Opinion
CV175039209S
07-06-2018
Erik KUSELIAS v. Holly NIEDERKOHR
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Wilson, J.
I
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 2, 2017, the plaintiff, Erik Kuselias, filed an eleven-count amended complaint (complaint) against the defendant who is also his wife, Holly Niederkohr. By way of background, the plaintiff and the defendant have been married since July 12, 2013. The parties are both sports commentators, and met in 2011 while working for the Golf Channel in Orlando, Florida. NBC purchased the Golf Channel in 2011, and the plaintiff, who was born and raised in Connecticut, moved back to Connecticut in 2012 to work out of the NBC Sport’s Group’s Stamford headquarters. Although the parties dispute how much time they spent working and residing in each state, they agree that they signed leases in Connecticut and that the marital home is in Florida. In 2015, the defendant filed for a dissolution of their marriage in Florida, but subsequently withdrew the action. In 2016, the defendant again filed for a dissolution of marriage in Florida, which is presently still pending. The plaintiff currently resides in Connecticut, and the defendant is living and working in California.
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant committed various torts both inside the state and outside of the state that caused harm to the plaintiff in Connecticut. Specifically, the plaintiff’s complaint sounds in (1) battery; (2) assault; (3) breach of contract; (4) tortious interference with business relations; (5) harassment/extortion; (6) civil talking/harassment; (7) civil conversion; (8) fraud/misrepresentation; (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (10) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (11) libel/slander. He alleges that the defendant was physically present in the state 100 days each year, and further alleges that the defendant had regular and purposeful contacts with Connecticut, including communications, visits to her residence, personal appointments, and business appointments.
On October 30, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a supporting memorandum of law on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. She argues that she maintains permanent residency in Florida, that this court does not have personal jurisdiction over her pursuant to Connecticut’s long-arm statute, General Statutes § 52-59b, and that she does not have minimum contacts with the state of Connecticut. She further argues that the matter should be dismissed because Florida is a readily available alternative forum for the plaintiff’s claims. The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to dismiss on December 15, 2017. The plaintiff argues that the court has jurisdiction pursuant to Connecticut’s long-arm statute because the defendant has, inter alia, committed tortious conduct inside and outside of the state causing harm to a Connecticut resident. The plaintiff further argues that the defendant has consistent and significant contacts with Connecticut, and knowingly availed herself of the laws of this state. Finally, the plaintiff argues that the defendant’s forum non conveniens argument must fail because the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed, and that the private and public interest factors weigh in favor of hearing the case in Connecticut.
The defendant’s motion to dismiss was timely filed within the thirty-day time requirement set forth in Practice Book § 10-30(b).
This court scheduled a Standard Tallow evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to § 52-59b, whether the defendant had minimum contacts with this state in order to satisfy due process, and whether Connecticut is an appropriate forum. The evidentiary hearing took place on February 5, 2018, and the court ordered the parties to submit post-trial briefs and proposed findings of fact, on or before March 26, 2018.
"When issues of fact are necessary to the determination of a court’s jurisdiction, due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence and to cross examine adverse witnesses." Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 56, 459 A.2d 503 (1983).
II
LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW
"[A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). "A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014).
"Because a lack of personal jurisdiction may be waived by the defendant, the rules of practice require the defendant to challenge that jurisdiction by a motion to dismiss." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Golodner v. Women’s Center of Southeastern Connecticut, Inc., 281 Conn. 819, 825, 917 A.2d 959 (2007). "If the defendant challenging the court’s personal jurisdiction is a foreign corporation or a nonresident individual, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove the court’s jurisdiction." Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 515, 923 A.2d 638 (2007).
"[W]here a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts ... Likewise, if the question of jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits of the case, a court cannot resolve the jurisdictional question without a hearing to evaluate those merits ... An evidentiary hearing is necessary because a court cannot make a critical factual [jurisdictional] finding based on memoranda and documents submitted by the parties." (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 652-54, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). "When issues of fact are necessary to the determination of a court’s jurisdiction, due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence and to cross examine adverse witnesses." Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 56, 459 A.2d 503 (1983).
III
DISCUSSION
A Standard Tallow Corp. evidentiary hearing took place on February 5, 2018. The plaintiff testified at the hearing and submitted the following evidence: (1) an affidavit of the plaintiff; (2) an e-mail to the parties with a lease agreement for property in Milford; (3) the defendant’s membership invoices from "The Edge" in Hamden; (4) a Petro utility bill addressed to the defendant; (5); an e-mail from the defendant to the plaintiff dated September 9, 2012; (6) e-mails from the defendant to the plaintiff dated June 7, 2013; (7) the defendant’s lease application for property in California; and (8) notice of an interview with the Connecticut Family Services Unit, addressed to the defendant. The defendant also testified at the hearing and submitted the following additional evidence: (A) the parties’ joint tax returns from 2013; (B) the defendant’s tax returns from 2014; (C) the defendant’s tax returns from 2015; (D) the plaintiff’s answer to petition for dissolution of marriage; (E) the plaintiff’s petition for injunction for protection against domestic violence in Florida, dated 2016; (F) the plaintiff’s restraining order in Florida, dated August 6, 2017; and (G) a picture of the defendant’s eyes.
The parties filed post-trial briefs and proposed findings of fact on March 26, 2018. The defendant reiterates the same arguments made in her motion to dismiss, namely, that the court does not have jurisdiction over her pursuant to § 52-59b. She argues that even if the court could exercise such jurisdiction, it would be against the defendant’s due process rights as she has had only minimal contacts with Connecticut and has not purposely availed herself of the laws of this state. The defendant also argues that the plaintiff can pursue his claims against the defendant in Florida, and that the court should dismiss the matter based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The plaintiff filed his proposed findings of fact separately, on April 5, 2018. Because the plaintiff filed its post-trial brief within the time ordered by the court, and the defendant did not object to the late filing of plaintiff’s proposed findings of fact, the court will consider these proposed findings.
The plaintiff argues that the defendant has transacted business in Connecticut, committed tortious acts both within and outside of the state causing harm in Connecticut, and possessed and used real property within Connecticut, all of which subject her to this court’s jurisdiction. The plaintiff further argues that the defendant has had consistent and significant contacts with the state, including the fact that the defendant knew that her husband was well established in Connecticut and moved back to Connecticut full time before their marriage. Finally, the plaintiff argues that his choice of forum should not be disturbed, and that both public and private interest factors weigh in favor of this court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant in Connecticut. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
A
Long-arm Jurisdiction
"[T]he court must undertake a two-part inquiry to determine the propriety of its exercising such jurisdiction over the [out-of-state] defendant. The trial court must first decide whether the applicable state long-arm statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over the [defendant]. If the statutory requirements [are] met, its second obligation [is] then to decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] would violate constitutional principles of due process." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kenny v. Banks, 289 Conn. 529, 533, 958 A.2d 750 (2008). "Those standards ... require that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, supra, 190 Conn. 51-52.
Section 52-59b(a) provides: "As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign voluntary association, or over the executor or administrator of such nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign voluntary association, who in person or through an agent: (1) Transacts any business within the state; (2) commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; (3) commits a tortious act outside the state causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act, if such person or agent (A) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce; (4) owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state; or (5) uses a computer, as defined in subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 53-451, or a computer network, as defined in subdivision. (3) of subsection (a) of said section, located within the state."
" ‘In judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984). ‘So long as it creates a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum, even a single act can support jurisdiction.’ " Cofrancesco Chiropractic & Healing Arts v. Maciejewski, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-13-6042888-S (November 3, 2014, Wilson, J.). In the present case, the majority of the plaintiff’s allegations sound in tortious conduct. Although the plaintiff’s cause of action alleging libel and slander must be dismissed under the defamation exception set forth in § 52-59b(a)(2) and (3); see Seeley v. Quinnipiac University, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-15-6057734-S (January 18, 2017, Richards, J.) ("[i]n reviewing the state’s longarm statute, particularly subsection (2) ... it is obvious that said defamation allegation cannot serve as the basis for the court’s assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in this action"); the plaintiff has met his burden of showing that the defendant is subject to jurisdiction in this state pursuant to § § 52-59b(a)(2) and (3), for tortious acts committed either within Connecticut, or outside of the state causing injury in Connecticut.
Although the plaintiff further argues that the court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant under subsections § § 52-59b(a)(1) and (4), "[b]ecause only one of the provisions of § 52-59b needs to be satisfied for [the court] to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant ... the court need not address this [alternative] argument." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Garcia v. Two By Six, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-04-5000021-S (January 29, 2010, Wilson, J.) (49 Conn. L. Rptr . 363, 368 n.9).
1
Tortious Conduct
Pursuant to Connecticut’s long-arm statute, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who "commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act." General Statutes § 52-59b(a)(2); see also Iino v. Spalter, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-146023643-S (October 13, 2015, Lee, J.) (61 Conn.L.Rptr. 102, 103-04) (finding long-arm jurisdiction on basis of allegations that decedent had sexually abused, assaulted, and exploited plaintiff while living in Connecticut); Gupta v. Garg, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-12-6034957-S (June 20, 2013, Peck, J.) (56 Conn.L.Rptr. 414, 415) (finding that defendant’s conduct satisfied jurisdictional requirements of § 52-59b[a][2] on basis of allegations that "the defendant committed several tortious acts against [the plaintiff], including civil assault and battery, false imprisonment and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress"); Gelinas v. Smith, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. 38 78 30 (October 25, 1991, Wagner, J.) (5 Conn.L.Rptr. 617, 617) (finding long-arm jurisdiction on basis of allegations that defendant "committed tortious acts of assault, invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional distress within the state").
The court is "required to determine whether the plaintiff [has] presented sufficient evidence of the defendant’s having committed a tortious act in this state to support long-arm jurisdiction"; Solano v. Calegari, 108 Conn.App. 731, 744, 949 A.2d 1257 (2008); but the court does not reach the merits of the case. See id. ("[t]he court’s conclusion that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof is not a ruling on the merits of the fraudulent misrepresentation count but, rather, is a ruling that the plaintiff did not present sufficient facts to satisfy the statutory jurisdictional requirements").
In the present case, the plaintiff testified that a number of physical altercations took place in the state, and testified particularly about an incident in Milford where the defendant threw an object at the plaintiff and struck the plaintiff in the face. The plaintiff also submitted e-mail exhibits wherein the defendant admitted to physically assaulting the defendant. Pl.’s Exs. 5, 6. The plaintiff’s allegations regarding these physical altercations are incorporated into each count of the plaintiff’s complaint. The defendant offered conflicting testimony, stating that she has never assaulted the plaintiff. The court notes, however, that although the defendant disputed the details regarding a physical altercation that took place in July of 2016, she does not deny that this altercation happened in Connecticut. Moreover, the defendant submitted no testimony or evidence to refute the myriad of averments set forth in the plaintiff’s affidavit, including averments that the defendant made threats against the plaintiff; sabotaged his business interests; stalked the plaintiff; communicated with the plaintiff’s ex-wife in order to interfere with the plaintiff’s custody over his two minor children, who reside in Connecticut; and communicated other threatening or false statements to third parties, all while the defendant was physically present in the state. Such alleged conduct renders the defendant subject to jurisdiction in this state pursuant to § 52-59b(a)(2).
Further, even if the defendant was not physically present in the state when certain tortious conduct occurred, she is still subject to jurisdiction in Connecticut under either § § 52-59b(a)(2) or (3). "Connecticut courts have held that § 52-59b(a)(2) is satisfied when a nonresident commits a tortious act within the state by sending a tortious communication into the state. For example, the Connecticut Superior Court ... held that § 52-59b(a)(2) was satisfied when the plaintiff alleged that the defendant sent a letter to the plaintiff in Connecticut to intentionally inflict emotional distress on her ... [T]he Connecticut Superior Court [has also] held that § 52-59b(a)(2) was satisfied when the plaintiff alleged that the defendant sent email containing offensive statements to recipients in Connecticut ... See also David v. Weitzman, 677 F.Supp. 95, 98 (D.Conn. 1987) (holding that the transmission of fraudulent misrepresentations into Connecticut by mail or telephone was tortious conduct in Connecticut sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under Connecticut’s long-arm statute, § § 33-411[c][4] and 52-59b[a][2] ); Knipple v. [Viking Communications, Ltd.] 236 Conn. 602, 611, 674 A.2d 426 (1996) (‘False representations entering Connecticut by wire or mail constitute tortious conduct in Connecticut under § 33-411[c][4] ... because the alleged misrepresentations ... would have been made by way of communications sent to and received by [the plaintiff] from the [out-of-state] defendants in Connecticut.’) ..." (Citations omitted.) Doe v. Ciolli, 611 F.Supp.2d 216, 221-22 (D.Conn. 2009); see also Banning v. Re/Max at the Lake, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-13-6036005-S (December 30, 2013, Fischer, J.) ("[e]ven where the sole contact of the defendants with Connecticut is to send fraudulent misrepresentations into Connecticut by mail and telephone, personal jurisdiction over the tortfeasors under Conn. Gen. Stat., § 52-59b(a)(2) has been found" [internal quotation marks omitted] ).
"The requirement that the forum state is directly and expressly targeted is essential to retain the distinction between two varieties of longarm provisions: those that require the defendant to take action ‘in’ or ‘within’ the forum state, and those that involve conduct occurring outside the forum state affecting individuals within the forum state. In the latter situation; see, e.g., General Statutes § 52-59b(a)(3); the plaintiff need not show that he is being directly or expressly targeted by the defendant, but need only show that the defendant’s conduct caused injury within the forum state, in addition to other requirements." (Footnote omitted.) Bentivegna v. Lall-Trail, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV-14-6040266-S (July 24, 2014, Hartmere, J.T.R.) (58 Conn.L.Rptr. 667, 669). These other requirements include showing that the defendant either "(A) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce." General Statutes § 52-59b(a)(3).
The plaintiff has not introduced any testimony or evidence that the defendant "derives substantial revenue" from Connecticut or interstate or international commerce, as that term is defined in the case law. See Ryan v. Cerullo, 282 Conn. 109, 125, 918 A.2d 867 (2007) (defining substantial revenue § 52-59b(a)(3)(B) to mean "enough revenue to indicate a commercial impact in the forum, such that a defendant fairly could have expected to be haled into court there" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The plaintiff has, however, shown that the defendant engaged in a persistent course of conduct in the state pursuant to § 52-59b(a)(3)(A), including but not limited to her alleged tortious conduct towards the plaintiff and, as will be discussed, her business contacts and leasing of rental property in Connecticut.
Moreover, the plaintiff testified, and the defendant does not dispute, that the defendant threatened and assaulted the plaintiff while he was in Connecticut. The plaintiff also testified that at some time during the parties’ marriage, the defendant took an uncompromising photograph of the plaintiff. The defendant then threatened to disseminate the photograph to third parties in the state, including the plaintiff’s children’s guardian ad litem. The defendant neither testified nor introduced evidence to the contrary, and also does not dispute the statements in the plaintiff’s affidavit detailing other tortious conduct directed toward the plaintiff in Connecticut. Such conduct includes hiring a private investigator to stalk the plaintiff, engaging in cyberstalking, and communicating false information with the intention of interfering with the plaintiff’s custody of his two minor children. Finally, the plaintiff avers that he has been harmed in the state, including financial harm, physical harm, and emotional distress. Accordingly, the plaintiff has met his burden in showing that the long-arm jurisdictional requirements have been met pursuant to either § § 52-59b(a)(2) or (3)(A).
B
Minimum Contacts
If the long-arm requirements are met, the court’s "second obligation [is] then to decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] would violate constitutional principles of due process." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kenny v. Banks, supra, 289 Conn. 533. "The twin touchstones of due process analysis under the minimal contacts doctrine are foreseeability and fairness. [T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis ... is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hart, Nininger & Campbell Associates, Inc. v. Rogers, 16 Conn.App. 619, 625-26, 528 A.2d 759 (1988). It is "incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the facts establishing the requisite minimum contacts." Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, supra, 190 Conn. 53. However, "under the ‘fairness’ test of the due process inquiry [t]he burden is on the defendant to prove a compelling case that personal jurisdiction is unreasonable under the circumstances." Seeley v. Quinnipiac University, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV- 15-6057734-S. "[Therefore] [w]hile the exercise of jurisdiction is favored where the plaintiff has made a threshold showing of minimum contacts at the first stage of the inquiry, it may be defeated where the defendant presents a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. 525.
"As articulated in the seminal case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), the constitutional due process standard requires that, in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice ... In other words, [t]he [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations ... By requiring that individuals have fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign ... the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit ... The due process test for personal jurisdiction has two related components: the ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry and the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry. The court must first determine whether the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state to justify the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. 523-24.
"Due process demands more, however, than the existence of minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state. Once minimum contacts have been established, [t]he second stage of the due process inquiry asks whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice- that is, whether it is reasonable under the circumstances of the particular case." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. 525. "In defining when it is that a potential defendant should ‘reasonably anticipate’ out-of-state litigation, the [Supreme] Court frequently has drawn from the reasoning of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 [78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283] (1958): The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. This purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts ... or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third person ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. 530. See e.g., Samelko v. Kingstone Ins. Co., 329 Conn. 249, 266 (2018) ("[b]ecause the defendant [insurer] obligated itself to provide a legal defense in Connecticut, it should have reasonably anticipated being haled into a Connecticut court when a dispute arose over the performance or nonperformance of its obligations"); U.S. Trust Co. v. Bohart, 197 Conn. 34, 42, 495 A.2d 1034 (1985) ("The defendants should reasonably have foreseen being haled into the Superior Court to defend this case. They held their interest in the trust under the terms of a trust agreement that had been executed by Connecticut residents"); Seeley v. Quinnipiac University, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV- 15-6057734-S ("[b]y virtue of his purposeful activities, the defendant created the requisite type of minimum contacts necessary for the court to assert jurisdiction over him without unreasonably impinging on the defendant’s constitutional rights"); Cofrancesco Chiropractic & Healing Arts v. Maciejewski, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-13-6042888-S ("given that the defendant was required to have ongoing and regular contact with the plaintiff, and regular access to the plaintiff’s computers, patients and insurance providers, to perform its duties under the contract, it was foreseeable to the defendant that if it did not perform under the terms of the contract it could be subject to be brought into court in this state").
The court concludes that the plaintiff has met his burden of demonstrating that the defendant has minimum contacts with Connecticut. The court further concludes that the defendant has not made a compelling case that this court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is unreasonable under the circumstances. The plaintiff testified that the defendant engaged in a number of personal and business activities in Connecticut, starting in 2013 and continuing throughout the parties’ marriage. The plaintiff testified that the defendant attended meetings with her agent in Greenwich in 2014 and 2015 and, although the defendant never filed taxes in Connecticut, she used the services of an accountant in Cheshire to prepare her taxes from 2013 to 2016. The plaintiff also testified that both he and the defendant attended six meetings with NBC executives concerning their employment at NBC. These meetings took place in Stamford during the summer and fall of 2014, and included discussions about how the parties ultimately came to leave the company. A subsequent dispute between the plaintiff and NBC resulted in arbitration proceedings and, ultimately, a two million dollar settlement to the plaintiff. Although the defendant was not a party to this arbitration, she participated as a witness during these proceedings in Connecticut. The plaintiff testified that he placed $400,000 of the settlement funds into a joint account with the defendant, which she subsequently withdrew. Whether the defendant properly withdrew these funds or whether she converted them is one of the very issues that the parties dispute.
Moreover, the court notes that the defendant was well aware that the plaintiff was born and raised in Connecticut, and living full time in Connecticut when the parties were married. The plaintiff testified that the defendant co-signed multiple rental properties with the plaintiff in Hamden and Milford, and the testimony and exhibits show that the defendant was at times responsible for paying rent and utilities in Connecticut. Although the parties dispute the precise amount of time that the defendant spent in Connecticut, the defendant did not refute that she used these Connecticut rental properties for both personal use and for business ventures as well. The plaintiff testified that the defendant kept her personal belongings at these properties, and spent time with his family and children in Connecticut. The plaintiff also testified that the defendant appeared as a "golf expert" guest on the plaintiff’s radio show, which he broadcast out of the Milford property, about once per month. Although the defendant introduced evidence that the plaintiff had also operated his radio show out of the parties’ Florida home, this was admitted for impeachment purposes only, and does not refute the plaintiff’s evidence that both parties also used the Milford rental property for business. Finally, the plaintiff states in his affidavit, which the defendant does not refute, that the parties were present in Connecticut when they entered into a business agreement, that the defendant has since breached.
More importantly, the crux of the plaintiff’s allegations stem from tortious conduct that the defendant either committed in or directed towards the plaintiff in Connecticut. The plaintiff avers, and the defendant does not refute, that the defendant assaulted, threatened, stalked, and harassed the plaintiff from within and outside of the state. These contacts were not the result of some " ‘unilateral activity’ of another party that would have inappropriately conferred jurisdiction over the defendant"; Cofrancesco Chiropractic & Healing Arts v. Maciejewski, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-13-6042888-S; but rather, evince the defendant’s purposeful contacts with Connecticut.
As for the "fairness" prong of minimum contacts, the defendant has not met her burden of showing that exercising such jurisdiction would be unreasonable. The defendant argues that the exercise of jurisdiction in Connecticut would be inconsistent with due process and would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice because, although she acted as a signatory to rental property in Connecticut, the case does not involve a dispute with the landlord at the Milford property or any other properties where she may have co-signed leases. She further argues that, given her lack of purposeful or continuous conduct in Connecticut, she could not reasonably anticipate being hauled into court here, and had no reason to believe the plaintiff would bring a lawsuit against her in any other jurisdiction aside from Florida.
As previously discussed, the plaintiff has met his burden in showing that the defendant has multiple contacts with the state of Connecticut in addition to co-signing leases in Milford and Hamden. The defendant is correct in noting that "[a] state court will have specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whenever the defendant has purposefully directed [its] activities at residents of the forum ... and the litigation [has] resulted] from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., supra, 236 Conn. 606 n.6: It is also true, however, that "[e]ven when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation’s [or individual’s] activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation [or individual] to its in personam jurisdiction if the defendant has had continuous and systematic general business contacts with the state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In the present case, the defendant not only acted as a signatory to the parties’ rental properties in Connecticut, but also had multiple business contacts with this state. Although our Supreme Court has held that only one business meeting in the state is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction; see Rosenblit v. Danaher, 206 Conn. 125, 138, 537 A.2d 145 (1988); in the present case, the defendant’s multiple business meetings with her agent, employer, and accountant in Connecticut evince purposeful business contacts with the state. See Hart, Nininger & Campbell Associates, Inc. v. Rogers, 16 Conn.App. 619, 625, 528 A.2d 759 (1988) (finding jurisdiction pursuant to § 52-59b(a)(1) where defendants traveled to Connecticut to negotiate and sign employment contracts, and thereafter "came to Connecticut to attend quarterly business meetings pertaining to their employment with [the plaintiff]"). Likewise, our Supreme Court affirmed that a "lodging and transportation arrangement" in Connecticut constituted a purposeful business transaction, particularly where the trial court found that the defendants’ presence in Connecticut " ‘conferred substantial benefits to their careers ...’ " See New London County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 745, 36 A.3d 224 (2012). Even if the court were to credit the defendant’s testimony that she signed the lease agreements merely as a surety, this too constitutes a business transaction. See Indymac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. v. Reyad, 167 F.Supp.2d 222, 235 (D.Conn. 2001) (defendant’s "involvement in financially supporting her husband’s Connecticut business and guaranteeing its obligations, indicate that [the defendant] transacted business in this state"). Taken altogether, the plaintiff’s evidence shows that the defendant has had continuous and systematic general business contacts with the state.
Notably, the defendants in Nantes raised a similar argument to the defendant in the present case, namely, that the plaintiff’s action "did not arise out of the lodging and transportation agreement because [the defendants’] injuries did not arise out of a breach of the terms or conditions of that agreement." Id., 746 n.8. The court noted that "[t]he defendants cite no authority, and we are aware of none, to support their contention that a cause of action cannot be deemed to arise out of a particular business transaction unless the cause of action involves a claim that a party to the transaction failed to comply with the transaction’s contractual terms." Id. Nantes did involve a dispute regarding the defendants’ rights under Nantes’ homeowner’s insurance policy, so Nantes is distinguishable from the present case on that point. Nevertheless, the defendant’s argument that there must be a dispute with a landlord in order to subject her to jurisdiction in Connecticut is too narrow of a reading of our long-arm statute and applicable case law.
Finally, the plaintiff presented evidence that multiple altercations, assaults, and other torts took place in Connecticut, including on the properties that the defendant leased. The defendant should have anticipated, from the very nature of these purposeful, tortious actions aimed at the plaintiff in Connecticut, that a lawsuit filed by the plaintiff could ensue.
C
Forum Non Conveniens
"[T]he doctrine of forum non conveniens vests discretion in the trial court to decide where trial will best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., 258 Conn. 454, 463-64, 782 A.2d 103 (2001). "A court that decides to dismiss a case on the ground of forum non conveniens has jurisdiction but elects to dismiss the case and defer to another forum." Id., 480. "The commo-law doctrine of forum non conveniens is an exception to the general rule that a court must hear and decide cases over which it has jurisdiction by statute or constitution, and recognizes the discretion of a court, in some few instances, where jurisdiction and venue are proper ... to dismiss a suit because the court has determined that another forum is better suited to decide the issues involved." (Citation omitted.) Sabino v. Ruffolo, 19 Conn.App. 402, 405-06, 562 A.2d 1134 (1989).
"Emphasis on the trial court’s discretion does not, however, overshadow the central principle of the forum non conveniens doctrine that unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant[s], the [plaintiffs’] choice of forum should rarely be disturbed ... Although it would be inappropriate to invoke [a] rigid rule to govern discretion ... it bears emphasis that invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is a drastic remedy ... which the trial court must approach with caution and restraint. The trial court does not have unchecked discretion to dismiss cases from [the plaintiffs’] chosen forum simply because another forum, in the court’s view, may be superior to that chosen by the plaintiff[s] ... Although a trial court applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens must walk a delicate line to avoid implicitly sanctioning forum-shopping by either litigant at the expense of the other ... it cannot exercise its discretion in order to level the playing field between the parties. The [plaintiffs’] choice of forum, which may well have been chosen precisely because it provides the plaintiff[s] with certain procedural or substantive advantages, should be respected unless equity weighs strongly in favor of the defendant[s]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., supra, 258 Conn. 464-65.
"[T]he overriding inquiry in a forum non conveniens motion is not whether some other forum might be a good one, or even a better one than the [plaintiffs’] chosen forum. The question to be answered is whether [the plaintiffs’] chosen forum is itself inappropriate or unfair because of the various private and public interest considerations involved ... Accordingly, the trial court, in exercising its structured discretion, should place its thumb firmly on the [plaintiffs’] side of the scale, as a representation of the strong presumption in favor of the [plaintiffs’] chosen forum, before attempting to balance the private and public interest factors relevant to a forum non conveniens motion." Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., supra, 258 Conn. 465.
Our Supreme Court has adopted a four-step process for examining forum non conveniens claims. Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., supra, 258 Conn. 466. "First, the court should determine whether an adequate alternative forum exists that possesses jurisdiction over the whole case ... Second, the court should consider all relevant private interest factors with a strong presumption in favor of ... the plaintiffs’ initial choice of forum ... Third, if the balance of private interest factors is equal, the court should consider whether any public interest factors tip the balance in favor of trying the case in the foreign forum ... Finally, if the public interest factors tip the balance in favor of trying the case in the foreign forum, the court must ... ensure that [the] plaintiffs can reinstate their [action] in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
"[T]he relevant private interest factors are: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process for the attendance of unwilling witnesses, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; (3) the possibility of viewing the accident scene if such viewing is appropriate to the action; (4) the enforceability of a judgment; (5) the relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial; and (6) all other practical problems that make the trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive ... [C]onsistent with the flexibility necessary in a forum non conveniens analysis, no single factor should be given undue weight." (Citation omitted.) Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., supra, 258 Conn. 467. The public interest factors include "(1) administrative difficulties for the courts, i.e., court congestion and the court’s familiarity with the applicable law; (2) imposing the burden of jury duty on [the] people of a community with no relation to the litigation; (3) holding trial in the view of interested persons; and (4) having matters decided in their local forum." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 463.
"Ordinarily, the alternative forum prerequisite will be satisfied simply if the defendants are amenable to service in another jurisdiction." Picketts v. International Playtex, Inc., 215 Conn. 490, 504 n.13, 576 A.2d 518 (1990). "The United States Supreme Court, however, has identified at least some instances in which mechanical inquiry into the amenability of process in the other forum must surrender to a more meaningful assessment of the suitability of the alternative forum ... [T]he United States Supreme Court noted that, in rare circumstances, where the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, such as where the alternative forum does not permit any litigation of the subject matter of the legal controversy, the other forum may not meet the threshold requirement of an adequate alternative." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id.
The defendant argues that Florida is the adequate alternative forum for this lawsuit because the parties are already litigating their divorce in Florida. The defendant’s argument, however, is not entirely clear or consistent. In her motion to dismiss, the defendant argues that the plaintiff has already made these same allegations in Florida, pursuant to a Florida restraining order. She argues that the plaintiff is attempting to have "a second bite at the apple," and that "[alt its core, this lawsuit is truly a marital dispute ..." Pl.’s Mem. 26. In her post-trial brief, however, the plaintiff proffers Florida’s statute of limitations for actions sounding in tort. She argues that Florida’s four-year statute of limitations has not yet run, and that the witnesses necessary for these claims will likely also be testifying in Florida as part of the divorce action. To the extent that the defendant argues that the plaintiff should bring his tort claims in Florida, independent of the divorce proceedings, "[t]he Florida Supreme Court has clearly held that a direct action between spouses, even for an intentional tort committed in the midst of a divorce is barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity." Treciak v. Treciak, 547 So.2d 169, 169 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1989). Further, to the extent that the defendant argues that this case should be dismissed because the plaintiff’s claims should be heard as part of the divorce proceedings, the relief available to the plaintiff pursuant to the restraining order and divorce is wholly different from the civil damages that he claims here. As such this situation is akin to that which is contemplated by the United States Supreme Court "where the alternative forum does not permit any litigation of the subject matter of the legal controversy." Picketts v. International Playtex, Inc., supra, 215 Conn. 504 n.13.
Although the Florida Supreme Court held that "the common-law unity concept is no longer a valid justification for the doctrine of interspousal immunity"; Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So.2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 1988); it nevertheless upheld the doctrine, noting that "[s]everal other reasons to bar interspousal actions ... still exist under certain conditions. Domestic tranquility, peace and harmony in the family unit, and the possibilities of fraud or collusion are the most frequently cited policy reasons for maintaining interspousal immunity. In cases where these considerations apply, the doctrine of interspousal immunity shall continue to bar actions between spouses." Id.
Even assuming that Florida is an adequate alternative forum, this court must still "properly [balance] the advantages offered by the two alternatives." Picketts v. International Playtex, Inc., supra, 215 Conn. 508. In the defendant’s motion to dismiss, she argues that the first factor, relative ease to access of proof, makes Florida the more appropriate forum for this lawsuit. The defendant argues that the plaintiff is presently engaging in discovery in Florida to support his claims in the Florida dissolution action. The plaintiff noted, however, that the defendant "testified that she believes some of these issues have already been litigated in the State of Florida, but could not name any with specificity[,] provided no evidence to back up this claim, and admits that there are no final adjudications for any claim." Pl.’s Br. 36 citing Tr. 124-25.
Further, in her post-trial brief, the defendant disputes the plaintiff’s argument that litigating the action in Florida would be cost prohibitive. She argues that, because the plaintiff is already actively litigating the parties’ divorce in Florida, "it seems likely that [his] alleged witnesses will already have to travel there to testify in the divorce action." Def.’s Br. 7. Assuming that these arguments fall within the ambit of the private interest factor relating to witness availability, the defendant has not met her burden in showing that these factors weigh in her favor.
"The assessment of the relative ease of access to sources of proof and the availability of witnesses for trial generally requires that the trial court become entangled in the merits of the underlying dispute ... [T]o examine such factors, the court must scrutinize the substance of the dispute between the parties to evaluate what proof is required, and determine whether the pieces of evidence cited by the parties are critical, or even relevant, to the [plaintiffs’] cause of action and to any potential defenses to the action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., supra, 258 Conn. 467-68.
"When a dismissal is premised on the convenience of witnesses, more than a mere allegation to that effect is required ... Rather, the defendant[s] must establish, with specificity, inconvenience to witnesses that is sufficiently prejudicial to justify dismissal ... A party seeking to transfer a case ... for the convenience of witnesses must identify the key witnesses to be called and must make a general statement of what their testimony will cover ... The burden is upon it to give the names and locations of potential witnesses and the substance of their testimony." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Picketts v. International Playtex, Inc., supra, 215 Conn. 509.
In the present case, the plaintiff testified that none of his anticipated witnesses live in Florida, and instead reside in Connecticut, New York, or California. These witnesses include the plaintiff’s parents and sister, the plaintiff’s children’s therapists, the plaintiff’s ex-wife, and various attorneys who have assisted the plaintiff in other matters. Similarly, the defendant did not name a single witness whom she would call that lives in Florida. Moreover, the defendant does not argue that it would be inconvenient for her witnesses to travel to Connecticut or that she would be prejudiced in any way. Rather, the defendant argues that, because the relevant witnesses will "likely" travel to Florida to testify at the parties’ divorce proceedings, it is immaterial that they be required to travel to Florida again to testify in this civil action. This argument hardly rises to the level of establishing, with specificity, an inconvenience to a witness that is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant dismissal. Rather, the fact that a majority of the parties’ relevant witnesses are present in, or proximal to the state of Connecticut weighs in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum. See Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., supra, 258 Conn. 476 ("because the defendants established that crucial witnesses will be unavailable if the action remains in Connecticut, and because the balance of hardships regarding access to evidence appears to favor neither forum, the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that, together, these factors did not favor dismissal").
The third factor, the possibility of viewing the accident scene, is inapplicable to the present matter. As for the fourth factor, the enforceability of a judgment, the Durkin court considered whether a judgment rendered in the defendant’s alternative forum could be enforced in the plaintiff’s chosen forum. See Durkin v. Intevac, supra, 258 Conn. 477. In Durkin, this factor did not weigh against dismissal because the defendants stipulated that they would "adhere to and abide by any judgment rendered" in the alternative forum. Id. Other courts, however, have considered whether a decision rendered in Connecticut would be enforceable elsewhere and note that, because "full faith and credit would be given to any decision rendered by the Connecticut court ... the enforceability of a judgment is not a private interest factor that weighs in favor of dismissal for forum non conveniens." Everett v. Everett, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-10-6004013-S (December 16, 2010, Adams, J.); see also Mathis v. Marriott International, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-14-6044292-S (September 12, 2014, Fischer, J.) ("there is no proffered reason, and the defendant has not provided the court with any reason, that a judgment in Connecticut could not be enforced in Florida"). Accordingly, the fourth factor does not weigh for or against dismissal in the present case.
"As to the fifth and sixth factors, the court must look at obstacles and practical problems that would result from having the case remain in Connecticut." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mathis v. Marriott International, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-14-6044292-S. The court in Durkin observed that the fifth factor, "the relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial, encompasses the defendants’ ability to implead third parties." Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., supra, 258 Conn. 477. This factor is not applicable to the present case. As for the sixth factor, the Durkin court held that this factor favored dismissal where "the [accident investigation] board’s extremely thorough findings, which derived from over 7000 pages of records and transcripts of interviews with 144 witnesses, were based on evidence located in Australia." Id., 479. In the present case, as discussed, a majority of the relevant witnesses are either located in, or proximal to Connecticut. Other than the defendant’s statement that the plaintiff is making similar allegations in the Florida dissolution matter, "the defendant fails to state any additional concerns, obstacles, or problems for the court’s consideration." Mathis v. Marriott International, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-14-6044292-S.
"The burden of proof to demonstrate that the forum is not convenient is on [the] defendant seeking dismissal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., supra, 258 Conn. 482. The defendant has not met her burden in showing that private interest factors warrant disturbing the plaintiff’s choice of forum.
Although the court need not review the public interest factors in light of the fact that the private interest factors weigh in the plaintiff’s favor, the public interest factors also favor Connecticut exercising jurisdiction. The "public interest factors ... include the following considerations: [A]dministrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Temlock v. Temlock, 95 Conn.App. 505, 515, 898 A.2d 209, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 910, 902 A.2d 1070 (2006).
The defendant argues that judicial economy would favor having the case decided in Florida, and argues that Florida is the parties’ "local forum." Although the marital property is located in Florida, the civil claims presently before the court involve torts committed in Connecticut, against a Connecticut resident. Some causes of action, particularly the counts alleging harassment/extortion and fraud/misrepresentation, even involve the plaintiff’s ex-wife and children from his prior marriage, who are all based in Connecticut. The public interest factors pertaining to imposing jury duty on a community with no relation to the litigation, and holding trial in the view of interested persons, both weigh in favor of maintaining the case in Connecticut. Compare Parker v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., Superior Court of Connecticut, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 123310 (July 30, 2002, Corradino, J.) (33 Conn.L.Rptr. 103, 107) ("[t]he burden of jury duty is appropriate- in a case brought by a Connecticut resident in one of her courts") with Stratford 31 Condominium Trust v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-17-6018280-S (December 12, 2017, Aurigemma, J.) ("The litigation impacts a Massachusetts condominium association and its members. The interests of Connecticut and its residents are not impacted by this litigation. Moreover, Massachusetts state and municipal government agencies as well as Massachusetts residents made all the decisions regarding the scope of the reconstruction on the Massachusetts property at issue here. Based on the foregoing, the public policy factors all weigh in favor of dismissal").
The court has carefully reviewed the facts and is mindful that a number of these allegations stem from the dissolution of the parties’ marriage, which is currently pending in Florida. This is not family court, however, and the complaint presently before the court alleges civil causes of action with civil remedies. The court cannot grant the motion to dismiss because the defendant plainly and clearly has multiple, purposeful contacts with the state of Connecticut, and the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the case should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied as to counts one through ten of the plaintiff’s complaint. The defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted as to count eleven, pursuant to the defamation exception set forth in 52-59b(a)(2) and (3).