Opinion
TTDFA166011308S
11-28-2017
Jodi-Lyn LAWRENCE v. Mark LAWRENCE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Murphy, J.
The plaintiff, JODI-LYN LAWRENCE, commenced this dissolution of marriage action against the defendant, MARK LAWRENCE, by summons and complaint dated September 20, 2016, returnable to this court on October 18, 2016. The case was tried before the Court on September 14, 2017. The plaintiff was represented by Attorney James J. Sullivan and the defendant was represented by Attorney Jeremiah N. Ollennu.
The court heard testimony from both parties. The plaintiff submitted a financial affidavit dated September 13, 2017. The defendant submitted a financial affidavit dated September 7, 2017. Both submitted a State of Connecticut Child Support Guidelines Worksheet prepared by Family Services on that date. Without objection, the court also marked as exhibits a total of seven Plaintiff’s exhibits as follows: (1) Defendant’s 2014 W-2s, (2) Plaintiff’s 2014 W-2s, (3) Defendant’s 2015 W-2s, (4) Plaintiff’s 2015 W-2s, (5) Defendant’s 2016 W-2s, (6) Plaintiff’s 2016 W-2s, (7) Ollennu, Green letter dated 2/14/2017, and a total of six Defendant’s Exhibits as follows: (A) Defendant’s Pay stub dated 3/31/2017, (B) Defendant’s Pay stub dated 3/22/2017, (C) 401(K) document dated 12/31/2016, (D) Ray Seraphin letter dated 5/19/2017, (E) Defendant’s Pay stub dated 9/1/2017. No other exhibits were entered into evidence.
At the outset of trial, the parties agreed that both parties would have joint legal custody of the remaining minor child. They also agreed that the plaintiff will continue to provide health care insurance for the minor daughter through her employer, as long as it is available through her employer at a reasonable cost, and requested that the court retain jurisdiction for purposes of entering educational support orders for the minor daughter at a later date. Both parties expressed a willingness to pay for the post-secondary educational expenses. The father expressed some concern over paying for out of region expenses but did not rule out the possibility of paying for such expenses.
The parties were at odds, however, on the issues of alimony and division of the marital estate.
Upon careful consideration of the facts agreed to by the parties, of the evidence presented and the pertinent statutory law, in particular General Statutes § 46b-84 (child support), § 46b-56 (custody and visitation), § 46b-66 (agreements), § 46b-82 (alimony) and § 46b-81 (assignment of the marital estate), and the relevant case law, and having observed the demeanor and assessed the credibility of the witnesses at trial, the court finds and orders as follows.
I. Jurisdiction
The plaintiff and the defendant were married on November 14, 1992 in East Hartford Connecticut. The parties continuously lived in the State of Connecticut for at least one year before this action was filed. All statutory stays have expired. The court has jurisdiction over this matter.
Discussion
A. Factual Background
The parties started dating while the plaintiff was in college. It was the first " real" relationship for Ms. Lawrence. They share three children in common, a son, Andrew, born on May 31, 1996, a second son, Sean, born on April 2, 1998 and a daughter, Skyler, born on March 1, 2000. Andrew is working in New London but lives at the marital home with the two parties. Sean Lawrence is in the Navy and does not live at home. Skyler is a senior in high school in Manchester, Ct. This divorce action was filed in September 2016. The plaintiff is not currently pregnant. Neither the parties nor their children received any public assistance during the marriage.
The plaintiff obtained a B.S. from Eastern Connecticut State University in the area of early childhood education. She started an M.S. program but had to discontinue it to pay for an issue involving the defendant’s taxes. She never resumed her studies. The plaintiff held two jobs prior to her marriage with the defendant. The main job was as a teacher for St. James School. She also worked after school in day care and had a job as a " nanny" at one time. She currently works for St. Gabriel’s school full time in Windsor, Ct. and part time with the East Hartford Board of Education, the Crossroads-O’Brien School. She recently started another part-time job with Applied Behavioral Analysis.
The defendant graduated from High School and post-high-school training. Prior to his marriage he attended a school in Hartford for automotive mechanics. Later, he attended Porter and Chester Institute where he received a two-year certificate for architecture draftsmanship. He worked briefly as a draftsman for Ames Department Store but when that did not work out he obtained a certification as a mechanic. The defendant worked for 12 years at Ray Seraphin Ford, a short time with Morande Ford, Interstate Ford for one year as a mechanic and then with the parts department. His work continued in the automotive/parts field throughout his working life. He returned to Ray Seraphin approximately six years ago and is currently employed in the Parts Department. In 1998 he took a part-time position with Connecticut Lighting Center after work. It was close to his full-time work and his initial motivation was that the position allowed him to get Afflac Insurance. He has continued to maintain that part-time position today. He also teaches auto class every Wednesday 2 1/2 hours for 9 weeks during the fall and spring semesters for the Vernon Board of Education.
The plaintiff was the primary caregiver for the three children. The court believes that the plaintiff did make a significant contribution to the household by staying home with the children and worked part-time while the defendant was the primary wage-earner.
The Court finds that both parties were credible in their testimony. There is no significant discrepancy between their respective testimony. The plaintiff indicated that early in their relationship the two went to bars together. She said that more recently the defendant drank alcohol on occasion. She also was concerned about the defendant’s use of marijuana which she believes continues until this day. Based upon the evidence before the Court it does not appear that either of these activities had a significant impact on the marriage. Regarding their relationship, the plaintiff said that for the first seventeen years things were ok. Both the plaintiff and defendant agreed that there were good times and there were bad times throughout the marriage. Plaintiff said that over the past seven years their relationship had become progressively worse. The plaintiff said that the defendant never seemed to be happy and was not supportive of her. She attributed this change to the introduction of the defendant’s affair into their marriage. She did not know that the affair was going on until she discovered it in mid-2016 but feels that there is a correlation between the affair and when the defendant’s attitude toward the plaintiff changed. The defendant described his wife as a person that was always there, as a great mother, and a person who raised the children very well. He admits to the affair with the woman that attended his automotive class. He denies that he had a post-marriage sexual relationship with " Sue" (his girlfriend from high school) but it is clear that some relationship did redevelop between he and Sue during the marriage. The Court does not have sufficient information to draw any conclusion regarding the nature of that relationship. With the exception of the defendant’s affair, the Court believes that these were two hard-working people trying to do their best for the most part. The Court finds that the defendant has shown genuine remorse for his fault in the divorce.
Regarding the plaintiff and defendant’s relationship with the children, both plaintiff and defendant testified that the defendant was not home much due to his work schedule which took him away from the home most of the time. Both parents agree that the plaintiff was the main contributor toward raising the three children. The plaintiff described the defendant’s relationship with Andrew as good, with Sean as bad the last 3 or 4 years. As they got older the defendant did do some activities with the two boys on a few weekends. As the boys have become adults it appears that the defendant’s relationship with them has improved. The defendant goes out to dinner and a movie with Drew every Friday. In regard to the minor daughter, Skylar, the plaintiff describes the defendant’s relationship with her as " nonexistent." The defendant describes it as difficult now but does not know if that relates to the divorce, other factors, or just the fact that Skylar is going through a natural process as a teenager.
There was no significant history of domestic violence in the relationship. The marriage did suffer from a nearly constant financial strain throughout. The plaintiff handled the finances throughout the marriage. Defendant worked many hours and plaintiff worked part-time and raised the children but there never seemed to be enough money to pay the bills. The parties frequently ate at the plaintiff’s parents’ house. They did not seem to have enough food in the house. They had to borrow money from the plaintiff’s parents. On multiple occasions the utilities were shut-off for nonpayment of bills. There was some indication that the defendant had access to more money during the marriage since he did not deposit his pay check directly into the combined account, but it is not clear how much money he kept from each paycheck. The Court does not assign blame for the financial problems on either party.
At the time of the hearing and going back a number of years neither party owned the family residence at 85 Brookfield Street, Manchester, Connecticut. The parties initially purchased their current home at 85 Brookfield Street, Manchester, CT. in approximately 1996 through a mortgage but later because of financial difficulties the bank foreclosed on the property. The plaintiff’s parents purchased the property from the bank and the property is currently owned solely by the plaintiff’s mother since the plaintiff’s father is deceased. Mr. Lawrence testified that there was an understanding at the time when the house went through foreclosure and Mrs. Lawrence’s parents purchased the house that the parents would obtain a mortgage and have the house in their name due to the Lawrences’ poor financial status, but that Plaintiff and Defendant would still be responsible for making payments to cover the mortgage, insurance, taxes and other house-related expenses. There was also an understanding that at a point when the Lawrences could qualify for a mortgage they would purchase the house from Plaintiff’s parents. In the alternative, if the Lawrences never obtained a new mortgage, when the house was sold, the Lawrences would share in the proceeds with Mrs. Lawrence’s parents. Such an arrangement makes sense and there was no evidence to contradict Mr. Lawrence’s testimony here. The Court finds that such an arrangement did exist at one time. Nevertheless, there is no evidence to indicate whether there is any current equity in the home. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s parents have carried the risk of purchasing the house and carrying the mortgage for a number of years. The house is the parents’ asset or liability. If there is any equity in the home it is an asset of Plaintiff’s mother (the father is deceased) and not an asset of the marriage between Plaintiff and Defendant. The possible preconditions of converting that asset (if it is an asset) from one of the parents’ to one of the married couple, namely the parties qualifying for a mortgage on their oven or the house being sold, never was met during the marriage. In addition, there is no evidence that the house, even if there was an equitable interest, has any value at all. Accordingly, the house or any interest in the house, is not an asset of the marriage and will not be considered in a final calculation of asset distribution.
Both parties continued to reside in the home together during the pendency of these proceedings. Since the home is owned by Plaintiff’s mother, Plaintiff will likely reside in the home following the divorce, subject to the wishes of Plaintiff’s mother. Defendant requested that he be allowed to remain in the home for an additional 60 days following final judgment. The reason for that request is that it would take time to remove his belongings. Plaintiff requested that Defendant be required to vacate the premises within ten days following final judgment. The Court finds that the divorce has been pending for over one year. The evidentiary portion of the hearing for the divorce occurred on September 14, 2017. The defendant was advised to find alternative living/storage arrangements in September and October 2017. On October 25, 2017 both counsel were advised that the defendant was to completely vacate the marital premises by December 8, 2017.
In addition, there is no dispute that on the property are a number of nonfunctioning vehicles that Mr. Lawrence brought to the property, likely to be sources of parts in the repair of other vehicles. Mr. Lawrence agrees to remove the vehicles and is asking for up to 90 days in order to make arrangements to remove them.
1. INCOME
The Plaintiff lists weekly income from St. Gabriel School in the amount of $609 per week and weekly income from the East Hartford Board of Education of $72 per week for a total of gross weekly income of $681. (It should be noted that the plaintiff has recently obtained another part-time job. The amount was not known at the time of the evidentiary hearing in this matter and the Court is not speculating as to the amount of new income that this would add. The Court assumes that it will be comparable to her East Hartford part-time income. Given the deficit described below, the Court does not consider this amount significant in these calculations.) Her weekly deductions total $248 including a $160 deduction for Health insurance. The Plaintiff’s net weekly income subtracting these deductions is $433. She lists her weekly expenses as $737. As listed the plaintiff would be running a deficit of $304 a week. It should be noted that the $737 in expenses include $256 for rent/mortgage. The defendant has been paying the rent/mortgage charge up to date but as of the date of dissolution the plaintiff will be responsible for this expense and the defendant will have his own housing expense. Therefore, the $256 expense is legitimately part of the plaintiff’s weekly expenses moving forward. The water/sewer charge of $56 is questionable. The telephone/internet/ cell charge seems a bit high. The electricity bill at $0 is too low. With adjustments to these expenses in mind the court finds that the total weekly expense estimate should be reduced by $50. With this in mind plaintiff’s weekly expenses is more accurately estimated at $687 leaving an operating weekly deficit of $254.
In his 9/7/17 Financial affidavit the defendant lists his weekly income as $780 regular income and $107 overtime from Ray Seraphin and $96 from Connecticut Lighting Center. The defendant also receives $1,188.00 gross ($924.00 net) seasonal income per year for teaching auto mechanics from the Vernon Board of Education. Divided by 52 weeks, the net weekly compensation from the Vernon Board of Education is $17.77. The defendant testified that the $107 per week amount includes overtime and his monthly bonus which range from $147 to $280. Mandatory deductions including Health insurance premiums total $362. The defendant’s net weekly income from all sources is $638. The defendant estimates his weekly expenses as $781. This amount includes an estimate of $100 a week for restaurant and $145 a week for " other" which is further described as gifts, lottery, legal, local income tax. The Court finds that these amounts are not reasonable or not recurring and therefore will not consider them in making findings regarding weekly expenses. The Court accepts the other weekly expense estimates. Accordingly the Court finds that a proper estimate of the defendant’s weekly expenses is $536. When this amount is subtracted from the defendant’s net weekly income this leaves the defendant with a total weekly operating surplus of $102.
2. CHILD SUPPORT
The Court adopts a new calculation of the Child Support Guidelines worksheet dated 9/7/17 modified by the defendant’s additional income outlined above as well as by an allowance for health insurance premiums for the defendant. The defendant lists gross weekly income at $1,033 and his net weekly income is $780. The court will add net weekly income of $17 per week for Vernon board of education. The court will also deduct an additional $175 for Health Insurance. The defendant’s net weekly income is $622. The combined net weekly income amount is $1,033.00 resulting in a basic child support obligation for both parties of $233. The plaintiff’s net weekly income is 40% of the total and the defendant’s share is 60%. As the non residential parent, the defendant should pay $140 a week in child support based upon the Connecticut Child Support Guidelines. In addition, under these same guidelines unreimbursed medical expenses should be borne by the plaintiff at 52% and by the defendant at 48%. Since the only minor child is a high school senior, there are no child care expenses. There also is no arrearage since both parties have been sharing expenses since the filing of the divorce.
3. Alimony
There is no absolute right to alimony. General Statutes § 46b-82 provides that the court " may" award alimony and the decision whether to do so rests within the discretion of the court. Weinstein v. Weinstein, 18 Conn.App. 622, 637, 561 A.2d 443 (1989). The purpose of alimony is to fulfill a continuing duty to support, which arises out of the obligation the spouses assume toward each other as a result of the marriage. Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn. 265, 275, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999). The court’s view in this case, considering all the applicable factors, is that the circumstances do not favor an award of alimony to the defendant.
When considering an award of alimony, the court must consider " the evidence presented by each party and shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b-81" concerning property distribution. Provided the court considers all the statutory criteria, it has wide discretion in awarding alimony. Costa v. Costa, 57 Conn.App. 165, 174, 752 A.2d 1106 (2000). The court may place varying degrees of importance on each statutory criterion according to the factual circumstances of the case. Cimino v. Cimino, 155 Conn.App. 298, 304, 109 A.3d 546 (2015). " [T]he specified criteria are not exhaustive, and the court properly may consider other equitable factors when crafting its property distribution and alimony orders." Keller v. Keller, 167 Conn.App. 138, 155, 142 A.3d 1197 (2016), quoting Loughlin v. Loughlin, 93 Conn.App. 618, 625, 889 A.2d 902, aff’d, 280 Conn. 632, 910 A.2d 963 (2006).
The court has considered all of the statutory factors in determining whether to award alimony to the defendant. There is a significant disparity of income between the parties, and there has been throughout the marriage. There was a conscious decision by both parties that plaintiff would stay home and raise the children and that the defendant would provide the main source of income.
Plaintiff puts much emphasis on the cause of the dissolution. There were other contributing factors such as the financial difficulties and the sometimes distant nature of the relationship between the parties over the years. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the cause of the dissolution was the defendant’s admitted infidelity. For four and a half years ending in January 2016 the defendant had a sexual relationship with another woman. The Court believes that the plaintiff would not have filed for divorce were it not for the defendant’s having an affair. The Court does not know whether the defendant’s infidelity was limited to this woman from his car mechanics class. This type of detail is not relevant to the Court’s decision. Despite finding that the defendant’s infidelity was the ultimate cause of the dissolution, the Court has not added any penalty to the Orders relating to Alimony or to Property Distribution as the result of this finding. The Court has made its determination weighing the other factors described above.
4. Assignment of the Marital Estate
At the time a court enters a judgment of dissolution, it " may assign to either spouse all or part of the estate of the other spouse." General Statutes § 46b-81. " The purpose of a property division pursuant to a dissolution proceeding is to unscramble existing marital property in order to give each spouse his or her equitable share at the time of dissolution." Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn. 265, 275, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999). " In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court ... shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ... dissolution of the marriage ... the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates." General Statutes § 46b-81(c). Provided the court considers all relevant statutory criteria, it may exercise broad discretion in dividing property. Coleman v. Coleman, 151 Conn.App. 613, 617, 95 A.3d 569 (2014). The court may place varying degrees of importance on each criterion according to the factual circumstances of each case. Keller v. Keller, 167 Conn.App. 138, 155, 142 A.3d 1197 (2016). " [T]he specified criteria are not exhaustive, and the court properly may consider other equitable factors when crafting its property distribution and alimony orders." Id., quoting Loughlin v. Loughlin, 93 Conn.App. 618, 625, 889 A.2d 902, aff’d, 280 Conn. 632, 910 A.2d 963 (2006).
The allocation of liabilities and debts is a part of the court’s broad authority in the assignment of property in marital dissolution proceedings. McKenna v. Delente, 123 Conn.App. 146, 2 A.3d 38 (2010). Requiring one party to assume the joint liabilities of the parties is authorized by Section 46b-81. Costa v. Costa, 57 Conn.App. 165, 752 A.2d 1106 (2000). The fact that a party does not currently have the financial ability to pay a debt is not determinative. Russo v. Russo, 1 Conn.App. 604, 608, 474 A.2d 473 (1984).
There is substantial overlap between the statutory criteria applicable to alimony and those applicable to property distribution. The principal difference when it comes to property distribution is that the court is to consider the " contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates." § 46b-81; see Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 362 A.2d 835 (1975). Such contributions are not limited to monetary contributions. One party’s nonmonetary contributions that make it possible for the other party to acquire or retain property, or have the effect of preserving or appreciating the value of property, should be considered. O’Neill v. O ’Neill, 13 Conn.App. 300, 311-12, 536 A.2d 978 (1988). Homemaking and primary caretaking responsibilities may constitute such a nonmonetary contribution, provided there is a connection between those efforts and the property in question. Picton v. Picton, 111 Conn.App. 143, 153, 958 A.2d 763 (2008).
a. Debts and Liabilities
The marital debts are as follows: The defendant husband lists a balance due with Connecticut Natural Gas of $200. The plaintiff wife lists two sole debts, a Kohl’s credit card with a balance of $690 and a Publishers Clearing House debt of $200. She also lists a number of joint debts: Car tax due of $398, Medical and Dental bills of $1,610 and College loans for one of their sons of $28,000.
b. Assets
The marital assets are as follows: The parties share one joint bank account. They also have their individual bank accounts. The defendant lists three vehicles, a solely owned 2000 Mercury Mountainer worth $1000, a jointly owned 2005 Ford Expedition worth $1000 and a jointly owned 1995 Ford Taurus worth $500. The plaintiff wife also lists three vehicles, a 2005 Ford Expedition worth $2000, a 1995 Ford Taurus worth $500 and 1989 Ford Bronco worth $100. Husband also lists checking and savings accounts with Webster Bank that he solely owns with $300 balances in each for a total balance of $600. He also lists two retirement assets: a Roth IRA with LPL Financial with a 3/31/2017 value of $61,352, and a Ray Seraphin Ford 401K with a 2/28/2017 value of $12,790. Plaintiff wife lists one jointly held American Eagle joint banking account with a balance of $600. She also lists two solely held banking accounts with American Eagle accounts with zero or negligible balances. She also lists a retirement asset with the Connecticut Teachers Retirement fund of $4,416. Based upon the defendant’s testimony it appears the defendant withdrew $9100.00 from the Ray Seraphin 401k in order to pay attorneys fees. The source of these funds is really not critical as the below calculations make clear.
The Court finds that the length of the marriage at the time the plaintiff filed this action was approximately 24 years. This length of time constituted nearly all of the plaintiff’s adult life and the great majority of the defendant’s adult life. The plaintiff is 49 years old and the defendant is 52 years old. The plaintiff has a bachelor of science degree in education. The defendant at one time was a certified mechanic and certified architectural draftsman. While it is clear that the defendant was the primary source of income throughout the marriage, it is also clear that the plaintiff had the primary responsibility of day to day raising of the three children. Both parties shared equally in creating the marital assets and in accumulating the marital debts. Given that substantial length of the marriage the Court finds that it would be equitable to split the parties’ assets and liabilities equally.
In order to evenly distribute the primary marital assets, the retirement funds the Court finds that the Defendant’s Roth IRA was worth $61,352, the Defendant’s Ray Seraphin 401k was worth $12,790, the Defendant’s distribution from one of these accounts was $9,100 and the Plaintiff’s retirement account was worth $4,416. The total of all of these assets is $87,658. Each party is entitled to half of this amount, $43,829. For ease of distribution and reduction of transaction costs the Court distributes the assets as follows:
Plaintiff to retain her retirement account of approximately $4,416.
Defendant to retain his Ray Seraphin 401k account of approximately $12,790 and his previous distribution of approximately $9,100.
From the remaining marital asset, the Defendant’s Roth IRA, the plaintiff is entitled to $39,413 (64.24%) and the defendant is entitled to $21,939. (35.76%).
Likewise, the Court finds that the marital liabilities are to be split evenly. The Connecticut Natural Gas bill (listed as $200) and any other utility bills that are accumulated up to the time of the dissolution are to be split evenly. Also, any automobile taxes which have been accumulated up to the time of dissolution (including the car tax identified by plaintiff) are to be split evenly by the parties. Finally, the Court finds that Medical and Dental bills of $1,610 and College loans for one of their sons of $28,000 are also marital debts and to be split evenly by the parties.
5. Custody and Visitation
The court’s authority to enter orders concerning child custody and visitation is governed by General Statutes § 46b-56. Section 46b-56(c) requires that, in making such orders, " the rights and responsibilities of both parents shall be considered and the court shall enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with the active and consistent involvement of both parents commensurate with their abilities and interests." The statute identifies sixteen factors the court may consider, without limitation, in determining the best interests of the child. The court has considered these factors, most of which are applicable to this case in light of the parties’ agreement.
III. Orders
A. The marriage is dissolved on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown. There is no hope of reconciliation. The parties are declared single and unmarried.
B. The plaintiff and defendant are awarded joint legal custody of the minor child, Skylar Lawrence, with primary residence with the plaintiff/mother. The parties shall confer with each other on all important matters pertaining to the minor child’s health, education welfare and upbringing with the intent to arrive at a harmonious policy calculated to promote the best interests of the child. The plaintiff and defendant shall reach mutual agreement on all major medical decisions regarding the minor child. The parent who has the minor child with him or her shall make minor or emergency medical decisions as necessary. The other parent shall be advised of any such medical treatment as soon as reasonably practical.
C. The defendant father will retain the right to liberal visitation to be worked out between the parties.
D. The defendant shall be required to pay child support in the amount of $140.00 weekly until June 30, 2018. This amount is consistent with the calculations above based partly on the Child support worksheet dated 9/14/2017 as modified above.
E. Each party shall be responsible for their own health insurance. The plaintiff shall be responsible for the minor child’s health insurance, for so long as she is eligible, provided it is available to her through her employer at reasonable expense. Unreimbursed medical and dental expenses for the minor child shall be paid 50 percent by the plaintiff and 50 percent by the defendant. This amount is consistent with the calculations above based partly on the Child support worksheet dated 9/14/2017.
F. The defendant father will be required to pay the amount of $10 a week in alimony until June 30, 2018 and then thereafter the defendant will be required to pay the amount of $150.00 per week in alimony to the plaintiff for a period of ten years, which is June 30, 2028. The weekly amount may only be changed upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. The duration of the payments may not be modified unless the plaintiff dies, remarries or cohabitates for a period in excess of 60 days with another person.
G. The defendant shall obtain and maintain a life insurance policy at his expense with a death benefit amount no less than $85,000 naming the plaintiff as primary beneficiary for the entire length of the defendant’s alimony commitment.
H. The defendant father will set up wage withholding with his current employer to arrange for $150 payment to mother every week up to the end of alimony payment period.
I. Both parties list three vehicles although there is disagreement as to the type of vehicle that they own. Plaintiff indicates that she does not have a functioning vehicle. The parties are ordered to split ownership of the three vehicles listed on their financial affidavits to their mutual satisfaction which includes completing all required paperwork transferring each vehicle to the desired party (including third parties).
J. With the exception of the above indicated vehicles, Defendant is ordered to remove all vehicles, vehicle parts and any vehicle-related debris from the area surrounding the marital home by February 10, 2018.
K. The defendant is to completely vacate the marital premises by December 8, 2017.
L. All joint bank accounts are to be liquidated with the proceeds to be distributed equally between the plaintiff and defendant.
M. All individually held bank accounts are to be retained by the party in whose name the account is listed.
N. All debts which are listed to each party individually are the responsibility of that party. More specifically, the plaintiff’s sole debts to Kohl’s credit services and to Publisher’s Clearing House are plaintiff’s responsibility.
O. All utility and other bills associated with the house or cellphones that accrue up until December 8, 2017 are to be split equally between the parties.
P. All unreimbursed medical costs accrued up until the date of dissolution are to be split evenly by the two parties regardless of who was the recipient of the services. The medical and dental bills in plaintiff’s financial disclosure in the amount of $1,600.00 is to be split evenly. Plaintiff to pay $800.00 and defendant to pay $800.00 with any late fees to be split evenly.
Q. Automobile taxes accrued up to the date of dissolution are to be split equally by the two parties.
R. All pending bills involving Federal and State Income taxes are to be split equally between the parties including the current bill in the name of Mark Lawrence in the amount due of $3,674.63.
S. College loans identified in the amount of $28,000 identified in plaintiff’s financial disclosure are to be split evenly. Plaintiff is responsible for $14,000.00. Defendant is responsible for $14,000.00. Both parties to make arrangements to assume their respective amounts within 90 days of this judgment.
T. The Court will retain jurisdiction on the issue of transfer of Defendant’s Roth IRA. Retirement assets are to be split evenly between the parties as follows:
- Defendant’s Roth IRA is to be split with 64.24% of the current balance on the date of dissolution to be transferred to the plaintiff and 35.76% of the current balance on the date of dissolution to be retained by the defendant.
- Defendant’s Ray Seraphim 401k to be retained by the defendant.
- Plaintiff’s teachers retirement asset to be retained by the plaintiff.
U. The parties are to divide their personal property to their mutual satisfaction.
V. Plaintiff will be entitled to claim the daughter for federal and state income tax exemptions.
W. Under C.G.S. Section 46b-56c the court finds that had the family remained intact, it is more likely than not that they would have provided support to their children for them to attend an institution of higher education, or an occupational school, for the purpose of attaining a bachelor’s or other undergraduate degree, or other appropriate vocational instruction. The parties shall consult with each other and shall participate with the child with respect to such basic decisions as the type of education, school visits, attending certain institutions, and expenses, in working toward the objective of having her attend an institution of higher education suitable to her abilities and desires. Consultation among the parties and the child shall commence in the college consideration phase and shall continue through the application process and ultimate choice of college. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over the issue of the amount of each parties’ financial obligation for the child’s educational costs pursuant to C.G.S. 46b-56c.
X. The Court is not ordering either party the payment of attorneys fees incurred by the opposing party. The defendant has previously used the marital assets to pay for his attorneys fees up to that date.