Opinion
B312945
01-28-2022
In re B.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, D.V., Defendant and Appellant.
Annie Greenleaf, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 18CCJP06961, Rudolph A. Diaz, Judge. Affirmed.
Annie Greenleaf, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 1
Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BENDIX, J.
D.V. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights as to her daughter B.V. At the time the dependency proceeding commenced, the available evidence indicated mother and daughter had arrived in the United States from Guatemala one to three months earlier, and therefore California was not B.V.'s home state. The record does not indicate, however, that the juvenile court expressly determined whether it had jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) (Fam. Code, § 3400 et seq.). Although mother did not contest the juvenile court's jurisdiction or invoke the UCCJEA below, on appeal she contends the trial court's failure to comply with the UCCJEA requires reversal of the trial court's assertion of jurisdiction and all subsequent orders, including the order terminating her parental rights.
Unspecified statutory citations are to the Family Code.
We conclude that uncontested evidence establishes the juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Accordingly, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 24, 2018, respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral that 23-month-old B.V. had been hospitalized with 2 injuries that medical staff were concerned were "the result of non-accidental trauma." (Italics omitted.) Police had taken B.V. into protective custody. Mother informed police she and B.V. had arrived in the United States from Guatemala a month earlier. Mother falsely claimed father was still in Guatemala, but later admitted to DCFS that father lived in the United States and that he helped her look after B.V.
Following an investigation, DCFS on October 29, 2018, filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 seeking to detain B.V. from parents. The petition alleged that B.V. was hospitalized with "first and second degree splash and non-splash burns" on her right leg. She also "had an acute subdural hemorrhage" to her brain, bruising on her wrists, chest, eye, ears, lower back, and face, and "healing fractures" in both wrists. The petition alleged that mother's and father's explanations were not consistent with the injuries, and the injuries instead were "consistent with inflicted trauma." Parents allegedly "failed to obtain timely necessary medical care for the child."
The petition further alleged that father physically abused B.V. "by burning the child's foot with hot water and punch[ing] the child's face." The petition alleged that mother physically abused B.V. "by forcefully slapping the child's face and pulling the child's ears."
Based on the above allegations, the petition asserted counts under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (e).
On October 30, 2018, the juvenile court ordered B.V. detained from parents. Following B.V.'s release from the 3 hospital, she was placed with a foster parent, E.J., on November 13, 2018.
Mother and father pleaded no contest to the dependency petition and on June 4, 2019, the juvenile court asserted jurisdiction, sustaining the petition as pleaded. The court ordered reunification services and visitation for both parents, with father's visits to be in a therapeutic setting.
On November 26, 2019, mother and father were criminally charged with child abuse. The trial court in Pomona issued criminal protective orders barring parents from contact with B.V. Mother was arrested and in custody for several months; the trial court ultimately sentenced her to five years' probation and time served, at which point she was released. Father posted bail; the record indicates his criminal hearing was pending and provides no further details.
Following a series of review hearings, the juvenile court terminated reunification services on February 9, 2021, and set a permanency planning hearing. Following that hearing, on June 8, 2021, the juvenile court terminated mother's and father's parental rights and transferred B.V. to DCFS for adoption planning and placement. B.V.'s foster parent E.J. was the prospective adoptive parent.
The juvenile court also granted B.V. special immigrant juvenile status, finding it would not be in her best interests to return to Guatemala. Among the juvenile court's findings in support was that B.V. "has no parent willing or able to care for her in Guatemala. Both [mother] and [father] reside in the United States, and both [mother] and [father] abused and neglected" B.V. In making this finding, the juvenile court found 4 that father was in fact B.V.'s father, a question the juvenile court had not ruled on earlier in the proceedings.
Mother timely appealed from the order terminating her parental rights. Father did not appeal.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Because mother does not challenge the sustained dependency allegations or the evidence underlying them, we limit our factual summary to the information pertinent to the UCCJEA, the sole issue on appeal.
Mother and B.V. came to the United States from Guatemala. Mother stated that when she and B.V. were in Guatemala, maternal grandmother and great-grandmother assisted in caring for B.V. when mother worked.
DCFS received inconsistent accounts of when mother and B.V. arrived in the United States, although there was no indication they had arrived more than three months prior to the dependency proceeding commencing on October 29, 2018. Mother gave her arrival date as September 24, 2018, but it is unclear if that was the date she arrived in the United States, or the date she arrived in the Los Angeles area-mother reported that immigration authorities had detained her in Texas for 18 days immediately upon her arrival to the United States. Father reported that mother had arrived in Los Angeles about 11/2 months before the proceeding commenced. Mother's cousin in Tennessee approximated mother's arrival as two to three months earlier, and mother's uncle in South Carolina stated two months.
Mother reported she was undocumented and was afraid of being deported back to Guatemala. Mother initially told DCFS she fled Guatemala to escape B.V.'s father, who she claimed 5 subjected her to physical and sexual abuse. She also said her brother-in-law in Guatemala had threatened to hurt her or B.V. if mother did not have sex with him. As stated, mother later admitted father was in the United States.
Father reported he came to the United States legally in August 2016. He lived with his four other children, two of whom were born in the United States, and their mother in El Monte. Father's sister (paternal aunt) lived in the front house on the same property as father, and sometimes helped with caring for the children, including B.V. When DCFS spoke with paternal aunt, she said she had little interaction with B.V. and would only care for her for a few minutes, but did help take her to the hospital on October 24, 2018.
Father reported that B.V. was the result of a one-night stand between father and mother while father was still in Guatemala. After B.V. was born, mother told father multiple times she wanted to come to the United States. He discouraged this, but she was persistent and he eventually paid a human trafficker to bring mother and B.V. to the United States.
DISCUSSION
The only issue before us is whether the juvenile court has jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. We hold it does.
A. Governing Law
"The UCCJEA 'is the exclusive method of determining the proper forum in custody disputes involving other jurisdictions and governs juvenile dependency proceedings.' [Citation.] The UCCJEA is designed to avoid jurisdictional conflicts between states and relitigation of custody decisions, promote cooperation between states, and facilitate enforcement of another state's 6 custody decrees. [Citation.] Foreign countries are treated as states for the purpose of determining jurisdiction. [Citation.]" (In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 125, 136.)
Family Code section 3421 provides four bases under which a California court may assert jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding and issue a permanent child custody order.
The UCCJEA also permits courts to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction under specified circumstances. (§ 3424, subd. (a).) Because we hold the juvenile court properly exercised full jurisdiction, we need not decide whether its actions were proper under its temporary emergency jurisdiction.
First, "[t]his state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state." (§ 3421, subd. (a)(1).)" 'Home state' means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding." (§ 3402, subd. (g).)
Second, "[a] court of another state does not have jurisdiction under [section 3421, subdivision (a), ] paragraph (1), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds that this state is the more appropriate forum under Section 3427 or 3428, and both of the following are true: [¶] (A) The child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence. [¶] (B) Substantial evidence is available in 7 this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships." (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2).)
Third, "[a]ll courts having jurisdiction under paragraph (1) or (2) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under Section 3427 or 3428." (§ 3421, subd. (a)(3).)
Finally, "[n]o court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)." (§ 3421, subd. (a)(4).)
B. The Juvenile Court Had Jurisdiction Under the
UCCJEA
The juvenile court in the instant case made no express findings under the UCCJEA. Mother contends this was reversible error. DCFS argues mother forfeited her challenge by not invoking the UCCJEA below, citing In re J.W. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 347, 362. In the alternative, DCFS argues the record supports the juvenile court's implicit assertion of UCCJEA jurisdiction. We agree with DCFS's alternative argument, and conclude undisputed facts in the record establish that the juvenile court appropriately exercised jurisdiction in this case.We therefore do not reach the forfeiture question. 8
It is unsettled whether we may reweigh UCCJEA facts de novo or must instead review the juvenile court's findings for substantial evidence. (See In re Aiden L. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 508, 519-520 (Aiden L.) [noting conflict and holding substantial evidence standard applies].) We need not resolve this question. The juvenile court's implicit assertion of jurisdiction is supported by substantial evidence, and our de novo review of the undisputed facts similarly confirms that jurisdiction was appropriate here. (See In re A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 670 [appellate court reviews de novo "a juvenile court's determination of jurisdictional facts based on undisputed evidence"].)
First, it is clear that B.V. had no "home state" as of the commencement of this proceeding. It was undisputed that B.V. had been in California between one and three months when DCFS filed the dependency petition. Thus, she was in neither California nor in Guatemala (or any other jurisdiction) "for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement" of the proceeding. (§ 3402, subd. (g); see In re Jaheim B. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1350 [minor born and raised in Florida who moved to California five months before he was taken into protective custody had no home state under UCCJEA].)
The record does not indicate when mother and B.V. left Guatemala, and therefore it is possible that Guatemala was B.V.'s home state "within six months before the commencement of the proceeding." (§ 3421, subd. (a)(1)). For Guatemala to retain home state jurisdiction despite B.V.'s absence, however, "a parent or person acting as a parent" would have to be living there. (Ibid.) Of course, both of B.V.'s parents lived in California when the proceeding began, and in granting B.V. special immigrant juvenile status, the juvenile court expressly found B.V. "has no parent willing or able to care for her in Guatemala."
Mother argues that "Guatemala could have home state jurisdiction over" B.V., and therefore the juvenile court was required to "reach[ ] out to the appropriate Guatemala court to determine if it wished to take . . . jurisdiction." It is true that "if the court is aware that another state (or foreign country) qualifies as the child's home state, the California court must 9 contact the home state court to give it an opportunity to decide whether to exercise its home state jurisdiction." (Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 518-519.) Guatemala was no longer B.V.'s home state under either sections 3402, subdivision (g) or 3421, subdivision (a)(1), however, and thus there was no home state for the juvenile court to contact.
Because B.V. had no home state at the commencement of the proceeding, the next question is whether the juvenile court could assert jurisdiction under section 3421, subdivision (a)(2). Jurisdiction under this provision requires that "the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent[ ] have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence," and "[s]ubstantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships." (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2)(A)-(B).)
This test is met here under undisputed evidence. Father had a significant connection with California, the state in which he shared a home with his four other children and their mother. B.V. also had a significant connection in that she was not only physically present, but in fact had relocated to and resided in California with her mother, and her father and four half-siblings had lived there for some time.
Substantial evidence was available in California "concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships." (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2)(B).) In particular, both of B.V.'s parents, as well as witnesses and medical evidence concerning the abuse and neglect she suffered, were in California. Thus, jurisdiction was proper under section 3421, subdivision (a)(2). 10
Mother argues jurisdiction under section 3421, subdivision (a)(2) could not be established through father's connections to California because the juvenile court never granted him presumed father status, nor did father ever seek to elevate his status to presumed after the juvenile court determined he was B.V.'s biological father.
"A father's status is significant in dependency cases because it determines the extent to which the father may participate in the proceedings and the rights to which he is entitled. [Citation.] 'Presumed father status ranks highest.' [Citation.] Presumed father status entitles the father to appointed counsel, custody (absent a finding of detriment), and a reunification plan. [Citations.]" (In re T.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209.) "Paternity presumptions are driven not by biological paternity, but by the state's interest in the welfare of the child and the integrity of the family." (Ibid.)
Mother cites no authority that father cannot qualify as a "parent" under the UCCJEA when he is B.V.'s biological father and there is no indication that anyone other than mother and father would claim to be B.V.'s parent-that is, there are no other presumed parents whose rights might supersede father's parentage claim.
Assuming arguendo, however, that for whatever reason the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction under the "substantial connection" test of section 3421, subdivision (a)(2), the juvenile court nonetheless would have jurisdiction under section 3421, subdivision (a)(4). This is because no other state or nation would have jurisdiction under any of the other subdivisions of section 3421.
The only possible competing contender for jurisdiction identified by mother is Guatemala. As we have explained, 11 Guatemala did not qualify as B.V.'s home state at the time the dependency proceedings commenced. Nor could Guatemala establish jurisdiction under section 3421, subdivision (a)(2)- although it appears mother and B.V. both have a substantial connection to Guatemala, Guatemala lacks crucial evidence "concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships" (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2)(B)), namely the evidence of abuse B.V. suffered at the hands of her mother and father in the United States. Indeed, Guatemala had no evidence concerning B.V.'s relationship with father, including the abuse to which he subjected her, because father had only interacted with B.V. in the United States.
Mother argues the fact that the evidence of abuse was in California "does not negate the fact that [B.V.] had lived most of her life in Guatemala" and "the majority of any relationships [B.V.] formed would also be with family members in Guatemala." We fail to see the relevance of B.V.'s relationships with her relatives in Guatemala when the core relationships at issue in the dependency proceeding were those with her parents, both of whom live in California.
Guatemala also could not have jurisdiction under section 3421, subdivision (a)(3), which applies only if other states with jurisdiction pursuant to subdivisions (a)(1) or (2) have declined to assert that jurisdiction. There was no state, apart from California, that could cede jurisdiction to Guatemala under subdivision (a)(3).
Thus, because Guatemala did not have jurisdiction under section 3421, subdivisions (a)(1) through (3), the juvenile court properly could take jurisdiction under subdivision (a)(4), 12 assuming it did not already have jurisdiction under subdivision (a)(2).
Mother argues California "may have been the inappropriate forum due to the questionable circumstances in which [m]other and [B.V.] arrived in the [United] States," referring to mother's and B.V.'s status as undocumented immigrants. Mother contends the juvenile court also should have considered "[m]other's reasons for coming to California and the propriety [of] [m]other removing [B.V.] from Guatemala," because "[a] party's unauthorized conduct may be a reason for the state to decline taking jurisdiction." In support, mother cites In re Nelson B. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1131 (Nelson B.), and Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 521.
Nelson B. held that "a minor's unilateral decision to run away to California cannot defeat the home-state status of his origin state under the UCCJEA." (Nelson B., supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132.) In support, the appellate court analogized to cases holding that a parent's abduction of a minor from the child's home state could not confer jurisdiction under the UCCJEA on a different state. (Id. at p. 1131.)
In Aiden L., the appellate court remanded for further findings under the UCCJEA, including whether the parents' decision to leave Arizona for California was motivated by any outstanding warrants for their arrest. (Supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 521.) The court cited section 3428, subdivision (a), providing "if a court of this state has jurisdiction under [the UCCJEA] because a person seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction," subject to certain exceptions. 13
There is nothing in the record to suggest that mother's decision to leave Guatemala with B.V. and come to California was improper such that the juvenile court should have inquired further. We decline to hold that mother's entering the United States with B.V. as an undocumented immigrant constitutes "unjustifiable conduct" under section 3428, subdivision (a). Mother cites no authority that restricts juvenile courts' jurisdiction over abused undocumented immigrant children. Neither Nelson B. nor Aiden L. supports such a Draconian rule.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
We concur: ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CRANDALL, J. [*] 14
[*] Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.