Opinion
2023 CA 0005
09-11-2023
BRENTY[1] LANDRY v. THOMAS P. GUDAN
Ashly Van Earl Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Brent Landty Karen Hayes Green Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant-Appellee Susan Baham, Executrix for the Estate of Thomas P. Gudan
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ON APPEAL FROM THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE, STATE OF LOUISIANA NUMBER C715212, SECTION 24 HONORABLE DONALD R. JOHNSON, JUDGE
Ashly Van Earl Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Brent Landty
Karen Hayes Green Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant-Appellee Susan Baham, Executrix for the Estate of Thomas P. Gudan
BEFORE: THERIOT, CHUTZ, AND HESTER, JJ.
CHUTZ, J.
Plaintiff, Brent Landry, appeals a trial court judgment sustaining a peremptory exception raising the objections of no cause and no right of action and dismissing his suit for damages with prejudice. We reverse and remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 20, 2022, plaintiff filed suit against Thomas P. Gudan (hereinafter "defendant") alleging they had entered into an oral agreement for the "Lease Purchase" of a house owned by defendant at 9685 S. Riveroaks Avenue in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Plaintiff alleged they agreed he "would make the monthly mortgage payments directly to the mortgage company and upon the mortgage being satisfied the property would be transferred to his [plaintiffs] name." According to plaintiff, he agreed in exchange not only to make the mortgage payments but to also provide housing and caretaker services to Barbara Gudan, defendant's estranged wife, and her mother.
Plaintiff alleged he peacefully resided in the house for a significant time, then "in 2021 [,] Defendant attempted to unilaterally revise the prior agreement by demanding a higher monthly rate than Plaintiff had been paying [and] began threatening to evict [Plaintiff] and sell the house if Plaintiff did not comply." Plaintiff maintained he has "invested monies into the upkeep, improvements, and equity of the home," and he would not have performed "significant improvements and remodeling" of the house if not for defendant's oral agreement to transfer ownership of the house to him. Plaintiff claimed he was "entitled to the continued peaceful enjoyment of the home and eventual ownership." Alternatively, plaintiff claimed he was "entitled to reimbursement of all monies that he invested into the property and other damages that will be shown at trial."
Defendant filed an answer denying plaintiffs allegations and peremptory exceptions raising objections of no cause of action and no right of action.Defendant argued plaintiff had no cause or right of action for damages because he had not pled the existence of a written agreement to sell immovable property or a confession by defendant under oath of such an agreement, as required for the transfer of immovable property or the promise to sell immovable property. Following a hearing, the trial court signed a judgment on May 19, 2022, sustaining the exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action. The trial court allowed plaintiff an opportunity to amend his petition to state a cause of action and right of action.
Defendant, Thomas P. Gudan, appeared in this suit exclusively through his agent and attomeyin-fact, Susan Baham. Further, during the pendency of this appeal, Ms. Baham filed a motion to substitute for Mr. Gudan on behalf of his estate, averring that Mr. Gudan died on January 13, 2023, she was his sole legatee, and she was appointed the independent executrix of his estate. In support of her motion, Ms. Baham attached "Letters of Independent Executorship" signed on January 20, 2023, by the 24th Judicial District Court. On March 31, 2023, this court signed an order granting Ms. Baham's motion to substitute for Mr. Gudan as the legal successor and representative of his estate pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 801(2).
Mr. Gudan also raised other exceptions not relevant to this appeal.
On July 27, 2022, plaintiff filed an amended petition in which he reiterated the allegations of his original petition and further alleged his caretaker duties pursuant to his agreement with defendant included ensuring the daily needs (doctor appointments, groceries, errands, transportation, etc.) of defendant's wife, Barbara Gudan, and his mother-in-law were met. Additionally, plaintiff alleged he made all mortgage payments on the house since the inception of the agreement with defendant and has thereby reduced the amount of the mortgage payoff on the house. He contends he "detrimentally relied upon Defendants prior statements and agreements and in addition to the mortgage payments has made significant investments into the property and invested time and effort as caretaker to [Defendant's wife and mother-in-law], without compensation, which will unjustifiably enrich the Defendant."
Plaintiff also added Barbara Gudan as a defendant in the amended petition, but made no specific allegations concerning her.
Subsequently, on August 15, 2022, defendant filed a "Motion and Order for Dismissal With Prejudice" asserting plaintiffs amended petition still failed to state a cause of action or right of action given the absence of any allegation that there was a written agreement between the parties to sell the property. On August 16, 2022, without holding a hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion and signed a judgment dismissing plaintiffs suit with prejudice. Plaintiff filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. On November 14, 2022, plaintiff filed a motion for suspensive appeal, which the trial court granted. In four assignments of error, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in granting defendant's exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action, in dismissing the entirety of his suit, and in denying his motion for new trial.
APPEALABILITY
This court ex proprio motu issued a rule to show cause whether this appeal should be dismissed as untimely. Specifically, it appeared plaintiffs motion for new trial may not have been filed within the delays provided by La. C.C.P. art. 1974. If the motion for new trial was untimely, plaintiffs November 14, 2022 motion for appeal of the trial court's judgment would also be untimely. A suspensive appeal may be taken within thirty days and a devolutive appeal within sixty days of the following: (1) the expiration of the delay for applying for a new trial, if no application has been filed timely; or (2) the date of the mailing of notice of the court's refusal to grant a timely application for a new trial. La. C.C.P. arts. 2087(A) &2123(A). The delay for applying for a new trial is seven days, exclusive of legal holidays, with the delay commencing to run on the day after the clerk has mailed the notice of judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 1974. Once the seven-day period for filing a motion for new trial has passed with no motion for new trial being filed, appeal delays begin to run. Nelson v. Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana, 10-1190 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/11/11), 57 So.3d 587, 589-90. Moreover, the untimely filing of a motion for new trial does not interrupt the delay for timely taking an appeal even if the trial court does not recognize the motion as untimely. Nelson, 57 So.3d at 590. If a party does not receive proper notice of judgment, however, the new trial and appeal delays from that judgment never begin to run. See Duncan v. Gauthier, 21-0220 (La.App. 1st Cir. 10/28/21), 332 So.3d 1191, 1197.
In this case, notice of the trial court's August 16, 2022 judgment was purportedly issued on August 19, 2022. Plaintiffs counsel, however, denied ever receiving notice of judgment and argued it was never properly issued. The timeliness of plaintiffs November 14, 2022 motion for appeal is dependent upon whether notice of judgment was actually issued on August 19, 2022. If so, this appeal is untimely whereas it would be timely if proper notice of judgment was never issued.
If notice of judgment was issued on August 19, 2022, the new trial delays expired on August 30, 2022. In that case, plaintiffs September 8, 2022 motion for new trial was untimely and did not prevent appeal delays from beginning to run on August 30, 2022, upon the expiration of the new trial delays. The last day of the sixty-day appeal delays would then have fallen on Saturday, October 29, 2022, a legal holiday, which would have given plaintiff until Monday, October 31, 2022, to file a timely devolutive appeal. Thus, the motion for appeal plaintiff filed on November 14, 2022, would be untimely, regardless of whether a suspensive or devolutive appeal was taken, the thirty-day appeal delays for a suspensive appeal having already expired earlier.
On May 3, 2023, this court issued an Interim Order remanding this matter to the trial court for the sole purpose of instructing the trial court to hold a hearing to determine whether notice of the court's August 16, 2022 judgment was issued to plaintiff and/or his counsel and, if so, on what date it was issued. On July 12, 2023, the trial court supplemented the appellate record with its ruling determining that notice of judgment was never issued to plaintiff and/or his counsel. In view of the trial court's factual determination that proper notice of judgment was not issued, appeal delays never began tolling and both plaintiffs motion for new trial and his motion for appeal were timely. Accordingly, the rule to show cause issued by this court is recalled, and this appeal is maintained.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in concluding he failed to state a cause of action on the grounds that he did not allege there was a written agreement to sell or transfer the immovable property. Although La. C.C. art. 1839 generally requires the transfer of immovable property to be by authentic act or by act under private signature, plaintiff points out the article provides an oral transfer is valid if the property has been delivered and the transferor recognizes the transfer under oath. Plaintiff argues his petition states a cause of action because the exception provided in Article 1839 is applicable to his agreement with defendant, which involved an oral promise to transfer immovable property, and he should be given an opportunity at trial to interrogate witnesses regarding the oral agreement. Plaintiff argues the trial court also erred in dismissing the entirety of his suit without taking any evidence or considering alternative claims raised by his petition for damages.
Initially, we reject plaintiffs argument that the trial court erred in dismissing his suit without taking evidence. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 931 specifically provides no evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the objection that a petition fails to state a cause of action. The peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action is triable on the face of the petition and tests the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the pleading. All well-pleaded allegations of fact are accepted as true. The issue is whether, on the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought. Labranche v. Landry, 22-0461 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/15/22), 357 So.3d 395, 403. The exceptor bears the burden of proof, and every reasonable interpretation must be accorded the language used in the petition in favor of maintaining its sufficiency. Id. On appeal, appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review because the exception of no cause of action raises a question of law. The pertinent question is whether, in the light most favorable to plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in plaintiffs behalf, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief. Wederstrandt v. Koi, 22-01570 (La. 6/27/23), 366 So.3d 47, 51.
Our review of plaintiffs original and amended petitions reveals they fail to state a cause of action for the breach of an agreement or promise to sell or transfer immovable property to plaintiff. Louisiana Civil Code article 2623 provides that "[a]n agreement whereby one party promises to sell and the other promises to buy a thing at a later time, or upon the happening of a condition, or upon performance of some obligation by either party ... must... meet the formal requirements of the sale it contemplates." We find no merit in plaintiffs argument that he can state a cause of action for breach of an agreement to transfer immovable property without the necessity of a written agreement. The courts of this state have consistently held that since La. C.C. art. 1839 generally requires a transfer of immovable property to be by authentic act or by act under private signature, an oral promise to sell or transfer immovable property is unenforceable. See Rumore v. Rodrigue, 15-0282 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/23/15), 2015 WL 9435213, at *3 (unpublished), writ denied, 16-0155 (La. 3/24/16), 190 So.3d 1191; John W. Stone Oil Distributor, L.L.C. v. River Oaks Contractors &Developers, Inc., 07-1001 (La.App. 5th Cir. 5/27/08), 986 So.2d 103, 108-09, writ denied. 08-1397 (La. 9/26/08), 992 So.2d 992; see also Bourgeois v. Franklin, 389 So.2d 358, 361 n.5 (La. 1980).
In this case, plaintiff alleged he had an oral agreement with defendant for the future transfer of the immovable property. Plaintiff did not allege in his original or amended petition either that a written agreement existed or that defendant had confessed under oath the existence of the alleged oral agreement to transfer immovable property. We find no merit in plaintiffs argument that he should be given an opportunity to interrogate other witnesses to establish the existence of the oral agreement with defendant. Article 1839 provides an exception to the writing requirement for a transfer of immovable property only in instances where "the transferor" himself "recognizes the transfer when interrogated on oath." Thus, because an oral agreement to sell or transfer immovable property is unenforceable, plaintiffs petitions fail to state a cause of action for breach of the alleged agreement by defendant to sell or transfer immovable property to plaintiff. See Rumore, 2015 WL 9435213, at *3; John W. Stone Oil Distributor, L.L.C., 986 So.2dat 108-09.
Nevertheless, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in dismissing the entirety of his suit without first considering his other claims against defendant. In particular, plaintiff contends his petitions state causes of action for detrimental reliance and unjust enrichment since his oral agreement with defendant led him to make significant investments in and improvements to defendant's property and to invest time and effort performing services as caretaker for defendant's wife and mother-in-law without receiving any compensation.
Three elements are required to establish a detrimental reliance claim: (1) a representation by conduct or word; (2) justifiable reliance; and (3) a change in position to one's detriment because of the reliance. La. C.C. art. 1967; Luther v. IOM Co. LLC, 13-0353 (La. 10/15/13), 130 So.3d 817, 825. This court has previously held, however, that the principles of detrimental reliance are not applicable where the promise to sell or transfer property relied upon by the plaintiff was not in writing. Rumore, 2015 WL 9435213, at *4 n.13; see also John W. Stone Oil Distributor, L.L.C., 986 So.2d at 108-09. Absent fraud, or at least affirmative misrepresentations by the defendant as to the necessity of a writing, both the Louisiana Supreme Court and this court have recognized it is almost always unreasonable to rely on an oral promise where the law requires a promise to be in writing to be enforceable. Morris v. Friedman, 94-2808 (La. 11/27/95), 663 So.2d 19, 26 n.14. Detrimental reliance cannot prevail when in conflict with the positive written law. See Morris, 663 So.2d at 26; Acurio v. Cage, 52,309 (La.App. 2d Cir. 9/26/18), 257 So.3d 824, 834, writ denied, 18-1762 (La. 1/8/19), 260 So.3d 581. Thus, plaintiffs petitions fail to state a cause of action for detrimental reliance when plaintiff placed his reliance on an unenforceable oral agreement to transfer immovable property. See Rumore, 2015 WL 9435213, at *4 n.13.
Plaintiff also contends his petitions state a cause of action for unjust enrichment Under La. C.C. art. 2298, "[a] person who has been enriched without cause at the expense of another person is bound to compensate that person." The essential elements of an unjust enrichment are: (1) an enrichment; (2) an impoverishment; (3) a connection between the enrichment and the resulting impoverishment; (4) an absence of justification or cause for the enrichment and impoverishment; and (5) the lack of another remedy at law. Davis v. Elmer, 141298 (La.App. 1st Cir. 3/12/15), 166 So.3d 1082, 1087-88.
Based on our review, it appears plaintiffs contention that his petitions state a cause of action for unjust enrichment has merit with respect to his allegations concerning the mortgage payments he made and monies he spent for the upkeep and maintenance of defendant's property. Plaintiff alleged he was induced to incur these expenses by defendant's oral promise to transfer the property to him once the mortgage was satisfied. According to plaintiff, defendant was also enriched by the uncompensated time and efforts plaintiff expended in providing caretaker services for defendant's wife and mother-in-law based on defendant's promise to transfer the property to him.
Accepting plaintiffs allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the allegations are sufficient to establish an enrichment of defendant, an impoverishment of plaintiff, and a connection between the enrichment and resulting impoverishment. Since plaintiff alleged he performed the caretaker services and expended the funds on the house because of an oral agreement with defendant that is unenforceable, the face of plaintiffs petitions also reflect an absence of justification for defendant's enrichment at plaintiffs expense (i.e., impoverishment). Finally, no other remedy at law is available to plaintiff for his claims for compensation for the caretaker services he performed and for reimbursement of monies he expended for mortgage payments (which increased defendant's equity in the property at plaintiffs expense), upkeep, and maintenance of the property. Thus, plaintiffs petitions satisfy all requirements for stating a cause of action for unjust enrichment as to these claims.
When the allegations of a petition state a cause of action as to any part of the demand, an exception of no cause of action must be overruled. ExPert Riser Solutions, LLC v. Techcrane International, LLC, 19-1165 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/30/20), 319 So.3d 320, 325. Therefore, because plaintiffs petitions state a cause of action for unjust enrichment concerning plaintiffs claims for compensation for caretaker services performed on defendant's behalf, as well as for mortgage payments and expenses incurred in the upkeep and maintenance of his property, the trial court erred in sustaining defendant's exception of no cause of action.
Because plaintiff alleged in his petitions that he had a lease-purchase type agreement with defendant, he made improvements to the property during his occupancy, and defendant attempted to evict him and sell the house, it appears plaintiff may also have stated a cause of action under La. C.C. art. 2695 for reimbursement of any expenses he incurred in making improvements and remodeling defendant's property. Article 2695 governs the rights and obligations of the parties regarding attachments, additions, or other improvements made to leased property by the lessee. Under Article 2695(2)(a), if the lessor appropriates ownership of the improvements made by the lessee (e.g., by selling the house with the improvements), he is obligated to reimburse the lessee either for the costs of the improvements or for the enhanced value of the leased thing, whichever is less. See Rumore. 2015 WL 9435213, at *4.
Lastly, the trial court also erred in sustaining defendant's exception of no right of action, which served to question whether plaintiff belonged to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the petition. See Bering v. Dering, 21-00691 (La. 10/1/21), 324 So.3d 1042. Since plaintiff was the person who performed the caretaker services for which compensation is sought and expended the monies for which reimbursement is sought in this suit, he clearly is a person entitled to bring the causes of action asserted. Accordingly, because the trial court erred in sustaining defendant's exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs suit with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons assigned, the rule to show cause issued on January 24, 2023, is recalled, and the appeal is maintained. The trial court's August 16, 2022 judgment dismissing the suit of plaintiff, Brent Landry, with prejudice is reversed. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. All costs of this appeal are assessed to defendant, Susan Baham, in her capacity as Independent Executrix of the Estate of Thomas P. Gudan.
RULE TO SHOW CAUSE RECALLED AND APPEAL MAINTAINED. JUDGMENT REVERSED, AND REMANDED.