Opinion
Civ. 24-024-TUC-CKJ
05-13-2024
Mikkel-Stanley Lamb, v. Smith and Wamsley, PLLC, et al. Defendants.
ORDER
Cindy K. Jorgenson United States District Judge
On January 12, 2024, Plaintiff Mikkel-Stanley Lamb ("Lamb") filed a Complaint for a Civil Case (Doc. 1). Lamb has also filed an Application to Proceed in District Court * Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 2).
I. In Forma Pauperis
The Court may allow a plaintiff to proceed without prepayment of fees when it is shown by affidavit that he "is unable to pay such fees[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Lamb's affidavit states his average monthly income during the past twelve months consisted of: disability payments of $2100. However, he states he expects his income "next month" to consist of a disability payment of $1500. Lamb states his fixed income is from veteran disability. Further, Lamb states he has $90 in a bank account and his total monthly expenses are $1560.
The Court finds Lamb is unable to pay the fees and will grant the Application to' Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 2).
II. Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.2
The applicable rule provides for privacy protection in documents filed with the Court. These protections include social security numbers, taxpayer-identification numbers, dates of birth, and financial account numbers. Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.2(a). The Court will direct her staff to redact the exhibits to Lamb's Complaint pursuant to the rule. Further, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to docket Lamb's original exhibits under seal and to publicly file the' redacted document. Lamb is advised if he believes further redactions pursuant to the rule are; appropriate, he may submit a more-redacted document for the Court's review.
III. Caption and Parties
Lamb's Complaint does not appear to include all required information in the caption. The applicable rule states:
(a) Caption; Names of Parties. Every pleading must have a caption with the court's name, a title, a file number, and a Rule 7(a) designation. The title of the complaint must name all the parties; the title of other pleadings, after naming the first party on each side, may refer generally to other parties.Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a). The caption of Lamb's Complaint states only Smith and Wamsley, PLLC, as the Defendant. However, the body of the Complaint states other Defendants: Kaycee Scarr Wamsley, Jason E. Smith, Sean K Moynihan, and Luisa Hernandez. (Complaint, Doc. 1, p. 2). Lamb is advised the caption of a complaint must include all named defendants.
IV. Screening Order
This Court is required to dismiss a case if the Court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A), or if the Court determines that the action "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
V. Lamb's Complaint
The caption of Lamb's Complaint states the Defendant as Smith and Wamsley, PLLC. The body of the Complaint lists Kaycee Scarr Wamsley, Jason E. Smith, Sean K. Moynihan, and Luisa Hernandez. The address listed for each of these individuals is the Tucson, Arizona, address of Smith & Wamsley, PLLC. See Smith & Wamsley website, https://smithwamsley.com/. Further, the Arizona Corporation Commission ("ACC") website' includes Smith & Wamsley. PLLC's Tucson, Arizona, address and states its domicile is; Arizona. See ACC Smith & Wamsley, PLLC, Entity Listing, https://ecorp.azcc.gov/ BusinessSearch/BusinessInfo?entityNumber=23268099 (last accessed May 6, 2024). Additionally, Lamb states his address is in Tucson, Arizona, and he is a citizen of the State of Arizona Republic.
Lamb's Complaint states the basis for federal court jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy is more than $75,000 because of "UCC-3 Statute Simple Security Instrument[.]" Complaint (Doc. 1, p. 4). The Complaint also states that, if the basis for jurisdiction is a federal question," 15 U.S.C. Suits by persons injured" is at issue in this case. Id. at 3.
Lamb's Complaint states the claim as: "Smith and Wamsley, PLLC are in breach of; contract per Sec. of State." Id. at 4. Additionally, under the subtitle "Relief," the Complaint states:
Please view Statute Staple Security Instrument Charging Lien placed on trust account which breach's contract.Id. at 5. The Complaint does not include any factual allegations that any named Defendant executed a contract with Lamb or any conduct exhibiting a breach of contract.
The documents attached to the Complaint include a "LEGAL NOTICE AND DEMAND . . . To: All Sate, Federal and International Public Officials, THIS IS A CONTRACT IN ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION THIS TITLE IS FOR YOUR PROTECTION[.]" two "ASSIGNMENTS] OF LIMITED POWER OF ATTORNEY[,]" a "UCC Financing Statement" and an Amendment that reference the Colorado Secretary of State, a "HOLD HARMLESS AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT," a "COMMON LAW: COPYRIGHT NOTICE[,]" a "Notice Concerning Fiduciary Relationship" naming "JANET YELLEN, et al D.B.A SECRETARY OF TREASURY (UNITED STATES)" as the fiduciary, another "Notice Concerning Fiduciary Relationship" naming "FRANCISCO ALICEA, et al D.B.A SECRETARY OF TREASURY (UNITED STATES)" as the fiduciary, a "Certificate of Foreign Status of Non-resident for United States Tax' Withholding and Reporting (Human)[,]" a "PRIVATE REGISTERED BOND FOR; INVESTMENT[,]" an "AFFIDAVIT OF TRUTH[,]" Complaint, Attachments (Docs. 101-1, pp. 1, 10, 12, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 27, 29, 35, 37).
The signature line of the Notice Concerning Fiduciary Relationship contains the typed name of Janet Yellen.
The signature line of the Notice Concerning Fiduciary Relationship contains the typed italicized name of Francisco Alicea.
The documents attached to the Complaint do not include any agreement/signature of any named Defendant showing the execution of a contract or the breaching of a contract. Rather, the documents appear to invoke legal principles (e.g., specifying the vessel in commerce Lamb was created as a trust; legal notice and demand purported to be acknowledged by silence and acquiescence of the Arizona Secretary of State; purported contract without inclusion of specific agreement of any person/entity other than Lamb, stating the failure to timely rebut the terms is agreement; right to appeal to a twenty-five' sovereign people Magna Carta Grand Jury; fealty is forever rebutted by counterclaim in; Admiralty) without any recognized authority.
The Ninth Circuit has held that "sovereign citizen" arguments have "been consistently and thoroughly rejected by every branch of the government for decades. Indeed[,] advancement of such utterly meritless arguments is now the basis for serious sanctions imposed on civil litigants who raise them." United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Caetano v. Kings Cnty. Sheriff, No. 1:22-CV-0261 JLT HBK,, 2022 WL 1271344, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2022), appeal dismissed, No. 22-16067, 2022 WL 18358075 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2022) ("To the extent Plaintiff's allegations are based on a sovereign citizen ideology in referring to his body as a "Sovereign" and a vessel courts uniformly and summarily have rejected arguments premised on such ideology as frivolous; and meritless.").
VI. General Requirements
A complaint is to contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Rule 8(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory' statements, do not suffice." Id. Especially where the pleader is pro se, the pleading should; be liberally construed in the interests of justice. Johnson v. Reagan, 524 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 11975). Indeed, a "complaint [filed by a pro se plaintiff] 'must be held to less stringent I standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), per curiam.
A complaint must set forth sufficient facts that serves to put defendants on notice as to the nature and basis of the claim(s). Failure to name potential defendants or sufficient facts to advise a defendant of the claim(s) may be result in no claim(s) being presented against a defendant. Furthermore, all allegations of a claim are to be set forth in numbered paragraphs that should be limited to a single set of circumstances. Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a). "Each' claim . . . shall be stated in a separate count . . . whenever a separation facilitates the clear; presentation of the matters set forth." Id. Failure to set forth claims in such a manner places the onus on the court to decipher which, if any, facts support which claims, as well as to I determine whether a plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought. Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F.Supp. 1303 (D.C.Va. 1981). Enforcement of this rule is discretionary: with the Court, but such enforcement is appropriate where it is necessary to facilitate a clear presentation of the claims. See, Benoit v. Ocwen Financial Corp., Inc., 960 F.Supp. 287 (S.D.Fla. 1997), affirmed 162 F.3d 1177 (compliance with rule required where allegations were so confusing and conclusory, claims were commingled, and impossible to determine nature of claims).
VII. Requirement that Action State a Claim on Which Relief Can be Granted
The United States Supreme Court has determined that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its facts." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). While a complaint need not plead "detailed factual allegations," the factual allegations it does include "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555. Indeed, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) requires a showing that a plaintiff is entitled to relief "rather than a blanket assertion" of entitlement to relief. Id. at 555 n. 3. The complaint "must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right to action." Id. at 555. Although a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) has not been filed in this case, the Court considers these standards in screening Lamb's Complaint to determine if Lamb has "nudge[d] [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Id. at 570. The Court also considers that the Supreme Court has cited Twombly for the traditional proposition that "[s]pecific facts are not necessary [for a pleading that satisfies Rule 8(a)(2)]; the statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardue, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
The holding in Twombly explicitly abrogates the well established holding in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."
In discussing Twombly, the Ninth Circuit has stated:
"A claim has facial plausibility," the Court explained, "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 129 S.Ct. at 1949. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955).
In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory "factual content," and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. Id.Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009).
This Court must take as true all allegations of material fact and construe them in the light most favorable to Lamb. See Cervantes v. United States, 330 F.3d 1186, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003). In general, a complaint is construed favorably to the pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds, 457 U.S. 800. Nonetheless, the Court does not accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, the Court is not to serve as an advocate of a pro se litigant, Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), in attempting to decipher a complaint.
VIII. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Court must dismiss a civil action if at any time it determines it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (h)(3). Federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). This Court presumes a civil action lies outside its limited jurisdiction and the burden to prove otherwise rests on a party asserting jurisdiction exists. Id. Additionally, an opposing party can never forfeit or waive a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). Generally, this Court has "original jurisdiction of . . . civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" and "civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000" and diversity of citizenship between the parties exists. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution extends the judicial power to controversies . . . between citizens of different states." Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over cases where there is complete diversity of citizenship, i.e., between citizens of different states, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Indeed, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 "requires complete diversity - no plaintiff may be a citizen of the same state as any defendant." Cady v. American Family Ins. Co., 771 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1130 (D.Ariz. 2011), citing Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 82 (2005); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806). Lamb, as the party asserting diversity jurisdiction, has the burden of proof. Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1986).
Lamb's Complaint asserts that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) because he and Defendants are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. However, in listing the parties, Lamb states all parties reside in Arizona, are incorporated in Arizona, or have their principal place of business in Arizona. In other words, Lamb has not alleged facts that establish that any Defendant is a citizen of any state other than Arizona. See e.g., Breitman v. May Company California, 37 F.3d 562, 564 (1994) ("a corporation is typically a citizen of two states for determining the existence of diversity jurisdiction: the state of incorporation and the state in which it has its principal place of business").
Further, "it is elementary that the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court is not a waivable matter and may be raised at anytime by one of the parties, by motion or in the responsive pleadings, or sua sponte by the trial or reviewing court." See Emrich v. Touch Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n. 2 (9th Cir.1988); see also Scholastic Ent't, Inc. v. Fox Ent't, 336 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir.2003) (it is well-established that a district court has the authority to dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction).
A plain reading of Lamb's Complaint fails to establish that all Defendants are citizens of a state other than Arizona. In other words, Lamb's Complaint fails to establish complete diversity of citizenship. The Court finds it does not have subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship of this matter.
Lamb's Complaint, however, also refers to "15 U.S.C. Suits by persons injured" as the basis for federal question jurisdiction. Although the apparently referenced statute provides that "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), this provision is limited:
The Court presumes Lamb is referring to 15 U.S.C. §15 as its title is "Suits by person injured[.]"
Notwithstanding the statutory term "any person," the Supreme Court has limited those who may sue for antitrust damages. The general rule is that only "the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution," has standing to sue.In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 320-21 (9th Cir. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S.Ct. 1514, 203 L.Ed.2d 802 (2019), citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977).
Further, the Complaint does not state it is seeking to state an antitrust violation or any antitrust law[s] Defendants are alleged to have violated. Lamb refers to a UCC-3 Statute Simple Security Instrument, but does not specify how such an instrument would constitute an antitrust violation. Rather, the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") "is a collection of proposed model laws, drafted by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, that are meant to serve as a guide for state legislatures when they draft statutes involving commercial contracts and related dealings." Library of Congress Research Guide Uniform Commercial Code, https://guides.loc.gov/ contract-law/uniform-commercial-code (last accessed May 6, 2024). In other words, UCC violations are based on state law rather than federal law.
The Court finds it appropriate to take judicial notice of information provided on government websites. See Arizona Libertarian Party v. Reagan, 798 F.3d 723, 727 (9th Cir. 2015), citations omitted (the Court may take judicial notice of "official information posted on a governmental website, the accuracy of which [is] undisputed"); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 112 F.Supp.3d 1011, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (the court can take judicial notice of "[p]ublic records and government documents available from reliable sources on the Internet," such as websites run by governmental agencies), citations omitted.
Additionally, Lamb's Complaint states the claim at issue is a breach of contract. Breach of contract claims are based on state common law. Even where, for example, federal regulations may be related to the claim, the claim ultimately remains based on state common law and do not present a federal question. See e.g. Alfaro v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 645 F.Supp.3d 955, 960 (C.D. Cal. 2022); see Moore v. First Transit Bus Co., No. CV-20-00790-PHX-JJT, 2020 WL 9347648, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 2020).
Further, even if the Court were to assume Lamb was attempting to state a securities violation based on the Complaint referring to a "Statute Simple Security Instrument," Lamb's Complaint fails to include what type of security violation may have occurred and fails to demonstrate such violation would qualify as an antitrust violation pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). Additionally, in discussing the interplay between suits involving antitrust and securities, the Supreme Court has determined that securities laws may, in some circumstances, be "clearly incompatible" with the application of the antitrust laws. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 285 (2007).
The Court finds Lamb's Complaint fails to include any allegation to establish Lamb's suit raises a federal question.
IX. Breach of Contract Claim
Even if diversity of citizenship had been adequately alleged, the Complaint fails to state a claim for breach of contract. Under Arizona law:
A breach of contract claim requires a valid contract, its breach and resulting damages. Thomas v. Montelucia Villas, LLC, 232 Ariz. 92, 96 ¶ 16 (2013). A contract is not valid unless the parties "manifested assent or intent to be bound." Rogus v. Lords, 166 Ariz. 600, 602 (App. 1991) (citing authority). Mutual assent turns on objective evidence, not a party's subjective intent. Muchesko v. Muchesko, 191 Ariz. 265, 270 (App. 1997).Phoenix L. Enf't Ass'n v. City of Phoenix, No. 1 CA-CV 19-0813, 2021 WL 1575782, at *4 (Ariz.App. Apr. 22, 2021). Lamb's Complaint does not include a short and plain statement of a valid claim of a contract. In other words, no factual allegations are stated that any Defendant agreed or intended to be bound. Further, no factual allegations are included that show any Defendant breached that contract or how such breach occurred.
X. Dismissal with Leave to Amend
As the Complaint does not afford this Court with subject matter jurisdiction and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court will dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (leave to amend is liberally granted unless absolutely clear deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment). Lamb will be afforded an opportunity to amend his Complaint to set forth a valid basis for subject matter jurisdiction and a claim upon which relief may be granted. Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991) (if a court determines dismissal is appropriate, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend a complaint when a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim); Bonanno v. Thomas, 309 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1962) (when dismissing with leave to amend, a court is to provide reasons for the dismissal so a plaintiff can make an intelligent decision whether to file an amended complaint); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1987).
Furthermore, Lamb is advised that all causes of action alleged in the original Complaint which are not alleged in any Amended Complaint will be waived. Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) ("an amended pleading supersedes the original"); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1987).
Lamb is advised that any Amended Complaint filed by him must be retyped or rewritten in its entirety and may not incorporate any part of the original complaint by reference. Any Amended Complaint submitted by Lamb shall be clearly designated as an Amended Complaint on the face of the document. Additionally, Lamb is advised civil pro se forms, including Complaints, are available on the District of Arizona's website: https://www.uscourts.gov/forms/civil-pro-se-forms.
XI. Warnings to Lamb
A. If Lamb's address changes, Lamb must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with LRCiv 83.3(d). Lamb must not include a motion for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this action.
B. Lamb must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Lamb.
C. If Lamb fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b); see also Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir.) (district court may dismiss action for failure to comply with any order of the Court), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992).
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:
1. The Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 2) is GRANTED.
2. Lamb's Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Lamb shall have until June 10, 2024, to file an Amended Complaint.
3. Any Amended Complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its entirety and may not incorporate any part of the prior Complaint or subsequent pleadings by reference. All causes of action alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in any amended complaint will be waived. Any Amended Complaint submitted by Lamb should be clearly designated as an amended complaint on the face of the document.
4. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter a judgment of dismissal, without prejudice, without further notice to Lamb, if Lamb fails to file an Amended Complaint on or before June 10, 2024.
5. A clear, legible copy of every pleading or other document filed SHALL ACCOMPANY each original pleading or other document filed with the Clerk for use by the District Judge to whom the case is assigned. See L.R.Civ. 5.4. Failure to submit a copy along with the original pleading or document may result in the pleading or document being stricken without further notice to Lamb.
6. At all times during the pendency of this action, Lamb shall immediately advise the Court of any change of address and its effective date. Such notice shall be captioned "NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS". The notice shall contain only information pertaining to the change of address and its effective date. The notice shall not include any motions for any other relief. Lamb shall serve a copy of the Notice of Change of Address on all served opposing parties. Failure to file a NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS may result in the dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).
7. The Court's staff shall redact the exhibits to Lamb's Complaint pursuant to the Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.2(a) and the Clerk of Court shall docket Lamb's original exhibits under seal and shall publicly file the redacted document prepared by the Court's staff. Lamb may submit a more-redacted document for the Court's review if he feels further redactions are needed/appropriate.
8. The Clerk of Court shall mail a copy of this Order, the redacted document, and the Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Non-Prisoner Complaint) form to Lamb.