Opinion
2012-03-22
Randall S. Carmel, Syosset, for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Scott Shorr of counsel), for respondent.
Randall S. Carmel, Syosset, for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Scott Shorr of counsel), for respondent. Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Judith Stern of counsel), attorney for the children.TOM, J.P., FRIEDMAN, ACOSTA, DeGRASSE, ROMÁN, JJ.
Order of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Jody Adams, J.), entered on or about September 22, 2010, which, upon fact-findings that respondent father sexually abused and neglected his stepdaughter and derivatively abused and neglected his two biological children, released the children to the custody of their mother, with supervision by petitioner Administration for Children's Services and, inter alia, limited respondent to supervised visitation with his two children, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
A preponderance of the evidence supports the finding that respondent sexually abused and neglected his stepdaughter ( see Family Court Act § 1012 [e][iii]; § 1046[b][i] ) and the derivative finding as to the two biological children ( see Family Court Act § 1046[a][i]; Matter of Marino S., 100 N.Y.2d 361, 373–374, 763 N.Y.S.2d 796, 795 N.E.2d 21 [2003], cert. denied 540 U.S. 1059, 124 S.Ct. 834, 157 L.Ed.2d 714 [2003] ). The stepdaughter's testimony amply corroborated her out-of-court descriptions of the abuse ( see Matter of Christina F., 74 N.Y.2d 532, 536–537, 549 N.Y.S.2d 643, 548 N.E.2d 1294 [1989] ). Contrary to respondent's contention, the testimony contained only peripheral inconsistencies relating to dates and times, and the court did not err in crediting it.
The finding of derivative abuse and neglect is not undermined by the fact that, at the time of the abuse of the stepdaughter, one of the biological children was an infant and the other had not yet been born. The evidence of the abuse demonstrates that respondent's parental judgment and impulse control are so defective as to create a substantial risk of harm to any child in his care ( see Marino S., 100 N.Y.2d at 374, 763 N.Y.S.2d 796, 795 N.E.2d 21; Matter of Vincent M., 193 A.D.2d 398, 404, 597 N.Y.S.2d 309 [1993]; Matter of Nyjaiah M. [ Herbert M.], 72 A.D.3d 567, 899 N.Y.S.2d 53 [2010] ).