Opinion
C.A. No. 03-70 S
June 12, 2003
Kantz LaPorte, Pro Se.
Michael B. Grant, Esq., Counsel for the Appellee.
Report and Recommendation
Plaintiff Kantz Laporte, pro se, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff names as defendants, A.T. Wall, Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, and persons he identifies as "Intake Officers." Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $50,000 from the defendants, in both their "official" and "individual" capacities.
On May 16, 2003, Wall filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Laporte, in response to the motion to dismiss, filed with the Court what he titled a "Brief Summary of the Case." The Court will treat this an opposition to the motion to dismiss. This matter has been referred to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for a report and recommendation. For the reasons that follow, I recommend that defendant Wall's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) be granted on plaintiff's official capacity claims and denied on plaintiff's individual capacity claims. I also recommend that defendant Wall's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 be denied.
Background
The follow are the facts from the Complaint, which are taken as true for the purposes of the instant motion:
On May 24, 2001, plaintiff was arrested on a charge of vandalism, a misdemeanor offense. Police officers transported the plaintiff to the Intake Service Center ("Intake") at the Adult Correctional Institution, Cranston, Rhode Island. When he entered Intake, plaintiff was strip-searched.
Plaintiff has brought suit alleging that the strip-search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Defendant Wall has moved to dismiss. Plaintiff has opposed the motion.
Discussion
A. Wall's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of actions which fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on a motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept the well pleaded averments of the ***complaint as true, and construe these facts in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff]."Chongris v. Board of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1987). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion will only be granted when, viewed in this manner, it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitled him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-6 (1957).
Under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a reviewing court is obliged neither to credit bald assertions, periphrastic circumlocutions, unsubstantiated conclusions, or outright vituperation, nor to honor subjective characterizations, optimistic predictions, or problematic suppositions."United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1992). Unverifiable conclusions, not supported by the stated facts, deserve no deference. Id. Thus, in ruling on the motion to dismiss, the pertinent inquiry is whether plaintiff's complaint sets forth sufficient factual allegations which, if proven, would support his claims of a deprivation of federal rights.
Plaintiff has brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In order to maintain a section 1983 action, the conduct complained must be committed by a person acting under color of state law and the conduct must have deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right or a federal statutory right. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Here, there is no dispute that defendant Wall acted under the color of state law. Wall asserts, however, that to the extent that plaintiff seeks relief from Wall in his "official" capacity, such a claim is not actionable. With respect to plaintiff's "individual" capacity claims, Wall contends that plaintiff has failed to properly allege a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. I will discuss these contentions in turn.
2. Official Capacity Claims
Wall first asserts that plaintiff's claims insofar as they are brought against him in his "official" capacity should be dismissed. In Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), the United States Supreme Court stated unequivocally that "a State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983." Id. at 64. "A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself." Id. at 71. Thus, "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983." Id.
Here, plaintiff has brought suit against Wall in both his "official" and "individual" capacities. However, pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in Will, plaintiff's official capacity claims can not be sustained. Accordingly, I recommend that they be dismissed.
3. Individual Capacity Claims
Plaintiff has brought suit against A.T. Wall in his individual capacity as well. With respect to the individual capacity claims, Wall contends that plaintiff's complaint fails to set forth sufficient facts which demonstrate a Fourth Amendment violation. I disagree.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches." U.S. Const. amend.IV. Both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees retain constitutional rights despite their incarceration, including basic Fourth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment, rights against unreasonable searches. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). However, these rights may be subject to restrictions and limitations based on the fact of confinement, the legitimate goals and policies of the penal institution, and the need of the institution to maintain security and internal order. Id. at 545-46. "[W]hen an institutional restriction infringes a specific fundamental guarantee" — here the Fourth Amendment, "the practice must be evaluated in light of the central objective of prison administration, safeguarding institutional security." Id. at 546. The test for determining whether a search passes constitutional muster is "reasonableness."Bell at 560. Reasonableness depends upon the particular circumstances in which the search takes place.
Plaintiff seeks to hold Wall responsible for the strip-search. Plaintiff does not aver whether Wall was present during the search, or whether he seeks to hold Wall, as the Director of the Department of Corrections, responsible in a supervisory capacity. Either way, Plaintiff has alleged facts which can sustain his claim.
Plaintiff indicated that he was detained on a minor charge of vandalism, and was subjected to a strip-search. This type of search can violate the Fourth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment, if Wall actually participated in the strip-search in question. See e.g. Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107 (2001). If, on the other hand, plaintiff seeks to hold Wall responsible in a supervisory capacity, such a claim at this time can also be sustained. This writer is mindful that the District Court has found strip-searches, such as the one allegedly at issue here, done pursuant to a policy at the RI DOC, unconstitutional. Roberts v. State of Rhode Island, No. 99-259ML (D.R.I. March 16, 2000), aff'd,Roberts v. State of Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2001). A supervisor's unconstitutional policy can lead to liability for the constitutional violation on the part of the supervisor. Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985); Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 582 (1st Cir. 1994).
In any event, at this time, this Court can not say that plaintiff will not be able to prove any set of facts which would entitled him to relief from Wall. Accordingly, Wall's motion to dismiss plaintiff's individual capacity claims should be denied. I so recommend.
B. Wall's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8.
Finally, Wall has moved to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint because he has failed to allegedly comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wall avers that plaintiff's complaint fails to provide any "notice or guidance as to the circumstances or conditions that the alleged wrongful conduct occurred." I disagree.
Rule 8 provides, in relevant part:
(a) A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, . . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).
While the plaintiff's Complaint is terse, it provides essential allegations from which notice of the claim can be gleaned. The Complaint alleges that the plaintiff was detained on May 21, 2001, on a minor charge of vandalism and subjected to a strip-search in Intake. Plaintiff contends that this strip-search violated his Fourth Amendment rights and seeks to hold responsible A.T. Wall, and persons he identifies as "Intake Officers." While plaintiff may not know the identify of the "Intake Officers" at this time, discovery should yield those persons responsible.
This Court is mindful that pro se pleadings should be construed liberally, see Haines v. Kemer, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f)'s admonishment that pleadings shall be construed as to do "substantial justice." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f). Accordingly, this writer will not recommend a dismissal pursuant to Rule 8.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that Wall's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) be granted on plaintiff's official capacity claims and denied on plaintiff's individual capacity claims. Wall's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 should be denied. Any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be specific and must be filed with the Clerk of Court within ten days of its receipt. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Local Rule 32. Failure to file timely, specific objections to this report constitutes waiver of both the right to review by the district court and the right to appeal the district court's decision. United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1980).