Opinion
B299825
04-29-2020
In re L.G., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.G., Defendant and Appellant.
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP01487) APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, D. Brett Bianco, Judge. Affirmed. Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant, S.G. (Father), is the father of L.G. (born in August 2012). Father argues on appeal that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's findings that it has jurisdiction over L.G. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (d) and (j), based on allegations that Father repeatedly exposed himself to L.G.'s older maternal half siblings when they were minors and masturbated in their presence. Father does not challenge the court's other finding that, based on Father's alcoholism and a drunk driving accident with L.G. in the car, jurisdiction over L.G. is proper under section 300, subdivision (b). The unchallenged finding is alone sufficient to support juvenile court jurisdiction in this matter, so we may affirm the court's order without addressing Father's arguments. Father asks that we nevertheless exercise our discretion and consider the issues he raises on appeal. We decline to do so and affirm.
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 5, 2019, then six-year-old L.G. was in a car accident while Father was driving a car intoxicated, and DCFS detained her. On March 7, 2019, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on L.G.'s behalf alleging she was at risk due to Father's alcohol abuse and the March 5 accident.
Upon further investigation, DCFS learned that L.G.'s older maternal half siblings, Z.F. and A.F., who are not Father's children, but with whom Father had previously lived, were the subject of dependency proceedings against L.G.'s mother. Specifically, in 2012, the juvenile court sustained a petition against the mother based on allegations that she failed to protect Z.F. and A.F. from Father, who "[i]n December 2011 and on prior occasions for the past three years, . . . sexually abused the child [A.F.] by removing [his] clothing and fondling [his] penis in the child's presence." The petition alleged this same conduct against Z.F. "[o]n a prior occasion." Finally, the petition alleged that "[o]n a prior occasion, [Father] asked [A.F.] to remove the child's clothing."
The mother moved out of state in 2017. It appears legal custody of L.G. was the subject of separate family court proceedings, the status and result of which is not entirely clear from the record before us. The mother is not a party to this appeal. She was initially named in the petition for failure to protect L.G., but the court ultimately struck those allegations and deemed her to be a non-offending parent.
In a February 2012 DCFS interview with A.F. summarized in DCFS reports from these proceedings, A.F. provided further detail on the conduct underlying the sustained petition. She said that when she was in approximately eighth grade, Father started walking around the house naked and openly masturbated in her presence when the mother was not home. She said Father was drinking heavily when he did these things, and that they happened too many times to be accidental. A.F. further reported that once, when she was in the eighth grade, Father asked her to put on a bathing suit and bathe the cat. She said Father was really drunk, gave her $20, told her to take off her bathing suit, and stated, '" '[W]hat am I paying you for?' "
Father denied that he sexually abused or was sexually inappropriate with A.F. or Z.F. He told DCFS he did not have the opportunity to defend himself against these allegations in the prior dependency proceedings, and that A.F. had made the allegations as "a ploy" because she wanted to live with a friend.
Based on the 2012 petition regarding A.F. and Z.F., DCFS filed a first amended petition adding counts pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (d) and (j), alleging L.G. was at risk of sexual abuse based on the conduct alleged in the 2012 petition involving A.F. and Z.F.
Section 300, subdivision (d) provides juvenile court jurisdiction where "there is a substantial risk that the child will be sexually abused, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, by his or her parent or guardian or a member of his or her household." (§ 300, subd. (d).) Penal Code section 11165.1 defines "sexual abuse" as, inter alia, "the intentional masturbation of the perpetrator's genitals in the presence of a child." (Pen. Code, § 11165.1, subd. (b)(5).) Where section 300, subdivision (d) jurisdiction is based on past instances of sexual abuse of a sibling, it can overlap significantly with section 300, subdivision (j), which provides for jurisdiction over a child if "the child's sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions." (§ 300, subd. (j); see In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 779 [affirming jurisdictional findings regarding male children under section 300, subdivisions (d) and (j) based on prior sexual abuse of child's female sibling]; In re Petra B. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1169 ["In determining whether the child is in present need of the juvenile court's protection, the court may consider past events."].)
At the June 2019 jurisdictional hearing, the court overruled Father's evidentiary objections to records from the previous dependency proceedings involving A.F. and Z.F. Father does not appear to challenge these evidentiary rulings on appeal, nor do we see any basis on which to do so.
In addition to the records from these proceedings, the court considered other evidence related to the sexual abuse allegations in the amended petition. DCFS offered a June 3, 2018 police report reflecting that Father had been arrested for and charged with indecent exposure after masturbating in a vehicle in a public parking lot and exposing his erect penis to a woman while waving and smiling at her. When police arrested Father, he appeared to be under the influence of alcohol and smelled of alcohol.
We do not attempt to itemize the statements or documentary evidence in the record relevant to the jurisdictional allegations based on alcohol abuse or Father's car accident, as Father does not challenge these on appeal.
The court further considered recent statements from Z.F. that, when Z.F. was living with Father more recently between September and December 2018, Father placed a hidden camera in Z.F.'s bedroom, and that after Z.F. found it, Father told her not to tell anyone he had done so. Z.F. also provided copies of what she represented to be inappropriate texts from Father to Z.F.'s teenage friend that stated, "Did Zz tell you I thought you were hot?" and "[s]end me [a] pic of that cute butt in the island sun."
The court was not presented with any evidence suggesting Father had ever sexually abused L.G. To the contrary, L.G. stated to social workers and in two forensic interviews that Father had never inappropriately touched her. In stark contrast, she spoke coherently about Father's drinking.
Father's counsel asked the court to strike the jurisdictional allegations involving sexual abuse, arguing that Father was not a party to the siblings' prior case and therefore did not have counsel or the opportunity to present evidence.
The court ultimately sustained the amended petition with interlineations that removed allegations against the mother. The court removed L.G. from Father and released her to the mother. The court ordered that Father's visits with L.G. be monitored with DCFS discretion to liberalize.
Father appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Father argues that substantial evidence does not support the court's jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivisions (d) and (j). Father challenges only these sexually-based jurisdictional findings, not the court's separate jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b), which derives from his alcohol abuse and the car accident.
"When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court's jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence." (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451; see In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385, fn. 6). Here, the unchallenged section 300, subdivision (b) finding independently supports juvenile court jurisdiction over L.G. and thus provides a sufficient basis on which to affirm the court's order.
Father argues that we should exercise our discretion to nevertheless address the issues he raises, because findings involving sexual abuse will hinder his ability to secure visitation with L.G. in family court custody proceedings with the mother and/or the instant dependency proceedings. (See In re D.P. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 911, 917.) We decline to do so.
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. We concur:
BENDIX, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.