Opinion
No. 2012–2677NC.
2014-07-28
The LAW OFFICES OF D'AMICO & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, Appellant, v. Dianna D'ELIA, Respondent.
Appeals from orders of the District Court of Nassau County, Second District (Michael A. Ciaffa, J.), dated, respectively, January 5, 2012 and March 16, 2012. The order dated January 5, 2012 denied separate motions by plaintiff to dismiss defendant's counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7), and CPLR 3211(a)(5), respectively. The order dated March 16, 2012, insofar as appealed from, upon granting the branch of plaintiff's motion seeking leave to renew and reargue its two prior motions, adhered to the original determination.
ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated January 5, 2012 is dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order dated March 16, 2012, made upon renewal and reargument; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order dated March 16, 2012, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that, upon renewal and reargument, plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) is granted and plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) is denied as academic; as so modified, the order dated March 16, 2012 is affirmed, without costs.
In May 2008, plaintiff, The Law Offices of D'Amico & Associates, PLLC (the firm), commenced this action against defendant Dianna D'Elia, its former client, to recover $10,701.93 in unpaid legal fees, arising out of services rendered in connection with the firm's representation of Ms. D'Elia in an action that had been brought against her by the estate of her late father. In February 2009, Ms. D'Elia answered and interposed counterclaims for legal malpractice with respect to the firm's representation of her in that action as well as its representation of her in a proceeding involving the distribution of the estate of her late uncle and in her purchase of a home.
In June 2009, the firm moved to, among other things, dismiss Ms. D'Elia's counterclaims, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (a)(7), which motion she opposed. While the firm's motion was pending, Ms. D'Elia commenced an action against various parties, including the firm, in Supreme Court, Nassau County, wherein she alleged claims against the firm arising out of the firm's representation in both of the estate matters and in her home purchase. In seeking to consolidate the District Court action with the Supreme Court action, Ms. D'Elia alleged that “[t]hese two cases are the same.” Subsequently, the firm moved to dismiss Ms. D'Elia's complaint in the Supreme Court action, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), (4) and (7). By order dated September 15, 2009, the Supreme Court (Edward W. McCarty, III, J.) denied Ms. D'Elia's consolidation motion and granted the firm's motion to dismiss the complaint, noting that Ms. D'Elia had apparently attempted to raise the same claims against the firm in the Supreme Court action as she had in her counterclaims in the District Court action, and stating, in pertinent part, that the firm's “motion ... to dismiss is granted pursuant to CPLR 3211(a), without opposition. Even giving plaintiff's complaint the benefit of every favorable inference she has failed to state a cause of action against defendant D'Amico, and any claims she might have are defeated by documentary evidence....”
Prior to the return date of the firm's motion to dismiss Ms. D'Elia's counterclaims in the District Court action, that court was advised of the Supreme Court's decision. By order dated October 20, 2009, the District Court dismissed her counterclaims, on res judicata grounds, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), based on a finding that the counterclaims were identical to the claims for legal malpractice she had asserted against the firm in the Supreme Court action. By decision and order dated April 26, 2011 (32 Misc.3d 28), this court reversed the District Court's order and remitted the matter to the District Court for a new determination of the firm's motion to dismiss the counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7), without prejudice to the firm's seeking dismissal of the counterclaims on the ground of res judicata, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), upon proper notice to Ms. D'Elia.
In May 2011, the firm moved, in the District Court, to dismiss Ms. D'Elia's counterclaims on res judicata grounds, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), and also sought a determination on its prior motion to dismiss the counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7). The firm noted that, by order dated March 3, 2010 (2010 N.Y. Slip Op 30545[U] ), the Supreme Court (Edward W. McCarty, III, J.), upon granting the branch of Ms. D'Elia's motion seeking, in effect, to vacate her default in opposing the firm's prior motion to dismiss her complaint, dismissed Ms. D'Elia's complaint insofar as asserted against the firm, based upon documentary evidence. Although Ms. D'Elia had filed a notice of appeal from that order, her appeal was ultimately dismissed by the Appellate Division, Second Department, in April 2011, due to her failure to perfect. Ms. D'Elia opposed the firm's motion.
By order dated January 5, 2012, the District Court, upon reviewing the two Supreme Court orders, denied the firm's motion to dismiss Ms. D'Elia's counterclaims on res judicata grounds, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5). The District Court further denied the firm's original motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7). Thereafter, the firm moved for, among other things, leave to renew and reargue its prior motions. The motion was unopposed. By order dated March 16, 2012, the District Court granted renewal and reargument, and adhered to its original determination.
The doctrine of res judicata is designed to put an end to a matter once it is duly decided ( see Siegel, N.Y. Prac § 442, at 772 [5th ed] ). Res judicata “generally dictates that a valid final determination on the merits bars a future action between the same parties on the same cause of action” ( Troy v. Goord, 300 A.D.2d 1086, 1087 [2002] ) and is invoked when a party, or those in privity with the party, seek to relitigate a disposition on the merits of claims or causes of action arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions which were raised or could have been raised in the prior litigation ( see Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005]; Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 306–307 [1929] ). Typically, “once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy” ( O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357 [1981] ). “The rationale underlying this principle is that a party who has been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim should not be allowed to do so again” ( Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d at 269).
In its January 5, 2012 order, the District Court stated that Ms. D'Elia's complaint in the Supreme Court action “included claims of legal malpractice which are essentially identical to Ms. D'Elia's counterclaims in this action” (emphasis added). The District Court, however, denied the firm's motion to dismiss Ms. D'Elia's counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court, in both its September 15, 2009 order and its March 3, 2010 order, stated that dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against the firm was warranted pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), based upon the documentary evidence submitted by the firm, which conclusively established the firm's defenses to plaintiff's claims.
In view of the foregoing, the District Court erred in not giving res judicata effect to the Supreme Court's dismissal of Ms. D'Elia's complaint insofar as asserted against the firm, and should have granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss Ms. D'Elia's counterclaims on that ground.
Accordingly, the District Court's March 16, 2012 order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that, upon renewal and reargument, plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaims on res judicata grounds, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), is granted, and plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) is denied as academic.