Opinion
No. 15–P–1313.
07-14-2016
Jan LATTELL v. Corrine LATTELL (and a companion case).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
After a nineteen-year marriage, the parties were divorced pursuant to a judgment nisi entered in Probate and Family Court on September 28, 2010. At issue in this appeal are those provisions in the judgment that relate to payment of the college expenses of the parties' two children. It is uncontested that at the time of the divorce, two Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA) accounts had already been established for such purposes, and that under the divorce judgment, “these funds shall be the first funds applied to the children's college costs and expenses after any scholarships or financial aid.” It is also uncontested that the divorce judgment required the parties to set aside assets to create additional college expense accounts for the children, and that these funds were to be used once the existing UGMA accounts were exhausted. The dispute is over the parties' respective obligations once the newly created accounts also have been exhausted, as now has occurred with respect to their older child, their daughter.
Each party had to create a $50,000 fund for the daughter, and a $30,000 fund for the son. The son is five years younger than the daughter, and it appears that the discrepancy in the amount of the funds related to the parties' expectation that the son's fund would have additional time to grow before it was needed.
The husband maintains that his only obligation with respect to college expenses was to fund the accounts required by the divorce judgment, and that he therefore is now relieved of any additional obligation to pay for such expenses for his daughter. The wife rejoins that the parties' obligations were not capped in this manner and that the divorce judgment expressly requires that college expenses be shared by the parties. On cross complaints for contempt, a Probate and Family Court judge agreed with the wife's interpretation. We affirm the resulting judgment.
The husband filed his contempt complaint because the wife was withholding a portion of her alimony payments to him to account for the share of the additional college expenses that he refused to pay. The wife then filed her own contempt complaint based on the husband's failure to pay his share of those expenses. Without holding either party in contempt, the judge resolved the question of how the judgment should be interpreted. The judge also let the wife keep the funds she had withheld, while ordering her not to exercise such self-help in the future.
The language of a divorce judgment provides the principal source of its meaning. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Pierce–Williams, 68 Mass.App.Ct. 785, 786–787 (2007) (vacating and remanding partition judgment to conform with plain language of divorce judgment). As both parties agree, the key sentence states as follows: “Those funds [that is, the funds in the newly created accounts] will be invested prudently, and shall be used exclusively for the costs of the children's college educational expenses, which shall be shared by the parties equally after exhaustion of the UGMA funds already established by the Wife.” Read naturally and in accordance with the rules of grammar, “which” is a reference to the last antecedent (“the costs of the children's college educational expenses”), not—as the husband would have it—to “[t]hose funds.” Herrick v. Essex Regional Retirement Bd., 77 Mass.App.Ct. 645, 650 (2010) (under rule of last antecedent, “qualifying phrases are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to others more remote”), quoting from Russell v. Boston Wyman, Inc., 410 Mass. 1005, 1006–1007 (1991). See generally Commonwealth v. Daley, 463 Mass. 620, 624 (2012) (applying rules of grammar to interpretation of text). Thus, the plain language of the judgment supports the wife's position.
Of course, “meaning and ambiguity are creatures of context.” Merrimack College v. KPMG LLP, 88 Mass.App.Ct. 803, 806 (2016), quoting from Downer & Co., LLC v. STI Holding, Inc., 76 Mass.App.Ct. 786, 792 (2010). This allows the husband to argue that his interpretation might be supported by examining the key language in the context of the divorce judgment as a whole. Downer & Co., LLC, supra at 792–794. However, there is nothing in the other provisions of the judgment that trumps the natural reading that college expenses “shall be shared by the parties equally.” For example, the fact that the original judge saw the need to have the parties fund the accounts as a means of securing payment for college expenses does not indicate that the judge intended the parties to be relieved of paying their share of such expenses if the amount of the sequestered funds proved insufficient.
To the extent that the husband contends there has been a material change of circumstances that warrants a modification of the educational expense provision, that would be a subject for a complaint for modification (we express no opinion on the merits of such an action). We also note that had the husband claimed an inability to pay his share of the additional educational expenses, he could have pursued that as a defense to the wife's complaint for contempt.
One final issue bears discussion. The husband argues that the wife is barred from claiming that he owes half of the additional educational expenses because of a different judge's ruling in an earlier contempt proceeding. We discern no merit in this argument. A party claiming issue preclusion (also known as collateral estoppel) must demonstrate, inter alia, that the issue decided in the earlier adjudication is identical to the one in the second, and that it was “essential” to the earlier judgment. Porio v. Department of Rev., 80 Mass.App.Ct. 57, 61 (2011). The husband has not made that showing. In the earlier proceeding, the wife sought to compel the husband to pay his share of what she claimed were college expenses. The husband countered that the outlays in question were not for legitimate college expenses, and the judge ultimately accepted that argument. The issue whether the parties are obligated to share college expenses after the funds created by the judgment were depleted cannot be said to have been “essential” to the judge's decision. Any comments made by the first contempt judge that could be taken as supporting the husband's view with respect to that issue do not create issue preclusion.
In fact, the record appears to support the wife's position that when the earlier contempt action had been brought, the funds had not been depleted.
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Although we ultimately reject the husband's appellate arguments, those arguments are not frivolous, and we decline the wife's request for appellate attorney's fees.
Judgment dated April 7, 2015, affirmed.