Opinion
No. CV06-5000699
July 16, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The plaintiff was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident on the early morning hours of May 30, 2004. The operator of the motor vehicle was a minor who was allegedly intoxicated after consuming alcohol beverages at the defendants' home. The defendants were not home at the time of the events of May 29 and May 30, 2004, but the gathering at their home was hosted by their son, Nicholas, who is under the age of twenty-one. The complaint is in one count alleging negligence by the defendants (the parents of Nicholas and owners of the residence) for failing to supervise their son and facilitating the consumption of alcohol by minors at their residence.
The defendants on April 5, 2007 filed this Motion for Summary Judgment and a memorandum in support accompanied by the affidavits of the defendants. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition on May 11, 2007 attaching: 1) portions of the plaintiff's deposition; 2) portions of the defendants' deposition; 3) portions of the defendants' son's deposition and portions of the deposition of the apportionment defendant Jeffrey Munson. The defendant filed a reply memorandum on May 15, 2007. The parties were heard in oral argument on May 29, 2007.
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Powell v. Infinity Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 594, 599-600 (2007).
"In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the non-existence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318-19 (2006).
"Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by a trial in the ordinary manner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 446 (1984). "The issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn.App. 287, 290, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 904 (2003). "The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does a trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murillo v. Seymour Ambulance. Ass'n, Inc., 264 Conn. 474, 478-79 (2003).
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants argue that they cannot be liable for negligence as regards the plaintiff because they owed the plaintiff no duty of care. They contend that on the date in question they were out of town and they did not purvey, serve, supply or furnish alcohol to minors. They further maintain that they did not know or have reason to know that their son would have a party or gathering at their house.
In their affidavits attached to their motion, the defendants assert that on May 30, 2004 they were vacationing in Rhode Island. They spoke with their son Nicholas on two occasions on that date and on neither occasion did Nicholas indicate that he was having a party at their house. When the defendants left their home, all alcohol in the house was locked in cabinets and the beer in the house was locked in a garage refrigerator. The defendants further indicated that the lock on the garage was opened with the same key that opened the house and that Nicholas had such a key. The defendants indicated that the weekend in question was the first time Nicholas had been left alone at home and that he was instructed not to have any visitors while they were gone. Nicholas testified that his father told him that he could only have close friends over which meant one particular friend. The defendants testified that their oldest son, Ryan, had held a party in their home and that it occurred in May 2004.
The plaintiff counters that the defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable care so as to control their minor son. She alleges that the defendants had reason to know that Nicholas would hold a party where underage drinking would occur because their older son, Ryan, had previously held a party in their home. The plaintiff contends that the defendant's knowledge of possible underage drinking was evidenced by the fact that prior to leaving town, the defendants moved the beer they had out of the house and into the garage refrigerator. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants had reason to know that a party might occur and that they left beer accessible to their minor son and were negligent in their supervision of Nicholas.
"The essential elements of the cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; actual injury . . . Because duty is an essential element in a negligence action, the plaintiff cannot have an action in negligence unless he shows that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Silano v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 85 Conn.App. 450, 453 (2004). "Although no universal test for (duty) ever has been formulated . . . our threshold inquiry has always been whether the specific harm alleged by the plaintiff was foreseeable to the defendant. Thus, initially, if it is not foreseeable to a reasonable person in the defendant's position that harm of the type alleged would result from the defendant's actions to a particular plaintiff, the question of the existence of a duty to use due care is foreclosed, no cause of action can be maintained by the plaintiff." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fraser v. United States, 236 Conn. 625, 633 (1996). A duty may arise "from circumstances under which a reasonable person, knowing what he knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely a result from the act or failure to act." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ward v. Greene, 267 Conn. 539, 547 (2004).
"The fundamental inquiry of proximate cause is whether the harm that occurred was within the scope of foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligent conduct . . . In negligence cases such as the present one, in which a tortfeasor's conduct is not the direct cause of the harm, the question of legal causation is practically indistinguishable from an analysis of the extent of the tortfeaser's duty to the plaintiff." First Federal Savings Loan Ass'n. of Rochester v. Charter Appraisal Co., 247 Conn. 597, 604 (1999).
"At common law, the torts of children do not impose vicarious liability upon parents qua parents, although parental liability may be created by statute . . . or by independently negligent behavior on the part of parents." Kaminski v. Fairfield, 216 Conn. 29, 34 (1990). "In recognizing a cause of action for negligent supervision of a minor child by the child's parents, Connecticut trial courts follow the 2 Restatement (Second) Torts, Standard of Conduct § 316, p. 123 (1965), whereby: "A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control." Doe v. Favreau, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV02-393019 (March 7, 2003, Thim, J.) ( 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 276.)
While our appellate courts have not adopted 2 Restatement (Second), Torts, Standards of Conduct § 316, a number of Superior Court cases have cited the section. See, e.g., Morocco v. Michaud, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV03-0522410 (June 15, 2004, Robinson, J.); Andrews v. Bonaminio, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV03-02829755 (November 4, 2003, Wiese, J.); Robyn v. Palmer-Smith, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV99-0174453 (February 20, 2001, D'Andrea, J.); Murphy v. Lachappell, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV97-142410 (May 23, 1999, Pellegrino, J.) ( 24 Conn. L. Rptr. 567); Natale v. Caron, Superior Court, judicial district of Norwich, Docket No. 111113 (May 21, 1997, Hendel, J.) ( 19 Conn. L. Rptr. 458); Jarboe v. Edwards, 26 Conn.Sup. 350, 355, 223 A.2d 402 (1966).
Three Appellate cases regarding service of alcohol to minors provide a framework for analysis of the present case. In Ely v. Murphy, 207 Conn. 88, 89-90 (1988), the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the adult defendant, who had sold beer to minors during the course of a party at the defendant's home. The plaintiff's decedent, a guest of the defendant, was struck and killed by another minor guest who attempted to drive after becoming intoxicated at the party. The Supreme Court recounted that at common law, no cause of action lay against one who furnished alcohol to another who thereafter voluntarily became intoxicated and harmed either himself or another. The rationale behind this rule was that "the proximate cause of the intoxication was not the furnishing of the liquor, but the consumption of it by the purchaser or donee. The rule was based on the obvious fact that one could not become intoxicated by reason of liquor furnished him if he did not drink it." 207 Conn. at 93.
Apprehending in recent legislation a "continuing and growing public awareness" that minors are incompetent to deal responsibly with alcohol and its effects, the court expressly abandoned the common-law rule, and held that a minor's "consumption of alcohol does not, as a matter of law, constitute the intervening act necessary to break the chain of proximate causation and does not, as a matter of law, insulate one who provides alcohol to minors from liability for ensuing injury." 207 Conn. 94-95. The court made clear that such a "social host or other purveyor of alcohol" would not be strictly liable, but instead would be liable if his actions were determined to be the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 97.
In Bohan v. Last, 236 Conn. 670, 675-76 (1996), patrons of a bar allegedly provided alcoholic beverages to a minor who had gained access to the bar. After becoming intoxicated, the minor was involved in a car accident, killing his passenger. Upon being sued for the wrongful death of the decedent, the defendants, the bar and its permittee, brought a third-party complaint against the patrons who supplied alcohol to the minor. The court applied Ely v. Murphy, supra, and found that the defendants had stated a cognizable cause of action. The court concluded: "In appropriate circumstances, adults have a duty to refrain from negligently or intentionally supplying alcohol to minors, whether such adults act as social hosts in their homes or as purveyors in a bar, because minors are presumed not to have the capacity to understand fully the risks associated with intoxication. In accordance with well established principles of proximate cause, this common law duty encompasses responsibility to innocent third party victims of intoxicated minors . . ." 236 Conn. at 681.
In Rangel v. Parkhurst, 64 Conn.App. 372, 374 (2001), the plaintiff brought suit seeking damages for injuries she and her son suffered in a car accident with the defendants' minor son. The defendants' son had purchased beer and stored it in the defendants' basement refrigerator. On the morning of the accident, the defendants' son removed the beer from the defendants' house and after drinking throughout the day and evening operated his automobile, subsequently injuring the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged the defendants were negligent in that they stored or made alcohol available to their son and allowed him to operate a vehicle when they knew or had reason to know he would do so while intoxicated. The uncontradicted evidence indicated that the defendants had neither purchased nor stored the beer as alleged in the complaint. There was disputed evidence, however, as to whether the defendants knew of or acquiesced in their son's storage of the beer. Despite this factual scenario, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants. The court summarized its holding as follows: "Even if we assume arguendo that the defendants knew their son was storing beer in the family refrigerator, that fact is of no consequence because our law does not impose liability on parents who know of and acquiesce in their minor child's storage of alcoholic beverages in their home. There is no evidence that the defendants supplied or purveyed beer to (their son). Unlike the defendants in Ely and Bohan, the defendants in this case were neither purveyors of alcohol nor social hosts. They owed no legal duty to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's claim is unenforceable as a matter of law. The court, therefore, properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on those facts." 64 Conn.App. at 381.
In this case, the two issues for the court to resolve on this motion for summary judgment are: 1) whether the defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the need to exercise "control" over Nicholas on the evening in question; and 2) whether the defendants supplied or purveyed alcohol to Nicholas and his guests.
The facts presented established that the defendants did not know or have reason to know the need to exercise control over Nicholas to keep him from holding a party on the night in question. Nicholas had never been left home alone and the defendants had no knowledge that Nicholas had ever hosted such a party before. Although the accounts of Nicholas and his mother are slightly divergent, at most, it can be said that the defendants told Nicholas he could have one friend over during their absence. There is evidence that the defendants were aware of their son Ryan having hosted a party on a previous occasion. The plaintiff does not cite, nor is the court aware of any case law to the effect that parents with such knowledge as to one of their children would be charged with such knowledge as to the future acts of another child.
The facts further establish that the defendants cannot be said to have supplied or purveyed alcohol to minors on the date in question. To hold that the defendants "supplied" or "purveyed" alcohol under these facts would be to extend liability in a manner not warranted by the precedent of Ely v. Murphy, supra, 207 Conn. 88; Bohan v. Last, supra, 236 Conn. 670; and Rangel v. Parkhurst, supra, 64 Conn.App. 372. The defendants did not directly provide alcohol to minors as did the defendants in Ely and Bohan. The facts here are more similar to those in Rangel, with the difference being that in Rangel, the defendants did not purchase or own the alcohol that their son eventually consumed.
The court finds that the harm suffered by the plaintiff is not foreseeable, the defendants had no duty of care to the plaintiff, and their acts cannot be said to be the proximate cause of her injuries. There being no disputed issue of material fact as to the defendants being entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the motion for summary judgment is granted.