Opinion
11-25-1908
LAMSBACK v. LAMSBACK.
William T. Boyle, for petitioner. Lewis Starr, for respondent.
Action by Grace Lamsback against Charles Frank Lamsback. On petition to modify a decree for alimony. Granted.
William T. Boyle, for petitioner.
Lewis Starr, for respondent.
LEAMING, V. C. (orally). It is possible and altogether probable that Mrs. Lamsback is receiving better attention and care where she is with her parents, who appear to be supplying her with the best medical attention that can be procured, than she would be with her husband, whose income is so much limited, but that is not the controlling element that we meet at this time.
The limit of the power of this court under the present application is to either continue or to terminate the alimony which is being paid under the former order, and the sole question at this time is whether or not that order for the payment of alimony should be continued longer.
Mr. Lamsback, notwithstanding the difficulties which have heretofore existed between himself and his wife, is still her husband, and is entitled to some rights. The conduct which was disclosed at the former hearing upon his part was not such as to bar him of his entire rights as a husband. He is entitled at the very least to the hope of reconciliation. The present condition of affairs, as they are disclosed by the evidence, deny to him even the right of personal intercourse with his wife, deny him the privilege of calling upon her and talking with her and reasoning with her, or endeavoring to win, if he has already lost (as it appears he has), her affections, and it cannot be that he is to be, as is suggested by counsel, banished from all social relations with her, and denied even the hope of any future reconciliation.
I am convinced that the husband, Mr. Lamsback, is entirely sincere in his wish that his wife should come to him. It is quite manifest, however, that at this time, whatever may have been the conditions heretofore, his wife probably is not physically able to come to him; but, beyond all of that, it is also manifest that, if she were able, she would not come. I do not think it is going too far to say that it may be that her fears of treatment she would receive at his hands are, from her standpoint, in view of her recollections of past treatment, well grounded; but if he is repentant for any faults that may have transpired heretofore, and is sincere in his determination to treat her right and to do by her as a husband should do by a wife, he is entitled to the benefit of his repentance. No conduct that has been shown upon his part at any time has been such as to deny him the status of a husband entitled to a future hope of reconciliation, and I can see no way under which this court could be justified in continuing to impose upon the husband the payment of alimony under the present conditions. If there should be any mistake touching my present belief that the reason why the wife refuses to return to her husband, or refuses to even treat with him, is that she has lost her love for him and does not mean to return to him in any event—if her real reason is only that her physical condition is such that it would be imprudent for her to do so—that condition of affairs can be made to appear at some future time; but at present I am entirely satisfied that there can be no propriety in continuing the order compelling the husband to pay a weekly alimony so long as there is a fixed determination upon the part of the wife to deny him even the privilege of social intercourse with her, to deny him the right to call at the house and talk with her, or to even discuss with her the propriety of their ever hoping to entertain proper relations as a husband and wife. I am convinced that the only order that can be properly made at this time is an order terminating, for the present, the order requiring weekly payments of alimony, and I will advise such an order.