Opinion
Case No. 98-3219-DES
July 19, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on a Petition (Doc. 1) for habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On March 12, 1991, petitioner was sentenced to a controlling sentence of eleven to forty years of imprisonment by the District Court of Sedgwick County, Kansas ("district court"). On July 18, 1991, petitioner's sentence was modified by the district court to a controlling term of five to twenty years. Petitioner received the sentence after pleading guilty to three counts of indecent liberties with a child and one count of rape. Respondents have filed an Answer and Return (Doc. 7), and petitioner has filed a Traverse (Doc. 10). Having examined the record, the court enters the following findings and order denying petitioner's request.
• PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 10, 1995, petitioner filed a collateral motion for relief in the district court pursuant to Kansas Statutes Annotated § 60-1507. The motion alleged that his guilty plea had been improperly taken in violation of statutory and constitutional requirements, that no factual basis had been established to support the rape charge, and that he should have been charged with the more specific crime of aggravated incest rather than rape. On January 12, 1996, petitioner's collateral motion was denied. On February 9, 1996, petitioner appealed the denial of his collateral motion to the Kansas Court of Appeals, raising the same issues. On September 26, 1997, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's motion. Landers v. State, No. 76,237 (Kan.Ct.App. Sept. 26, 1997) (unpublished). Petitioner appealed the court of appeals decision to the Kansas Supreme Court. On December 23, 1997, the Kansas Supreme Court denied review.
On March 10, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. The issues raised by petitioner were the relative equivalents of the three issues raised in petitioner's original collateral motion. On April 27, 1998, the United States Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari.
On July 2, 1998, petitioner filed the instant application for federal habeas corpus relief. Petitioner filed several motions in the months following his original application: petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 12); Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 15); and a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 14). On November 10, 1998, the court issued an Order (Doc. 16) denying all three of petitioner's motions.
• PETITIONER'S CLAIMS
Petitioner brings the following three claims in his request for habeas corpus relief:
1. The Trial Court erred when it failed to set aside the Petitioner's guilty plea because said plea did not comply with K.S.A. 22-3210 and the United States Constitution.
2. A factual basis was never established for the Court's acceptance of the plea of guilty to the charge of rape.
3. The Petitioner should have been charged with the more factually specific crime of Aggravated Incest rather than the crime Indecent Liberties with a Minor and Rape where the purported victim in this case was his step-daughter.
(Pet'r Mem. at 4).
• STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court is precluded from granting habeas relief on any claim adjudicated by a state court, unless the state court's proceeding "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-13 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (construing the review standard in 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
Because petitioner filed his petition for habeas relief well after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), the AEDPA applies to his petition. See generally Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
A state court's decision is "contrary to" an established federal law if the state court reaches a different result than the Supreme Court would when presented with facts that are "materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent" or if the state court "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has clearly dictated that "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Federal habeas actions do not provide relief for errors of state law. Id. (citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)).
• DISCUSSION
• Inadequate Guilty Plea
On January 29, 1991, petitioner entered his guilty plea in the district court. Petitioner now argues that such plea was deficient and should be set aside. Relying extensively on Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), petitioner argues that the trial court should have offered him a specific oral advisement of the rights waived by a guilty plea. In Boykin, the Court held that the mere act of entering a guilty plea, does not by itself, create a presumption that the defendant waived his or her constitutional rights. The Court concluded that, in the absence of evidence in the record of whether the defendant's guilty plea was made voluntarily and understandingly, the plea must be set aside. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242. Petitioner asserts that at his plea hearing, the district court failed to properly advise petitioner of the consequences of his entering a guilty plea. The Kansas Court of Appeals found petitioner entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily.
In delivering the Court's ruling, Justice Douglas stated:
Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Second, is the right to trial by jury. Third, is the right to confront one's accusers. We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record.Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 (internal citations omitted).
Upon review of the record, the court finds petitioner's argument to be without merit. Although the district court did not verbally question petitioner regarding each of his waived rights, petitioner and his attorney did sign an "Acknowledgment of Rights and Entry of Plea" document. The document lists in great detail all of petitioner's rights adversely affected by his plea. The district court asked petitioner if he had signed the document and if petitioner understood everything contained therein. (Hr'g Tr. at 2). The district court went on to list each of the counts to which petitioner was pleading and ask petitioner whether he had in fact committed each crime. (Hr'g Tr. at 3-5). Additionally, the district court inquired whether there was anything in petitioner's background that would impede his mental ability to understand the purpose of the plea hearing, and petitioner denied any such mental impediment. (Hr'g Tr. at 2-3). Finally, in response to the district court's inquiry regarding the rape count, petitioner acknowledged he was entering his guilty plea to take advantage of the plea bargain. (Hr'g Tr. at 4-5).
Instead of creating a rigid script for trial courts to read, the holding of Boykin ensures that the accused "has full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences." 395 U.S. at 244. Stated differently, Boykin imposes only a "requirement of an affirmative record showing a voluntary and intelligent plea." Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.2d 913, 915 (10th Cir. 1973).
After examining the record, in light of the above standard, the court finds that petitioner's plea was entered voluntarily and with full understanding. Petitioner was clearly made aware of his right to a jury trial and that a guilty plea would divest him of that right. Additionally, petitioner was informed of his right not to testify and his ability to call witnesses on his own behalf. Petitioner does not assert that he was confused or mislead regarding these rights or his subsequent waiver. In fact, at his plea hearing petitioner demonstrated a competent understanding regarding the strategic benefit in entering a plea of guilty. Petitioner's situation does not present, as was the case in Boykin, a silent record regarding his waiver of rights. Petitioner presents no evidence or argument attacking the voluntariness of his plea. His argument appears centered solely on his perceived inadequacies in the district court's soliloquy. Because the court finds sufficient evidence that petitioner made his plea in an intelligent and informed manner, the argument that his 1991 plea was entered in violation of the Constitution is without merit.
To the extent petitioner argues error by the district court in failing to follow the dictates of state law in accepting his guilty plea, such argument is not properly before the court and is also without merit. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3210 (permitting acceptance of a guilty plea only if certain conditions are satisfied).
• Failure to Establish a Factual Basis
Petitioner's second claim also concerns his plea hearing. Petitioner asserts the state court accepted his guilty plea without producing, pursuant to Kansas Statutes Annotated § 22-3210(4), a sufficient factual basis for the plea. The Kansas Court of Appeals found a sufficient factual basis supported petitioner's guilty plea. The requirement of a factual basis for a guilty plea is not rooted within the United States Constitution, so as indicated above, this state law issue is not appropriate for consideration by a federal habeas court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Sena v. Romero, 617 F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir. 1980) ; Freeman v. Page, 443 F.2d 493, 497 (10th Cir. 1971); Meyers v. Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147, 1151 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Put simply, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . does not require an on-the-record development of the factual basis supporting a guilty plea before entry of the plea, and the failure of a state court to elicit a factual basis before accepting a guilty plea does not in itself provide a ground for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254."). This issue is somewhat clouded by the fact that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does require a factual basis. Rule 11, nevertheless, is not binding on state courts. Freeman, 443 F.2d at 497. Petitioner limits his arguments to the district court's perceived failure under state law, and as such, the issue is not justiciable.
Although petitioner fails to make the argument, the court is compelled on its own initiative, after liberally construing petitioner's pro se pleading, to briefly address a related issue. While generally, as discussed above, state courts are not constitutionally required to establish a factual basis for a defendant's guilty plea, a state court may be required to make such a finding if the defendant claims his factual innocence while entering the plea. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-39 (1970). During his plea hearing, petitioner and the district court had the following discussion regarding the rape charge:
In Alford, the defendant had been charged in state court with first-degree murder but elected to plead guilty to second-degree murder despite his asserted innocence, because he wished to avoid the risk of a death penalty. The Supreme Court upheld the guilty plea under those circumstances for two reasons: (1) because the defendant had intelligently concluded that his interests required the entry of a guilty plea; and (2) because there was "strong evidence" in the record of the defendant's actual guilt. Alford, 400 U.S. at 37.
THE COURT: In the 5th count, the district attorney says that around or about the 17th day of July of 1990, here in Sedgwick County, Kansas, that you engaged in an act of sexual intercourse with an individual and it was against the will of the other individual and it was after their resistence was overcome by force or by fear.
The latter count is called rape.
Did you do what they say you did?
THE DEFENDANT: I would like to say that sexual intercourse did not take place, but I have entered the plea of guilty for that charge.
THE COURT: There's nothing wrong with that, entering a plea of guilty when you didn't do it, as long as you know what you are doing, you are doing what you want to do and you are entering the plea of guilty to take advantage of a plea bargain that you negotiated with the district attorney through your lawyer.
Is that what you are saying on that 5th count?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
(Hr'g Tr. at 5). The court will assume, arguendo, that petitioner's statement regarding sexual intercourse was a claim of factual innocence. Therefore, the court must now look within the record to determine if a sufficient factual basis existed for petitioner's guilty plea.
The degree or measure of the necessary factual basis is muddied by ambiguity thanks in part to the interplay of Alford, its progeny, and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(f) ("Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea."). Federal courts weighing Alford considerations and Rule 11 compliance routinely interweave both standards within their discussions.
For example, in United States v. Keiswetter, 860 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1988), the Tenth Circuit discussed the necessary findings required in considering the constitutionality of an Alford-type guilty plea made in federal court. In particular, the circuit court analyzed two issues: first, whether the defendant entered the guilty plea voluntarily and knowingly; and second, whether, viewed from the trial judge's perspective, a factual basis existed for the guilty plea. Keiswetter, 860 F.2d at 993-94. As to the degree of facts necessary under the second inquiry, the circuit court noted that "[n]either Alford, nor any case subsequent to Alford, suggests that "strong evidence" is the only constitutionally adequate standard for the acceptance of an Alford plea. The outer limits of the factual basis sufficient for an Alford plea have yet to be defined." Id. at 996 n. 6. The dissent in Keiswetter, however, disagreed and argued that Alford mandates that a "reviewing court must find evidence presented at the taking of the plea which strongly suggests the guilt of the accused." Id. at 998 (Moore, J., dissenting). After an en banc rehearing, the majority adopted the result urged in Keiswetter's dissent, but ultimately relied on Rule 11, not Alford, for the basis of its decision. United States v. Keiswetter, 866 F.2d 1301, 1302 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc) ( Keiswetter II). Unlike Keiswetter, the present case requires only an application under Alford.
As to petitioner's state of mind, the court has no hesitation in finding he entered his plea voluntarily and with his best interests at heart. Petitioner's decision to plead was evidentially the product of weighed alternatives. The district judge, therefore, inquired and made certain "to resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of innocence." Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n. 10.
As to the second issue, the court concludes the record in this case reveals there was a sufficient factual basis supporting petitioner's guilty plea. At petitioner's sentencing hearing, defense counsel admitted "that these contacts [petitioner] had with the minor were not ones where he went out on the street, something like this. Throughout the history, it involved him being drunk and then fondling the child." (Hr'g Tr. at 7). The uncontroverted facts before the district court revealed an individual having illegal contact with a minor. While petitioner denied the extent of the contacts by asserting sexual intercourse did not occur, such an argument does not dissuade the court from its belief that there existed in the very least a factual basis providing for petitioner's guilt. Therefore, assuming the argument were properly submitted, the court finds petitioner's plea was not constitutionally infirm under Alford.
C. Error in Charging the Offense
Petitioner was charged and pled guilty to the crimes of indecent liberties with a child. The child victim, however, was petitioner's own step-daughter. Therefore, he argues the State should have charged the specific offense of aggravated incest instead of indecent liberties with a child. The Kansas Court of Appeals determined that petitioner's argument was governed by LaBona v. State, 872 P.2d 271 (Kan. 1994). In LaBona, the Kansas Supreme Court held that by pleading guilty to indecent liberties with a child, the defendant waived the right to challenge the failure of the State to charge the specific offense of aggravated incest and acquiesced in his convictions of indecent liberties with a child. 872 P.2d at 273. Therefore, the district court was not required to vacate the pleas of guilty and the sentence imposed was legal. Id. See also Baker v. State, 894 P.2d 221 (Kan.Ct.App. 1995) (applying LaBona and holding defendant's guilty plea to indecent liberties was a waiver to right to be sentenced for aggravated incest).
The state court's holding, that a guilty plea to a general crime is a waiver of the right to be sentenced for the more specific crime, is nothing more than an interpretation of state law. "[S]tate courts are the ultimate expositors of state law and we are bound by their constructions." Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) (internal citations omitted). "[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Petitioner does not cite any case supporting a constitutional claim. Nor does he explain how his due process rights or equal protection rights were violated.
This court could find no federal constitutional standard or Supreme Court precedent that was violated by the proceedings in state court. Accordingly, petitioner's claim for federal habeas relief is denied.
• CONCLUSION
After reviewing petitioner's grounds for federal habeas relief and finding them all lacking in merit, the court is compelled to deny petitioner's request.
IT IS THEREFORE BY THIS COURT ORDERED that petitioner's Petition (Doc. 1) for habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is denied.