Opinion
CLAIM NO. E708248
OPINION FILED FEBRUARY 12, 1999
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by the HONORABLE JASON WATSON, Attorney at Law, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
Respondents represented by the HONORABLE CURTIS L. NEBBEN, Attorney at Law, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
OPINION AND ORDER
[2] The respondents appeal an opinion and order filed by the administrative law judge on March 6, 1998. In that opinion and order, the administrative law judge found that the claimant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained compensable bilateral shoulder injuries. After conducting ade novo review of the entire record, we find that the claimant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a compensable left shoulder injury. Therefore, we find that the administrative law judge's decision in this regard must be affirmed. However, we also find that the claimant has failed to establish a compensable right shoulder injury with objective medical findings. Therefore, we find that the administrative law judge's decision that the claimant proved that she sustained a compensable right shoulder injury must be reversed. The claimant worked on the deburring line at the respondent-employer's place of business. The deburring line is the last stage in the production of aluminum automobile wheels. The process of deburring removes any sharp burs on the wheels generated during the machine molding process. The claimant's job duties required her to pick up a wheel off of the conveyor belt, put the wheel on her work table, sand the back of the wheel, debur the valve hole, place the wheel on a stand and debur the decorative holes using a pneumatic drill, inspect the wheel and then place it on a cart or bin or hang it up. The claimant estimated that she handled 300 to 350 wheels per ten hour shift and that each wheel weighed anywhere from 15 to 35 or 40 pounds.The claimant described the specifics of each step of her job duties. While using both hands to lift the wheel off the conveyor belt, the claimant would set the wheel on her work table and sand the wheel by moving a sand block around the wheel several times in a circular motion. The claimant next used a deburring gun or drill on the holes and crevices of the wheel. The claimant then carried the wheel to carts or bins that were about waist high and approximately 10 to 15 feet away from her station. The claimant would then wait for the next wheel to come down the conveyor line. The claimant stated that there would be a new wheel approximately every two minutes.
The claimant testified that the respondent employer began manufacturing wheels from Oldsmobile in September or October of 1996. She stated this is when she began to experience left shoulder difficulties. The claimant testified that the wheels manufactured for Oldsmobile weighed approximately 35 pounds. She also had to stamp each of these wheels using a metal stamp and hammer as well as doing the normal deburring process.
The claimant's supervisor, Mr. Ray Upchurch, testified concerning the claimant's job duties. Mr. Upchurch testified that the conveyor belt is immediately adjacent to the work tables and is approximately hip high. He stated that the workers do not have to extend their arms to pick up the wheels and do not work above shoulder level. Mr. Upchurch also testified that a deburrer handles approximately 30 wheels per hour and can chose the sequence of the process. Mr. Upchurch testified that an experienced deburrer, such as the claimant, could complete the entire process in less than a minute. Mr. Upchurch further testified that there is lapse time between the wheels and that deburrers were free to use this time to go to the bath room, get water, coffee or sodas. He stated that it was easy for them to catch up because it would take ten minutes before the line is stacked up again.
Mr. Upchurch additionally testified with respect to the manufacture of the Oldsmobile wheels in the fall of 1996. Mr. Upchurch explained that these are "as-cast" face and are chrome and this alters the deburring process. He stated that the sanding is performed only on the block of the wheel and instead of using a sand block, a Scotchbrite pad similar to a dish scouring pad is used. These wheels are deburred on the inboard side only and the wheel must be stamped using a 6" by 1 1/2" stamp weighing three to four pounds and a five pound hammer. Mr. Upchurch estimated that the workers handled approximately 25 of these wheels per hour. According to Mr. Upchurch, the claimant has previously worked on this type of wheel prior to October, 1996. He could not recall that she made any complaints about her shoulder while working on these wheels prior to October of 1996.
The claimant testified that she began to experience problems with her left shoulder as early as 1993. The records reflect that the claimant went to see Dr. Tim Yawn in May of 1994 and was diagnosed with left biceps tendinitis and left trapezius muscle strain. Dr. Yawn prescribed medication and light duty limitations and the claimant's condition improved to the extent that she was able to return to normal work activities.
The claimant sought treatment from her family physician, Dr. E.N. McCollum, for left shoulder complaints in 1995. The records reflect that Dr. McCollum gave the claimant a series of injections in March of 1995 and the claimant's condition improved.
The claimant testified that her current onset of pain began in the fall of 1996 as a crick in her shoulder. She said that her shoulder felt like someone was pulling down on her arm. Her left shoulder was worse than her right and she reported her difficulties to her assistant foreman, however no accident report was ever completed. The claimant sought treatment again from Dr. McCollum on September 23, 1996. Dr. McCollum provided injections to the claimant which gave temporary relief. She returned to Dr. McCollum on October 21, 1996 for another injection.
The claimant continued to work during this time period and was ultimately referred to Dr. William Bugbee in November of 1996. The claimant was examined by Dr. Bugbee on November 12, 1996 who diagnosed overuse syndrome of the shoulder and mild acromioclavicular joint arthrosis and biceps tendinitis. Dr. Bugbee gave the claimant additional injections.
The claimant reported her difficulties to her supervisor who informed the respondent's safety director. The claimant was sent to see Dr. Gary Moffitt for an examination. Dr. Moffitt examined the claimant on February 5, 1997 and issued a report indicating:
On examination, there is no swelling or discoloration of her shoulders. There is no tenderness to palpation. She has a negative saw sign. There is no giveaway weakness. The range of motion is normal. Upper extremity reflexes are normal. X-ray is normal. And, in actuality, her entire examination of her shoulders bilaterally is found to be normal.
Having seen the deburring job many times at Superior Industries, I do not see how it could be associated with shoulder problems as she is describing. She states that she thinks lifting the wheels is what is causing her problem. However, I have never really seen anybody develop significant shoulder problems from this job either. I do not think that her work has had anything to do with causing the symptoms that she is having. With the physical examination, I am not really sure that there is any significant problem present at this time. She may continue to work with no restrictions and she is not being treated with any medications.
The claimant continued to work and followed up with Dr. McCollum and Dr. Bugbee. On February 7, 1997, Dr. McCollum documented advanced osteoporosis and Dr. Bugbee took the claimant off work on February 10, 1997. The claimant continued to receive conservative treatment and Dr. Bugbee's records reflect an assessment of chronic acromioclavicular arthrosis and bicipital tendinitis. Dr. Bugbee performed a left shoulder arthroscopy with synovectomy and debridement of biceps tendon on March 31, 1997. Dr. Bugbee's operative report indicates that he found synovitis and used his shaver to clean the tissue. He also removed a portion of the claimant's clavicle which he found to be arthritic. The claimant has not worked since February 10, 1997.
In June of 1997, the claimant sought treatment on her own from Dr. James M. McKenzie. Dr. McKenzie diagnosed the claimant with a possible rotator cuff tear following a arthrogram. Dr. Bugbee's operative report however makes no mention of a rotator cuff tear. Dr. McKenzie has recommended surgical intervention, however the claimant has not undergone any procedure because her insurance has lapsed.
The claimant testified that she only experienced difficulties in her shoulders and has not looked for a job since she last worked for the respondent on February 10, 1997. The claimant has drawn either short-term or long-term disability since February 1997 and has also applied for social security disability benefits.
The claimant's injury occurred after July 1, 1993, thus, this claim is governed by the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 as amended by Act 796 of 1993. We have held that in order to establish compensability of an injury, a claimant must satisfy all the requirements set forth in Act 796. Jerry D. Reed v. ConAgra Frozen Foods, FC Opinion filed Feb. 2, 1995 ( E317744). The claimant does not contend that her injury is identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Indeed, the claimant contends that her injury was caused by rapid repetition motion. Consequently, in order to prevail on a rapid, repetitive motion claim, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained an injury causing internal or external harm to the body which arose out of and in the course of their employment and which required medical services or resulted in disability or death. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii) and § 11-9-102(5)(E)(ii) (Supp. 1997). The claimant must also prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a work-related injury caused by rapid repetitive motion, and that the work-related injury was the major cause of her disability or need for treatment. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii)(a) and § 11-9-102(5)(E)(ii) (Supp. 1997). Finally, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(D) requires that a claimant must establish a compensable injury "by medical evidence supported by `objective findings' as defined in § 11-9-102(16)." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(D) (Supp. 1997).
Initially, we note that the respondents seem to suggest in their brief on appeal that this Commission's construction of the term "rapid repetitive motion" in Richard Throckmorton v. J J Metals, Full Workers' Compensation Commission, Opinion filed August 14, 1995 (Claim No. E405318), is the appropriate legal standard for assessing whether the claimant's job duties required rapid repetitive motion. The respondents assert that the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her job activities involved rapid motion as defined byThrockmorton.
However, on numerous occasions, the Courts have held that the Commission's Throckmorton statutory interpretation was too restrictive, and the Courts have provided the Commission guidance and precedent in several published opinions.See, generally, Baysinger v. Air Systems, Inc., 55 Ark. App. 174, 934 S.W.2d 230 (1996),Lay v. United Parcel Service, 58 Ark. App. 35, 944 S.W.2d 867 (1997); Kildow v. Baldwin Piano Organ, 58 Ark. App. 194, 948 S.W.2d 100 (1997); Rudick v. Unifirst Corp., 60 Ark. App. 173, 962 S.W.2d 819 (1998); High Capacity Products v. Moore, 61 Ark. App. 1, 962 S.W.2d 831 (1998); Boyd v. Dana Corp., 62 Ark. App. 78, 966 S.W.2d 946 (1998); Malone v. Texarkana Public Schools, 333 Ark. 343, 969 S.W.2d 644 (1998).
In the present case, we find that the claimant's job duties for the respondent handling approximately 30 tire rims per hour for 50 or more hours per week as a tire "deburrer" required rapid and repetitive shoulder motion. The evidence indicates that the claimant began working for the respondent on the debur line in October of 1991, and was in that position until February of 1997. During that time, she processed approximately 300 wheels per shift using essentially the same four steps: (1) lifting a wheel rim onto a table, (2) sanding the wheel with a circular motion, (3) deburring the wheel with a pneumatic grinder, (4) lifting the wheel onto a cart or bin. When the plant ran chrome wheels, the claimant was also required to use a four-pound stamper and a five pound shop hammer to mark each wheel. On this record, we find that the claimant's multiple step tasks, taken together, consisted of repetitive motion. Likewise, we find that the greater weight of the evidence indicates that the repetitive motions used by the claimant were "rapid", as that requirement was recently construed by the Arkansas Court of Appeals inBoyd v. Dana Corp., 62 Ark. App. 78, 966 S.W.2d 946 (1998). In Boyd, the Court of Appeals compared the duties of a worker who repeated a four-step metal fabricating process approximately 100 to 125 times per shift to the duties of a delivery man whose repetitive motions were separated by intervals of several minutes in the case of Lay v. United Parcel Service, 58 Ark. App. 35, 944 S.W.2d 847 (1997). In comparing these two situations, the Court of Appeals inBoyd found that the metal fabricating process involving 100 to 125 parts per hour was sufficiently rapid and repetitive to satisfy the requirements of Act 796 of 1993. In this regard, the Court stated:
[I] n the instant case, the evidence is that the appellant's series of repetitive motions were performed 115 to 120 times per day separated by periods of only 1.5 minutes, and we do not think that this brief interval rises to a period of "several minutes or more" as stated in Lay. Boyd, Supra, at 83.
When considering the nature and the rate of repetition of the claimant's duties in the present case as compared to the rate of repetition and the nature of the claimant's duties in theBoyd case, we find that the claimant has established by a preponderance of the credible evidence that her duties in the present case were rapid as well as repetitive, within the meaning of Act 796 of 1993.
In reaching our decision, we note that some discrepancy exists between the testimony of the claimant and the testimony of Mr. Upchurch over exactly how far away the claimant's work station was located from the bins and hanging lines, and over the exact maximum height that the claimant was required to reach at various stages of handling wheels. To the extent that the dissent seems to suggest that these discrepancies in distance and height indicate that the claimant's job duties as a wheel deburrer did not require rapid repetitive shoulder motion, we point out that the facts regarding the claimant's rate of production and the nature of the duties required of a wheel deburrer are not in dispute. We note that the exact distance that the claimant had to walk carrying a wheel, and the exact height to which the claimant had to lift a wheel, should logically have some bearing on the total amount of strain to which the claimant's shoulders were subjected over a ten-hour shift. However, the exact distance that the claimant walked, and the exact height to which she lifted wheels would appear to have little bearing on the issue as to whether the claimant's shoulder motions required rapid or repetitive motion, particularly where, as here, the duties themselves and the rate of repetition are not in dispute.
We also find that the claimant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that her compensable injury was the major cause of her disability and need for medical treatment. In this regard, we note that the respondents and the dissent rely on the opinion of Dr. Moffitt, the company physician, in their assertion the claimant has failed to establish that her work-related injury is the major cause of her disability and need for medical treatment. In this regard, we note that Dr. Moffitt examined the claimant on one occasion, indicating that he did not see any problem with the claimant's shoulders and opined that he didn't see how her work could be associated with the shoulder problems that she described. However, in assessing the potential weight to be accorded Dr. Moffitt's opinion on causation, we note that, at the time he rendered his causation opinion, Dr. Moffitt did not diagnose the claimant with any type of shoulder problem. In light of the fact that Dr. Moffitt was unable to diagnose the claimant with any type of shoulder condition when he examined her, we find that his opinion regarding the issue of the causation of the claimant's shoulder problems should be entitled to essentially no weight, since Dr. Moffitt has effectively admitted that he had no idea what abnormality was causing the claimant's symptoms.
In assessing the cause of the claimant's shoulder problems, we accord significantly greater weight to Dr. Bugbee's March 6, 1997 report which states:
[I]n the description of her type of work i.e. lifting heavy wheels to head height away from her body, this is a classic type of activity that would cause arthrosis of the acromioclavicular joints. [Emphasis added].
We find this statement significant for two reasons. First, Dr. Bugbee has opined a causal connection between the claimant's work duties and the abnormality for which Dr. Bugbee ultimately performed surgery on the claimant's left shoulder. Second, although the dissent would seem to characterize the claimant's shoulder abnormalities as "degenerative", and by inference not work related, we interpret Dr. Bugbee's statement as indicating that the claimant's job duties caused, not merely aggravated, the claimant's shoulder "degenerative" arthrosis.
As to the claimant's subsequent shoulder problems and diagnosis, when the claimant's shoulder problems persisted following Dr. Bugbee's first surgery for left-shoulder arthroscopy with synovectomy and debridement of biceps tendon on March 31, 1997, Dr. Bugbee later opined in a June 10, 1997 note:
As I outlined to her before at length, her problem now is muscular imbalance. Because of the type of work she has done, she has very strong pectoral muscles and anterior shoulder muscles. Her back muscles, particularly her trapezius, rhomboids and other periscapular muscles are extremely weak and she has a posture problem causing spasm and pain in the periscapular area.
As a result of an arthrogram, Dr. James McKenzie, diagnosed the claimant with a small complete rotator cuff tear in the left shoulder in June of 1997. However, the claimant has been unable to obtain the needed surgery for the controverted injury. As a result, on October 30, 1997, Dr. McKenzie reported increased pain in the claimant's shoulder.
After considering the reports of Dr. Moffitt, Dr. Yawn, Dr. McCollum, Dr. McKenzie, and Dr. Bugbee, and all other evidence properly in the record, and for the reasons discussed herein, we find that the claimant has established by a preponderance of the credible evidence that her left shoulder synovectomy, biceps tendon injury, arthrosis, and rotator cuff tear each arose out of and in the course of her employment duties, that her work-related injury has caused internal physical harm to her body at issue in this case, and that the claimant's work-related left shoulder injury was the major cause of the shoulder treatment she has received and the disability she has experienced.
Likewise, we note that the claimant's left-shoulder abnormalities are established by objective medical findings which include Dr. Bugbee's March 31, 1997 surgical observations, and Dr. Rodkin's June 18, 1997 arthrogram of her left shoulder.
However, with regard to the administrative law judge's finding that the claimant also established a compensable right shoulder injury as well as a left shoulder injury, we note that there are no objective medical findings of any right shoulder injury in the record. Therefore, we find that claimant has failed to establish that she has sustained a compensable right-shoulder injury.
Finally, we find that claimant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she remained within her healing period and incapacitated to earn from February 10, 1997 through the date of the hearing in this case, and to a date yet to be determined. In reaching that conclusion, we note that the claimant has been diagnosed with a rotator cuff injury requiring surgery for her left shoulder, that the left shoulder surgery has not been authorized because it has been controverted as a non-compensable injury, and that the claimant will remain within her healing period until she has had an opportunity to have the recommended surgery. Likewise, we note that the claimant was released from work on February 10, 1997, and has not been released to return to work since that date. However, the claimant testified that she has received short term as well as long term disability benefits through her group carrier. Therefore, the respondent is entitled to a dollar for dollar offset in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-411.
Therefore, after conducting a de novo review of the entire record, we find that the claimant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a compensable left shoulder injury, that she remained within her healing period and incapacitated to earn beginning February 10, 1997 and continuing to a date yet to be determined, and that the respondents are entitled to a dollar for dollar offset pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-4-11. Therefore, we find that the administrative law judge's decision in these regards must be affirmed. However, we find that the claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a compensable right shoulder injury. Therefore, we find that the administrative law judge's decision in this regard must be reversed.
All accrued benefits shall be paid in a lump sum without discount and with interest thereon at the lawful rate from the date of the administrative law judge's decision in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-809 (Repl. 1996). For prevailing in part on this appeal before the Full Commission, claimant's attorney is hereby awarded an additional attorney's fee in the amount of $250.00 in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715 (Repl. 1996).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
I find that I must concur in part and dissent in part from the majority opinion. I concur with the majority holding that claimant suffered a compensable left shoulder injury. I must however dissent from the finding that claimant failed to establish a compensable right shoulder injury. Accordingly, I would affirm the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge in its entirety.
PAT WEST HUMPHREY, Commissioner
CONCURRING DISSENTING OPINION
I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion finding that the claimant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a compensable gradual onset injury. Based upon my de novo review of the record, I find that the claimant has failed to meet her burden of proof. I do agree with the majority's finding that the claimant failed to prove she sustained a compensable injury to her right shoulder. However, in my opinion the claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a compensable injury toeither shoulder.
The claimant contends that she sustained a gradual overuse bilateral shoulder injury which arose out of and in the course of her employment. The respondent contends that this is a nonwork-related condition and that the claimant has consistently treated it as a nonwork-related condition. Further, the claimant's group health insurance carrier has consistently paid for her treatment for this problem until she no longer had insurance benefits.
In my opinion, the claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her job entailed rapid and repetitive motion. There is no doubt that the claimant used her hands while working for the respondent employer. The claimant's job duties required her to pick up a wheel off a conveyor line, put the wheel on her work table, sand the back of the wheel, debur the valve hole and the decorative holes using a pneumatic drill, inspect the wheel, and then place it on a cart bin or hang it. There were two employees who worked together at each deburring station and the claimant normally handled approximately 30 wheels per hour during her shift. This equates to one wheel every two minutes on the average.
The claimant's supervisor, Mr. Upchurch, testified that an experienced deburrer such as the claimant could complete the entire process in 30 seconds to a minute or less and the wheels are presented one every two minutes. Thus, it is clear that there was a significant period of lapsed time between wheels.
It is also significant that the conveyor belt that is immediately adjacent to the work tables is approximately hip high. Mr. Upchurch testified that the workers do not have to extend their arms to pick up the wheels and do not have to work above shoulder level. Contrary to the claimant's testimony, Mr. Upchurch testified that the carts, bins or hanging lines are only three or four feet from the work station. The top rack of the hanging line is approximately lower chest level and the bin is approximately six inches above the waist. Workers are not required to bend or extend their arms to place a wheel on either the bins or the carts. Mr. Upchurch specifically testified that he had never observed the claimant working overhead or with her arms extended. The evidence clearly shows that the claimant's job duties did not entail rapid and repetitive motion as it has been defined by the Courts.
The claimant had at least one minute between working on each wheel. In addition, the claimant never had to work above her shoulders. For me to find that the claimant's shoulder problems were the result of rapid repetitive motion would require me to resort to conjecture and speculation. Conjecture and speculation, even if plausible, cannot take the place of proof.Ark. Dept. of Correction v. Glover, 35 Ark. App. 32, 812 S.W.2d 692 (1991). Dena Construction Co. v. Herndon, 264 Ark. 791, 575 S.W.2d 155 (1970). Arkansas Methodist Hospital v. Adams, 43 Ark. App. 1, 858 S.W.2d 125 (1993).
Even if the claimant was able to prove that her job duties were rapid and repetitive, which I do not find, I also find that the claimant has failed to prove the major cause portion of the statute as well. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(14) defines "major cause" as more than fifty percent (50%). In my opinion, the claimant has failed to prove that her injury is the major cause of her disability. Dr. Moffitt specifically addressed causation in his reported dated February 5, 1997 wherein he stated:
Having seen the deburring job many times at Superior Industries, I do not see how it could be associated with shoulder problems as she is describing. She states that she thinks lifting the wheels is what is causing her problem. However, I have never really seen anybody develop significant shoulder problems from this type of job either. I do not think that her work has anything to do with causing her symptoms that she is having. With physical examination, I am not really sure that there is any significant problem present at this time. She may continue to work with no restrictions and she is not being treated with any medication.
The medical evidence indicates that the claimant's shoulder problems are the result of degenerative changes. Dr. Bugbee examined the claimant on November 12, 1996 and diagnosed the claimant with overuse syndrome of the shoulder and mild acromioclavicular joint arthrosis and biceps tendinitis. On February 7, 1997, Dr. McCollum documented advanced osteoporosis. Again, on March 6, 1997, Dr. Bugbee's records reflect an assessment of chronic acromioclavicular arthrosis. In Dr. Bugbee's operative report of March 31, 1997, he found synovitis and used a shaver to clean the tissue. Further, Dr. Bugbee removed the portion of the claimants's clavicle that was found to be arthritic. Specifically, Dr. Bugbee documented findings of "[s]evere degenerative changes of the distal clavicle of the acromioclavicular joint." Clearly, these findings are degenerative in nature and do not relate to the claimant's employment at the respondent. These medical records indicate that the claimant's shoulder problems are degenerative in nature and not a result of any sort of gradual onset type injury with the respondent.
The claimant testified that she only experienced difficulties in her shoulders and has not looked for a job since she last worked for the respondent on February 10, 1997. The claimant has drawn either short-term or long-term disability since February 1997 and has also applied for social security disability benefits.
It is noted that the claimant received a workers' compensation settlement for a carpal tunnel injury while she was working for Campbell Soup. However, the claimant failed to disclose this fact when she applied for employment with the respondent-employer. The claimant also failed to disclose this injury when specifically asked if she had ever had any injuries when the adjuster contacted her for her recorded statement.
The claimant's credibility is suspect because she lied about her prior workers' compensation injury on her employment application with the respondent. Further, the claimant lied to the adjuster at the time of her interview with the adjuster on this case. It is the exclusive function of the Commission to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Johnson v. Riceland Foods, 47 Ark. App. 71, 884 S.W.2d 626 (1994). Furthermore, the Commission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or other witnesses, but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony it deems worthy of belief.Morelock v. Kearney Co., 48 Ark. App. 227, 894 S.W.2d 603 (1995).
Therefore, based upon my de novo review of the record, and without giving the benefit of the doubt to either party, I find that the claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a compensable injury. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
MIKE WILSON, Commissioner