Opinion
A24-0125
08-05-2024
Dennis Larson, as assignee of Jo Ann Monson, Respondent, v. Chad Monson, Appellant.
Kandiyohi County District Court File No. 34-CV-23-231.
Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Schmidt, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Renee L. Worke, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Chad Monson challenges the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss respondent Dennis Larson's judgment-renewal action against him for insufficient service of process.
2. On August 26, 2013, the district court entered a judgment against Monson for $1,590,000 in favor of his ex-wife as part of a property settlement in a marriage dissolution proceeding. In May 2014, Monson initiated bankruptcy proceedings seeking to discharge the 2013 judgment, in addition to other debt matters petitioned for bankruptcy. Monson's ex-wife subsequently assigned the judgment to Larson.
3. Judgments generally expire if they are not renewed within ten years. Minn. Stat. § 541.04 (2022). The judgment in this matter was set to expire on August 26, 2023.
4. On May 15, 2023, Larson served a complaint on Monson seeking to renew the 2013 judgment, but he did so without serving a summons.
5. In June 2023, the parties stipulated to stay the judgment-renewal proceedings until Monson's bankruptcy proceedings had ended. The district court granted the stay. On August 30, 2023, after the limitations period for the 2013 judgment had run, Monson moved the district court to: (1) dissolve the stay, and (2) dismiss the renewal action pursuant to rule 12.02(a), (b), (d). The district court denied the motion.
6. Monson contends that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the judgment-lien claim due to Larson's failure to serve him with a summons.
7. Whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law that we review de novo. Daniel v. City of Minneapolis, 923 N.W.2d 637, 644 (Minn. 2019). "Subject matter jurisdiction . . . cannot be waived, and it can be raised at any time in the proceeding." Tischer v. Hous. & Redev. Auth., 693 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 2005).
8. The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the judgment-lien claim. Although Monson characterized his challenge as involving the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction, it was actually a challenge to the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Rued v. Comm'r of Hum. Servs., 993 N.W.2d 295, 301-02 (Minn.App. 2023) (stating that "[n]ot every use of the word 'jurisdiction' implicates the concept of subject-matter jurisdiction"), rev. granted (Minn. Sept. 19, 2023). Generally, a statute or rule setting forth requirements related to service of process affects personal jurisdiction-not subject-matter jurisdiction. McCullough &Sons, Inc. v. City of Vadnais Heights, 883 N.W.2d 580, 590 (Minn. 2016). Therefore, Monson's claim that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to ineffective service of process fails.
9. Monson contends that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the judgment-lien claim because there was ineffective service of process, which could not be cured because the limitations period had passed pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 541.04.
10. "Whether service of process was effective, and personal jurisdiction therefore exists, is a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo. But in conducting this review, [appellate courts] must apply the facts as found by the district court unless those factual findings are clearly erroneous." Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn. 2008) (citations omitted); see also Melillo v. Heitland, 880 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Minn. 2016). Generally, when a party actively participates in the proceedings, this conduct may be construed as a waiver of a personal-jurisdiction defense. Shamrock, 754 N.W.2d at 382.
11. Monson moved the district court twice after the defective service of process but before raising a personal-jurisdiction defense or a service-of-process defense-first, the consolidation motion; and second, the motion to stay the proceedings. In so doing, Monson actively participated in the proceedings thereby waiving these defenses. See id. Because these defenses were waived, Monson cannot subsequently assert either defense later in the proceeding. Therefore, Monson's argument that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction because of ineffective service of process fails.
12. Monson also challenges whether the judgment-lien claim was timely. The application of statutes of limitations is reviewed de novo. Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn. 2011). To be considered timely, Larson's judgment-lien claim must have commenced before August 26, 2023. See Minn. Stat. § 541.04 ("No action shall be maintained upon a judgment or decree of a court . . . unless begun within ten years after the entry of such judgment."); see also Gerber v. Gerber, 714 N.W.2d 702, 702 (Minn. 2006) (referring to ten-year limit on enforcing judgments in section 541.04 as statute of limitations).
13. On May 15, 2023, Larson commenced the judgment-renewal action by serving it on Monson (and Monson subsequently waived any defect in the service of process). On May 16, Larson moved the district court for renewal and reentry of the judgment lien. "A judgment may be renewed by an independent action upon the judgment [if] such an action [is] commenced within the ten-year period" pursuant to section 541.04. Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wartman, 841 N.W.2d 637, 640-41 (Minn.App. 2014) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 2014). Therefore, Larson made a timely motion for renewal and reentry of the judgment lien as it was brought within the ten-year limitations period.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order denying the motion to dismiss is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.