Opinion
23A-CR-2699
09-24-2024
Alsham M. Laster, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Talisha Griffin Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Daylon L. Welliver Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court Trial Court Cause No. 49D20-2111-MR-33962 The Honorable Jennifer P. Harrison, Judge
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Talisha Griffin Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Daylon L. Welliver Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Kenworthy, Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] Following a jury trial, Alsham M. Laster was convicted for the murder of his girlfriend, Latisha Burnett. Laster now appeals, raising one issue for our review: did a twenty-two-hour delay in securing a warrant render the seizure of his cell phone unreasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution? Concluding the seizure was reasonable under both constitutions, we affirm.
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (2018).
We heard oral argument on August 30, 2024, on the Indiana Fever Practice Court. We thank Danny Lopez, Executive Vice President for Community and External Engagement and Corporate Communications at Pacers Sports and Entertainment, and the Gainbridge Fieldhouse staff for their warm welcome and hospitality. We also thank the students of Believe Circle City High School, Ben Davis High School, Irvington Preparatory Academy, New Palestine High School, Purdue Polytechnic High School, and Rooted School-Indy for their attention and thoughtful questions. And lastly, we thank counsel for the quality of their arguments and for staying to answer student questions.
[¶2] Laster and Burnett lived together in Laster's home on North Luett Avenue in Indianapolis. During the week of July 5, 2021, Burnett's cousin, Corey Smith, was remodeling the home's bathroom. Smith worked at the home on Friday, July 9, and planned to continue working into the next week, until Laster texted Smith on Monday, July 12, telling him not to come over.
[¶3] In the evening prior, July 11, Laster's neighbor heard what she thought were gunshots coming from Laster's home. But the neighbor did not call the police because she "hear[d] gunshots all the time in the neighborhood." Tr. Vol. 3 at 197. The neighbor saw Laster leave his home around 9:30 that evening in a black Honda SUV belonging to Burnett, which Laster sometimes drove because his own car had a broken wheel. The next day, the neighbor watched as Laster returned home in the Honda. After about twenty minutes, Laster emerged from the home with a trash bag and something else under his arm. Laster placed the items in the Honda and left.
[¶4] Around 9:30 p.m. that same day, July 12, Laster called 9-1-1 using his cell phone. During the call, Laster identified himself and notified police "there is a deceased person" in his home on North Luett Avenue. Conventional Ex. Vol. 1 page 2 at 0:05-0:11. Laster was not at home when he made the call. When asked how he knew the person was dead, Laster said, "That's for the medical team to determine," id. at 2:07-2:11, and "They're not moving to anything. They're not responding to anything." Id. at 2:29-2:34.
[¶5] Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Daniel Reed was dispatched to Laster's home and arrived minutes later. Officer Reed entered the home through the unlocked front door and found Burnett's body in a "funeral pose" on a bedroom floor. Tr. Vol. 3 at 143. Burnett's head was lying on a pillow, her arms were positioned across her chest, and a white sheet was "pulled up almost all the way up to [her] chin . . . very neatly tucked in and put together." Id. at 144. Next to her body, a box fan turned on high blew cold air in her direction. Police identified a crumpled dryer sheet and possible blood near Burnett's body. And the home's thermostat was set to fifty degrees, causing the room to be "very, very cold." Id.
[¶6] Burnett's body had wounds consistent with those caused by gunshots. A pair of holes in the bedroom floor lined up with holes in Burnett's body. Police found three shell casings in a trashcan in the same room as Burnett's body and a fired bullet in one of the holes in the floor. Police also recovered Burnett's cell phone from the bedroom. Following an autopsy, a pathologist classified Burnett's death as a homicide caused by multiple gunshot wounds. He reasoned Burnett's body had been cooling for at least twenty hours but did not think it had "been there for days" before police arrived. Tr. Vol. 4 at 27.
[¶7] On July 13, around 2:00 a.m., police stopped Laster while he was driving Burnett's Honda and took him to the police station for questioning. Once there, the police seized Laster's cell phone. Laster said the phone's number ended in 0721 and was the phone he called 9-1-1 from. About two hours later, Detective Connie Pearson met with Laster and read him his Miranda rights. Laster was handcuffed and refused to speak to police without a lawyer present. While Laster was being held at the police station, police obtained a warrant to search the black Honda SUV. During their search, police found laundry detergent and a bag containing a pair of pants with several blood stains. DNA testing later confirmed most of the blood on the pants was Burnett's and a smaller portion was Laster's. Police released Laster around 10:53 a.m. but did not return his cell phone.
[¶8] The next morning, July 14, around 8:15 a.m., Detective Pearson applied for a warrant to search Laster's cell phone. In her warrant request, Detective Pearson detailed potential evidence, like GPS and location data, she expected to find on the cell phone. A trial judge granted Detective Pearson's request. In total, about twenty-two hours elapsed between the warrantless seizure of Laster's cell phone and the trial court's grant of Detective Pearson's request for a warrant to search the phone. The following items were obtained from Laster's cell phone: the cell phone itself; the phone's SIM card; a report decoding data extracted from the cell phone; copies of text messages; logs of incoming and outgoing calls and text messages; a photo of Burnett with her eyes closed, lying in the same position and wearing the same clothes as she was when police found her deceased; and meta data showing the photo of Burnett was taken at 4:47 p.m. on July 10, 2021. Police also obtained copies of several text messages and call logs from Burnett's cell phone.
Detective Pearson had previously applied for a warrant to search and seize Laster's cell phone, but a trial court denied her request. A copy of Detective Pearson's first warrant request was not included in the appellate record.
The parties stipulated to the timing of Laster being brought in for questioning, his release, and the application of the warrant at a suppression hearing. On appeal, the parties frame the gap between the seizure and the obtaining of a warrant as twenty-two hours. This represents the time between Laster being released from questioning just before 11:00 a.m. on July 13 and the trial court granting Detective Pearson's second warrant request around 8:30 a.m. on July 14.
[¶9] In November 2021, the State charged Laster with Burnett's murder. Laster moved to suppress all evidence obtained from his cell phone, arguing police seized his phone in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of Indiana's Constitution. The trial court denied Laster's motion, finding the seizure reasonable under both constitutions. The case proceeded to trial. The jury found Laster guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to sixty-two years in the Indiana Department of Correction.
Standard of Review
[¶10] Laster contends the trial court erred in admitting the evidence obtained from his cell phone, renewing his argument that the seizure of his cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment and Section 11. Trial courts have discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and although "we assess claims relating to admitting or excluding evidence for abuse of discretion, to the extent those claims implicate constitutional issues, we review them de novo." Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 189 (Ind. 2021); see also Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014) (noting the "ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law that we consider de novo").
Laster does not challenge the legality of the search of his cell phone.
1. The trial court did not admit evidence in violation of Laster's Fourth Amendment rights.
[¶11] The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The "basic purpose of this Amendment . . . is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303 (2018) (citation omitted). And as its text makes clear, the Fourth Amendment's "ultimate touchstone" is reasonableness. Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 301 (2021) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
[¶12] Ordinarily, "seizures of personal property are 'unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment . . . unless . . . accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant.'" Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983)). But a law enforcement officer may temporarily seize property without a warrant if they have "probable cause to believe [the property] holds contraband or evidence of a crime" and "the exigencies of the circumstances demand it or some other recognized exception to the warrant requirement is present." Place, 462 U.S. at 701.
A. Police had probable cause to seize Laster's cell phone.
[¶13] Laster first contends police did not have probable cause to seize his cell phone. Although probable cause is the "traditional standard" of the Fourth Amendment, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987), it is a "fluid concept" not susceptible to a precise definition, Hodges v. State, 125 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)). So, rather than applying "rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries," courts should favor a "more flexible, all-things-considered approach" when determining whether probable cause exists. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013) (describing probable cause as a "practical and common-sensical standard"). That is, probable cause exists "when the totality of the circumstances establishes 'a fair probability'-not proof or a prima facie showing-of criminal activity, contraband, or evidence of a crime." Hodges, 125 N.E.3d at 582 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Probable cause does not establish guilt; instead, innocent activity "will often supply a basis for showing probable cause." Id. (reviewing "the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts" to determine the existence of probable cause) (quotation omitted). Ultimately, probable cause is "not a high bar." Id. at 581 (quoting Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014)).
[¶14] By the time police seized Laster's phone, they were aware he had called 9-1-1 using that phone and requested police conduct a welfare check on a person he believed was deceased in his home. In this same call, Laster provided police with his name and phone number, and relayed he was not currently at home. When responding to the call, police located Burnett's body in a bedroom. Examiners identified what they believed to be three gunshot wounds. Three bullet casings were also found in a trashcan in the bedroom. And police spoke with Laster's neighbors, who observed Laster coming and going from the house around the time Burnett was killed. Detective Pearson's warrant application also detailed evidence of potential criminal wrongdoing that might be on Laster's phone, including the phone's call log, browser history, location information, photos, and messages. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, an objective police officer could reasonably conclude there was a fair probability Laster's cell phone contained evidence of a crime. Police therefore had probable cause to seize Laster's cell phone.
B. Exigent circumstances justified the cell phone's seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
[¶15] Because police seized Laster's cell phone without a warrant, the State must show one of the "few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement applies. Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 190 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). One such exception is when the exigencies of a situation make law-enforcement needs so compelling that a warrantless search or seizure is objectively reasonable. Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 319. Preventing the "imminent destruction of evidence" is a recognized exigency. Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 190 (quotation omitted). Courts determine whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless seizure by considering whether: (1) the police had probable cause to believe the item seized contained contraband or evidence of a crime; (2) the police had "good reason to fear" that, absent such seizure, the defendant would destroy material evidence before the officers could obtain a warrant; and (3) the police "made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy." McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331-32. This is a "case-specific" inquiry. Lange, 594 U.S. at 302.
[¶16] Here, an objective police officer could reasonably conclude the contents of Laster's cell phone were in danger of being imminently destroyed. If police had returned Laster's cell phone after his interview, Laster would have had an opportunity, and perhaps a strong incentive, to delete or otherwise destroy incriminating evidence on his phone. To prevent the cell phone's contents from being tampered with or destroyed, police secured it while applying for a warrant. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 388-89 (2014) (explaining how seizing a cell phone while pursuing a warrant can prevent the destruction of evidence by removing the risk posed by the owner or another individual deleting, wiping, or encrypting evidence on the phone). By doing so, police acted within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. See Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 190-91 (upholding a warrantless seizure of a recording device under the exigent-circumstances exception when police had a compelling need to secure the recorder before obtaining a warrant to search it due to the destructibility of the recorder's contents); see also Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 808 (1984) (recognizing "society's interest in the discovery and protection of incriminating evidence from removal or destruction can supersede, at least for a limited period, a person's possessory interest in property, provided that there is probable cause to believe . . . that property is associated with criminal activity").
C. The twenty-two-hour delay in obtaining a warrant did not render the seizure of Laster's cell phone unreasonable.
[¶17] A permissible warrantless seizure, however, may still be unreasonable if police fail to obtain a warrant within a reasonable period of time. See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332 (explaining a seizure must last "no longer than reasonably necessary for the police, acting with diligence, to obtain the warrant"). But there is no bright-line rule for determining when a delay becomes unreasonable. Instead, courts assess the reasonableness of a seizure by weighing "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." Place, 462 U.S. at 703; see also McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331 (instructing courts to "balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable"). When conducting this balancing, courts should consider factors like the "brevity" of the seizure, the strength of the State's basis for the seizure, and "whether the police diligently pursue[d] their investigation." Place, 462 U.S. at 709.
[¶18] Starting with Laster's interests, we note he had a strong interest in possessing his cell phone. But the seizure at issue here implicates only Laster's possessory interests, not his privacy or liberty interests. See Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 190; see also Segura, 468 U.S. at 806 ("A seizure affects only the person's possessory interests; a search affects a person's privacy interests."). After all, the police did not search the contents of Laster's cell phone until after obtaining a warrant to do so. Laster's privacy interests therefore were not adversely affected.
[¶19] As for the State's interests, police had probable cause to believe Laster's cell phone would contain evidence of a crime. The State therefore had a stronger interest than if the seizure rested only on reasonable suspicion. Compare McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331 (holding a two-hour delay after probable-cause seizure of house was reasonable), with Place, 462 U.S. at 709 (holding 90-minute delay after reasonable-suspicion seizure of a suitcase was unreasonable).
[¶20] Turning to law-enforcement diligence, we are mindful that with the benefit of hindsight, courts "can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985). But that does not necessarily mean police conduct was unreasonable. During the twenty-two-hour gap between seizing Laster's phone and obtaining a warrant, police were investigating Burnett's death by requesting warrants to search Laster's residence, Burnett's vehicle, and recovered cell phones-including Laster's. Said another way, police were not abdicating their responsibility or causing unnecessary delay.
[¶21] Considering these factors together, we cannot say the twenty-two-hour delay was so long the seizure of Laster's cell phone was unreasonable. See United States v. Burgard, 675 F.3d 1029, 1034 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding a six-day delay between the seizure of a cell phone based on probable cause and the police obtaining a warrant to search the phone did not render the seizure unreasonable), cert. denied.
[¶22] In sum, police had probable cause to seize Laster's cell phone, the warrantless seizure of Laster's cell phone was justified under the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, and the twenty-two-hour gap between the seizure and police obtaining a warrant did not render the seizure unreasonable. As a result, the seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence obtained from Laster's cell phone.
2. The trial court did not admit evidence in violation of Laster's Article 1, Section 11 rights.
[¶23] Laster also claims the trial court admitted evidence in violation of his rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, which guarantees, in relevant part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated[.]" Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. Although the language of Section 11 is nearly identical to its federal counterpart, our courts interpret the state provision "independently and ask whether the State has shown that a particular search or seizure was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances." Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 191. In doing so, we use the framework set forth in Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005). We determine the reasonableness of a lawenforcement officer's search or seizure by balancing three factors: "1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs." Id. at 361. "When weighing these factors as part of our totality-of-the-circumstances test, we consider the full context in which the search or seizure occurs." Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 943 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied.
[¶24] We begin by evaluating the law-enforcement officer's "degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred." Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361. We consider all the information available to the officers at the time of the search or seizure. Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 943. When police seized Laster's phone, they had at least a moderate degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge a violation had occurred. Laster called 9-1-1 to request police conduct a welfare check on a deceased person in his home. Only Laster and Burnett lived at the North Luett Avenue home. Police responding to Laster's call located Burnett's body lying in a "funeral pose" on a bedroom floor, identified apparent gunshot wounds to Burnett's body, and found three spent shell casings in a trashcan nearby. Tr. Vol. 3 at 143. And when police searched Burnett's Honda SUV, they found a pair of pants with blood stains next to a bottle of laundry detergent. Police had at least a moderate degree of suspicion a violation had occurred when they seized Laster's cell phone.
[¶25] Next, we consider "the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities." Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361. We measure the degree of intrusion from the defendant's point of view, considering the "intrusion into both the citizen's physical movements and the citizen's privacy." Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 944. Additionally, we focus on the degree of intrusion caused by the method of search or seizure. Id. at 945. The degree of intrusion was low. Although police seized Laster's cell phone, they did not search it until they obtained a warrant. As a result, Laster's privacy interests were not adversely affected. See Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 190. A twenty-two-hour-long deprivation of Laster's possessory interests is not insignificant but was not unreasonable when placed in the context of the early stages of a homicide investigation.
[¶26] Under the final Litchfield factor, we review the extent of law enforcement's needs "to act in a general way" and "to act in the particular way and at the particular time they did." Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 946-47. The need to seize Laster's phone was significant. After Laster was brought in for questioning and then released, he likely knew he was a suspect in Burnett's murder. If police returned Laster's cell phone at that point, he would have had the opportunity and incentive to wipe his phone of potential incriminating evidence. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 388-89 (discussing two types of evidence destruction unique to digital data beyond manual destruction: remote wiping and data encryption). True, police could have taken additional steps to better protect the information on Laster's phone after seizing it-turning it off, placing it in airplane mode, and/or putting it in a Faraday cage. This inaction cuts against lawenforcement needs being significant, but this factor still weighs in favor of the State.
Faraday cages or bags are "essentially sandwich bags made of aluminum foil" which isolate a phone from radio waves. Id. at 390.
[¶27] On balance, the seizure of Laster's phone pending a search warrant did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of Indiana's Constitution.
Conclusion
[¶28] The Fourth Amendment and Section 11 demand reasonableness, not perfection. Because that bar was met here, we affirm.
[¶29] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.