Opinion
14-20-00393-CV
08-18-2022
ALI REZA LAHIJANI, Appellant v. MERIT ENERGY COMPANY, L.L.C., Appellee
On Appeal from the 152nd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2019-42539
Panel consists of Justices Wise, Spain, and Hassan. Justice Spain joins the opinion except as to the discussion of issue two. (Spain, J., concurring) (Hassan, J., concurring).
MEMORANDUM MAJORITY OPINION
Ken Wise Justice.
Appellant Ali Reza Lahijani sued appellee Merit Energy Company, L.L.C. and another party for negligence concerning soil and groundwater contamination caused by an oil well on Lahijani's property. The trial court granted Merit's motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, and Lahijani appeals. We affirm.
Although the trial court's judgment did not dispose of Lahijani's claim against the other defendant, the record reflects that the other defendant was not served and did not answer and that Lahijani did not intend to serve it. Thus, the trial court's judgment was final. See M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 674 (Tex. 2004) (judgment final if remaining defendant was never served with citation and did not answer, and nothing in the record indicates the plaintiff expected to obtain service).
I. Standard of Review and Legal Principles
We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and indulging every reasonable inference against the movant. See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Pasko, 544 S.W.3d 830, 833 (Tex. 2018). A defendant moving for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of limitations, as here, must conclusively establish the elements of the defense. Id. This burden includes conclusively establishing when the claim accrued. Id.
Generally, a claim accrues when a wrongful act causes a legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred. Id. at 834; see also ExxonMobil Corp. v. Lazy R Ranch, LP, 511 S.W.3d 538, 542-43 (Tex. 2017) (noting that a "claim accrues when injury occurs, not afterward when the full extent of the injury is known"). An exception to this rule is the discovery rule, which delays the accrual of the limitations period until the plaintiff knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the wrongful act and resulting injury. Schlumberger, 533 S.W.3d at 834. The discovery rule applies if the type of injury is objectively verifiable and inherently undiscoverable within the limitations period. Lazy R Ranch, 511 S.W.3d at 544. An injury is inherently undiscoverable if, by its nature, it is unlikely to be discovered within the limitations period despite due diligence. Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co., 211 S.W.3d 310, 313 (Tex. 2006). "This legal question is decided on a categorical rather than case-specific basis; the focus is on whether a type of injury rather than a particular injury was discoverable." Id. The Supreme Court of Texas has "restricted the discovery rule to exceptional cases to avoid defeating the purpose behind the limitations statutes." Id.
When, as here, the plaintiff has pleaded the discovery rule, the defendant must conclusively establish either (1) the discovery rule does not apply; or (2) if the rule applies, the summary judgment evidence negates it. Schlumberger, 544 S.W.3d at 834. Undisputed evidence may be conclusive if reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions about the evidence. Id
II. Evidence and Procedural Background
The material underlying facts are not disputed. In 2000 and 2004, Lahijani purchased two tracts of land for future development. An oil well was located on the property and was in production and operated by Merit from 1995 to 2002. Merit's representative testified that all of Merit's operations ceased on April 1, 2002. The well was then acquired by Americo Oil & Gas Production Company, and it produced until 2008. Americo's representative testified that no "activities or operations were conducted on the Property that could have caused any deposit to tank bottoms, oil stain or deposit of salt residue after February 27, 2015."
In 2016, Lahijani considered the market conditions for real estate development to be favorable, so he visited the property with a potential investor in February or March of that year. The investor noticed white areas around oil tanks to be a sign of a potential spill or leak of saltwater. Lahijani testified that the last time he had visited the property was sometime around 2010, and he had never before noticed any white areas on the property.
On March 1, 2016, Lahijani complained to the Railroad Commission of Texas about the wells and remaining oil field equipment on his property. A few days later, a Commission field inspector and Lahijani inspected the property together. According to the Commission's records, "During the inspection Mr. Lahijani alleged that numerous spills have occurred in the past resulting in dead vegetation on the lease." The Commission informed Americo of several violations on the property. After a later inspection showed that the violations had been remedied, the Commission closed the complaint.
On May 23, 2017, Lahijani again complained to the Commission-this time about "pollution" on the property. On May 25, the Commission's inspectors and Lahijani inspected the property and observed a "pollution" violation: "oil stained soil was observed in an area thirty feet by seventy-five feet and salt crystals were observed on top of soil impacting an area thirty feet by twenty-one feet." The Commission sent a letter concerning the violation to Lahijani by mail and email on June 1.
In October 2017, Lahijani sued Americo, alleging among other things that Americo's negligence caused pollution to the property. In an amended petition, Lahijani asserted the discovery rule should toll the statute of limitations in that suit because Americo's negligence was "not discovered until on or about March 18, 2016." The district court in that case granted Americo's motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, and this court affirmed. See Mustafa v. Americo Energy Res., LLC, No. 14-20-00202-CV, 2022 WL 1088584 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 12, 2022, pet. filed).
In August 2018, Lahijani retained a geologist to provide a work and sampling plan. The geologist sent a report to Lahijani in May 2019, confirming that the property was contaminated as a result of oil and gas operations, but the property had not been "fully assessed at this time due to the unknown extent of contamination."
On June 20, 2019, Lahijani sued Merit in a different district court from the Americo case, alleging among other things that Merit's negligence caused pollution to the property and contaminated the groundwater. Lahijani asserted the discovery rule, alleging that Merit's negligence was "not discovered until on or about April 2019" because "at no time prior to April 2018 [sic] was plaintiff aware of any groundwater contamination or any potential groundwater contamination."
Merit filed a motion for traditional summary judgment, alleging that any negligence must have occurred on or before March 31, 2002, when its operations on the property ceased. Merit argued that the discovery rule did not apply as a matter of law, and even if it did, Lahijani had actual knowledge of an injury in 2016, more than two years before he filed suit. Lahijani responded that Merit failed to conclusively negate a factual dispute as to whether or not Lahijani exercised due diligence in discovering the groundwater contamination and that evidence of soil discoloration was not the equivalent of visible surface spills.
Lahijani does not dispute that his claim is governed by the two-year statute of limitations. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a).
The trial court granted Merit's motion for summary judgment, and Lahijani appeals.
III. Analysis
In two issues, Lahijani contends that the trial court erred by granting the summary judgment to Merit on its limitations defense because (1) Merit did not conclusively establish the date of injury, and the presence of equipment, debris, and soil discoloration did not prohibit application of the discovery rule to soil and groundwater contamination claims in the absence of any evidence of an active surface spill; and (2) Merit did not conclusively negate the existence of factual disputes related to the discovery rule, i.e., that Lahijani lacked due diligence.
We hold that Merit conclusively established the accrual date and that the discovery rule does not apply, but even if it did apply, Merit conclusively established that Lahijani knew of his injury more than two years before filing suit.
A. Accrual Date
Merit presented undisputed evidence that all of Merit's operations on the well ceased in April 2002. Absent the discovery rule, Merit conclusively established that Lahijani's claim accrued at the latest in April 2002. See Mustafa 2022 WL 1088584, at *5 (Americo conclusively established that Lahijani's claim accrued at the latest in February 2015 when Americo's activity ceased on the property) (citing Lazy R Ranch, 511 S.W.3d at 544).
B. Discovery Rule Does Not Apply
In the appeal from the summary judgment in the Americo case, this court held that the type of injury alleged by Lahijani-soil and groundwater contamination stemming from oil and gas operations-was not inherently undiscoverable. Id.; see also Lazy R. Ranch, 511 S.W.3d 542-43. This court is bound by the panel holding in the Americo case. See Chase Home Fin., L.L.C. v. Cal W. Reconveyance Corp., 309 S.W.3d 619, 630 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.), ("Absent a decision from a higher court or this court sitting en banc that is on point and contrary to the prior panel decision or an intervening and material change in the statutory law, this court is bound by the prior holding of another panel of this court."), cited with approval in Brazos Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 576 S.W.3d 374, 382 n.6 (Tex. 2019).
Thus, the discovery rule is inapplicable to Lahijani's claim for soil and groundwater contamination. See Mustafa, 2022 WL 1088584, at *5-6.
Lahijani's first issue is overruled.
C. Discovery Rule Negated
Even if Merit failed to conclusively establish accrual of Lahijani's claim at the latest by April 2002, or if the discovery rule applied to Lahijani's claim, Merit presented undisputed evidence that Lahijani was aware of contamination on his property more than two years before he filed suit against Merit on June 20, 2019. The undisputed summary judgment evidence shows that Lahijani first became aware of potential contamination in March 2016, according to his allegation in the Americo lawsuit. See Brown v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 883, 900 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) ("[P]leadings in other actions which contain statements inconsistent with the party's present position can also be received as admissions."). He testified that he became aware of the potential contamination when visiting the property with an investor around that time, and he informed the Railroad Commission of Texas that numerous spills had occurred on the property. In May 2017, Lahijani again complained to the Commission about pollution on the property, which the Commission confirmed.
Even if Lahijani was not aware of the full extent of his injuries by May 2017-namely, groundwater contamination-the summary judgment evidence shows that he was aware of a wrongful act and resulting injury. See Lazy R. Ranch, 511 S.W.3d 542-43 (rejecting plaintiffs argument that, regardless of when its claims for surface contamination accrued, its claims for groundwater contamination could not be barred by limitations because it had not yet happened; reasoning that a claim accrues when injury occurs, not afterward when the full extent of the injury is known); see also Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 207 (Tex. 2011) ("Once a claimant learns of a wrongful injury, the statute of limitations begins to run even if the claimant does not yet know the specific cause of the injury; the party responsible for it; the full extent of it; or the chances of avoiding it." (quotation omitted)).
In sum, Merit conclusively negated the discovery rule because the undisputed evidence shows that Lahijani was aware of a wrongful act and injury more than two years before he filed suit.
Lahijani's second issue is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled Lahijani's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
MEMORANDUM CONCURRING OPINION
Meagan Hassan, Justice
Although I agree with the court's judgment, I am perturbed by the circumstances surrounding it, including (1) this court's correct conclusion that, "The undisputed summary judgment evidence shows that Lahijani first became aware of potential contamination in March 2016 . . ." (Majority Op. at 7); (2) a previous panel's conclusion that a different defendant was entitled to summary judgment against Lahijani's claims based on the statute of limitations because a reasonable person would have investigated before October 13, 2015 (see Mustafa v. Americo Energy Res., LLC, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2022 WL 1088584, at *4-6 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 12, 2022, pet. filed); and (3) the previous panel's inability to identify the precise date upon which Lahijani first became aware of facts that would have led him to investigate this particular injury at this particular site. See id. at *8 (Hassan, J., dissenting) ("Even after this de novo review, it is still unclear as to when Appellants should have discovered their injuries."); cf. id. at *6-8 (dissenting from the majority's affirmation of a waived summary judgment argument despite de novo review and the defendant's failure to secure necessary findings of fact supporting said summary judgment).
Together, these facts are remarkable not only because they reveal two panels of the same court applied the same law to the same facts and achieved two different results that both managed to deny Lahijani access to a jury trial, but because this panel has identified the precise date upon which he "first became aware of potential contamination." Majority Op. at 7. This finding is conclusive. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 6 ("Provided, that the decision of said courts shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before them on appeal or error.").
Finally, October 13, 2017 (the date on which Lahijani filed his previous suit) is less than two years after any day in March 2016. This court's controlling conclusion concerning the date on which Lahijani became aware of potential contamination highlights the nature and depth of the material injustice previously handed down by this court against Lahijani. However, there is nothing this particular panel (or even the en banc court) can do to alleviate that previous injustice, and therefore I respectfully concur in the court's judgment here.
MEMORANDUM CONCURRING OPINION
Charles A. Spain, Justice
I concur in the judgment and join the opinion as to issue one. Because it is unnecessary to reach issue two, I do not join the opinion regarding issue two.