Opinion
21-CV-9307 (AJN) (JLC)
04-05-2022
DAQUAN LANIER, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL CAPRA, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility, Defendant.
Honorable Alison J. Nathan, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JAMES L. COTT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro se petitioner Daquan Lanier seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 following his conviction by guilty plea of manslaughter in the first degree. He was sentenced to a determinate prison term of 20 years, followed by five years of post-release supervision. For the reasons set forth below, the petition should be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Charges, Arrest, and Arraignment
Due to Lanier's conviction by guilty plea, the following facts, which are drawn from the record of proceedings before the state trial court, are set forth in the light most favorable to the State. See, e.g., Jacks v. Lempke, No. 09-CV-8768 (DAB) (FM), 2012 WL 3099069, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 3930098 (Sept. 10, 2012).
The state court record is filed at docket entry 12. The plea transcript (“TP.”) is filed at docket entry 12-5, as an exhibit to the Respondent's Declaration in Opposition to the petition. The sentencing transcript (“TS.”) is filed at docket entry 12-6. Background information regarding the charges is drawn from Lanier's brief on direct appeal (“Pet. Br.”), filed at docket entry 12-1, and Respondent's brief on direct appeal (“Res. Br.”), filed at docket entry 12-2. Pinpoint citations to these filings refer to the pagination that runs through the documents, and not to the pagination generated by the Court's Electronic Case Filing system.
On March 16, 2014, at around 9:00 p.m., Lanier and two other individuals were on their way to a grocery store in the Bronx when they heard a woman, Verbana Burgess, singing. Pet. Br. at 3. Annoyed by Ms. Burgess's singing, Lanier and the other individuals told her to stop. Id. In response, Ms. Burgess called her three sons, including Tony Burgess, to address Lanier and the others. Id. When the sons arrived, they and Lanier argued and physically fought. Id. After a short period of time, Lanier left the scene of the fight and returned to his apartment to retrieve a gun, while the Burgesses returned to their apartment. Resp. Br. at 2. Armed, Lanier headed back to the Burgess's apartment to confront the sons. At the apartment, Lanier approached Tony Burgess and shot him in the back of the head with a single bullet, killing him. Resp. Br. at 2.
Four days after the shooting, Lanier was arrested and arraigned on four charges: (1) second-degree murder, N.Y. Pen. L. § 125.25[2]; (2) first-degree manslaughter, N.Y. Pen. L. § 125.20[2]; and (3) two counts of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon, N.Y. Pen. L. § 265.03[1][b], [3]. On March 26, 2014, a grand jury indicted Lanier on the four arrest charges. Resp. Br. at 3.
B. The Plea
More than two years later, on October 11, 2016, Lanier appeared in the Supreme Court, Bronx County, before the Honorable Robert Neary (“trial court”), to accept a negotiated plea. The prosecution informed the trial court that after the parties had engaged in “very extensive plea negotiations,” Lanier had agreed to plead guilty to first-degree manslaughter, a class B violent felony offense, see N.Y. Pen. L. § 125.20, in exchange for a sentence of 20 years' incarceration and five years' post-release supervision. TP. at 2. Lanier also specifically agreed to waive his right to appeal. Id. The trial court confirmed with (1) defense counsel, that she and Lanier had discussed this offer, and (2) Lanier, that he understood the offer, which he confirmed by stating, “Yes.” Id. at 3. At this point in the proceedings, Lanier and defense counsel reviewed the waiver of the right to appeal form (the “waiver form”). Id.
After Lanier reviewed the waiver form, the trial court described the plea offer and asked Lanier whether he intended to accept it; Lanier affirmed that he did. Id. at 4. The trial court then asked Lanier, under oath, a series of questions to ensure that his plea was voluntary and that he understood that he was waiving many of his rights, including his right to appeal, id. at 5, 8. Lanier confirmed that his plea was voluntary. Id. at 5. Lanier also responded “Yes” when the trial court inquired: “Have you talked to your lawyer about waiving the right to appeal?” Id. at 8. Defense counsel then stated on the record that Lanier “ha[d] read the waiver of the right to appeal and . . . [was] executing [his] signature on [the] document.” Id. at 9. After Lanier and defense counsel signed the waiver form, the trial court stated to Lanier: “you now formally waive your right to appeal under indictment number 0967 of ‘14.” Id. After the trial court confirmed that Lanier was pleading guilty to first-degree manslaughter, allocuting him on the specific elements of the charge, the trial court asked Lanier if he had any questions for the trial court or the prosecution, noting that “[n]ow would be the last time to voice any objections.” Id. at 10. Lanier affirmed that he did not have any questions.
The trial court listed the other rights that Lanier would be waiving, including the right to a trial by jury and the right to have the prosecution prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. TP. at 6-7.
After the plea allocution, defense counsel stated on the record that the prosecution had offered the 20-year sentence approximately six months earlier, in April 2016, and she “continuously asked [the prosecution], on the advice of [Lanier's] family, on the advice of [Lanier], to see if the offer could ever come down.” Id. at 12. The prosecution had informed defense counsel during that six-month period that “it ha[d] always been the People's position that they would not come down from the 20 years flat.” Id. The trial court concurred, stating that defense counsel had been “steadfast in [her] argument on behalf of [Lanier] for reduction . . . [but] [i]t wasn't to be in this case ....” Id.
Defense counsel also noted that the trial court allowed time for her to speak with Lanier before he pleaded guilty. In response to Lanier's plea, the trial court stated: “I accept the plea knowingly and voluntarily entered into.” Id. A sentencing date was immediately scheduled without further discussion. Id. at 12-14.
C. Sentencing
On November 2, 2016, the parties appeared for Lanier's sentencing. The proceeding commenced with defense counsel taking “two minutes” to speak with Lanier, whom she had attempted to see before the sentencing, to no avail. TS. at 2. Defense counsel then stated that Lanier “d[id] not wish to be sentenced . . . [because] he want[ed] to withdraw his plea.” Id. at 3. The trial court summarily denied the request, stating that Lanier had “not put[ ] forward any legal reasons that he can't be sentenced so we are going to go ahead with the sentence.” Id. After the prosecution and two witnesses - Tony Burgess's sister and a close family friend of the Burgesses - spoke, defense counsel addressed the court. Id. at 9. She emphasized that because the plea was negotiated, she was asking the court “to impose the promised sentence” of 20 years. Id. She also stated, on behalf of Lanier, that because he believed “the time was too high,” he “want[ed] to withdraw his plea.” Id. When Lanier spoke, he reiterated defense counsel's argument that his desire to withdraw the plea hinged on the length of the negotiated sentence: “I just feel that you know this is a very harsh sentence, that's why I wanted to withdraw my plea.” Id. at 10.
Lanier also stated that he did not have access to “the correct documents,” which he did not describe. TP. at 10. In response, defense counsel explained that Lanier was referring to grand jury minutes - which had not been provided to her because he was pleading guilty. Id. at 11.
Finally, Lanier argued that he “didn't have too much of a time to decide because . . . [he] came to court October 4th, the 11th is when I had to make my decision,” to which the trial court responded: “I think you have had ample time. We went over that.” Id. at 10, 11. The court then sentenced Lanier to 20 years' incarceration and five years' post-release supervision. Id. at 12.
After sentencing Lanier and advising him of his right to appeal, the trial court emphasized that although under the plea agreement, he had waived his right to appeal, some rights could not be waived, “such as jurisdiction of the court, some things like that.” Id. at 13. The trial court also noted that “as far as the appeal . . . obviously, you did waive that, you plead[ed] guilty under oath and you indicated there was no pressure being applied, things like that.” Id.
D. Direct Appeal
With new counsel, Lanier appealed his conviction to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department on October 17, 2018. Pet. Br. at 28. Lanier raised two grounds for appeal: (1) Lanier's waiver of appeal was invalid because it was not knowingly and intelligently made; and (2) Lanier's 20-year sentence was excessive considering that Lanier did not have an extensive criminal record. See id. at 10-27.
Lanier presented four arguments to support the claim that his waiver of appeal was invalid. First, he argued that he did not seek to set aside his guilty plea, and a challenge to the appellate waiver should not affect the validity of the plea. See id. at 10. Second, he argued that he “lacked the knowledge and intelligence required to execute a valid waiver of his appellate rights,” asserting that trial counsel “only discussed the plea and waiver with [him] in the morning before he executed the plea,” id. at 12, and that her “advice to [him] was inadequate and insufficient to provide him with the requisite information to knowingly waive his appellate rights,” id. at 13. Third, Lanier argued that the trial court failed to “adequately inquire whether [Lanier] truly understood the consequences of the waiver” because the court did not specify which appellate rights he retained. Id. at 14. Lanier asserted that the trial court “was aware that [trial counsel] had taken little time to discuss the plea's repercussions with Mr. Lanier - namely that it would deprive him of his liberty for twenty years.” Id. Fourth, he argued that the trial court did not confirm with Lanier whether he understood the appellate waiver.
As for Lanier's second ground, that the 20-year sentence was excessive, he sought a modification of his sentence and argued that (1) the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors during sentencing; (2) his sentence deviated from sentences of similarly situated defendants; and (3) the sentence violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 17-27. With respect to the latter argument, the Eighth Amendment challenge, he generally reiterated his first two arguments, contending that “the trial court failed to balance the gravity of the offense with the harshness of the penalty,” and his sentence was inconsistent with New York State and federal sentences. Id. at 24-26.
Respondent argued in the appellate proceedings that Lanier knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to appeal, and that his sentence was fair and proper. Res. Br. at 8, 12. With respect to the validity of the waiver, Respondent contended that the trial court had described all the rights Lanier would waive by pleading guilty, including the right to appeal, and provided trial counsel and defendant time to discuss the waiver form. Id. at 9. Respondent cited to the language of the written waiver and claimed that it expressly explained that Lanier was waiving his right to challenge the excessiveness of his sentence. See Res. Br. at 10; see also id. at 5, n.2. Respondent also referred to trial counsel's statement that she had negotiated with the prosecution for six months, in an attempt to receive a more favorable offer. See id. at 11. Finally, Respondent argued that the bargain Lanier received - not facing a second-degree murder conviction, the first count of the indictment - necessarily showed that Lanier was intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily agreeing to the sentence he ultimately received. See id. at 12.
As to the alleged excessiveness of the 20-year sentence, Respondent argued against a modification of the sentence, noting that even though the Appellate Division had the “broad, plenary power” to do so, id., Lanier “received exactly what he bargained for: a very favorable disposition in light of the serious nature of his offenses.” Id. at 13. Respondent also contended that Lanier failed to argue in favor of leniency, as he did not show sufficient remorse or present evidence of mitigating factors arising from his family background. While Lanier had referred to cases in which the Appellate Division did modify sentences, Respondent argued that those cases were not analogous because they did not “involve[ ] a negotiated guilty plea with a waiver of appeal to Manslaughter in the First Degree on an indictment charging intentional murder [citations omitted].” Id. at 16. With respect to Lanier's Eighth Amendment challenge, Respondent argued that the claim was “meritless . . . [because] in general, a sentence of imprisonment within statutory limits is not cruel and unusual punishment [citations omitted].” Id. at 18.
In its decision affirming Lanier's conviction, the Appellate Division determined that the 20-year sentence was not excessive. People v. Lanier, 173 A.D.3d 416, 416 (1st Dep't 2019). The Court of Appeals denied Lanier's application seeking leave to appeal. 35 N.Y.3d 1027 (2020).
E. Section 2254 Petition
On September 14, 2021, Lanier filed his habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. See Lanier v. Capra, No. 21-CV-5221 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2021). That court transferred the petition to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on September 24, 2021, which received the case on November 10, 2021. Dkt. No. 4. By order of reference dated December 3, 2021, this matter was referred to me for a report and recommendation. Dkt. Nos. 10, 11.
In his petition, Lanier, proceeding Pro se, raises the same two grounds he raised in his direct appeal: (1) his appellate waiver was invalid because “it was not done knowingly,” Dkt. No. 1 at 5, and (2) his sentence “was excessive in light of [m]itigating factors,” id. at 6. With respect to his challenge to his appellate waiver, Lanier expressly states that he is not challenging the validity of the plea. See id. at 5 (“[c]hallenging the validity of an Appellate of right [sic] not affect the validity of a plea”).
On January 31, 2022, Respondent filed an opposition to the petition, arguing that (1) Lanier's appellate waiver claim is moot because the Appellate Division reached the merits of Lanier's excessive sentence ground, and (2) the excessive sentence ground is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Dkt. No. 13. On February 22, 2022, Lanier filed a reply to Respondent's opposition, repeating the arguments raised in his petition. Dkt. No. 15.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards for Habeas Corpus Relief Under Section 2254 1. Standard of Review under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)
The AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Jones v. Murphy, 694 F.3d 225, 234 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 66 (2011)). Under the AEDPA, federal courts may only grant a habeas petition if the challenged state court decision was (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” at the time of the state court decision, or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
2. Pro Se Status
A petitioner bears the burden to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his constitutional rights have been violated. See, e.g., Cardoza v. Rock, 731 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2013). However, the submissions of a Pro se petitioner are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See, e.g., Davis v. Walsh, 08-CV-4659 (PKC), 2015 WL 1809048, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2015) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Courts must liberally construe a “pro se petition ‘to raise the strongest arguments' it suggests.” Id. (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 472 (2d Cir. 2006)). Pro se status, however, “does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Triestman, 470 F.3d at 477 (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)).
B. Analysis
1. Waiver of Right to Appeal
Lanier challenges the validity of his appellate waiver, claiming that at the time he signed the appellate waiver form, he did not understand that he had waived his right to appeal his sentence. I recommend denying this claim as moot.
“The hallmark of a moot case or controversy is that the relief sought can no longer be given or is no longer needed.” Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 702 F.2d 380, 386 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)). The mootness doctrine, which derives from the case or controversy requirement under Article III, Section 2, of the United States Constitution, id., prohibits federal courts from issuing advisory opinions in cases that do not require resolution of a dispute, Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (mootness doctrine derived from Article III's prohibition on issuing advisory opinions).
In the context of a habeas petition challenging the validity of an appellate waiver, such a claim does “not present a basis for habeas relief . . . and [is] . . . moot,” where the state appellate court does not enforce the waiver and proceeds to adjudicate the appeal. Jacob v. Capra, No. 13-CV-4586 (RJD), 2016 WL 5349783, *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2016) (declining to address appellate waiver claims because state appellate court had concluded that appellate waiver was unenforceable, permitting the appellate court to adjudicate the other claims).
Lanier's challenge to his appellate waiver is moot because the Appellate Division reached the merits of his excessive sentence ground and did not apply the appellate waiver. Had it applied the waiver, it would not have reached the merits of the excessive sentence ground. See, e.g., Spikes v. Graham, No. 9:07-CV-1129 (DNH) (GHL), 2010 WL 4005044, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. July 14, 2010) (“The Appellate Division found that Petitioner's excessive sentence claim was barred by the waiver of appeal and, as a result, did not reach the substantive merits of that claim. Therefore, Petitioner's claim regarding his waiver of appeal is not entirely moot.”), adopted by, 2010 WL 3999474 (Oct. 12, 2010).
The sole reason Lanier challenges his appellate waiver - to seek a ruling that it is invalid and therefore unenforceable - is baseless as the Appellate Division did not apply the waiver and considered his request for modification. Because a ruling with respect to the validity of the appellate waiver is no longer required, the claim is moot.
2. Excessive Sentence
Petitioner challenges his sentence as excessive, claiming that it is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. However, the term of a sentence is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment if the sentence falls within the applicable statutory range. See White v. Keane, 969 F.2d 1381, 1383 (2d Cir. 1992) (“No federal constitutional issue is presented where . . . the sentence is within the range prescribed by state law.”). The Eighth Amendment “forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.” United States v. Bullock, 550 F.3d 247, 252 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 960 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Lanier pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter - a class B violent felony, see N.Y. Pen. L § 70.02(1)(a) (listing first-degree manslaughter as a class B violent felony) - pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, with a promised sentence of 20 years' incarceration and five years' post-release supervision. This sentence falls within the New York Penal Law's statutory range. Under § 60.05(3), “every person convicted of a class B violent felony offense . . . must be sentenced to imprisonment in accordance with such section 70.02,” which provides that such a sentence “must be at least five years and must not exceed twenty-five years.” Id. A period of two-and-one-half to five years' post-release supervision also must be imposed. See § 70.00(6); § 70.45(2)(f) (fixing post-release supervision term for determinate sentences imposed under § 70.02).
At sentencing, defense counsel asked the trial court to sentence Lanier in accordance with the negotiated plea agreement, and the trial court did exactly that, sentencing him to 20 years' incarceration, followed by five years' post-release supervision. Because this sentence is within the statutory range for first-degree manslaughter, Lanier does not present a constitutional claim. See White, 969 F.2d at 1383. Any suggestion that the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment is therefore without merit.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that Lanier's petition for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.
PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file any objections (plus three days because the Report is being mailed to Petitioner). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a). A party may respond to any objections within fourteen (14) days after being served. Subject objections, and any responses to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Alison J. Nathan at the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York 10007, and to the chambers of the undersigned at the same address. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Nathan.
FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).
If Lanier does not have access to cases cited herein that are reported on LexisNexis or Westlaw, he should request copies from counsel for the Respondent. See Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2009); Local Civil Rule 7.2, Local Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York.