees Assn. v. Livingston Union School Dist., supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 397.)
As noted, AR 4218 stated: "The employee may, within five (5) calendar days after receiving the recommendation of personnel action described above, appeal by signing and filing the card or paper included with the recommendation. Any other written document signed and appropriately filed within the specified time limit by the employee shall constitute a sufficient notice of appeal." In providing for five calendar days' notice of the right to request a hearing on disciplinary charges, AR 4218 satisfies the minimum five-day notice requirement of section 45113, subdivision (c). AR 4218 also satisfies due process, because it provides the employee with a reasonable notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard on disciplinary charges. (See Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75, 80-81 [statute providing for reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard satisfies due process].) C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Determination That Leavitt Was Given Five Days' Notice of His Right to Request a Hearing
Leavitt's due process right to a reasonable notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the disciplinary charges against him was satisfied if he was, in fact, given at least five day's notice of his right to request a hearing. (See California School Employees Assn. v. Livingston Union School Dist., supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 399 ["in the case of personal delivery of a disciplinary notice, five days within which to respond would satisfy due process"].) The trial court determined that Leavitt was given five days' notice, and substantial evidence supports this factual determination.
The District presented evidence that, on the morning of November 8, it personally served Leavitt with its November 8 letter, notifying him of its intent to recommend that its governing board terminate his employment at the next scheduled meeting at 6:00 p.m. on November 13. Though the notice stated, in bold, underlined letters that Leavitt had until 4:00 p.m. on November 12 to request a hearing, the District presented evidence that, later during the day on November 8, it telephoned Leavitt and advised him he had until 4:00 p.m. on November 13 to request a hearing. The District also faxed a copy of the November 8 notice to Leavitt's counsel, Anyiam, on November 8, and on the same date the District's counsel, Thompson, advised Anyiam that Leavitt had until 4:00 p.m. on November 13 to request a hearing. D. Leavitt Was Not Excused From Exhausting His Administrative Remedy of Requesting a Hearing by November 13, 2007
Leavitt also maintains that, even if he was given five days' notice of his right to request a hearing, he was excused from requesting a hearing by November 13, because the November 8 notice and information accompanying it was conflicting and confusing, and for this reason did not satisfy due process. We disagree.
"The general rule of exhaustion 'forbids a judicial action when administrative remedies have not been exhausted, even as to constitutional challenges . . . .' [Citation.] However, '. . . if the remedy provided does not itself square with the requirements of due process the exhaustion doctrine has no application.'" (Bockover v. Perko (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 479, 486.) Due process does not require a particular form of notice or method of procedure. (Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors, supra, 13 Cal.2d at p. 80.) But when, as here, the notice involves an important issue, such as a government employee's loss of his or her permanent employment, the notice "'should be clear, concise and easily understandable, and not ambiguous or confusing.'" (California School Employees Assn. v. Livingston Union School Dist, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 397, quoting White v. De Martini (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 665, 669.)
Leavitt principally argues the November 8 notice was ambiguous and confusing because it was accompanied by copies of both AR 4218 and BP 4213.1. As noted, BP 4213.1(d)(B) stated: "The employee shall have ten calendar days following the delivery or mailing of the notice in which to return the notice of defense asking for a hearing." Based on BP 4213.1(d)(B), Leavitt claims he reasonably believed he had 10 days to request a hearing, not five days as provided in AR 4218.
There was nothing ambiguous or confusing about the November 8 notice, even though it was accompanied by copies of both AR 4218 and BP 4213.1. The notice plainly stated that it was being "given" "pursuant to" AR 4218, and that Leavitt had a right to request a hearing "pursuant to" AR 4218. BP 4213.1 was nowhere mentioned in the six-page letter in which Leavitt was notified of the District's intent to recommend his dismissal, the statement of charges, and right to request a hearing on the charges. Also, the trial court found, and substantial evidence shows, that (1) the copy of BP 4213.1 was included with the notice as part of a package of documents concerning Leavitt's previous one-day suspension in 2002; and (2) both Leavitt and his counsel, Anyiam, were aware, on November 8, that the District was proceeding under AR 4218, not BP 4213.1.
To be sure, the November 8 letter stated, in bold, underlined letters, that Leavitt had to request a hearing before the governing board by 4:00 p.m., November 12, which was a holiday, Veteran's Day. But substantial evidence also shows that, later on November 8, the District advised Leavitt and Anyiam that Leavitt had until 4:00 p.m. on November 13 to request a hearing. The trial court found "not credible" Leavitt's assertion that, on November 9, he received a telephone call from District employee Jamica, advising him he had 10 days to request a hearing, and we are bound by this finding.
In sum, the November 8 notice and documents accompanying it were not ambiguous or confusing. Nor did any confusion arise from the fact that both AR 4218 and BP 4213.1 were in effect in November 2007, and the governing board's "deletion" of BP 4213.1 "in favor of" AR 4218 several weeks after it terminated Leavitt's employment. The November 8 notice plainly advised Leavitt that the District was proceeding under AR 4218. Under all the attendant circumstances, a reasonable person in Leavitt's position would not have been confused by the inclusion of BP 4213.1 along with the notice, or the fact BP 4213.1 was still in effect at the time the notice was given. Given the content of the notice and the fact Leavitt and Anyiam were advised that Leavitt had five days to request a hearing, neither of them could have reasonably believed that BP 4213.1 governed the disciplinary proceedings or Leavitt's right to request a hearing. E. Leavitt's Wrongful Termination Claim Was Properly Dismissed
As indicated, after the trial court denied Leavitt's writ petition, it sustained without leave to amend the District's demurrer to Leavitt's sole remaining cause of action against the District for monetary damages based on wrongful termination. Leavitt suggests his cause of action for wrongful termination was erroneously dismissed and should be reinstated, again because the District violated his due process rights in failing to afford him reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard on the disciplinary charges that resulted in his termination.
Leavitt cannot maintain a cause of action for monetary damages for his alleged wrongful termination, however, precisely because he failed to timely request a hearing before the governing board on the disciplinary charges that resulted in his termination. "Exhaustion of administrative remedies is 'a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.'" (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 69-70, italics omitted, quoting Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 293.) Thus, Leavitt's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies by timely requesting a hearing bars his claim for monetary damages based on wrongful termination. (See, e.g., Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465, 484 [physician's tort claim based on hospital's termination of his staff privileges was barred because he failed to seek administrative review of hospital governing board's quasi-judicial action upholding his termination].) F. None of Leavitt's Other Claims are Cognizable in the Present Action
Leavitt raises several arguments generally criticizing the District's handling of its investigation of the disciplinary charges and his ultimate termination. He argues, for example, that the District failed to provide him with sexual harassment training after he became a supervisory employee (Gov. Code, § 12950.1), failed to provide him with a copy of his personnel file when he requested it during the investigation (Ed. Code, § 44031, subd. (a)), and improperly shared information about the investigation with Schaefermeyer before the investigation was completed.
Whatever effect, if any, any of these claims or issues may have had on the governing board's decision to terminate Leavitt's employment, they are not cognizable on this appeal, nor were they cognizable in the trial court, because Leavitt never raised them at a hearing before the governing board. (Niles Freeman Equipment v. Joseph (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 765, 787 [issues not presented at administrative hearing cannot be raised on judicial review]; Pegues v. Civil Service Com. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 95, 103-105 [trial court erroneously considered employee's disparate treatment claim not raised at administrative level].) This rule is part of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which, as noted, is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a litigant's resort to the courts. (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 69-71; 1 Cal. Administrative Mandamus (Cont.Ed.Bar 2011) Laying the Foundation at the Administrative Hearing, § 3.3, pp. 49-50.)
At oral argument, Leavitt stressed that the allegations against him were never proven in court, and he asked that this court clear his name by reversing the judgment dismissing his writ petition and related wrongful termination claim. This court does not sit as a jury or arbiter of the facts, however. Our review is limited to whether, based on the trial court's findings of fact, Leavitt exhausted his administrative remedies by timely requesting a hearing on his proposed termination before the District governing board before he petitioned the trial court to overturn the board's decision terminating his employment. For the reasons explained, Leavitt did not exhaust his administrative remedies, and for this reason his writ petition and related wrongful termination claim were properly dismissed.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their respective costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
King
J.
We concur:
Ramirez
P.J.
McKinster
J.