Opinion
2015-03-20
In the Matter of KYLA E. and Tyler E. Onondaga County Department of Social Services, Petitioner–Respondent; Stephanie F., Respondent–Appellant.
Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Philip Rothschild of Counsel), for Respondent–Appellant. Gordon J. Cuffy, County Attorney, Syracuse (Maggie Seikaly of Counsel), for Petitioner–Respondent.
Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Philip Rothschild of Counsel), for Respondent–Appellant. Gordon J. Cuffy, County Attorney, Syracuse (Maggie Seikaly of Counsel), for Petitioner–Respondent.
Theodore W. Stenuf, Attorney for the Children, Minoa.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., LINDLEY, VALENTINO, and DeJOSEPH, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
In this proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384–b, respondent mother appeals from an order that, inter alia, terminated her parental rights with respect to the subject children on the ground of permanent neglect. We affirm. Although the mother correctly contends that Family Court erred in admitting hearsay testimony from one of petitioner's witnesses ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 624; Matter of Nicholas C. [Erika H.-Robert C.], 105 A.D.3d 1402, 1402, 964 N.Y.S.2d 806; see generally Matter of Leon RR, 48 N.Y.2d 117, 121, 421 N.Y.S.2d 863, 397 N.E.2d 374), we nevertheless conclude that “[a]ny error in the admission of [those] statement[s] is harmless because the result reached herein would have been the same even had such [statements] been excluded” (Matter of Tyler W. [Stacey S.], 121 A.D.3d 1572, 1572–1573, 994 N.Y.S.2d 217 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Marino S., 100 N.Y.2d 361, 372, 763 N.Y.S.2d 796, 795 N.E.2d 21, cert. denied540 U.S. 1059, 124 S.Ct. 834, 157 L.Ed.2d 714). Moreover, “[t]here is no indication that the court considered, credited, or relied upon inadmissible hearsay in reaching its determination” (Matter of Merle C.C., 222 A.D.2d 1061, 1062, 636 N.Y.S.2d 519, lv. denied88 N.Y.2d 802, 644 N.Y.S.2d 689, 667 N.E.2d 339).
Contrary to the mother's further contention, petitioner established “by clear and convincing evidence that it made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the relationship between [the mother] and the child[ren]” (Matter of Ja–Nathan F., 309 A.D.2d 1152, 1152, 764 N.Y.S.2d 894; seeSocial Services Law § 384–b[3][g][i]; [7][a] ) and that, despite her participation in some of the services afforded her, the mother “did not successfully address or gain insight into the problems that led to the removal of the child[ren] and continued to prevent the child[ren]'s safe return” (Matter of Giovanni K., 62 A.D.3d 1242, 1243, 878 N.Y.S.2d 846, lv. denied12 N.Y.3d 715, 2009 WL 1851454; see§ 384–b[7][a]; Ja–Nathan F., 309 A.D.2d at 1152, 764 N.Y.S.2d 894; Matter of Shanika F., 265 A.D.2d 870, 870, 695 N.Y.S.2d 470).
Finally, the mother did not request a suspended judgment at the dispositional hearing and thus failed to preserve for our review her contention that the court erred in failing to grant that relief ( see Matter of Atreyu G. [Jana M.], 91 A.D.3d 1342, 1343, 938 N.Y.S.2d 686, lv. denied19 N.Y.3d 801, 2012 WL 1502691). In any event, “the record of the dispositional hearing establishes that ... any progress that [the mother] made ‘was not sufficient to warrant any further prolongation of the child[ren's] unsettled familial status' ” ( Matter of Jose R., 32 A.D.3d 1284, 1285, 821 N.Y.S.2d 719, lv. denied7 N.Y.3d 718, 827 N.Y.S.2d 689, 860 N.E.2d 991).
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.