Opinion
Civil Case No. 4:19-cv-03396-HMH-MGB
01-24-2020
Jesse Vernon LaLone, Plaintiff, v. Kia Wilson, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
In this civil action, Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se, alleges legal malpractice against her counsel, Defendant Kia Wilson, in an underlying criminal matter in state court. Currently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 6.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. As discussed further below, the undersigned recommends the Court grant in part Defendant's Motion, dismiss Plaintiff's claim for federal constitutional violations, and remand the remaining state law claims to Horry County.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County, South Carolina on October 9, 2019. The short Complaint alleges that Defendant is a public defender and alleges that Defendant has "failed to communicate and advocate for the Plaintiff during the adversarial process in a criminal proceeding, which has ultimately prejudiced the rights of the Plaintiff and subjected him to a deprivation of effective representation . . . ." (Id.) The Complaint alleges causes of action against Defendant for: (1) "constitutional violations"; (2) "attorney malpractice"; and (3) "malfeasance, misfeasance, nonfeasance." (Dkt. No. 1-1.)
Defendant removed the action to this Court on December 5, 2019. (Dkt. No. 1.) On December 11, 2019, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 6.) Plaintiff then filed two affidavits in December of 2019, which expand on his allegations in the Complaint. In these affidavits, Plaintiff states that Defendant "refused to interview any witnesses on [his] behalf" and "refused to file a motion to suppress evidence that was illegally obtained." (Dkt. No. 12 at 2.) Defendant further avers that he is "not guilty of the crimes [he is] accused of," and he has been "incarcerated" for 26 months without a trial. (Id. at 3.) On January 10, 2020, Defendant filed a supplement to her Motion to Dismiss, stating that the Circuit Court for Horry County has appointed a private attorney to represent Plaintiff going forward in the underlying criminal matter "[d]ue to the conflict presented by Plaintiff proceeding in this case against Defendant." (Dkt. No. 21.) Defendant has provided the Order appointing new counsel, dated January 7, 2020, in which the court found "there is a conflict with the staff of the Office of the Public Defender." (Dkt. No. 21-1.) Plaintiff filed a response to the Motion on January 16, 2020 (Dkt. No. 22), to which Defendant replied on January 23, 2020 (Dkt. No. 23). The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review.
STANDARDS
A. Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court "conjure up questions never squarely presented." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should "accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court "need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts" nor "accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000).
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues for dismissal on the basis that, inter alia: (1) Plaintiff has failed to show Defendant acted under the color of state law with respect to her claim for federal constitutional violations; (2) Plaintiff failed to file an expert affidavit with his Complaint in support of his attorney malpractice claim, as required under state law; and (3) Plaintiff's claim for "malfeasance, misfeasance, nonfeasance" is not a cognizable claim under state law and it is "a rephrasing" of his other two claims.
The undersigned considers the claims alleged by Plaintiff, below.
A. Constitutional Violations
Under the cause of action for "constitutional violations," the Complaint alleges that Defendant "prejudiced the rights of the Plaintiff and subjected him to a deprivation of effective representation, due process, and equal protection of the law in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I and Section 3 and 14 of the South Carolina Constitution." (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4.) In her Motion to Dismiss, Defendant only addresses the federal constitutional violations alleged by Plaintiff. Specifically, Defendant asserts that because Plaintiff alleges violations of his federal constitutional rights, this claim necessarily arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 6 at 3.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of his federal constitutional rights under § 1983. (Id. at 3-5.) Plaintiff responds that he "has never claimed . . . that Defendant acted under color of state law" and that Defendant turned his Complaint into a § 1983 action by removing it to federal court. (Dkt. No. 22 at 4.)
Here, because Plaintiff asserts violations of his federal constitutional rights, this Court has original jurisdiction over such a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal courts "have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution [and] laws . . . of the United States"). Further, "[s]ection 1983 . . . provides a method for vindicating federal constitutional and statutory rights." Jones v. Chandrasuwan, 820 F.3d 685, 691 (4th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim for federal constitutional violations is properly brought under § 1983.
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person with the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . ." However, § 1983 "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). In other words, § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a "person acting under the color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 823 (2011). "[T]he party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor." West, 487 U.S. at 49.
The United States Supreme Court has held that "a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); see, e.g., Mateen-El v. Bell, 747 F. App'x 169, 170 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 78, 205 L. Ed. 2d 63 (2019) ("Mateen-El's claims against the public defenders and the private citizen were not cognizable under § 1983 because those defendants did not act under color of state law."); Powell v. Harris, 99 F.3d 1130, 1996 WL 582911, at *1 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[P]ublic defenders are not considered state actors for § 1983 purposes."). Because Defendant is a public defender and Plaintiff's claims arise from Defendant's conduct as his public defender in a criminal proceeding, Plaintiff cannot state a claim under § 1983. This claim therefore fails under federal law, and the undersigned recommends it be dismissed. See, e.g., Dodson, 454 U.S. at 325.
B. Remaining State Law Claims
Having recommended dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for violations of his federal constitutional rights, only his state law claims remain. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts claims for: (1) violation of his constitutional rights under the South Carolina Constitution; (2) "attorney malpractice"; and (3) "malfeasance, misfeasance, nonfeasance." (Dkt. No. 1-1.) Because there are no federal claims remaining, the undersigned recommends the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims. As noted by the Fourth Circuit, "once a district court has dismissed the federal claims in an action, it maintains 'wide discretion' to dismiss the supplemental state law claims over which it properly has supplemental jurisdiction." Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541, 553 n. 4 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 353-54 (1988)). A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) if . . . (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C § 1367(c)(3)-(4). When determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, a district court must consider "convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicial economy." Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7).
Here, the undersigned is unable to find that the parties would be inconvenienced or unfairly prejudiced by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. Nor does the undersigned find there to be any underlying issues of federal policy involved in Plaintiff's state law claims—this action sounds in legal malpractice, a claim arising under state law. The comity factor and considerations of judicial economy weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. For these reasons, the Court should decline to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law causes of action. See, e,g., Brown v. Phylbeck, No. 4:18-cv-202-FL, 2019 WL 2745758, at *5 (E.D.N.C. July 1, 2019) ("[W]here plaintiff's state law claims substantially predominate over the federal claims in this action grounded in alleged attorney malpractice, the court in its discretion declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims."), appeal dismissed sub nom. Brown v. Philbeck, 788 F. App'x 913 (4th Cir. 2019); Johnson v. Ozmint, No. 9:08-cv-0431-PMD-BM, 2009 WL 252152, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 2, 2009) (dismissing federal claims and noting, "With respect to these remaining state law causes of action, when federal claims presented in a case which has been removed to federal court from state court are dismissed, the case should be remanded to state court for resolution of any remaining state law claims . . . ."). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's state law claims be remanded to Horry County.
Given that these recommendations are dispositive of the case, the undersigned does not address the parties' remaining arguments.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends GRANTING IN PART and DENYING IN PART the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 6). Specifically, the undersigned recommends the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claim for federal constitutional violations and remand the remaining state law claims to Horry County.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. January 24, 2020 Charleston, South Carolina
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).