Opinion
Case No. 3:17-cv-00055-SLG
02-04-2019
Kristjan LAXFOSS, Plaintiff, v. Brian F. LANG, et al., Defendants.
John E. Casperson, Holmes Weddle & Barcott, PC, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff. David Paul Begnell, San Bernardino, CA, pro se.
John E. Casperson, Holmes Weddle & Barcott, PC, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff.
David Paul Begnell, San Bernardino, CA, pro se.
ORDER RE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Sharon L. Gleason, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court at Docket 25 is Plaintiff Kristjan Laxfoss's motion for summary judgment as to Defendant David Begnell. Mr. Begnell opposed the motion in a declaration at Docket 30. Mr. Laxfoss replied at Docket 32.
BACKGROUND
On March 16, 2017, Mr. Laxfoss filed his complaint in this action. He sought "a declaration that the Vessel [LADY GUDNY, Official Number 615085, ("Vessel") ] is not subject to certain Notices of Claim of Maritime Lien or to the maritime liens asserted therein." The complaint includes 24 counts, each identifying a potential lien against the Vessel. Count Seven alleged that "David Paul Begnell, a crew member aboard the Vessel ... filed a Notice of Claim of Maritime Lien, for $ 12,849.60 against the Vessel with the United States Coast Guard on May 3, 1999." Mr. Laxfoss maintains that because Mr. "Begnell has had reasonable opportunity to enforce the lien, but has done nothing to pursue his claim," Mr. "Begnell's claim is barred by laches."
Docket 1 (Complaint).
Docket 1 at 2, ¶¶ 2–3.
Docket 1 at 2–14, ¶¶ 5–49.
Docket 1 at 5, ¶¶ 16–17.
On September 11, 2018, Mr. Laxfoss filed the instant motion. As of that date, default or dismissal had been entered as to all claims with the exception of Claim Seven.
Docket 25.
Docket 4 (Notice of Dismissal re Defendant Bruce Greenwood); Docket 9 (Notice of Dismissal of Certain Defendants); Docket 15 (Order Granting Motion at Docket 13 for Entry of Default); Docket 24 (Order re Plaintiff's Motion at Docket 22 for Order of Default).
LEGAL STANDARD
"[L]aches is a defense developed by courts of equity; its principal application was, and remains, to claims of an equitable cast for which the Legislature has provided no fixed time limitation." Laches applies when a party's institution of litigation to recover on a claim (1) is unreasonably delayed and (2) that delay prejudiced the other party. Laches may apply even when the other party has had notice of the claim.
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 678, 134 S.Ct. 1962, 188 L.Ed.2d 979 (2014).
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp. , 263 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 954-55.
As to unreasonable delay, "[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that no arbitrary or fixed period of time has been, or will be, established as an inflexible rule, but that the delay which will defeat such a suit must in every case depend on the peculiar equitable circumstances of that case."
In re Beaty , 306 F.3d 914, 927 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal alteration, citation, and quotation marks removed); see also The Key City , 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 653, 660, 20 L.Ed. 896 (1871) ("[N]o arbitrary or fixed period of time has been, or will be, established as an inflexible rule, but that the delay which will defeat such a suit must in every case depend on the peculiar equitable circumstances of that case.").
As to prejudice, two forms exist: "evidentiary and expectations-based. Evidentiary prejudice includes such things as lost, stale, or degraded evidence, or witnesses whose memories have faded or who have died." Expectations-based prejudice requires a party to "show[ ] that it took actions or suffered consequences that it would not have, had the plaintiff brought suit promptly."
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp. , 263 F.3d 942, 955 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp. , 263 F.3d 942, 955 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Mr. Laxfoss maintains that since Mr. Begnell filed his claim of lien in 1999, Mr. "Begnell has done nothing to pursue his claims from this date until this suit was filed ...." And indeed, it is not Mr. Begnell that instituted this suit to recover on his lien, but Mr. Laxfoss. Mr. Laxfoss maintains that "[a]ny lack of money or ignorance of the issues does not justify any delay, and [Mr.] Begnell has suggested no other reasonable basis on which to justify his delay." Mr. Begnell responds that he "do[es] not have any money to defend my lien ... but [he] believe[s] the lien is a valid claim."
Docket 25 at 4.
Docket 25 at 5.
Docket 30 at 2.
Mr. Laxfoss filed his complaint in March 2017, more than 17 years after Mr. Begnell filed his lien against the vessel. The Ninth Circuit held in In re Beaty held that laches did not bar a creditor's claim despite the creditor's knowing "for five years that he had a potential ... action, and that he affirmatively opted not to file that action until the law on dischargeability changed in his favor." The Circuit Court determined that a party's awaiting a favorable change in the law constituted a reasonable basis for the delay.
Docket 1 at 5, 14.
306 F.3d 914, 927 (9th Cir. 2002).
More applicable to this case is the First Circuit's holding in Puerto Rico Ports Authority v. Umpierre-Solares. In that case, the plaintiff paid defendants to remove and dispose of a sunken ship. The defendants did not complete performance of the contract. Eleven years later, the plaintiff brought an action seeking specific performance. In light of the fact that "the record [was] devoid of any evidence to show plaintiffs made any extra-judicial or judicial effort during the eleven (11) year-period to request from defendants the specific performance of the contract," the First Circuit held that in "the absence of any reasonable explanation for such inaction," the delay was unreasonable.
P.R. Ports Auth. v. Umpierre-Solares , 456 F.3d 220, 222–23 (1st Cir. 2006).
P.R. Ports Auth. v. Umpierre-Solares , 456 F.3d 220, 227–28 (1st Cir. 2006).
Mr. Begnell seeks to justify his inaction by maintaining that he lacked the money to bring suit. The Court is sympathetic to Mr. Begnell's financial circumstances, but it is the law in this Circuit and nationwide that "a party's poverty or pecuniary embarrassment [is] not a sufficient excuse for postponing the assertion of his rights." Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Mr. Begnell unreasonably failed to timely bring a lawsuit to enforce his lien.
Leggett v. Standard Oil Co. , 149 U.S. 287, 294, 13 S.Ct. 902, 37 L.Ed. 737 (1893) ; see also Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp. , 263 F.3d 942, 954–55 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding, as part of laches determination, that a party's delay was unreasonable despite his claims that he could not afford to bring suit).
See also 46 U.S.C. § 31343(e) (notice of maritime lien expires three years after filing).
Mr. Laxfoss maintains that he has suffered evidentiary prejudice because "records documenting the activities of the Vessel and of Harold Holman (the operator of the Vessel during the time period of Begnell's lien claims) have been lost[.]" Mr. Begnell does not directly dispute this assertion. Mr. Laxfoss maintains that he has also suffered expectations-based prejudice because "the cloud on title of the vessel has prevented Laxfoss's efforts to market the Vessel at a reasonable price." Mr. Laxfoss's inability to quiet title to the Vessel is sufficiently immediate and specific to constitute expectations-based prejudice. Accordingly, Mr. Laxfoss has demonstrated that he has been prejudiced by Mr. Begnell's inaction.
Docket 25 at 5.
In re Beaty , 306 F.3d 914, 928 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that generic allegations of harm were insufficient to establish prejudice).
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CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to David Begnell at Docket 25 is GRANTED. The final judgment in this matter shall contain a declaration that David Begnell does not have a valid maritime lien pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 31343(c)(2) upon the LADY GUDNY, Official Number 615085.