Opinion
SCB 2070/18
09-05-2018
Gilead KREITEN, d/b/a Bloomingdale Road Judgment Recovery, Plaintiff(s), v. Karen SCOTT, Defendant(s).
Gilead Kreiten, plaintiff pro se. Karen Scott, defendant pro se.
Gilead Kreiten, plaintiff pro se.
Karen Scott, defendant pro se.
Fidel E. Gomez, J. In this action for breach of contract, defendant orally moves for an order dismissing the instant action, because, inter alia , the pleadings provide her with no information regarding the plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff opposes the instant motion, asserting that it would apprise defendant about the basis of the instant action at trial.
The Court treats this motion as one for dismissal pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(2) - that the Small Claims Part of the Civil Court does not have the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to hear this action - and grants defendant's motion.
A review of the evidence adduced at oral argument, a record of which was created, indicates that the instant action is to collect a debt. Plaintiff is a debt collector, who purchases debt obligations from others and, thereafter, attempts to collect from the debtor. When attempts to collect the debt fail, plaintiff initiates an action in Small Claims Court, generally asserting a breach of an underlying agreement. In this case, as per documents provided, plaintiff purchased a debt incurred by defendant. Specifically, pursuant to a letter written by plaintiff to defendant and dated May 30, 2018, defendant, in connection with the purchase of furniture from City Furniture Decor incurred a debt with Crest Financial Services, LLC. As per the foregoing document, defendant ultimately failed to pay the debt, which totaled $1,585.60. Plaintiff, subsequently purchased the foregoing debt, attempted to collect it and when that proved fruitless, initiated the instant action.
Defendant's motion to dismiss this action is granted pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(2). Significantly, when read together, the New York City Civil Court Act and the Uniform Rules for the New York State Trial Courts, indicate that the instant action is one premised on a Consumer Credit Transaction, and thus, this action does not fall within the ambit of Article 18-A of the New York City Civil Court Act. Thus, this Court - when as here, it presides in the Smalls Claims Part - lacks the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to hear this action.
Pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(2) an action should be dismissed when "the court has not jurisdiction of the subject matter of the cause of action." A court lacks adequate subject matter jurisdiction to hear an action when it lacks "competence to entertain an action" ( Lacks v. Lacks , 41 N.Y.2d 71, 75, 390 N.Y.S.2d 875, 359 N.E.2d 384 [1976] ; Renee XX. v. John ZZ. , 51 A.D.3d 1090, 1092, 857 N.Y.S.2d 770 [3d Dept. 2008] ; Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, Nat. Ass'n v. Mastropaolo , 42 A.D.3d 239, 244, 837 N.Y.S.2d 247 [2d Dept. 2007] ). The foregoing generally means that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear an action, when, by operation of law, jurisdiction to hear an action has been placed with another tribunal (see Indemini v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. , 309 A.D.2d 651, 765 N.Y.S.2d 849 [1st Dept. 2003], affd , 4 N.Y.3d 63, 790 N.Y.S.2d 625, 823 N.E.2d 1271 [2005] ["Plaintiff's claim arises out of the termination of her employment as a physician in defendant hospital's residency program in Emergency Medicine. Thus, judicial review is available only by way of an action for an injunction pursuant to Public Health Law § 2801-c following completion of the investigation of the Public Health Council pursuant to Public Health Law § 2801-b."]; Finkel v. D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. , 213 A.D.2d 588, 589, 623 N.Y.S.2d 930 [2d Dept. 1995] ["Finally, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the second cause of action and the cause of action sounding in market manipulation, as these causes of action are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal courts."] ).
New York City Civil Court Act § 2101(g) defines a Consumer Credit Transaction as one ‘‘wherein credit is extended to an individual and the money, property, or service which is the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family or household purposes.’’
Because a Consumer Credit Transaction is one for the payment of money only, New York City Civil Court Act § 902(a)(1) relaxes the pleading requirements in such action, allowing the same to be initiated by an Indorsed Complaint, thus, obviating the need for a formal complaint (id. ["If the plaintiff's cause of action is for money only, the cause of action may be set forth by indorsement upon the summons. The indorsement shall consist of a statement of the nature and substance of the cause of action, and the summons in such instance shall set forth the amount in which the plaintiff will take judgment in the event of default. If the plaintiff shall appear without attorney, such indorsement shall be made by the clerk."] ). Notwithstanding the foregoing, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 208.6(d)(1), in an action arising from a Consumer Credit Transaction, the summons must contain additional significant, specific and conspicuous language (id. ["IMPORTANT!! YOU ARE BEING SUED!! THIS IS A COURT PAPER—A SUMMONS DON'T THROW IT AWAY!! TALK TO A LAWYER RIGHT AWAY!! PART OF YOUR PAY CAN BE TAKEN FROM YOU (GARNISHEED). IF YOU DO NOT BRING THIS TO COURT, OR SEE A LAWYER, YOUR PROPERTY CAN BE TAKEN AND YOUR CREDIT RATING CAN BE HURT!! YOU MAY HAVE TO PAY OTHER COSTS TOO!! IF YOU CAN'T PAY FOR YOUR OWN LAWYER, BRING THESE PAPERS TO THIS COURT RIGHT AWAY. THE CLERK (PERSONAL APPEARANCE) WILL HELP YOU!!"] ), and must also contain the required language in Spanish ( 22 NYCRR 208.6 [d][1] ).
By contrast, and as relevant here, New York City Civil Court Act § 1804-A allows the initiation of Commercial Claims and Consumer Transactions in the Small Claims Part of the Civil Court, setting the burden of proof as one of substantial justice and dispensing with the rules of evidence (id. ["The court shall conduct hearings upon commercial claims in such manner as to do substantial justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law and shall not be bound by statutory provisions or rules of practice, procedure, pleading or evidence, except statutory provisions relating to privileged communications and personal transactions or communications with a decedent or mentally ill person."] ). Pursuant to New York City Civil Court Act § 1802-A(1) a Commercial Claim ‘‘include[s] any cause of action for money only not in excess of the maximum amount permitted for a small claim in the small claims part of the court, exclusive of interest and costs, provided that subject to the limitations contained in section eighteen hundred nine-A of this article, the claimant is a corporation, partnership or association, which has its principal office in the state of New York and provided that the defendant either resides, or has an office for the transaction of business or a regular employment, within the city of New York.’’
Moreover, a Consumer Transaction is "a transaction between a claimant and a natural person, wherein the money, property or service which is the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family or household purposes" ( New York City Civil Court Act § 1801-A[b] ). Unlike a Consumer Credit Transaction, subject to enhanced pleading requirements imposed by 22 NYCRR 208.6(d)(1), in a Commercial Claim arising out a Consumer transaction, no pleading need be served upon the defendant, let alone one which is compliant with 22 NYCRR 208.6(d)(1) and (3). To be sure,
‘‘Commercial claims in actions arising out of consumer transactions shall be commenced upon the payment by the claimant of a filing fee of twenty-five dollars and the cost of mailings as herein provided, without the service of a summons and, except by special order of the court, without the service of any pleading other than a required statement of the cause of action by the claimant or someone on its behalf of the clerk, who shall reduce the same to a concise written form including the information required by subdivision (c) of this section, denominate it conspicuously as a consumer transaction, and record it in the docket marked as a consumer transaction, and by filing with the clerk a required certificate verified as to its truthfulness by the claimant on forms prescribed by the state office of court administration’’ ( New York City Civil Court Act § 1803-A[b] ).
Based on the foregoing, this action must dismissed pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(2) because the Small Claims Part of the Civil Court lacks the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to hear an action arising from a Consumer Credit Transaction. Based on a review of the relevant statutes and rules, it is clear that a suit premised on a Consumer Credit Transaction, as defined by New York City Civil Court Act § 2101(g), is neither a Commercial Claim nor a Consumer Transaction as defined by New York City Civil Court Act § 1803-A(a) and (b). As such, a Consumer Credit Transaction cannot be initiated in the Small Claims Part of the Civil Court.
To be sure, applying well settled rules governing statutory construction, the omission of the term Consumer Credit Transaction from Article 18-A of the New York City Civil Court Act is concrete evidence that the Small Claims Part was intentionally divested of subject matter jurisdiction to hear cases stemming from Consumer Credit Transactions. It is well settled that ‘‘legislative intent is to be ascertained from the words and language used, and the statutory language is generally construed according to its natural and most obvious sense, without resorting to an artificial or forced construction’’ (Statutes Law § 94). Thus, when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous the statute should be literally construed ( People v. Munoz , 207 A.D.2d 418, 419, 615 N.Y.S.2d 730 [2d Dept. 1994] ) and a court should not endeavor to "extend such statute beyond its express terms or the reasonable implications of its language" ( Drelich v. Kenlyn Homes, Inc. , 86 A.D.2d 648, 649, 446 N.Y.S.2d 408 [2d Dept. 1982] ). Accordingly, here, the New York Civil Court Act, in specifically defining the term Consumer Credit Transaction and omitting it from Article 18-A, precludes the prosecution of the foregoing cases in the Small Claims Part of the Civil Court. The instant action must therefore be dismissed and brought in the Civil Court, which will then route the same to its Consumer Credit Part.
Any assertion that the similarity in the definition and indeed the nomenclature between a Consumer Credit Transaction as defined by New York City Civil Court Act § 2101(6) and a Consumer Transaction as defined by New York City Civil Court § 1801-A(b) means that the Small Claims Part has the subject matter jurisdiction to hear an action arising from a Consumer Credit Transaction, lacks merit. In addition to the reasons articulated above - the tenets of statutory construction - which support the Court's holding, the definition of the relevant terms indicate that they are meant to describe totally different transactions. To be sure, § 2101(g) of the Civil Court Act, defines a Consumer Credit Transaction as one "wherein credit is extended." Conversely, § 1801-A(b), which defines a Consumer Transaction, makes absolutely no mention of credit or the extension thereof. Accordingly, it is clear that while cases arising "between a claimant and a natural person, wherein the money, property or service which is the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family or household purposes" ( New York City Civil Court Act § 1801-A ), e.g. , suits for money damages against tax preparers, mechanics, home improvement contractors, etc., can properly be brought in the Small Claims Part, cases such as the one here - where the suit arises from the extension of credit to defendant and the failure by her to repay the same, cannot.
Accordingly, the instant motion is granted. It is hereby
ORDERED that this action be dismissed without prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that defendant serve a copy of this Order with Notice of Entry upon plaintiff within thirty days (30) hereof.
This constitutes this Court's Decision and Order.