Opinion
Civil No. 03-503-GPM.
September 1, 2006
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Report and Recommendation from Magistrate Judge Frazier dated July 17, 2006 (Doc. 114). In the Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Frazier recommends that the Court grant the pending motion to dismiss, which was converted by Magistrate Judge Frazier to a motion for summary judgment, filed by Defendant Shultz. Plaintiff filed a timely objection to the Report and Recommendation on August 2, 2006 (Doc. 126).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, John Lavin, is currently an inmate in the Stateville Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois. He filed this action on August 5, 2003, seeking damages for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the time of the alleged deprivations, Lavin was an inmate at Menard Correctional Center. In a previous order, this Court summarized Plaintiff's claims in his pro se complaint as follows:
COUNT 1: Against Defendants Snyder, Walls, Feinerman, Anyanwu, Kumar, Burrows, Schultz, Doughty, Grubman, and Health Care Professionals for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment.
COUNT 2: Against Defendants Snyder, Walls, Feinerman, Anyanwu, Kumar, Burrows, Schultz, Doughty, Grubman, and Health Care Professionals for subjecting him to inhumane conditions of confinement, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment.
COUNT 3: Against Defendants Keeler, Lt. Walker, Bendinger, and Bauer for use of excessive force, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment.
All that is currently at issue, of course, are the claims against Defendant Shultz in Counts 1 and 2. In a nutshell, Plaintiff claims that Shultz, a physician, treated him between August 27, 2001, and February 22, 2002, for a spinal impairment. It is undisputed that all treatment took place at a private hospital or Shultz's private office and not at a prison. Thus, Shultz argues that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because he did not act under color of state law so as to subject him to liability under Section 1983.
ANALYSIS
Because timely objections to the Report and Recommendation have been filed, this Court must undertake a de novo review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); SDIL-LR 73.1(b); Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 824 F. Supp. 786, 788 (N.D. Ill. 1993); see also Govas v. Chalmers, 965 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1992). The Court "may accept, reject or modify the magistrate judge's recommended decision." Harper, 824 F. Supp. at 788. In making this determination, the Court must look at all of the evidence contained in the record and "give `fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objections have been made.'" Id. (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR M. MILLER RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil 2d § 3076.8, at p. 55 (1992 Pocket Part)).
Under the well-settled standard, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Cox v. Acme Health Servs., Inc., 55 F.3d 1304, 1308 (7th Cir. 1995). A genuine issue of material fact exists for trial when, in viewing the record and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant bears the burden of establishing that there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
If the movant meets this burden, the nonmovant must set forth specific facts that demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against the party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case, and in which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
The Supreme Court has recognized that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners" may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). This encompasses a broader range of conduct than intentional denial of necessary medical treatment, but it stops short of "negligen[ce] in diagnosing or treating a medical condition." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. See also Jones v. Simek, 193 F.3d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1999); Steele v. Choi, 82 F.3d 175, 178 (7th Cir. 1996). Before the Court ever reaches the question of whether the Eighth Amendment was violated, however, Lavin must show that Shultz was acting under color of state law. "Action is taken under color of state law when it involves a misuse of power, `possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.' As a result, acts by a state officer are not made under color of state law unless they are related in some way to the performance of the duties of the state office." Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 484-85 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Walker v. Taylorville Corr. Ctr., 129 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1997)).
Here, there is no evidence that Dr. Schultz was acting under color of state law. Dr. Shultz is not employed by the State of Illinois, and he treated Lavin in a private office ( see Doc. 33-2). Unlike the physician in West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988), Dr. Shultz does not even have a contract with the State of Illinois, and, therefore, any alleged constitutional deprivation could not have been caused "by the State's exercise of its right to punish [Lavin] by incarceration and to deny him a venue independent of the State to obtain needed medical care." Id. at 55.
Lavin urges the Court to delay these proceedings to allow him to find evidence that Dr. Shultz acted under color of state law. Yet the Court notes that this action has been on file for more than three years, and there is simply nothing in the record to show that Dr. Shultz acted under color of state law. The Court has carefully reviewed the documents submitted by Lavin in his objection to the Report and Recommendation, but there is nothing therein to refute the conclusions reached by Magistrate Judge Frazier.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Frazier's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 114) is ADOPTED, and Plaintiff's objection (Doc. 126) is OVERRULED. The motion to dismiss, converted to a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 33), is GRANTED, and Defendant Shultz is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly at the conclusion of the entire action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.