Opinion
NO. 2012-CA-001110-MR
04-26-2013
KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION AND DIVISION OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPELLANTS v. CHARLES D. RYAN AND GREENBAUM ASSOCIATES APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Patrick B. Shirley Education and Workforce Development Cabinet Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Stuart E. Alexander Louisville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE IRV MAZE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 12-CI-000172
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: COMBS, MOORE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES. COMBS, JUDGE: The Division of Unemployment Insurance and Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (the KUIC) appeal an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court that reversed the KUIC's determination denying unemployment benefits to Charles Ryan. We affirm.
Ryan began working for Greenbaum Associates (Greenbaum) on February 7, 2011, as a full-time engineer technician at a wage of $16.00 per hour. Ryan believed that he had been hired to work primarily as the quality control engineer for a project at Fort Knox. Greenbaum was working at Fort Knox as a subcontractor under a contract with GSC Construction. Because work at the Fort Knox site was less than full time, Ryan performed other jobs as directed by Sandy Greenbaum, the owner of Greenbaum.
On May 6, 2011, when Ryan reported to the Fort Knox job site, he was informed by GSC that he was no longer needed. Believing that he was out of a job, he contacted Greenbaum to inform the company that he had been released from his duties at Fort Knox. Mr. Greenbaum was not available. Ryan informed Judy Bright, Mr. Greenbaum's secretary, that work was no longer available at the job site and that he would be seeking unemployment benefits. There is no indication that Greenbaum ever contacted Ryan regarding the possibility of continued employment. Greenbaum then retrieved its work vehicle from Ryan's residence.
Ryan applied for unemployment insurance benefits, and the Division of Unemployment Insurance determined that he was unemployed due to lack of work. Therefore, he was eligible to receive benefits.
Greenbaum then appealed this initial determination to a Hearing Officer/Referee. At the hearing before Referee K. Clouse, Mr. Greenbaum testified and indicated that, although the Fort Knox job ended, there was "busy work" that Ryan could have done if he had simply continued to show up to work. However, there is no indication that Mr. Greenbaum ever asked Ryan to return or ever indicated that he was still Greenbaum's employee; nor did he offer to keep Ryan on as an employee. Mr. Greenbaum testified that he believed that Ryan had accepted a position at GSC. His belief, which was incorrect, was based upon a conversation with Bright earlier in the week. Ryan indicated that he had approached GSC because he was not working 40 hours per week at Greenbaum Associates and that he was not allowed to use earned vacation time to make up for the shortfall in work assignments. Ryan was not hired by GSC.
The Referee determined that Ryan had been relieved from his job as a result of lack of work. As to the discussion of Ryan's going to work with GSC, the Referee found that that discussion never evolved into a position of employment. The Referee affirmed the initial determination by the Division of Unemployment Insurance, finding that lack of work did not result in disqualification from receipt of benefits and that Ryan had not been discharged for misconduct. As a result, Ryan was not barred from receiving benefits.
According to the Referee, Ryan's unemployment began when he was informed that he was no longer needed for his primary job duties at Fort Knox. The Referee noted that benefits are available to employees who are not working or who are working less than full time through no fault of their own. When Ryan announced that he would be seeking unemployment benefits, he was not quitting his job. Rather, he was seeking assistance because of a lack of full-time work. The Referee emphasized that Greenbaum never contacted Ryan or attempted to have him return to work. The decision of the Referee was mailed October 5, 2011.
Greenbaum then appealed to the KUIC, which reversed the Referee's decision on December 21, 2011. The KUIC determined that Ryan had voluntarily quit his job without good cause. KUIC held that, pursuant to KRS 341.370(1)(c), he was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. The KUIC went on to explain that Ryan initiated the separation and bore the burden of proving that his voluntary quitting occurred as a result of good cause. The KUIC found that Ryan failed to make sufficient contact with his employer to determine further instructions. The KUIC also determined that Ryan failed to establish that he quit for good cause and that he was, therefore, disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.
Ryan appealed the decision of the KUIC to the Jefferson Circuit Court. By order of April 10, 2012, the Jefferson Circuit Court reversed the KUIC and found that there was no evidence that Ryan had quit his position. On the contrary, the court determined that Ryan duly informed Greenbaum that his position at the Fort Knox site was eliminated and that Ryan was offered no additional work. The KUIC asked the circuit court to set aside its order of April 10, 2012. In its opinion and order of June 4, 2012, the Jefferson Circuit Court again denied relief to Greenbaum and refused to set aside its original order. The court found that Ryan had not been offered suitable alternative work after having been relieved of his duties at the Fort Knox site. The court also noted that Greenbaum's claim that Ryan turned down suitable alternative work was unsupported by the record. This appeal followed.
In appeals involving the KUIC, our standard of review is similar to that of the circuit court in undertaking its analysis.
On review of an administrative decision, the circuit court must not reconsider the merits of the underlying action nor substitute its judgment for that of the agency. An administrative agency's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, and its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. The judicial standard of review of an unemployment benefit decision is whether the KUIC's findings of facts were supported by substantial evidence and whether the agency correctly applied the law to the facts.Skees v. Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 347 S.W.3d 467, 470 (Ky. App. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The pertinent statute is Kentucky Revised Statute[s] (KRS) 341.370(1)(c), which disqualifies a worker from receiving benefits if he or she voluntarily quits suitable employment. Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Melvin's Grocery, 696 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Ky. App. 1985). The circuit court correctly determined that no evidence exists to support KUIC's finding that Ryan voluntarily quit his job. It found that his primary job duties had been eliminated. It was Ryan's understanding that he was hired by Greenbaum to perform the work on the Fort Knox site. Upon notifying Greenbaum that he was no longer needed at the Fort Knox site, Greenbaum made no attempt to contact Ryan regarding alternatives. Greenbaum retrieved its work vehicle. Although GSC rather than Greenbaum announced the decision to remove Ryan from the Fort Knox site, the result was the same: Ryan was left without work through no fault of his own.
The circuit court properly concluded that there was no evidence in the record that Ryan voluntarily quit his employment or that suitable alternative work existed. Thus, Ryan was entitled to receive unemployment benefits.
We affirm the opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Patrick B. Shirley
Education and Workforce
Development Cabinet
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Stuart E. Alexander
Louisville, Kentucky