Opinion
02-03-2017
Law Office of Samuel R. Miserendino, Esq., Buffalo (Samuel R. Miserendino of Counsel), for Petitioner. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Laura Etlinger of Counsel), for Respondent.
Law Office of Samuel R. Miserendino, Esq., Buffalo (Samuel R. Miserendino of Counsel), for Petitioner.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Laura Etlinger of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., DeJOSEPH, NEMOYER, TROUTMAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM: Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul a determination made after a fair hearing that denied her request to amend an indicated report of maltreatment with respect to a foster child to an unfounded report, and to seal it (see Social Services Law § 422 [8 ][a][v]; [c][ii] ). Petitioner contends that the determination that she committed an act of maltreatment and that such maltreatment was relevant and reasonably related to childcare is not supported by substantial evidence. We reject that contention. " ‘It is well established that our review is limited to whether the determination to deny the request to amend and seal the [indicated] report is supported by substantial evidence in the record’ " (Matter of Dawn M. v. New York State Cent. Register of Child Abuse & Maltreatment, 138 A.D.3d 1492, 1493, 30 N.Y.S.3d 471 ; see Matter of Theresa WW. v. New York State Off. of Children &
Family Servs., 123 A.D.3d 1174, 1175, 998 N.Y.S.2d 488 ). "Substantial evidence is such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact ... [,][and] hearsay evidence alone, if it is sufficiently reliable and probative, may constitute sufficient evidence to support a determination" (Dawn M., 138 A.D.3d at 1493, 30 N.Y.S.3d 471 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Bounds v. Village of Clifton Springs Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 137 A.D.3d 1759, 1760, 28 N.Y.S.3d 542 ). "To establish maltreatment, the agency was required to show by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the physical, mental or emotional condition of the child had been impaired or was in imminent danger of becoming impaired because of a failure by petitioner to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child with appropriate supervision or guardianship" (Matter of Gerald HH. v. Carrion, 130 A.D.3d 1174, 1175, 14 N.Y.S.3d 185 ; see 18 NYCRR 432.1 [b][1][ii] ). If there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the administrative agency's determination, we "cannot substitute [our] own judgment for that of the administrative agency, even if a contrary result is viable" (Matter of Danielle G. v. Schauseil, 292 A.D.2d 853, 854, 738 N.Y.S.2d 913 ; see Matter of Fermin–Perea v. Swarts, 95 A.D.3d 439, 440, 943 N.Y.S.2d 96 ). Upon our review of the testimony and the evidence presented at the fair hearing, we conclude that the determination " that petitioner maltreated the subject child[ ] and that such maltreatment was relevant and reasonably related to childcare ... is supported by substantial evidence" (Dawn M., 138 A.D.3d at 1494, 30 N.Y.S.3d 471 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the determination is unanimously confirmed without costs and the petition is dismissed.