Opinion
B300231
04-28-2020
In re J.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. H.T., Defendant and Appellant.
Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP07985) APPEAL from jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Conditionally affirmed and remanded with directions. Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Appellant H.T. (father) appeals from the juvenile court's dispositional orders concerning his son J.T. Father challenges the juvenile court's decision not to place J.T. with him as a noncustodial and nonoffending parent, and to order father to participate in a substance abuse program and a parenting class. Father also contends that Tennessee was J.T.'s home state, and thus the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over J.T.'s dependency proceeding. Finally, father argues respondent Los Angeles County Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and its corresponding provisions under California law (see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.).
We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that placement with father would be detrimental to J.T., and that the juvenile court was within its discretion to order father's case plan. The record contains evidence that father had endangered J.T. on one occasion when J.T.'s mother M.D. (mother) was trying to take J.T. out of father's car, and father drove off with the door open and J.T. not restrained in a car seat. The record further indicates that father had an alcohol problem, including a vehicle accident after consuming alcohol and a conviction for driving under the influence. He also had a conviction for possession of marijuana.
We further conclude the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction based on a police report establishing that J.T. lived in California at least six months before the dependency proceeding commenced.
Lastly, we conclude that DCFS failed to comply with ICWA because, despite mother's assertion that she may be eligible for membership in a Sioux tribe, DCFS provided notice to only 14 of the 16 Sioux tribes identified by the Bureau of Indian Affairs for purposes of ICWA.
Accordingly, we conditionally affirm the dispositional orders but remand for ICWA compliance.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We limit our summary of the facts to those relevant to the issues on appeal. We summarize additional procedural history in the relevant parts of our Discussion section, post.
A. Detention and adjudication
On December 17, 2018, DCFS filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 seeking to detain J.T., age two, and his two older half-siblings T.D. and S.B., ages eight and five, respectively. The petition alleged that mother physically abused S.B., that mother had a history of substance abuse and currently abused marijuana, and that mother had failed to provide adequate care and supervision of J.T., who had been "found wandering on a street without adult supervision early in the morning."
Further undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The children were detained and placed in foster homes.
DCFS located father in Georgia, where he resided with his parents. Father reported that he and mother had lived together with T.D. and S.B. beginning in 2015, and J.T. was born during that time. In 2017, mother left Georgia with the children, and since then, father's only contact with J.T. had been by telephone or video communication.
Father reported that he was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) in 2016 for which he completed a court-ordered program. He also reported he had been arrested in 2015 for possession of one gram of marijuana. He was placed on probation, which he had completed a year earlier. Father stated he did not abuse drugs or alcohol, and was willing to test to verify his sobriety.
Father stated he wished to be involved in J.T.'s life, as well as the lives of T.D. and S.B., whom he had raised with mother for several years.
DCFS interviewed mother about father. Mother said she lived with father for two and a half or three years. Mother left father when J.T. was a year old "because [father] was constantly cheating on me."
Mother stated, " '[Father] drinks. I don't know if he drinks now. He drank at least 2 beers a day. Sometimes, he would get home sloppy drunk. He has 2-3 DUI['s]. He was kicked out of [the] military, because of domestic violence. He hit his wife. He never hit me. He got drunk every day. He was really good with the kids. He didn't drink and drive with the kids in the car.' "
DCFS filed an amended section 300 petition adding, inter alia, count b-6 alleging that father had a history of alcohol abuse and criminal convictions for driving under the influence, which put J.T. "at risk of physical and emotional harm and damage."
On February 11, 2019, the juvenile court found father to be J.T.'s presumed father and appointed counsel for him.
DCFS received confirmation that father in April 2018 had completed a 20-hour risk reduction and drug and alcohol abuse awareness program in Georgia in order to reinstate his suspended driver's license. DCFS sought further information regarding father, including a home visit, from DCFS's counterpart in Georgia, but as of the disposition hearing, had not received any information.
The juvenile court conducted J.T.'s adjudication hearing on May 30, 2019. The juvenile court sustained three counts against mother based on her history of substance abuse and failure to provide appropriate care and supervision of J.T. The juvenile court dismissed all other counts, including count b-6 based on father's alleged alcohol abuse. The record on appeal does not contain a transcript of the adjudication hearing.
B. Disposition
In advance of the disposition hearing, father requested J.T. be released to him, and filed a memorandum of points and authorities in support of his request.
The juvenile court held the disposition hearing on July 18, 2019. Father's counsel appeared but father was not present himself.
Mother testified she had last seen father in November 2017. Father visited her and J.T. for a week, before mother moved from Tennessee to California. Since then, father had had "rare" contact with J.T. via telephone or video communication.
Mother testified her relationship with father was "[n]ot very good." When J.T. was a newborn, she and father "had several . . . domestic altercations where the police were called out." These altercations "caused [mother] to leave Georgia and to go back to Tennessee with my mother."
Asked to describe the domestic violence, mother said, "It was pretty bad. We didn't really fight too much in front of the kids. There were a couple of incidences with my newborn child [J.T.]. That's actually the reason as to why I left. They were all due to alcohol issues. [Father] being out all night. I mean he had problems with alcohol. I was dealing with emotional stress from just having a baby."
Mother testified that father had an unresolved warrant in Colorado for driving under the influence. Father was in a "bad accident" and the police took him to the hospital. He was supposed to go to court, but mother and father "ended up leaving from Colorado and moving in with my mom in Tennessee."
The juvenile court asked mother to describe specifically the domestic violence between father and her. Mother replied, "There was an incident where I called the police because [father] was driving my son without him being restrained in his car seat and [father] put him in the passenger's side of the vehicle. I was trying to get my son out of the car, and [father] actually drove off with my child in the car unstrapped with the door open. I ended up calling the police. I tried to get the neighbors to help me, and he kept driving."
When the juvenile court asked if there were any other incidents of domestic violence besides the one in which father drove off with J.T., mother replied, "We've had altercations where he's actually put his hands on me prior to that but not with the child around."
The juvenile court stated that mother had "credibly testified to the event of placing the child in a car seat unrestrained and taking off, and mother had to call the police." The juvenile court found this to be clear and convincing evidence of detriment: "[A]ny parent that would take off—drive a car without restraining an infant child demonstrates incredible lack of parental capacity and ability to protect."
Accordingly, the juvenile court denied father's request that J.T. be released to him, but stated the court might revisit the issue after father's home had been assessed and there was further evidence placement with him would be suitable. The juvenile court ordered J.T. removed from the custody of his parents, to be "placed in Suitable Placement under supervision of [DCFS]."
The juvenile court ordered father to complete a full drug and alcohol program with aftercare and a developmentally appropriate parenting course, and to participate in individual counseling to address case issues including relapse prevention and domestic violence. The juvenile court granted father monitored visits three times a week.
Father's counsel asked why the juvenile court ordered a drug and alcohol program for "the non-offending father." Counsel for DCFS stated that father "has a history of drug and alcohol abuse. Mother has testified that it's ongoing." The juvenile court stated, "Under my broad powers given the child's tender age and the children's young age, I have concerns about substance abuse."
Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Juvenile Court's Decision Not To Place J.T. With Father Was Supported By Substantial Evidence
Father challenges the juvenile court's finding that placing J.T. with father would be detrimental to the child.
Section 361.2, subdivision (a) provides, "If a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." A juvenile court's finding of detriment must be based on clear and convincing evidence. (In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426 (Luke M.).)
We review the juvenile court's finding of detriment for substantial evidence. (Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1424.) "We review the record in the light most favorable to the court's order to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find clear and convincing evidence that placement would be detrimental to the child." (In re Patrick S. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1262.)
Here, the juvenile court's finding of detriment was supported by substantial evidence. The juvenile court credited mother's testimony that on one occasion when she was trying to take the infant J.T. out of father's car, father drove off with the door open and J.T. not restrained in a car seat. Mother also testified that father had an alcohol problem, DUI convictions, and an unresolved DUI warrant in Colorado resulting from a "bad accident" for which he was hospitalized. Father, who was not present at the disposition hearing, presented no countervailing evidence disputing mother's testimony. Indeed, his admission to DCFS that he was convicted in 2016 for driving under the influence corroborated mother's testimony in part. In sum, this evidence supported the juvenile court's conclusion that father demonstrated a "lack of parental capacity and ability to protect."
Father argues that the details of the incident where he drove off with J.T. "were vague," and "the sole act of driving off without restraining the child cannot constitute grounds for refusing to place a child with his noncustodial and nonoffending parent." Father cites no authority in support of his contention that this "sole act" is insufficient to prove detriment. In our view, driving off with an unrestrained infant and an open car door while the mother attempts to retrieve the child shows, at best, grievously poor judgment as a parent.
Although the juvenile court focused on the driving-off incident in finding detriment, that incident was not the only cause for concern. As discussed, there was also evidence of father's alcohol abuse, including a "bad accident" caused by drinking and driving, and, by father's own admission, a DUI conviction. Father argues "no nexus existed between father's 2016 DUI and any risk of harm to the minor," but the driving-off incident establishes, at minimum, that father's questionable decisions when operating vehicles had put J.T. at risk.
Father contends that it was "illogical" for the juvenile court to dismiss the jurisdictional counts against father yet deny him placement of J.T. Father cites no authority in support of this contention. The juvenile court's ruling was not "illogical." Father lived thousands of miles away from J.T. at the time of the jurisdictional hearing and had not seen him in well over a year. Thus, the juvenile court logically could conclude that father's conduct, as measured at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, was insufficient to support an assertion of dependency jurisdiction based on father putting J.T. at substantial risk of harm. (See § 300, subd. (b)(1).) At the same time, however, the juvenile court logically could conclude that father's conduct would put J.T. at risk of harm were J.T. to be placed with father.
Father argues that mother "made several conflicting statements and assertions," some suggesting she believed J.T. was safe with father. Of course, when reviewing for substantial evidence, "issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court." (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) We will not disturb the juvenile court's factual conclusions simply because the facts might support alternative conclusions.
II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Ordering Father's Case Plan
Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering him to attend parenting classes and a drug and alcohol program, and by restricting him to monitored visitation. Father argues the orders "were not designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court's finding that the minor was a person described by Section 300."
Father did not object to the case plan in the juvenile court, and therefore cannot challenge it on appeal. (In re C.M. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 376, 385.)
We also reject father's challenge on the merits. Section 362, subdivision (a) gives the juvenile court broad authority to "make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child." Subdivision (d) of that section provides, "The juvenile court may direct any reasonable orders to the parents or guardians of the child who is the subject of any proceedings under this chapter as the court deems necessary and proper to carry out this section . . . . That order may include a direction to participate in a counseling or education program, including, but not limited to, a parent education and parenting program . . . . The program in which a parent or guardian is required to participate shall be designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court's finding that the child is a person described by Section 300." We review the juvenile court's dispositional orders for abuse of discretion. (See In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 851.)
This division has held that under section 362, subdivision (a), so long as the juvenile court has a basis to assert jurisdiction over a child, it has the authority to order "a nonoffending parent to participate in services." (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1148.) Moreover, " '[t]he problem that the juvenile court seeks to address [through the dispositional order] need not be described in the sustained section 300 petition.' " (Ibid.) Thus, the juvenile court was within its authority to order father to participate in services although the juvenile court did not sustain any of the jurisdictional allegations against him.
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father's specific case plan. As set forth above, there was evidence that father had on one occasion seriously jeopardized J.T.'s safety, and that he had problems with alcohol, including a DUI conviction. Father also admitted to suffering a conviction for possession of marijuana. The juvenile court was within its discretion, therefore, to order father to participate in parenting classes and a drug and alcohol program, and to allow only monitored visitation.
III. The Juvenile Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Father argues that because J.T. and mother had only recently moved to California from Tennessee before the instant proceeding commenced, California was not J.T.'s home state for purposes of the juvenile court having subject matter jurisdiction. We reject this argument.
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) (Fam. Code, § 3400 et seq.) is the exclusive means for determining subject matter jurisdiction in child custody proceedings. (In re A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 668 (A.C.).) A dependency action is a child custody proceeding within the meaning of the UCCJEA. (In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703, 715.) " 'Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child custody determination.' " (In re Gino C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 959, 965.)
The issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. (See In re Gloria A. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 476, 481 ["Subject matter jurisdiction has to be addressed whenever that issue comes to the court's attention"].)
The UCCJEA lists a number of circumstances in which the juvenile court has subject matter jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding, including if California "is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding." (Fam. Code, § 3421, subd. (a)(1).) "Home state" is defined as "the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding." (Fam. Code, § 3402, subd. (g).) The UCCJEA defines " '[c]ommencement' " as "the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding," which here was on December 17, 2018. (Fam. Code, § 3402, subd. (e).)
Thus, for California to be J.T.'s home state for purposes of the UCCJEA, he and mother would have to have been living in California as of June 17, 2018, six months before DCFS filed the original section 300 petition seeking his detention. "On appeal, 'when the facts are contested, a trial court's jurisdictional finding under the UCCJEA is reviewed under the deferential substantial evidence standard.' " (A.C., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 669.)
The record does not indicate that the parties raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction or that the juvenile court expressly made a finding under the UCCJEA. The record supports, however, an implicit finding that California was J.T.'s home state at the commencement of the proceedings.
The detention report stated that a DCFS social worker contacted the Los Angeles Police Department seeking information about mother. An officer informed the social worker of "a police report in May 2018 where mother's car was impounded." This is substantial evidence that mother, and by extension her young child, J.T., were in Los Angeles in May 2018, more than six months before DCFS filed the section 300 petition.
Father does not mention or address the evidence of the May 2018 police report in his appellate briefing, and it is not entirely clear what evidence he believes supports his argument that J.T. did not live in California as of June 17, 2018. Based on the record citations in his appellate briefing, it appears he bases his conclusion on the statement of a family acquaintance in the detention report, and a statement by mother at the disposition hearing.
The acquaintance reported that "since August [2018]," mother and the children "ha[d] been on the streets, lived in a shelter, rented an apartment that they never paid for, and now live[d] in an RV." At the July 18, 2019 disposition hearing, mother testified she had lived in California "[f]or a year now."
This evidence does not contradict the evidence of the May 2018 police report. The acquaintance's statement regarding the family's living situation as of August says nothing about where mother and J.T. lived before August. As for mother's testimony, it reasonably may be construed as an approximation, not a statement that she literally moved to California precisely one year before the date of her testimony.
IV. DCFS Failed To Provide Sufficient ICWA Notice
Father argues that DCFS failed to comply with ICWA. First, he argues that DCFS failed to notify all relevant tribes. Second, he argues that DCFS failed to investigate mother's purported Indian affiliation with maternal relatives and to document properly its investigation. We agree with father's first argument and reject the second.
Father did not raise this challenge below, but "a challenge to ICWA compliance is not forfeited due to a failure to object in the trial court." (In re J.T. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 986, 991.)
A. Relevant proceedings below
Mother completed and signed an ICWA-020 form at the outset of the dependency proceeding in which she indicated, "I am or may be a member of, or eligible for membership in, a federal recognized Indian tribe." She specifically identified the Cherokee and Sioux tribes.
According to the jurisdiction and disposition report, mother and maternal grandmother "claimed that they may have affiliation with" the Cherokee, Choctaw, or Sioux tribes.
DCFS prepared an ICWA-030 "Notice of Child Custody Proceeding for Indian Child" form. (Some capitalization omitted.) The form listed mother's name as well as the names of J.T.'s maternal grandparents, great-grandparents, and great-great-grandparents, with some listings including dates of birth and/or places of birth.
DCFS sent the ICWA-030 notice to three Cherokee tribes, three Choctaw tribes, and 14 Sioux tribes. As of the May 30, 2019 adjudication hearing, 14 of the tribes had responded that J.T. was not enrolled or eligible for membership.
At the adjudication hearing, the juvenile court found "no reason to know that [J.T.] is an Indian Child."
B. DCFS failed to provide notice to all tribes of which J.T. may be a member or eligible for membership
ICWA requires that notice be provided "to Indian tribes in any involuntary proceeding in state court to place a child in foster care or to terminate parental rights 'where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved.' " (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8, quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) Section 224.3, subdivision (a)(3)(A) requires that notice be sent to "[a]ll tribes of which the child may be a member or citizen, or eligible for membership or citizenship."
The federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) periodically publishes a list in the Federal Register of "Designated Tribal Agents for Service of Notice" under ICWA (BIA list). (See, e.g., 84 Fed.Reg. 20387 (May 9, 2019).) Courts have relied on the BIA list to determine if a child welfare agency has provided notice to all relevant tribes. (See In re J.T., supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) In In re J.T., the Court of Appeal held the child welfare agency did not comply with ICWA when it failed to send notice to all 16 Sioux tribes on the BIA list after the child's mother identified herself as possibly having Sioux heritage. (Id. at pp. 992, 994.)
The state ICWA statutes have been revised since In re J.T. was decided. As discussed, however, they continue to require the child welfare agency to provide notice to "[a]ll tribes of which the child may be a member or citizen, or eligible for membership or citizenship." (§ 224.3, subd. (a)(3)(A).)
Similar to In re J.T., here mother indicated on the ICWA-020 form that she "may be a member of, or eligible for membership in" a Sioux tribe. The current BIA list, like the list in J.T., includes 16 Sioux tribes, as did the list in effect at the time DCFS mailed the notices in the instant case. (See 84 Fed.Reg. 20409-20411, 20420 (May 9, 2019); 83 Fed.Reg. 25685, 25703-25704, 25710 (June 4, 2018).) The record indicates that DCFS provided notice to 14 of those 16 tribes, but, as father notes, the record does not indicate that DCFS provided notice to the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe or the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe. (84 Fed.Reg. 203387, 20409 (May 9, 2019); 83 Fed.Reg. 25685, 25703 (June 4, 2018.) There is no explanation in the record for why DCFS did not send notice to those tribes. Consistent with In re J.T., therefore, we conclude the ICWA notice in this case was inadequate.
Our recent decision In re Austin J. (Apr. 15, 2020, B299564) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ held that changes in 2018 to the state ICWA-related statutes modified the criteria triggering DCFS's duty to provide notice to Indian tribes. (See id. at pp. *14-*16.) Here, however, DCFS does not dispute that the information provided by mother and maternal grandmother obligated DCFS to provide notice to "the relevant tribes." Given this implicit concession, the issue of whether the information provided by mother and maternal grandmother met the criteria in the amended statute triggering DCFS's duty to provide notice is not before us, and we express no opinion on it.
DCFS argues the responses DCFS received from the other Sioux tribes were sufficient to indicate that J.T. was not a member or eligible for membership in any Sioux tribe. DCFS provides no support for the assertion that lack of eligibility for membership in some Sioux tribes necessarily means lack of eligibility for membership in all Sioux tribes.
Courts have held that failure to comply with ICWA requirements is not jurisdictional error, and does not require the reversal of juvenile court orders apart from orders terminating parental rights. (In re Brooke C. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 377, 385.) Instead, the proper remedy is to conditionally affirm the dispositional orders and remand for the limited purpose of ICWA compliance. (In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1388 (Kadence P.).) We follow that course here.
In Kadence P., our colleagues in Division 7 described the juvenile court's course of action upon such a conditional affirmance: "Upon remand the juvenile court shall direct [DCFS] to send ICWA notice to the . . . tribes in accordance with ICWA and California law. The Department shall thereafter notify the court of its actions and file certified mail, return receipts for any ICWA notices that were sent together with any responses received. The court shall then determine whether the ICWA inquiry and notice requirements have been satisfied and whether [the child] is an Indian child. If the court finds [the child] is an Indian child, it shall conduct a new disposition hearing, as well as all further proceedings, in compliance with ICWA and related California law." (Kadence P., supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1388-1389.)
C. Father fails to show any additional insufficiency in DCFS's investigation of mother's purported affiliation with Indian tribes
Father claims DCFS's ICWA investigation was lacking because the agency "did not interview the maternal grandmother or the maternal great grandfather regarding the ICWA after the mother provided their contact information."
Father also claims DCFS failed to document the inquiries it made regarding mother's purported affiliation with Indian tribes. Father specifically claims DCFS failed to document how it learned mother might be affiliated with Choctaw tribes, when she originally identified only Cherokee or Sioux tribes.
As indicated by the jurisdiction and disposition report, DCFS did interview maternal grandmother, and she and mother reported that mother may be affiliated with Cherokee, Choctaw, or Sioux tribes. The record does not indicate that DCFS interviewed the maternal great-grandfather regarding mother's Indian affiliation, but father fails to explain why such inquiry was necessary given that mother and maternal grandmother had already provided the names of the relevant tribes. We note further that mother did not identify maternal great-grandfather as someone with information about her Indian affiliation—instead, she provided his contact information as a possible caregiver for the children.
Father's contention that DCFS failed to document how it had learned of mother's possible Choctaw affiliation ignores the jurisdiction and disposition report, which, as noted above, indicated it was mother and maternal grandmother who identified the tribes with which mother might be affiliated.
Father thus fails to demonstrate any insufficiency in DCFS's ICWA inquiry apart from not sending notice to the two Sioux tribes identified above.
DISPOSITION
The dispositional orders are conditionally affirmed, and the matter is remanded for the limited purpose of ICWA compliance. The juvenile court shall direct DCFS to send notices as required by ICWA and related California law to the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe and the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe, and to submit those notices and any responses thereto to the juvenile court. If the juvenile court concludes that J.T. is an Indian child, it shall conduct further proceedings in accordance with ICWA and related California law.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J. We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.