Opinion
No. 25779-7-III.
February 26, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 04-2-02929-0, Harold D. Clarke III, J., entered November 27, 2006.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished opinion per Schultheis, A.C.J., concurred in by Kulik, J., and Stephens, J. Pro Tem.
A directed verdict is proper only when the court can find, as a matter of law, that there was no substantial evidence or reasonable inference to sustain a verdict for the nonmoving party. Here, Tai Le was a passenger in a car driven by Van Thi Lam. Ms. Lam's car collided with Matthew Flory's car in an uncontrolled intersection. Mr. Le sued both Mr. Flory and Ms. Lam for injuries resulting from the collision. After Mr. Le testified, the trial court granted Ms. Lam's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of her liability. Mr. Le appeals the trial court's ruling granting the directed verdict, arguing there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Ms. Lam negligent. When the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Mr. Le, a question remains as to Ms. Lam's negligence. We therefore reverse the order for a directed verdict and remand for a new trial.
Motions for a directed verdict were renamed motions for judgment as a matter of law effective September 17, 1993. Guijosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 Wn.2d 907, 915, 32 P.3d 250 (2001).
FACTS
This action arose out of a two car collision on the afternoon of January 25, 2003, at the uncontrolled intersection of Queen Avenue and Standard Street. Queen Avenue runs east-west and is intersected by Standard Street which runs north-south. Ms. Lam was driving west on Queen Avenue as she approached the intersection. Mr. Le was a passenger in the front seat. Mr. Flory was driving north on Standard Street when the cars collided in the intersection. Mr. Le and Ms. Lam were both bruised as a result of the accident.
Mr. Le sued Mr. Flory for damages resulting from the collision. He later amended the complaint to include Ms. Lam as a defendant. Ms. Lam filed a cross claim for damages against Mr. Flory.
At trial, Mr. Le testified that the afternoon of the collision was dark and rainy. Ms. Lam's headlights were on. He was not certain whether Ms. Lam was speeding or whether she looked both ways before entering the intersection. Mr. Le recalled that Ms. Lam's car was the first to reach the intersection and that Mr. Flory's car was a good distance away. He stated that Ms. Lam slowed as she approached the intersection. He then saw Mr. Flory's car speeding through the intersection, but was unable to warn Ms. Lam in time. The front of Ms. Lam's car hit the rear passenger door of Mr. Flory's car. Ms. Lam was about halfway through the intersection when the accident occurred.
Mr. Le could not remember the impact, but when he woke up he had pain in his neck and under his jaw. For the first month after the accident he had headaches, his neck hurt, and his jaw was so painful he could not eat. At the time of trial, he claimed that his neck problems persisted. A family practice physician testified that Mr. Le suffered muscular strain. A chiropractor diagnosed Mr. Le with postwhiplash syndrome, explaining that Mr. Le had strained several muscles in his neck.
Ms. Lam moved for a directed verdict regarding her liability. She argued that Mr. Le had failed to present evidence that she violated a duty of care or that she proximately caused the collision. The trial court granted the motion, concluding there was not even "a scintilla of evidence as to responsibility from Ms. Lam to Mr. Le." Report of Proceedings (RP) (Aug. 29, 2006) at 8.
The case then proceeded to trial against Mr. Flory only. Ms. Lam testified that before the collision she was driving under the speed limit of 25 miles per hour. She slowed to 18 miles an hour as she approached the intersection and looked both ways. She saw Mr. Flory's car to her left. She stated that she looked both ways as she entered the intersection and noticed that Mr. Flory had not reached the intersection. She accelerated to cross. Next, Mr. Flory's car suddenly appeared in front of her and she tried to brake. She denied hitting his car, stating that Mr. Flory "cut in front of me so he hit me." RP (Aug. 29 31, 2006) at 21.
Mr. Flory recalled a different version of events. He testified that the day was overcast, but not raining. His car headlights were off. He was driving within the speed limit and looked both ways as he approached the intersection. He saw Ms. Lam's car about half a block from the intersection. He stated that he reached the intersection before Ms. Lam. He believed he had enough time to cross and proceeded to do so. When he saw Ms. Lam's vehicle in the middle of the intersection, he prepared himself for a collision, but did not swerve. Mr. Flory testified that Ms. Lam's car hit his and that Ms. Lam contributed to the accident.
The jury found Mr. Flory negligent, but that he did not proximately cause the collision. Mr. Le then moved to vacate the directed verdict or to grant a new trial. He argued that the trial court's release of Ms. Lam from potential liability deprived him of a fair trial because there was sufficient evidence of her negligence to go to a jury. The trial court denied his motions. He appeals.
ANALYSIS
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court should have submitted the issue of Ms. Lam's possible negligence to the jury. Mr. Le contends the evidence is sufficient to establish that Ms. Lam could have been liable for the accident. He also argues that he was entitled to recover damages jointly and severally from Mr. Flory and Ms. Lam. Ms. Lam responds that the trial court properly dismissed Mr. Le's claim against her because Mr. Le failed to present any evidence that she was negligent.
In evaluating the propriety of the trial court's ruling, we are mindful of Washington Constitution article I, section 21, which provides that the right of a trial by jury shall be preserved inviolate. The standard for a directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law is rigorous. A trial court should grant such a motion only "'when viewing the material evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court can say, as a matter of law, that there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inferences to sustain a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Guijosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 101 Wn. App. 777, 795, 6 P.3d 583 (2000) (quoting Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wn.2d 251, 271-72, 830 P.2d 646 (1992)), aff'd, 144 Wn.2d 907, 32 P.3d 250 (2001). Substantial evidence exists if it is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared premise. Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 149 Wn.2d 521, 531, 70 P.3d 126 (2003).
In determining whether a fact exists for a directed verdict, the court must admit the truth of the opponent's evidence and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Cent. Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 126 Wn.2d 50, 98, 882 P.2d 703, 891 P.2d 718 (1994). Further, the court can determine negligence as a matter of law only when the facts are undisputed and have only one reasonable inference from them. Guerin v. Thompson, 53 Wn.2d 515, 519, 335 P.2d 36 (1959). An appellate court reviews the trial court's decision de novo and applies the same standard as the trial court. Guijosa, 144 Wn.2d at 915.
CR 50(a)(1) governs here. It provides in part: "If, during a trial by jury, a party has been fully heard with respect to an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find or have found for that party with respect to that issue, the court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party."
The crucial question here is whether no reasonable person could have found Ms. Lam negligent. Guijosa, 101 Wn. App. at 795. We first turn to the distinction between actual cause and legal cause:
An actual cause, or cause in fact, exists . . . when the injury would not have resulted "but for" the act in question. But a cause in fact . . . does not of itself support an action for negligence. Considerations of justice and public policy require that a certain degree of proximity exist between the act done or omitted and the harm sustained, before legal liability may be predicated upon the "cause" in question. It is only when this necessary degree of proximity is present that the cause in fact becomes a legal, or proximate, cause.
The most usual definition of proximate cause of an event is: that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new, independent cause, produces the event, and without which that event would not have occurred.
Eckerson v. Ford's Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 11, 3 Wn.2d 475, 482, 101 P.2d 345 (1940).
Further, "[w]hether a person has exercised due care for the safety of other users of the highway is a factual issue to be determined only by the trier of the facts." Johnson v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 66 Wn.2d 614, 618, 404 P.2d 444 (1965). Both drivers have a duty to avoid collisions at uncontrolled intersections. Henderson v. Bobst, 6 Wn. App. 975, 977, 497 P.2d 957 (1972).
Here, questions of fact exist regarding Ms. Lam's liability. The testimony was disputed as to which driver first reached the intersection. Mr. Flory testified that he reached the intersection before Ms. Lam. Mr. Le testified that he did not know whether Ms. Lam was speeding or if she looked both ways before she entered the intersection. He could not remember whether she stopped before she entered the intersection. Mr. Le also testified that he did not believe Ms. Lam swerved to avoid the accident. He saw her hit Mr. Flory's car when it was almost through the intersection.
Assuming Mr. Le's testimony is true and giving him the benefit of every favorable inference, we cannot say that there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inference to sustain a verdict in his favor. Hiner v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 91 Wn. App. 722, 731, 959 P.2d 1158 (1998), rev'd in part on other grounds, 138 Wn.2d 248, 978 P.2d 505 (1999). Mr. Le's testimony creates a question of fact as to who was responsible for the accident — Mr. Flory, Ms. Lam, or both. This being the case, the trial court erred in taking the issue of negligence from the jury.
Mr. Flory requests an award of costs if he prevails on appeal. Because he is not the prevailing party, he is not entitled to costs on appeal. RAP 14.2.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in dismissing Mr. Le's case against Ms. Lam. This in turn deprived him of a fair trial. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Kulik, J., Stephens, J. Pro Tem., concur.