Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-00091-RMG-JDA
09-17-2018
Herman Lawrence, Plaintiff, v. Detyens Shipyards Inc., Hitrak Staffing Inc., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 28.] Plaintiff alleges race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"). [Doc. 1-1 at 7-8.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.
Plaintiff filed this action in the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas. [Doc. 1-1.] Defendants removed the case to this Court on January 12, 2017. [Doc. 1.] On April 30, 2018, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 28.] Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on May 14, 2018 [Doc. 30], and Defendants filed a reply on May 21, 2018 [Doc. 32]. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is ripe for review.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's Employment with Defendants
Defendant Hitrak Staffing, Inc. ("Hitrak"), a staffing agency, hired Plaintiff to work at Defendant Detyens Shipyards, Inc. ("Detyens") in January 2014. [Doc. 28-3 at 3 ¶¶ 9, 13.] Jim Youker ("Youker"), Human Resources Director at Detyens, recruited Plaintiff. [Doc. 28-4 at 20:20- 21:24; see Doc. 28-3 at 2 ¶ 2 (averring that Youker has been Human Resources Director since 2006).] He was hired as a temporary worker on a probationary term, which typically lasts thirty to ninety days, though Plaintiff's was to last only thirty days. [Docs. 28-4 at 26:5-14; 30-3 at 5:17-25; 30-4 at 27:19-28:4; 30-5.] Plaintiff worked as a leadman supervisor under Jack Smith ("Smith") in the paint department. [Docs. 28-4 at 4:22-25; 30-5.]
Although Plaintiff was told his probationary term would last thirty days, he did not become a Detyens employee until August 4, 2014. [See Doc. 28-3 at 13-14 (noting Plaintiff's rollover date as August 4, 2014).] Plaintiff first asked Smith about becoming a Detyens employee after working thirty days as a Hitrak employee. [Doc. 28-4 at 28:7-25, 29:19-25.] Plaintiff continued to complain to Smith about not becoming a Detyens employee at least weekly, but Smith always told Plaintiff he was busy and they would discuss it later. [Doc. 30-4 at 16:14-21.] Plaintiff believed Smith did not want Plaintiff to become a Detyens employee because Plaintiff is African American. [Doc. 30-4 at 28:20-30:10.] Plaintiff also complained to Larry Reynolds ("Reynolds"), Smith's boss, about not becoming a Detyens employee. [Docs. 28-4 at 29:1-6, 35:14-36:1; 30-4 at 15:16-22.] Plaintiff told Reynolds that the only difference between Plaintiff and Dale Phipps—another leadman supervisor who was hired directly by Detyens and did not go through the probationary period with Hitrak—was their skin tone. [Doc. 28-4 at 23:13-24:22, 53:1-9, 54:15-25.] April 23, 2015 Complaint
On April 23, 2015, Marco Galvanez ("Galvanez"), a painter, complained to Youker about Plaintiff. [Doc. 28-3 at 16.] According to Galvanez, Plaintiff "became very angry with [Galvanez] and began yelling in [his] face, using bad language." [Id.] Plaintiff then kicked a half-gallon of hardener, and the chemicals got all over Galvanez, forcing him to change clothes. [Id.] Galvanez also reported that Plaintiff always used bad language toward him. [Id.]
According to Plaintiff, he kicked the bucket of hardener out of frustration because Galvanez was not doing what Plaintiff had asked him to do. [Doc. 30-4 at 9:2-10:16, 14:10-17.] When Plaintiff kicked the bucket, the lid came off, but he did not see anything on Galvanez. [Id. at 10:16-22.] An hour later, Galvanez informed Plaintiff that he needed to change clothes because, when Plaintiff kicked the bucket, the chemicals got on Galvanez. [Id. at 10:23-11:12.] Plaintiff did not believe anything had gotten on Galvanez when he kicked the bucket, but he told Galvanez to go ahead and change clothes. [Id. at 11:12-15.]
Following the complaint, Youker met with Plaintiff and Smith. [Docs. 28-3 at 3 ¶ 15; 30-4 at 7:5-25.] Youker instructed Plaintiff to stop yelling and using profanity toward employees, to be more of a teacher and explain what he wanted subordinates to accomplish, and to behave and act like a supervisor. [Doc. 28-3 at 17.] Youker also reminded Plaintiff that he represented Detyens. [Id.] June 22, 2015 Complaint
On June 22, 2015, Terry Jenkins ("Jenkins"), an employee who worked under Plaintiff, complained to Youker about Plaintiff. [Doc. 28-3 at 4 ¶ 16.] Jenkins' written statement indicates that Plaintiff "started cussing then told [Jenkins] nigger get out my dock and meet me in the parking lot at 5:30." [Doc. 28-3 at 18.]
After receiving the complaint, Youker interviewed two other employees—Leroy Graham ("Graham") and Charles Wigfall ("Wigfall")—who worked under Plaintiff. [Id. at 4 ¶ 16.] Graham reported that he heard Plaintiff yelling at Jenkins, but could not hear everything Plaintiff said. [Id. at 19.] Plaintiff told Graham "that 'Jenkins is going to make me F- him up.'" [Id.] Wigfall reported that Plaintiff yelled and cursed at him every day and that Wigfall got along with all other leadmen but would prefer not to work with Plaintiff. [Id.]
Youker suspended Plaintiff for three days without pay. [Id. at 20.] On the Employee Conduct Form, Youker indicated that "[a]ny future violations may result in termination of employment." [Id.] Plaintiff made the following remarks on the form:
Employee (Lawrence) has repeatedly ref[er]red subordinates to my sup. J. Smith for insubordination or failure to p[er]form assigned duties. On this and the other occasion (Lawrence) called J. Smith to inform him of Jenkins and Leroy Graham's inactivity. . . . to no avail. It is very upsetting to me that the root cause of these confrontations is never addressed. Marco was told "not to mix any paint" [illegible] Jenkins was hiding underneath the boat w/Leroy on the day prior to undocking. I called to report this to J. Smith. I aske[d] him to leave the [illegible]. The fact that he was idle and doing nothing has never been addressed. Nor was Marco['s] refusal to obey a specific instruction. I had to be judged by subordinates and would rather be judged by my contemp[o]raries.[Id.] Plaintiff testified that there was "some verbal confrontation" and that he told Jenkins, "if you want me to, I'll meet you anywhere you want to," but denies using the "F-word" or the "N-word" in the context of his confrontation with Jenkins. [Doc. 28-4 at 6:5-6, 7:1-17.] October 22, 2015 Complaint
On October 22, 2015, Plaintiff had an altercation with another employee, Joe Samaniego ("Samaniego"). [Doc. 28-3 at 4 ¶ 17.] After the altercation, Youker interviewed Samaniego, Plaintiff, and three witnesses. [Id.] Samaniego reported that he was with another employee, Richard Steel ("Steel"), to load three kits of paint on a shop truck. [Doc. 32-10 at 6.] As Steel was waiting, Plaintiff began talking to him. [Id.] Samaniego asked Steel to back up the truck so Samaniego could easily load the paint onto the back of the truck, and Plaintiff asked why Samaniego's "fat lazy ass couldn't walk the paint" another fifteen feet. [Id.] Samaniego responded by asking "why don't you ladies gossip later after I get this paint to the job." [Id.] At that point, Plaintiff walked over and got in Samaniego's face, pointing his finger and saying Samaniego "better never call him a fucking bitch again." [Id.] Samaniego then put his finger in front of Plaintiff's face, stating he had not called Plaintiff a bitch but instead said "you ladies." [Id.] Plaintiff responded that calling him a lady was calling him a fucking bitch; leaned forward, cussing and swearing at Samaniego; touched the tip of his nose on Samaniego's finger; and pushed Samiego back at the wall "open handed on [Samaniego's] chest." [Id.] Samaniego raised his hands to protect himself, and Plaintiff hit him in the right side of the face and knocked him backwards almost to the floor. [Id. at 7.]
Steel stated that as he was backing his truck up for Samaniego to load the paint, he noticed an altercation between Samaniego and Plaintiff in the truck's rear view mirror. [Doc. 28-3 at 21.] Steel saw Plaintiff shove Samaniego in the chest and Samaniego reciprocate by pushing Plaintiff. [Id.]
Jimmy Carter ("Carter"), another witness, was exiting a building when he heard an argument between Plaintiff and Samaniego. [Id. at 23.] Carter heard both men use profanity, including Plaintiff stating, "I'll whip your M.F. ass." [Id.] As the verbal exchange escalated, Plaintiff approached Samaniego and put his finger in front of Samaniego's face. [Id.] Samaniego slapped Plaintiff's finger away, then Plaintiff shoved Samaniego against the wall. [Id.]
Tony Shackelford ("Shackelford"), a carpenter leadman, was walking over to talk to Steel when Plaintiff started "bashing" Samaniego about being lazy for wanting Steel to back up the truck. [Id. at 24.] Plaintiff got very angry and called Samaniego a bitch. [Id.] Shackelford walked away but turned around as he got down the pier to see Samaniego point at Plaintiff and Plaintiff smack Samaniego's hand. [Id.] Then, Shackelford saw Samaniego push Plaintiff and Plaintiff push Samaniego back with a lot of force. [Id.]
Plaintiff reported that after Plaintiff suggested that Samaniego could simply walk the paint over, Samaniego said, "'I'm waiting on you two bitches to finish you[r] conversation.'" [Doc. 32-10 at 12.] Plaintiff then walked over to Samaniego and told him that Plaintiff did not appreciate being called a bitch. [Id.] Samaniego "got very loud and animated and repeated that 'you are a bitch.'" [Id. at 13.] Samaniego then pointed his finger in Plaintiff's face several times and made contact with Plaintiff's face. [Id.] Plaintiff acted on his natural instinct and pushed Samaniego's finger out of Plaintiff's face, then walked away. [Id.] Plaintiff walked about thirty yards and turned around to see Samaniego and Smith walking out of Smith's office. [Id. at 13-14.] Samaniego, Smith, and Plaintiff discussed what happened and then went to Youker's office. [Id. at 14.]
At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that Samaniego fell back against the wall when Plaintiff hit his hand. [Doc. 28-4 at 47:8-9.]
Plaintiff's Termination
After the altercation between Plaintiff and Samaniego, Youker determined that Plaintiff should be terminated. [Doc. 28-3 at 4 ¶ 18.] Youker avers that he
reviewed witness statements, Mr. Samaniego's statement, [Plaintiff's] statement, the prior complaints against [Plaintiff], and [Plaintiff's] previous suspension. I also considered the general disposition of Mr. Samaniego, whom I consider to be passive. Furthermore, I did not recall Mr. Samaniego ever being accused of having a bad temper or treating another employee poorly. I determined that [Plaintiff] was the aggressor in the incident. I determined that [Plaintiff] should be terminated even though I knew his supervisors valued him.[Id.; see also id. at 25 (Employee Separation Form).]
Plaintiff's Charge of Discrimination and This Action
In January 2016, Plaintiff filed Charges of Discrimination against Hitrak and Detyens with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging race and color discrimination and retaliation. [Docs. 28-7; 28-8.] The EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights on July 11, 2016, on the Charge against Hitrak and on September 13, 2016, on the Charge against Detyens. [Docs. 28-9; 28-10.] Plaintiff filed this action on December 13, 2016, in the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas, alleging race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. [Doc. 1-1 at 4-9.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, Plaintiff concedes that Hitrak is entitled to summary judgment and that the case should proceed against Detyens only. [Doc. 30 at 1.] Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted with respect to the claims against Hitrak.
With respect to the claims against Detyens, Defendants argue that Plaintiff can neither establish a prima facie case of race discrimination or retaliation nor establish pretext and that Plaintiff cannot prove the elements of a hostile work environment claim. [Doc. 28-1 at 11-19.]
Discrimination and Retaliation Claims
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII's retaliation provision forbids an employer from taking action that discriminates against an employee because that employee has either "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter" or has "made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The purpose of this antiretaliation provision is to prevent "an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees." Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006).
Through the two clauses of the antiretaliation provision, Title VII protects activities that "fall into two distinct categories: participation or opposition." Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1998). Here, Plaintiff alleges he engaged in opposition activity.
Absent direct or indirect evidence of discrimination or retaliation, a Title VII plaintiff may proceed under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to establish a claim of employment discrimination or retaliation. Foster v. Univ. of Md.-Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 249 (4th Cir. 2015); Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005). Under the burden-shifting framework, an employee must first prove a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. By providing such an explanation, the employer rebuts the presumption of discrimination or retaliation created by the prima facie case, and "[t]he presumption, having fulfilled its role of forcing the [employer] to come forward with some response, simply drops out of the picture." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993) (citing Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981)). If the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the articulated reason was actually a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
Although Plaintiff conclusorily states he "can point to direct evidence of race discrimination" [Doc. 30-1 at 7], Plaintiff's memorandum addresses exclusively the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme [see id.].
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; (3) he was performing his job duties at a level that met the employer's legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse employment action; and (4) other employees who are not members of the protected class did not suffer the adverse employment action under similar circumstances. See Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 133 (4th Cir. 2002); see also EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 851 n.2 (4th Cir. 2001) ("What is critical with respect to the fourth element is that the plaintiff demonstrate he was not hired (or fired or not promoted, etc.) 'under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.'" (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981))). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate "(1) []he engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer acted adversely against h[im], and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the asserted adverse action." Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 337 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 218 (4th Cir. 2007)).
Here, even assuming Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination and/or retaliation, Detyens has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for terminating Plaintiff's employment. Specifically, Detyens maintains that "Plaintiff was terminated after three employees complained to Human Resources about the way Plaintiff cursed, threatened, and/or assaulted them." [Doc. 28-1 at 17.] Detyens' employee handbook provides,
As one court within the Fourth Circuit has noted, "[t]he relevance of the McDonnell Douglas scheme outside of the trial context is limited." Lerner v. Shinseki, No. ELH-10-1109, 2011 WL 2414967, at *14 (D. Md. June 10, 2011). The Fourth Circuit has observed,
Notwithstanding the intricacies of proof schemes, the core of every Title VII case remains the same, necessitating resolution of "the ultimate question of discrimination vel non." U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983). As the Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000). Thus, "[c]ourts must . . . resist the temptation to become so entwined in the intricacies of the [McDonnell Douglas] proof scheme that they forget that the scheme exists solely to facilitate determination of 'the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.'" Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
Detyens expects all employees to conduct themselves as responsible adults and good citizens. This includes treating fellow employees, customers and visitors with respect and understanding. We expect all employees to conduct company business using discretion, good judgement and high ethical standards.
Improper conduct between employees and/or between employees and business associates will not be tolerated, whether or not it adversely affects company business. Any employee demonstrating illegal, unethical or improper conduct will be subject to disciplinary action including termination of employment and could be subject to legal proceedings.[Doc. 32-2.] The handbook further provides the following example of misconduct: "[f]ighting, striking, mishandling, threatening, or intimidating another person while on DSI premises." [Doc. 32-3.] As previously stated, Galvanez complained about Plaintiff in April 2015 after an altercation where Plaintiff kicked a bucket of hardener, Jenkins complained about Plaintiff in June 2015 after a verbal altercation with Plaintiff, and Samaniego complained about Plaintiff in October 2015 after a verbal and physical altercation with Plaintiff. Because Detyens has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for terminating Plaintiff, the Court will consider whether Plaintiff has met his burden of demonstrating that Detyens' proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination or retaliation, which would indicate whether Plaintiff could meet his ultimate burden of persuasion and demonstrate discrimination or retaliation vel non. See Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 294 (4th Cir. 2010).
***
Violation of company guidelines constitutes misconduct and appropriate disciplinary action may be initiated. Disciplinary action may include, but is not limited to: Verbal Reprimand; Written Notice; Suspension from Work Without Pay; Immediate Termination of Employment.
Generally, to prove an employer's articulated reason is a pretext for discrimination or retaliation, a plaintiff "must prove 'both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason' for the challenged conduct." Jiminez v. Mary Wash. Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515). However, "a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). Ultimately, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate "a genuine dispute of material fact on the question of pretext sufficient to make [the employer's] proffered justification a triable issue." Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 217 (4th Cir. 2016).
Although Plaintiff does not dispute that he was involved in altercations at work, he argues that Detyens manufactured behavioral issues as a pretext to terminate him and that further investigation would have shown the reasons for his termination were false. However, when determining whether an articulated reason is pretextual, "[i]t is the perception of the decision maker which is relevant." Tinsley v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 444 (4th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the analogous situation where a plaintiff disagrees with the facts underlying a decision maker's assessment of the employee. Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2000). In Hawkins, the employer argued it terminated the plaintiff because she performed poorly in her special-projects capacity and failed to improve even after receiving negative feedback. Id. at 279. The plaintiff claimed the employer's criticisms were inaccurate and insisted she performed her job well. Id. The court held the plaintiff could not show the employer's stated reasons for terminating her were not the real reasons for her discharge, noting that "'it is not our province to decide whether the reason was wise, fair, or even correct, ultimately, so long as it truly was the reason for plaintiff's termination.'" Id. (citing DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998); see also id. at 280 ("But instead of producing evidence that shows [the supervisor's] assessment of her performance was dishonest or not the real reason for her termination—as the law requires—[the plaintiff] disputes the merits of [the] evaluations."). The record in this case provides a sufficiently specific factual basis for Youker's decision to terminate, and Plaintiff has failed to put forth any evidence to suggest that Youker did not believe that termination was warranted based on the three altercations Plaintiff was involved in between April and October 2015. See Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1034 (11th Cir. 2000) ("A subjective reason is a legally sufficient, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason if the defendant articulates a clear and reasonably specific factual basis upon which it based its subjective opinion."). Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted with respect to Plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims against Detyens.
Plaintiff's assertion that even his supervisor felt it was unfair to terminate Plaintiff [Doc. 30-1 at 8] does not establish that Detyens' reason for terminating Plaintiff was false. Youkers avers he knew that Plaintiff's supervisors valued him, but that he determined Plaintiff should be terminated based on his investigation, prior complaints, and Plaintiff's previous suspension. [Doc. 28-3 at 4 ¶ 18.]
Hostile Work Environment Claim
Title VII prohibits creating or allowing a hostile work environment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 746 n.14 (4th Cir. 2006). To prove a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he experienced unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on race; (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive atmosphere; and (4) some basis exists for imputing liability to the employer. Gilliam v. S.C. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 474 F.3d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 2007); Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the standard for determining when a plaintiff has established a hostile work environment, stating that a plaintiff must establish that the environment was "both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993)). Actionable harassment occurs when the workplace is "permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.'" Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)). Title VII is not a "general civility code." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). "Workplaces are not always harmonious locales, and even incidents that would objectively give rise to bruised or wounded feelings will not on that account satisfy the severe or pervasive standard." EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008). Complaints based on nothing more than rude treatment by co-workers, callous behavior by supervisors, or a routine difference of opinion and personality conflict with supervisors are not actionable under Title VII. Id.
When considering a plaintiff's claim that he was subjected to a hostile work environment, the Court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. Relevant factors "may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it [was] physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Id. "To be actionable, the conduct must create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment, and the victim must also perceive the environment to be abusive." Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 184 (4th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff asserts he had "to leave work meetings because of the 'hanging tree' joke" and that he was "the subject of severe rumors: that he had murdered his wife who was Caucasian." [Doc. 30-1 at 10.] Considering the arguments and evidence, Plaintiff has not established a hostile work environment based on race. Plaintiff has provided no explanation or legal analysis regarding how the complained-of conduct was because of Plaintiff's race. Moreover, Plaintiff has not established that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive atmosphere and alter the conditions of employment. See Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d at 315-16 (citing cases holding that complaints based on rude treatment, callous behavior by superiors, or a difference of opinion or personality conflict with a supervisor are not actionable under Title VII); Harvey v. Saluda Smiles Family Dentistry, 210 F. Supp. 3d 812, 821 (D.S.C. 2016) (finding that the plaintiff had not established she experienced severe or pervasive harassment where the plaintiff alleged "nitpicking" by her superior, being chastised in front of a patient, and ongoing friction with her superior). Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted as to Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim against Detyens.
Smith invites people to his house for a cookout and to watch football the Saturday after Thanksgiving. [Doc. 30-3 at 16:14-17.] When Smith shared a picture of his house to show where it is, another employee, James Rogers, said he would not come to Smith's house because he had a hanging tree in the back yard. [Id. at 16:17-24.] Plaintiff testified that it was a running joke. [Doc. 30-4 at 3:10-25.]
According to Plaintiff, he was under investigation for involvement in his wife's death. [Doc. 30-4 at 23:4-11.] Detectives came to Detyens to verify that he was at work when his wife died. [Id. at 24:3-8.] When Plaintiff returned to work after his wife's death, "the whole rumor mill on the yard was that [he] had something to do with [his] wife's death." [Id. at 23:19-22.] --------
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge September 17, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina
Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 294-95 (4th Cir. 2010). Further, the Supreme Court has stated,
Where the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant. The district court has before it all the evidence it needs to decide whether "the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff."Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253); see Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("The Aikens principle applies, moreover, to summary judgment as well as trial proceedings."). In light of this guidance from the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court agrees with the District of Maryland that where the employer has met its burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action against the plaintiff, the Court may assume, without deciding, that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination. See Lerner, 2011 WL 2414967, at *14.