Opinion
Civil Action 3:20-cv-02428
01-06-2021
ANTHONY LAWSON, #2020-01070, Plaintiff, v. PIZZA HUT, et al, Defendants.
MARIANL, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR., UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a pro se action for damages, asserting federal civil rights claims against several defendants, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his pro se complaint, the plaintiff, Anthony Lawson, alleges that the various defendants violated his constitutional rights in connection with state criminal proceedings against him. For the reasons stated herein, it is recommended that the amended complaint be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(i) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
I. Background
The pro se complaint names several defendants, including the Dunmore Police Department and four of its police officers, the private restaurant where the plaintiff worked prior to his arrest and its owner, and Lackawanna County Prison, its warden, two deputy wardens, and three other prison officials. The complaint alleges that, on May 17, 2020,
[s]omeone called police on me [and] because of that, Pizza Hut fired me. Th[e]n police officers arrested me on false accusations and lied on their police report to gain approval [of those] charges.
After that, I was unjustly [held in custody] at Lackawanna County Prison. They didn't give me a fair trial since 5/17/2020, and violated plaintiff[']s Sixth Amendment constitutional right to get a trial in six months.(Doc. 1, at 8.) The complaint alleges no additional facts in support of his claims. Based on these sparse factual allegations, the plaintiff claims that he was fired by his employer "without reasonable doubt," that the defendants violated the "Sunshine Act of Pennsylvania Law," and that his (unspecified) constitutional rights were violated. For relief, the plaintiff seeks an award of $50,000 in damages from each defendant.
A review of publicly available state court records reveals that, on May 19, 2020, the plaintiff was charged by criminal complaint with felony corruption of minors and related lesser offenses. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, Docket No. CP-35-CR-0001065-2020 (Lackawanna Cty. (Pa.) C.C.P.). He has been arraigned and is currently awaiting trial on these charges. Id. The plaintiff has been held in custody as a pretrial detainee because he has been unable to post bail. Id.
II. Legal Standard
A plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides that a court "shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action ... is frivolous." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint is "frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact." Neitzke u. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). To determine whether it is frivolous, a court must "assess an in forma pauperis complaint from an objective standpoint in order to determine whether the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or clearly baseless factual contention." Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992)). This statutory provision further permits a court, in its sound discretion "to dismiss an in forma pauperis claim if it determines that the claim is of little or no weight, value, or importance, not worthy of serious consideration, or trivial." Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1089; see also Denton, 504 U.S. at 33-34 ("[F]rivolousness is a decision entrusted to the discretion of the court entertaining the in forma pauperis petition.").
III. Discussion
Lawson's claims seek damages for constitutional violations in connection with the pending criminal proceedings for which he is awaiting trial. In particular, he appears to assert malicious prosecution and speedy trial claims under the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments, respectively. See generally Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704F.3d239, 244-46 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing a court's obligation to liberally construe pro se pleadings and other submissions, particularly when dealing with imprisoned pro se litigants). Pursuant to the favorable termination rule articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), however, these claims are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that, where judgment in favor of a plaintiff in a § 1983 action for damages would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiffs criminal conviction or sentence, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that "the criminal proceedings have terminated in the plaintiffs favor." Id. at 489. "[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1.983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus [under] 28 U.S.C. § 2254." Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). In Wilkinson v. Dolson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the favorable termination rule and broadened it to encompass equitable remedies as well, holding that "a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter what the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration." Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-82. The Heck bar applies whether the plaintiff is a pretrial detainee or has already been convicted of the charges for which he is currently incarcerated. See Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996) ("In terms of the conflicts which Heck sought to avoid, there is no difference between a conviction which is outstanding at the time the civil rights action is instituted and a potential conviction on a pending charge that may be entered at some point thereafter."), abrogated on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007).
Lawson has failed to demonstrate that the criminal proceedings at issue have terminated in his favor. Accordingly, under Heck, Lawson's federal civil rights claims against these defendants are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Humphries v. Houghton, 442 Fed.Appx. 626, 629 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) ("[C]laims that defendants used perjury and false evidence to secure . . . conviction are not cognizable under Heck's favorable termination rule."); Davila v. Pennsylvania, Civil No. 3:11-CV-01092, 2011 WL 7178689, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2011) (Heck barred speedy trial claim), adopted in part and rejected in pari on other grounds, 2012 WL 406985 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2012); von Schlichten v. County of Northampton, Civil Action No. 06-1028, 2007 WL 2768853, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2007) (Heck barred speedy trial claim); Asque v. Commonwealth Allegheny County, Civil Action No. 07-294, 2007 WL 1247051, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2007) (Heck barred speedy trial claim). As such, these claims lack any arguable basis in law and should be dismissed as legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Saunders v. Bright, 281 Fed.Appx. 83, 85 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Ruth v. Richard, 139 Fed.Appx. 470, 471 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Boy kin v. Siena House Gaudenzia Program, 464 F.Supp.2d 416, 424 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
Moreover, we note that the "under color of state law" element of § 1983 excludes from its reach "merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982). It is beyond cavil that the plaintiffs former employer is a private company and its owner is a private individual, and neither is an arm of the state. See Waldron v. Kozachyn, Civil No. 19-16928 (RBK/KMW), 2019 WL 4785766, at *3-*4 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2019). Under limited circumstances, a private individual may be liable under § 1983 if his or her conduct is so closely related to governmental conduct that it can be fairly viewed as conduct of the state itself. See Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1142-43 (3d Cir. 1995) (detailing the various tests used to analyze whether private conduct may be treated as state action). But none of the vague conduct by these defendants-Lawson's firing- can be fairly viewed as state action. He has failed to allege facts to plausibly demonstrate that his private-sector employer "acted with the help of or in concert with state officials." Id. at 1142. Thus, the plaintiffs claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against these private-sector defendants is clearly based on an indisputably meritless legal theory and should be dismissed as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See Brett v. Zimmerman, Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-02414, 2018 WL 6576412, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2018) (recommending dismissal of § 1983 claims against private individual as frivolous), report and recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 6567721 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2018); Toroney v. Woyten, Civ. A. No. 86-4871, 1986 WL 11081, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 1986) (dismissing § 1983 claims against private actor as frivolous).
IV. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that:
1. This action be DISMISSED as legally frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); and
2. The Clerk be directed to mark this case as CLOSED.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated January 6, 2021. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Failure to file timely objections to the foregoing Report and Recommendation may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.