Opinion
C/A 5:21-00811-TMC-KDW
10-18-2021
Chad Edwin Langford, Plaintiff, v. Hector Joynor, Warden at FCI Estill; FNU LNU, FCI Estill, Asst. Health Services Administrator; Ms. FNU Chambers; Ms. FNU Boatright; Ms FNU Lloyd; Mr FNU Midock; John Doe, employee at FCI Estill in his individual capacity; Richard Doe, employee of FCI Estill in his individual capacity; and Richard Roe, employee of FCI Estill in his individual capacity, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kaymani D. West United States Magistrate Judge
Chad Edwin Langford, Plaintiff, is a federal inmate currently housed at the United States Penitentiary in Oxford, Wisconsin. Mr. Langford brings this action alleging claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights. This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, filed on July 6, 2021. Plaintiff filed a Response to the Motion on August 3, 2021. ECF No. 13. Defendants filed a Reply on August 10, 2021. ECF No. 14. This matter is now ripe for review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C, which provides for all pretrial proceedings in certain types of matters be referred to a United States Magistrate Judge. Because Defendants' Motion is dispositive, the undersigned enters this Report (“R&R”) for the district judge's consideration.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on March 19, 2021, and brought a single cause of action against multiple Defendants related to his medical care while he was housed at FCI Estill. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him timely and appropriate treatment for an “an acute abdominal catastrophe with sepsis and peritonitis cause by multiple intra-abdominal abscesses due to a small bowel obstruction with multiple small bowel perforations.” Id. at ¶ 1. As a result, Plaintiff claims to have suffered “excruciating pain, was hospitalized at HRMC for seven weeks, and suffered permanent injury.” Id.
In the Factual Allegations section of his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on March 20, 2018, he was transported from FCI Estill to Hampton Regional Medical Center (“HRMC”) while suffering from abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. Id. at ¶ 6. He further represents that he was seen in the emergency room for medical evaluation and testing which was found to be “unmarkable” by HRMC staff. Id. So, he was returned to FCI Estill. Id. Plaintiff maintains his condition worsened upon his return to FCI Estill and became an “acute medical emergency” on March 28, 2018. Id. at ¶ 7. He alleges that he remained at FCI Estill from March 20, 2018, until his admission to HRMC on March 28, 2018 for emergency surgery. Id. at ¶ 8.
Plaintiff represents that during that time, he “continually brought to the attention of the Defendants, and other members of FCI Estill staff, whose identities are unknown, that his condition was worsening, that he was suffering acute and excruciating pain and feared he was dying.” Id. He maintains that during these nine days, he could barely walk, was assisted by other inmates, used a wheelchair, and was brought to FCI Estill medical offices where he sought treatment. Id. at ¶ 9. He alleges that each time he was brought to the medical area, he waited for “as long as he was allowed to do so, ” but was refused treatment or even an examination of his physical condition. Id. Plaintiff represents he was denied consultation or treatment even though “his worsening medical condition was obvious from his physical appearance.” Id. Plaintiff represents when he was not in the waiting area at the medical offices, he “spent most of [his time] immobile in the showers because of his uncontrollable diarrhea.” Id.
Plaintiff brings one cause of action against Defendants for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment constitutional rights. Id. at ¶¶ 12-17. He seeks actual, incidental, and consequential damages, a jury trial, and other further relief the court deems just and proper. Id. at ¶ 17.
II. Standard of Review
Defendants have moved to dismiss this action based on Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenge is raised to the factual basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction is on the plaintiff. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. U.S., 945 F.2d 765, 768 (1991). “In determining whether jurisdiction exists, the district court is to regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Id. The district court should apply the standard applicable to a motion for summary judgment, under which the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts beyond the pleadings to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. The moving party should prevail only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Id.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (quoting Bell Alt. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This court is “not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Indeed, “[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support [the legal conclusion].” Young v. City of Mount Rainier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001). If matters outside the pleadings, such as affidavits, are considered by the court in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, then the motion to dismiss converts to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wilson-Cook Med., Inc. v. Wilson, 942 F.2d. 247, 251 (4th Cir. 1991).
III. Analysis
a. Failure to allege sufficient personal knowledge by Defendants
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's purported claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient personal knowledge by Defendants. See ECF No. 9 at 3-7. They argue that the Complaint is completely devoid of any allegations of personal wrongdoing by the individual Defendants. Id. at 7. Further, they indicate that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating personal involvement as to each of the individual Defendants. Id. Defendants maintain that Plaintiff failed to specify what actions or inactions by any of the Defendants violated his rights. Id.
In Response, Plaintiff argues his Complaint contains “sufficient detail to show a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits that his claim against the individual federal officers based on those officers' acts or omissions led to [his] Eighth Amendment [r]ights being violated.” ECF No. 13 at 4. Further, he argues he has alleged he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment while in the custody of the United States Bureau of Prison (“BOP”) by each of the named Defendants, all of whom are employed by FCI Estill. Id. (citing Compl. ¶¶ 7-14). Additionally, Plaintiff maintains he has brought claims against the federal officers in their individual capacities, and each named defendant was directly connected to his lack of necessary medical treatment, and the claims asserted that resulted from their “own acts or omissions.” Id.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that complaints shall contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The purpose behind Rule 8 is to give the defendant fair notice of the claims and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Further, the plaintiff is obligated to provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . .” Id. The factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Twombly Court noted that defendants will not know how to respond to conclusory allegations, especially when “the pleadings mentioned no specific time, place, or person involved in the alleged conspiracies.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10. However, Twombly did not expressly hold that a plaintiff must assert specific time, place, and persons involved in order to comply with Rule 8. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal Twombly citation omitted) (“As the Court held in Twombly, [] the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”); Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, 592 F.3d 314, 325 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding the Twombly court noted, in dicta, that the pleadings there mentioned no specific time, place, or person involved in the alleged conspiracies and rejected defendants' argument that Twombly requires a plaintiff identify the specific time, place, or person related to each conspiracy allegation); Milliken & Co. v. CNA Holdings, Inc., 3:08-CV-578-RV, 2011 WL 3444013, at *5 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 8, 2011) (finding other courts have held a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss even though he fails to answer who, what, when and where).
The government is “obligat[ed] to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). This obligation arises from an inmate's complete dependence upon prison medical staff to provide essential medical service. Id. To state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim for medical indifference or indifference to inmate safety against a governmental actor, a prisoner must demonstrate that a sufficiently serious deprivation occurred resulting “in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, ” and that the prison employee had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal citation omitted). “Eighth Amendment analysis necessitates inquiry as to [(1)] whether the prison official[s] acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective component) and [(2)] whether the . . . injury inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious (objective component).” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-10 (1992) (discussing subjective and objective components). With respect to medical and health needs, a prisoner must show deliberate indifference to a serious need. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1977). At the threshold, a complaint of deliberate indifference must disclose an objective injury or inattention to serious medical need. See, e.g., Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 1995); Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375 (4th Cir. 1993). Additionally, deliberate indifference involves a subjective component which the Supreme Court has termed a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” on the part of defendants. Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 1998).
The Fourth Circuit has held that to bring a denial of medical treatment claim against non-medical prison personnel, an inmate must show that such officials were personally involved with a denial of treatment, deliberately interfered with prison doctors' treatment, or tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians' misconduct. Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1990). Prison personnel may rely on the opinion of the medical staff as to the proper course of treatment. Id.
Here, Plaintiff has indeed made broad allegations against Defendants in a collective fashion. However, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's Complaint contains facts that, if true, demonstrate Defendants knew of and disregarded Plaintiff's serious medical needs. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges:
From the time of his return to FCI Estill on March 20, 2018, until his admission to HRMC on March 28, 2018 for emergency surgery, Langford continually brought to the attention of the Defendants, and other members of FCI Estill staff, whose identities are unknown, that his condition was worsening, that he was suffering acute and excruciating pain and feared he was dying.ECF No. 1 at ¶ 8. Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants refused to provide him medical treatment on several occasions. See Id. at ¶¶ 9-11. Though the allegations group the Defendants, Plaintiff has at least alleged that FCI Estill officials were personally involved with a denial of his medical treatment. Therefore, at this early stage of litigation, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss based on Rule 8 pleading requirements be denied.
b. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 9 at 7-9. In response, Plaintiff argues that he has alleged Defendants clearly failed to provide him with proper medical care, a violation his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. ECF No. 13 at 6. He further maintains that his need for medical attention was clearly established by his worsening medical condition. Id. So, he argues that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity as they clearly violated his constitutional rights. Id.
Based on the undersigned's above recommendation, the Motion to Dismiss based on qualified immunity should likewise be denied because Plaintiff's allegations do state a plausible claim for relief. The inquiry under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) does not change where a claim of qualified immunity is asserted. See Turner v. Thomas, 930 F.3d 640, 642-44 (4th Cir. 2019); Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 353 (4th Cir. 2014). When a qualified immunity defense is asserted at the Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) stage, “the defense faces a formidable hurdle and is usually not successful” because all the plaintiff has to do is state a plausible claim. See Owens v. Baltimore City States' Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 396 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted); see also Raub v. Bowen, 960 F.Supp.2d 602, 613-14 (E.D. Va. 2013) (recognizing that summary judgment is the typical “vehicle to resolve qualified immunity”); Quigley v. City of Huntington, W.V., 2017 WL 4998647, *6 (S.D.W.V. Nov. 2, 2017) (denying Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on qualified immunity where facts alleged plausibly established arrest without probable cause).
Because Defendants have asserted qualified immunity, the court must inquire whether Plaintiff has “plead[ed] factual matter that, if taken as true, states a claim that [Defendants] deprived him of his clearly established constitutional rights.” Massey, 759 F.3d at 353 (citation omitted) (first alteration in original). The qualified immunity analysis requires two steps. First, Plaintiff must allege facts that make out a violation of a constitutional right. See Id. at 353-54. Second, the constitutional right at issue must have been clearly established at the time of the alleged violation of that right. See Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)) (setting out the two-step analysis).
As explained above, Plaintiff has alleged a plausible claim that his constitutional rights were violated. Further, it was alleged that Plaintiffs right to receive medical attention was clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation. Thus, the undersigned recommends that Defendants not be granted qualified immunity at this time. Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss based on qualified immunity be denied.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, be denied.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”