Opinion
B295005
03-04-2020
In re S.A. et. al, Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. E.A., Defendant and Appellant.
William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, Kimberly Roura, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a). Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP04531 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Diane C. Reyes, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed. William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, Kimberly Roura, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Following entry of judgment after a dispositional hearing, Eric A. (father) challenges the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Father contends there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate his two daughters were at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to his substance abuse issues.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
We conclude substantial evidence supports the court's jurisdictional findings. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Father and Holly W. (mother) are the parents of two children, Sofia A. and Sabrina A. Sofia was born in 2009, and Sabrina was born in 2011. Mother and father divorced in 2017. Both parents have remarried and share joint 50/50 custody of the children per an order obtained in family court.
Mother is not a party to this appeal.
On July 13, 2018, police responded to a call reporting a vehicle belonging to the children's step-father, Teddy W. (step-father), had crashed into a tree near the condominium complex where step-father resided. The reporting party stated that when she went to look at the crash site, she observed mother and step-father exit the vehicle and walk into his condominium unit.
When the police knocked on the door to step-father's unit to speak with him about the vehicle collision, step-father opened the door, ran towards them "in a rage" while yelling profanities, and threw a champagne bottle at them. Step-father then ran back into his unit and slammed the door shut. Later, one of the investigating officers observed mother leaving step-father's unit. Mother told the police officer no children were present in the condominium. While speaking to mother, the police officer observed her breath smelled strongly of alcohol. Ultimately, the police were unable to convince step-father to exit the unit and speak with them about the crash.
The July 13 incident prompted a referral to the Department of Children and Family Services (Department). During its investigation, father informed the Department he had obtained a restraining order against mother and step-father, as both of them have physically assaulted him in the past.
On July 18, 2018, the Department detained the children from mother and placed them with father. Two days later, the Department filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), alleging the children were at risk of serious physical harm due to mother's "violent conduct" towards father (counts a-1 and b-2) and mother's abuse of alcohol and prescription medication (count b-1).
Following the children's detention, mother provided the Department with a declaration, in which she described father's history of mental health and substance abuse issues, and recounted several incidents where father had engaged in acts of "aggression and violence against [her]" Mother also informed the Department a deputy district attorney had told her counsel that father was "visibly drunk and/or on drugs" at a court appearance on September 18, 2018, while the children were in father's custody.
On November 9, 2018, the Department filed its First Amended Petition, which added an additional allegation under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The additional allegation asserted the children were at risk of serious physical harm due to father's alcohol abuse (count b-3).
At the jurisdictional hearing held on November 20, 2018, the court dismissed counts a-1, b-1, and b-2, but sustained count b-3. Subsequently, at the dispositional hearing held on December 20, 2018, the court found the issues that initially justified exercising jurisdiction over the children no longer existed, and terminated jurisdiction. The court released the children to their parents, and granted mother and father joint legal and physical custody in accordance with the previous family court order, with the caveat that step-father not be permitted to transport or be alone with the children. Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. This appeal has not been rendered moot.
Preliminarily, we address the Department's assertion that this appeal should be dismissed as moot. The Department contends this appeal has been rendered moot because the juvenile court already terminated jurisdiction over the children, such that father cannot be provided any "effective relief" on appeal. We disagree.
"As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot. [Citation.] However, dismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic, but 'must be decided on a case-by-case basis.' [Citations.]" (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) Courts have acknowledged that where a judgment dismissing a dependency action is challenged on appeal, the case is not moot if the purported error may affect the outcome of subsequent proceedings. (Ibid.; see also In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1547.)
Here, father correctly points out the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings could prejudice him in future dependency or family law proceedings. Consequently, we conclude this appeal was not mooted by the court's termination of jurisdiction, and therefore address the merits of father's challenges to the disputed findings. (See In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 716 [finding juvenile court's termination of jurisdiction did not moot father's appeal because, "if erroneous, [the challenged jurisdictional findings] could have severe and unfair consequences to [him] in future family law or dependency proceedings"].)
II. The jurisdictional findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a child if it finds "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . due to the parent's or guardian's . . . substance abuse." (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) In evaluating whether a child faces a risk of harm under section 300, the court may consider past events, as "[a] parent's past conduct is a good predictor of future behavior. [Citation.]" (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.) To establish a risk of harm at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, however, "[t]here must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur. [Citation.]" (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136.)
We review a juvenile court's jurisdictional orders for substantial evidence. (In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992 (Yolanda L.).) Under this standard, "we view the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's determinations, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the juvenile court's findings and orders." (Ibid.) "We do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.]" (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228 (Dakota H.).)
"Substantial evidence must be of ponderable legal significance. It is not synonymous with 'any' evidence. [Citation.] The evidence must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. [Citation]" (Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 228.) "'. . . "The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Yolanda L., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 992.) "The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. [Citation.]" (Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 228.)
Father contends the juvenile court erred in sustaining count b-3 of the First Amended Petition, asserting there was insufficient evidence to establish the children had suffered or were at risk of suffering serious physical harm due to his substance abuse issues. In support of his argument, father relies principally on In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822 (David M.). We do not agree with father's argument.
The present case is distinguishable from David M. In David M., the court determined that although the mother "suffer[ed] from a substance abuse problem with marijuana," the evidence related to her substance abuse "was never tied to any actual harm . . . or to a substantial risk of serious harm" to her children. (David M., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 829-830.) Rather, the evidence reflected the children were "healthy, well cared for, and loved," and that the mother had "tested negative for drugs approximately 18 times" in the time between the detention and jurisdictional hearing. (Id. at p. 830.) Thus, the court reversed the juvenile court's findings under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) pertaining to the mother's substance abuse issues. (Id. at p. 833.)
By contrast, here, while the record does not demonstrate father's substance abuse caused actual harm to the children in the past, the record contains sufficient evidence tying father's alcohol abuse to a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the children in the future. As discussed below, the record reflects that in the last few years, father's alcohol abuse led him to engage in behaviors that seriously compromised his own safety and the safety of others on several occasions. Although father reported he was sober and seeking treatment in the five months prior to the jurisdictional hearing, the evidence shows father had recently relapsed after being sober for a similar length of time.
In an interview with the Department, father reported he "had a drinking problem in the past," but did not specifically identify when his substance abuse issues began. Mother's description of father's substance abuse history, however, indicates he has struggled with substance abuse at least since 2015. According to Mother, father's substance abuse issues resulted in his hospitalization in August 2015, February 2016, May 2016, and December 2016.
Father was involved in two violent altercations while under the influence of alcohol in 2017. Mother reported that in May 2017, father told her he had gone to urgent care because he woke with a large laceration over his eye, which had bled all over his pillow and bed sheets the night before. Father told mother that although he was unable to recall the events from the previous evening, as he had "passed out" from "drinking so much," he "was sure a violent altercation had occurred." A few months later, in August 2017, father was arrested for felony assault after an argument with a woman he had mistaken for his Uber driver escalated into a physical altercation. During the altercation, father slapped and punched the woman in the face. He also grabbed her by the throat with both hands and threw her to the ground twice. The police determined father was severely intoxicated when he was arrested.
Four months before the jurisdictional hearing, father was arrested for public intoxication. At around 4:35 a.m. on July 8, 2018, police officers on patrol observed father sitting in the driver's seat of a vehicle parked near a residential driveway. The driver's side door was open, and father "was hunched over" and "vomiting into the street." Upon approaching father, one of the officers observed the vehicle smelled strongly of alcohol, and that father appeared to be drunk. When the officer asked father what he was doing, father stated he was trying to give his female passenger a ride home, although he admitted "he should not have" because "he was too intoxicated."
While father reported he had been sober for five months, from July through November 2018, the record reflects father previously relapsed after a five-month sobriety period, which began in October 2017 and ended in February 2018. Indeed, father acknowledged his relapse culminated in his July 2018 arrest. Moreover, the evidence also suggests father may have relapsed again within his most recent period of reported sobriety. As discussed above, a deputy district attorney observed father appeared to be intoxicated at a court appearance in September 2018.
On this record, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude father's substance abuse has caused him to engage in behaviors jeopardizing his own safety and the safety of others numerous times in the last few years. Considering father's recent relapse in March 2018, the court could appropriately infer that although father was reportedly sober in the five months leading up to the jurisdictional hearing, there was a fair possibility father could relapse again in the near-future. Under these circumstances, the court could properly conclude the children were at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to father's substance abuse. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the court's jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b)(1).
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional findings are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
CURREY, J. WE CONCUR:
MANELLA, P.J.
COLLINS, J.