Opinion
Civil Action No. 6:20-cv-00759-BHH-JDA
04-13-2020
Robert Lang, Plaintiff, v. Furman University, Robert Bierly, Lisa Knight, Alex Francis-Ratte, Katherine Palmer Kaup, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. [Doc. 7.] Plaintiff alleges violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), based on sex discrimination and retaliation, as well as state law claims for defamation and civil conspiracy. [Doc. 10.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.
Plaintiff brought suit in the Greenville County Court of Common Pleas on January 2, 2020. [Doc. 1-1.] Defendants removed the case to this Court on February 18, 2020, and filed a motion to dismiss the civil conspiracy claim for failure to state a claim on February 25, 2020. [Docs. 1; 7.] Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on March 11, 2020, and a response opposing Defendants' partial motion to dismiss on March 27, 2020. [Docs. 10; 18.] Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff's response on April 3, 2020. [Doc. 20.] Accordingly, the motion is ripe for review.
Although Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint after Defendants filed their motion to dismiss the conspiracy claim, this Court considered the motion to be addressed to the Amended Complaint and directed Plaintiff to respond to the motion to dismiss. [Doc. 12.]
BACKGROUND
The Background section is a summary of the allegations contained in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, which the Court accepts as true in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
Defendant Furman University ("Furman") is a private university located in Greenville, South Carolina. [Doc. 10 ¶¶ 3, 8.] At the time at issue, Plaintiff was a 40-year-old Asian male employed by Furman in its Academic Affairs Division, Asian Studies Department as a Programs Coordinator. [Id. ¶ 14.] Defendant Bierly was Furman's Assistant Vice-President for Human Resources. [Id. ¶ 4.] Defendant Knight was a Professor of Religion, Asian Studies, and Anthropology, and she became Department Chair of Furman's Department for Asian Studies on or about August 1, 2018. [Id. ¶ 5.] Defendants Kaup and Francis-Ratte were both James B. Duke Professors of Asian Studies and Politics and International Affairs. [Id. ¶¶ 6, 7.]
Plaintiff alleges that "as early as mid-March, 2018, . . . Francis-Ratte, Kaup, and Knight were coordinating and conspiring with guidance from . . . Bierly to try to influence Plaintiff's supervisor to give him a bad initial review so that they could get him fired." [Id. ¶ 15.] Then, after Plaintiff opposed a comment from Francis-Ratte that Plaintiff considered to be sexist, "Francis-Ratte began a campaign of complaining about every little mistake, shortcoming or slight" from Plaintiff that she perceived and she "joined the other individual Defendants in [t]his quest." [Id. ¶ 17.] "[I]n or around late June, early July 2018, Francis-Ratte also made a bad faith complaint about Plaintiff to upper management and without following the chain of command." [Id.] Additionally, Knight, before becoming Department Head, and therefore becoming Plaintiff's supervisor, met with Bierly in July 2018 "to draft a performance improvement plan for items that had already been addressed" by Plaintiff's supervisor with Plaintiff at Plaintiff's annual review in May 2018. [Id. ¶¶ 19, 20.]
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint contains two paragraphs numbered 19 and 20. [Doc. 10 at 5, 6.] This citation is to the first paragraphs 19 and 20.
After becoming Department Head on August 1, 2018, Knight placed Plaintiff on the performance improvement plan she had created "with guidance from . . . Bierly, and in combination with" Francis-Ratte and Kaup. [Id. ¶ 21.] Plaintiff completed the plan without incident; however, Knight "unilaterally" extended it. [Id. ¶¶ 19-20.] Then on February 18, 2019, "Plaintiff was 'suspended' for a fabricated issue that was set-up by . . . Knight, in conjunction with . . . Kaup and Bierly." [Id. ¶ 21.] And, on March 1, 2019, Furman's University Police came to Plaintiff's house, "demanded that he agree to have 'no contact' with any Furman employee," and "purport[ed] to prevent him from being at any 'Furman University employee's employment, residence, . . . or any other place that they may be at.'" [Id.] Furman terminated Plaintiff on March 8, 2019. [Id. ¶ 22.] Even after the termination, Bierly, Knight and Furman claimed falsely that Plaintiff had " violated the law and University policy in preparing for a faculty event he was set up for by . . . Kaup and Knight." [Id. ¶ 23.]
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint contains two paragraphs numbered 21. [Doc. 10 at 5, 6.] This citation is to the first paragraph 21.
As stated, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint contains two paragraphs numbered 19 and 20. This citation is to the second paragraphs 19 and 20.
As stated, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint contains two paragraphs numbered 21. This citation is to the second paragraph 21.
Before instituting this action, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission based on the allegations set out above. [Id. ¶ 28.] Plaintiff received his Notice of Right to Sue and initiated the present action. [Id. ¶ 29.]
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint contains two paragraphs numbered 28. [Doc. 10 at 8-9.] This citation is to the second paragraph 28.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Title VII claims for gender/sex discrimination and retaliation [id. ¶¶ 11-38], as well as state-law claims for defamation and civil conspiracy [id. ¶¶ 39-46]. He demands compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and reinstatement. [Id. at 13-15 ¶¶ A-M.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Motion to Dismiss Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should "accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court "need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts" nor "accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may rely on only the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
With respect to well-pleaded allegations, the United States Supreme Court explained the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citations omitted); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) ("[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than a bare averment that the pleader wants compensation and is entitled to it or a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action.").
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)—the pleader must plead sufficient facts to show he is entitled to relief, not merely facts consistent with the defendant's liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief."'" (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). Accordingly, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's civil conspiracy cause of action fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The Court agrees.
To be successful on a claim of civil conspiracy in South Carolina, the plaintiff must show (1) a combination of two or more persons; (2) for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff; (3) causing the plaintiff special damages. Vaught v. Waites, 387 S.E.2d 91, 95 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989). "A claim for civil conspiracy must allege additional acts in furtherance of a conspiracy rather than reallege other claims within the complaint." Hackworth v. Greywood at Hammett, LLC, 682 S.E.2d 871, 874 (S.C. 2009). Stated differently, the acts pled in furtherance of the conspiracy must be "separate and independent from other wrongful acts alleged in the complaint, and the failure to properly plead such acts will merit the dismissal of the claim." Id. at 875. "Moreover, because the quiddity of a civil conspiracy claim is the special damage resulting to the plaintiff, the damages alleged must go beyond the damages alleged in other causes of action." Id. at 874. "If a plaintiff merely repeats the damages from another claim instead of specifically listing special damages as part of [his] civil conspiracy claim, the[] conspiracy claim should be dismissed." Id. at 875.
Additionally, under South Carolina law, "a civil conspiracy claim by an at-will employee against an employer arising out of the employee's termination" is barred by the at-will employment doctrine. Faile v. Lancaster Cty., No. 0:11-2206-CMC, 2013 WL 786447, at *4-5 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2013) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that his claim was not barred because "his 'allegations of civil conspiracy go beyond the termination'" because plaintiff "alleged a claim for civil conspiracy . . . for 'engaging in a campaign to have him terminated from his employment'"); see also Angus v. Burroughs & Chapin Co., 596 S.E.2d 67 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that an at-will employee could not maintain a conspiracy action against a former employer or its agents arising out of the employee's termination), rev'd on other grounds, 628 S.E.2d 261, 262 (S.C. 2006); Ross v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 259 S.E.2d 814, 815 (S.C. 1979) ("South Carolina has embraced the general rule that [an at-will employment contract] may be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason at all. Therefore, [the employee-plaintiff's] allegations of conspiracy fail to state a cause of action.").
Here, Plaintiff's conspiracy claim fails because Plaintiff has not identified concrete acts that are independent of any other alleged wrongdoing. Rather, Plaintiff bases his civil conspiracy claim on the same alleged actions that serve as the basis for his other causes of action. [See Doc. 10 ¶¶ 44-46.] Additionally, Plaintiff has not alleged special damages from the alleged conspiracy, but instead has alleged only that, like the alleged false statements that formed the basis for his defamation claim, the conspiracy caused his termination and the injuries that flowed from it. [See, e.g., id. ¶ 40 (alleging that defamation caused him "damages to his reputation, self-esteem, [and] loss of wages").] Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Court grant Defendants' motion to dismiss the civil conspiracy claim.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim is barred by the at-will employment doctrine. [Doc. 7-1 at 6-7.] In response, Plaintiff admits that his conspiracy claim is barred by the doctrine to the extent that Furman is named as a defendant, but he contends that the at-will employment doctrine does not bar his conspiracy claim is as against the individual defendants. [Doc. 18 at 8.] In support of this position, Plaintiff contends only that "[n]either [he] nor any of the Defendants are a public institution or 'public officials.'" [Id.] However, as Defendants point out, this Court has not limited the doctrine to situations where the defendant is a public institution or the plaintiff is a public official. See, e.g., Smith v. Palmetto Denture Care, P.A., No. 7:17-cv-1043-AMQ-KFM, 2018 WL 3611368, at *6 (D.S.C. July 27, 2018).
The Court notes that Defendants also argue that Plaintiff's conspiracy claim is barred by the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine [Doc. 7-1 at 5-6], but because the Court has concluded that Plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim fails for the aforementioned reasons, the Court declines to address this issue.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim [Doc. 7] be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge April 13, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina